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Region is a relative concept. Globally speaking, a country is a region; for a 
country, an area is a region. Regions share commonalities, similarities and 
generalities, but are also characterized by their individuality, particularity and 
diversity. Regional government is a government organization which administers 
affairs within its own jurisdiction, with a relatively fixed area, a relatively con-
centrated population and institutional governance. Regional government has 
the attributes of publicity and coerciveness.
The external possibility of regional government 
competition
The publicity of regional management is mainly reflected in ensuring regional 
public spending and maintaining regional markets and social stability by means of 
taxation, industry and commerce, public security and monitoring and supervision, 
and in ensuring its openness, fairness and impartiality through administrative 
legislation and justice. The coercive power of regional administration is embodied 
not only in the three super-economy coercive forces of legislation, justice and 
administration, but also in the economic coercion derived from its financial rights 
and rights to administer its affairs. Superficially, regional government manages 
economic development, urban construction and social livelihood, but in essence, 
its administration is reflected in its effective allocation of tangible and intangible 
resources of various categories, existing and potential, within its jurisdiction.
Social welfare resources correspond to people’s livelihood and are categorized 
into “non-operational resources” in market economy. The guideline policies 
for the management and allocation of such resources can be generalized as 
“social guarantee, general underpinning, fair play, and effective promotion”. 
Industrial resources correspond to economic development and are referred to 
as “operational resources” in market economy. The guideline policies for the 
management and allocation of such resources can generalized as “planning, 
guidance; support and regulation; supervision and administration”.
City resources correspond to urban construction and fall into “quasi-operational 
resources” in a market economy, covering public services systems that ensure 
smooth regional economic and social activities as well as the “hard” and “soft” 
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infrastructure that provides public services for regional production and people’s 
lives, for example, public facilities, transportation, telecommunications, power 
and water supply, landscaping, environmental protection, project development, 
education, science, culture, health, sports, journalism, publishing, radio and 
television. They are so called because their development and management can 
be implemented either by government, in which case they are public and non-
operational in nature, or through market channels, in which case they become 
a commodity and operational. The choice of whether they are conducted by 
government or through market mechanisms depends on a range of factors, such 
as regional revenues and expenditure, market demand and public acceptability.
The practices of regional administration in the world and the successful 
experience of China’s reform and opening up show that regional government 
will, partly or wholly, resort to market mechanisms in its allocation, develop-
ment and management of quasi-operational resources under the fundamental 
principles of “general underpinning, fair play, effective promotion” of social 
welfare services and public product provision. This aims to prevent the idleness 
and waste of urban resources and eliminate problems of urban resource depletion, 
low-quality operations and disorderly urban management owing to investment 
without earnings, construction without operation and focusing on public welfare 
while overlooking effectiveness. In the transformation from “quasi-operational 
resources” to “operational resources”, the determination of the nature of the 
entities of resource allocation – that is, the nature of the ownership and its 
governance structure, whether solely foreign-owned enterprises, joint ventures, 
cooperatives, joint-stock companies or private or state-owned businesses – must 
be in line with market rules, and its resource allocation and capital operations 
must be conducted through market competition, whether BOT, PPP, bonds or 
stocks. From the onset, the mode of “government promotion, social participa-
tion and market operation” opens up external possibilities of inter-regional 
government competition.
The intrinsic necessity of regional government 
competition
Two serious drawbacks reside in western market economics. On the one hand, 
government, market and society are considered independent, and government has 
been excluded from the market; on the other hand, government is deemed to 
have a single function of public administration and is deprived of a competitive 
function in economic development and urban construction.
Regional government’s basic policy of “general underpinning, fair play and 
effective promotion” of non-operational resources and the regulation, supervi-
sion and management policies for operational resources make it the centralized 
agent of both the region and the central government. These also enable it to 
promote social stability through basic social guarantees and public services and 
to regulate regional economy through pricing, taxation, interest rates, exchange 
rates and legal means. In practice, regional government achieves its publicity and 
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coercive power by utilizing public revenues and expenditure and increasing taxes 
and other sources of revenue to provide budget arrangements for government 
administration, national defense and security, culture and education, science, 
health and utilities, etc. This is accomplished by providing social consumption 
expenses in the industrial, transportation, commercial and agricultural sectors; 
by providing fiscal investment expenditure in government investments, which 
comprise infrastructure, scientific R&D and policy-oriented financial invest-
ment in industries that need urgent development; and by providing transfer 
expenditure, mainly composed of social security and various fiscal subsidies. By 
so doing, regional government plays the “quasi-state” and “quasi-macro” roles.
Regional government’s participation in the allocation of and competition 
for quasi-operational resources and its planning, guidance and support for 
operational resources make it the centralized agent of a non-government entity 
in the region, and enable it to compete with other regions through innova-
tion in institution, management and technology. Under such circumstances, 
regional government possesses management rights as its jurisdictional power, 
which allows it to allocate resources so as to maximize regional benefits, mainly 
through investment attraction, development, investment and operation and 
management of regional projects. Although this role of regional government 
differs from enterprises in objectives, development modes, regulatory factors and 
evaluation criteria, the competitive mechanism becomes the driving force for 
regional governments as the same agent of resource allocation as of enterprises 
within certain areas; their rules of behavior must meet the requirements of 
market mechanisms. Regional government then plays the “quasi-enterprise” 
and “quasi-micro” roles.
Regional government’s “dual role” and the competitiveness stemming from 
it in practice remedy the drawbacks of traditional market economic theories. 
According to modern market economics, not only are enterprises the entity of 
market competition but regional governments as well. The operating mechanisms 
of regional government explain the inherent inevitability of regional competition.
The relations and differences between regional 
government competition and business competition
Enterprises generally compete for the allocation of industrial resources, and 
regional governments mainly compete for the allocation of city resources. Rela-
tive independence and complementarities exist between enterprises and regional 
governments, but they differ as follows:
First, differences in fields of competition. Enterprises are micro-economic 
entities. They mainly compete for commodity markets and focus on industrial 
resources allocation. Market equilibrium theory, which takes manufacturers as 
its main subject, occupies a dominant position in western classical economics. 
Enterprises regard the pursuit of profit maximization as a precondition and 
assume the competitive forms of supply, demand, market equilibrium prices, 
perfect market competition, monopolistic competition, oligopolistic market, 
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different market structures and competitive strategies, etc. Enterprise competition 
is the precondition and basis for regional government competition.
Regional government is the subject of mezzo-economics. Competition 
between regional governments focuses on factor markets and city resources 
allocation. Factor markets include land, capital, labor forces, property rights, 
and hardware and software markets such information engineering. Regional 
government improves its competitiveness through the quantity, quality, structure 
and layout of urban resources. Regional government can also make policies 
and initiatives to regulate the allocation of regional factors and to attract and 
influence the direction of factor flow outside the region, so as to optimize the 
allocation of resources and eventually enhance regional competitiveness. Factor 
market competition affects enterprise commodity market competition.
Second, differences in means of competition. Enterprises seek to maximize 
profits mainly by increasing labor productivity – to effectively influence costs, 
prices, supply and demand and scale – and by optimizing the allocation of corpo-
rate resources to promote their cost minimization. Regional government makes 
every effort to increase total factor productivity as its chief means of sustainable 
growth. After simple dilatation through competing for tangible factors, such as 
land, projects and capital, the bottleneck of diminishing capital profits makes 
extensive economic growth difficult to continue. When nothing more can be 
added to regional input of all tangible factors, regional government will have to 
depend on the investment, increase and improvement of intangible factors such 
as technological advancement (with innovation as the core), resource allocation 
optimization and structural adjustment as well as institution, organization, 
legislation, environment, etc. as the new driving forces of regional economy 
development and urban construction.
Third, differences in paths of competition. Enterprises are investment growth-
oriented. The continuous improvement of business performance comes from the 
constant input of production factors, including capital, labor, land, technology, 
entrepreneurship and so on. The initial strategy for businesses investment is 
mainly extensive expansion of quantity, followed by the quality-enhancing stage 
and then the stage of business management. In all these stages, sustained and 
effective inputs become critical. Regional government is efficiency growth-
riented. In light of the experiences of regional economies in the world, their 
economic growth path starts from the factor-driven stage (also known as the 
resource allocation stage) to the investment-driven stage (also known as the 
efficiency improvement stage) and then to the innovation-driven stage (also 
called the sustainable growth stage). Regional government makes efforts to 
optimize the combination of tangible and intangible factors, with efficiency 
improvement as the focus of its growth.
Fourth, differences in orientations of competition. Enterprises regard 
demand-side expansion as their orientation. Business competition starts from 
market demand, demand quantities, demand structure, corporate strategies and 
tactics. The ability to adapt to market requirements becomes essential to their 
survival and success. Regional government regards supply-side optimization 
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as its orientation. Regional government’s determined direction for economic 
development, urban construction and facilitation of people’s livelihood is to 
promote supply-side structural reforms by effectively allocating the supply of 
land, capital, projects, technology, work forces and other tangible resources; 
by effectively regulating the supply of prices, taxation, interest rates, exchange 
rates, law and other intangible resources; and through innovation in institution, 
organization and technology.
And, finally, differences in modes of competition. Enterprises adopt the 
ERP (enterprise resources planning) mode to exercise effective and integrated 
management of materials, finance, information and customer resources and to 
achieve inter-regional, inter-sector and inter-industrial coordination and effective 
allocation in terms of logistics and personnel, financial and information flow. 
Guided by market demands, enterprises will strive for effective integration of 
resources, adjustment of functions, improvement of production efficiency and 
eventual enhancement of competitiveness. Regional government, however, may 
establish the DRP (district resources planning) mode to effectively allocate 
resources such as land, population, finance, environment, technology and policies, 
design layouts and make appropriate arrangements according to regional planning 
and strategies. Equipped with systematic management notions and approaches, 
regional government employs layout design and planning as the basis to make 
judgment upon market changes, deploy regional resources, enhance regional 
competitiveness, realize the best regional TFP and achieve sustainable economic 
and social development in the region.
The representation of regional government competition
The relations and differences in competition between regional governments 
and enterprises reveal that competition between regional governments and 
that between enterprises are two systems of competition on different levels 
of the modern market economy. They are mutually independent but related, 
constituting the double entities of competition of the modern market economy. 
Competition between enterprises is the basis of competition in the market 
economy and leads to competition between regional governments. Regional 
governments compete for the optimization of resources allocation via systems, 
policies, projects and environment. It is a different kind of competition, above 
the level of enterprise competition, which in turn influences, supports and 
promotes enterprise competitiveness. Enterprise competition takes place only 
across enterprises. Regional government can only act as a planner and guide of 
industrial development; an assistant and regulator of commodity production; 
and a supervisor and manager of market order. It has no right to exercise 
direct intervention in micro-level enterprise operations. Regional government 
competition takes place only across regional governments. It follows the rules 
of market economy and competes in terms of projects, policies and public 
affairs in relation to regional resource allocation, economic development, urban 
construction and people’s livelihoods.
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Project competition
There are three main categories of projects: national key projects, social invest-
ment projects and foreign investment projects. The first category includes 
special national key projects; major projects for national science and technology 
programs; major infrastructure projects for national science and technology pro-
grams; and major state-financed construction and industrial projects. The second 
category includes projects in high-tech industries, newly emerging industries, 
equipment manufacturing, raw materials, finance, logistics and other services. 
The third category includes projects concerning intelligent manufacturing, cloud 
computing and big data, networking, intelligent urban construction and so on.
Regional governments compete for projects in order to directly acquire 
capital, talents and industry; effectively solve regional financing, land acquisi-
tion and other issues through legitimate project policies and rational public 
services; guide, through project implementation, regional land development 
and urban infrastructure construction; increase investment; promote industrial 
development; optimize the allocation of resources; enhance policy capabilities; 
and facilitate the sustainable development of regional economy and community. 
Consequently, project competition becomes one of the key issues for regional 
government work that leads the direction of regional development. Awareness 
of the importance of projects, development, efficiency, advantages, conditions, 
policies and risks becomes an essential requirement for regional government in 
market competition.
Competition of industrial chain development
Generally speaking, each region has its own industrial foundation with its 
own characteristics, which are in most cases contingent upon natural resource 
endowments in the region. The crux of the matter lies in how to maintain and 
optimize regional internal resources endowments and how to synergize and 
obtain high-end resources from outside the region. The key is optimization 
of industrial structure and effective development of industrial chains, and the 
breaking point is developing towards high-end industries, forming industrial 
agglomeration and leading industrial clustering.
Regional government competition for industrial chain development unfolds 
mainly in two aspects. The first is concerned with factors of production. Low-
end or primary factors of production cannot form a stable and long-lasting 
competitive edge. Only by introducing, investing in and developing high-end 
and high-level factors of production – such as industrial technology, modern 
information technology, network resources, transport facilities and professional 
personnel, research and development think tanks, etc. – can powerful and 
competitive industries be built up. The second is concerned with industrial 
clustering and industrial underpinnings. Regional competitiveness reveals that 
effective industrial clustering, employing the existing regional industrial base as 
the leading force, can reduce business transaction costs and improve enterprise 
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profitability. The industrial smile curve makes manifest that the most valuable 
areas are located at both ends of the value chain – R&D and market. As a result, 
an important route for regional government to follow in achieving sustainable 
development is to cultivate competitive industries, develop industrial chains 
and introduce “targeted” investment according to the structural requirements 
of the industry.
Competition for talents, science and technology
The primary issue in competition for talents and science and technology is the 
recognition of the doctrines that human resources are primary resources and that 
science and technology are primary productive forces. The most fundamental task 
is to improve local personnel training systems and increase regional investment 
in personnel training and technological innovation, and the greatest essence 
resides in creating conditions for talent attraction, introduction, training and 
employment. The competitiveness of science and technology talents is measured 
by regional science and technology human resources indexes; the number of 
people engaged in scientific and technological activities per ten thousand people; 
the number of scientists and engineers per ten thousand people; the total number 
of scientific and technological activities per ten thousand people; the number 
of students in colleges and universities per ten thousand people; annual invest-
ment in science and technology talent training index per ten thousand people; 
total operating expenses of science and technology activities; the percentage of 
GDP for science and technology expenditure; per capita research funding; the 
percentage of local fiscal expenditure for financial allocations to local science 
and technology; per capita government expenditure on education; total local 
fiscal expenditure on education; number of full-time college teachers; and other 
indicators. Regional government makes efforts to improve and enhance related 
indicators so as to reinforce the overall competitiveness of talent in science and 
technology.
Fiscal and financial competition
Regional fiscal competition covers fiscal revenue and expenditure competition. 
Fiscal revenue is mainly achieved through the pursuit of economic growth and 
the accrual of taxes. Apart from social consumption and transfer expenditure, 
competition is chiefly realized through government investment, such as invest-
ment in infrastructure, science and technology R&D, investment of fiscal policy 
funds in industries that need urgent development and other fiscal investment 
expenditure. Fiscal investment expenditure is an important force for driving 
economic growth. The overall size of fiscal revenues and expenditure is limited; 
regional government must actively build various platforms for investment and 
financing – as well as mobilize and attract regional, national and interna-
tional financial institutions, funds, personnel, information and other financial 
resources to the greatest possible extent – in order to benefit regional economic 
Foreword xv
development, urban construction, social and livelihood services. Preferential 
policies and measures adopted by regional governments drive each other into 
competition for fiscal spending and monetary absorption.
Infrastructure competition
Infrastructure competition takes place in the construction of both infrastructure 
hardware and smart city software. The former includes transportation platforms 
of highways, ports and aviation; energy supply platforms of electricity, gas and 
others; information platforms of cable and networks; and science and technol-
ogy, industrial, entrepreneurial and creative parks. The latter includes intelligent 
city-building platforms of big data, cloud computing and the Internet of things. 
Infrastructure systems, which can be rated as advanced, adaptive and backward, 
underpin economic and social development in the region. The moderately 
advanced infrastructure supply in a region will provide optimal services for urban 
structure, facility size and spatial layout in market competition so that enterprise 
costs are reduced, production efficiency enhanced and industrial development 
facilitated. Whether regional infrastructure is complete directly brings forth 
differences in regional economy and affects its future.
Competition in environmental systems
In addition to infrastructure, environmental systems here mainly cover the 
construction of ecological environment, humanistic environment, policy envi-
ronment, social credit systems and the like. Regional government competition 
entails environments for development, including the harmony between invest-
ment development and ecological protection; the matching between investment 
attraction and policy services; the agreement between pursuit of wealth and 
social returns; and the mutual support between legal supervision and social 
credit. Favorable environment systems are the recipe for success in investment 
solicitation, project construction and sustainable development; this has been 
proven by successful experience in China and overseas.
Competition in policy systems
This involves policies implemented by regional government on both foreign and 
regional levels and is also true between countries. Policies are public products 
that are non-exclusive and imitative. Therefore, good competitive policy systems 
must be (1) realistic, i.e. in line with reality and the requirements for socio-
economic development; (2) advanced, in the sense that they are foresighted 
and innovative; (3) workable, in the sense that they are clear, targeted and 
enforceable; (4) organized, in the sense that specialized agencies and people 
perform duties and put them into operation; and (5) effective, which means 
that there are inspection, monitoring, assessment and evaluation mechanisms, 
including the involvement of third parties playing their role so as to achieve 
xvi Foreword
policy objectives effectively. Whether policy systems are sound or not has great 
impact upon regional competition.
Competition in management efficiency
Regional government management efficiency is an overall indication of admin-
istrative activities, speed, quality and efficiency; this covers macro-efficiency, 
micro-efficiency, organizational efficiency and individual efficiency. In terms of 
administrative compliance, regional government bodies should follow the norms 
of legality, interest and quality, and in terms of administrative efficiency, they 
should follow the norms of quantity, time, speed and budgeting. Competition 
in management efficiency is in nature competition of organizational systems, 
government obligations, service awareness, work skills and technological plat-
forms. Developed regions have been practicing, without precedent, the paralleled 
and integrated service modes.
Regional government competition is embodied in the above-mentioned eight 
types and is in essence reflected in their policies regarding the allocation of 
regional resources towards operational resources, so as to enhance enterprise 
vitalities, and towards non-operational resources, so as to create favorable envi-
ronments; these are, in their ways, rules and supporting policies to be employed 
to manage quasi-operational resources, so as to achieve sustainable growth in 
the region. In a nutshell, regional government competition is basically reflected 
in competition in the optimization of resource allocation.
Government Foresighted Leading (GFL) as the core 
of regional competition
Competition entails innovation, and innovation is competitiveness. Continuous 
innovation is sustained competitiveness. Regional innovation is the core of 
regional government competition. Innovation in notion, institution, organiza-
tion, administration and technology is indispensable in regional government 
competition. GFL becomes essential to regional competition and development.
First, notional foresighted leading is the actual competitiveness in the factor-
driven stage of economic growth, which has been amply demonstrated through-
out the world. In this very stage, economic growth is chiefly achieved through 
the expansion of production input, like land, labor and other natural resources; 
there is a focus on competition for resources and in prices, which are prone to 
such problems as excessive exploitation of production factors, lower production 
efficiency, technological backwardness, resource depletion, brain drain and social 
conflicts. Consequently, development notions, direction and modes in this stage 
become decisive. Advanced notions tend to determine the modes and trends 
of regional development. Regional government’s innovative notions – e.g. the 
overall command of regional factors, strategic positioning, development paths, 
modes and layout and a driving force for development – become the focus 
of regional competition. Therefore, for the facilitation of stable, coordinated 
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regional development, it is of primary significance to follow foresighted leading 
notions of “coordination”, “green” and “openness” in the factor-driven stage.
Second, organizational foresighted leading plays a key role in competition 
in the investment-driven stage, in which period expanding investment, and 
intensifying its stimulation to economic growth, is the primary means of regional 
competition. Driven by investment multiplier effects, investment can enormously 
expedite economic growth; this has been demonstrated in the Keynesian theory 
of effective demand. Investment is of great significance for increasing effective 
demand and boosting GDP. Especially during economic downturns, govern-
ment can increase investment to reverse the trend of economic downturn and 
drag economy out. However, problems like quick ups and downs in economy 
and the lagging-behind of technology and innovation may ensue after single 
short-term stimulus of investment as a result of “investment hunger” and “invest-
ment dependence”. Under such circumstances, innovation in organizational 
administration becomes crucial. That requires the intensification of investment 
management standards; rapid organizational responsive capabilities; closer rela-
tions to market and enterprise services; network and matrix structuring; and 
streamlined administration so as to achieve greater efficiency and flexibility and 
improve investment effectiveness. Organizational foresighted leading is crucial 
to stable and orderly economic development and inter-regional competition in 
the investment-driven stage.
Third, technological and institutional foresighted leading is the key to scoring 
success in regional competition in the innovation-driven stage. Innovation has 
the most explosive driving force for economic development and pushes the 
socio-economy to transform from quantity- to quality-type, reflecting overall 
breakthroughs in socio-economic performance and in optimized social alloca-
tion. At this stage, technological innovation is the core of all driving forces, 
and institutional innovation is the fundamental guarantee for continuous tech-
nological innovation. Technological innovation gives birth to new formats, new 
products, new industries and new models. Institutional innovation protects and 
promotes the integrated innovative development of science and technology, 
finance and industry, which combine to stimulate innovation-driven sustainability. 
Technological and institutional foresighted leading become an important means 
of regional competition at this stage.
Finally, overall foresighted leading is the inevitable choice for competition in 
the wealth-driven stage. Under the assumption that regional economic develop-
ment in the world follows the sequence of factor-driven, investment-driven, 
innovation-driven and wealth-driven stages, then the wealth-driven stage of 
economic growth requires not only innovation in notions, technology, orga-
nizations and institutions but also overall foresighted leading, so as to achieve 
and guarantee the sustained advantages of regional competition. This stage is 
characterized by the full play of individual creativity; comprehensive balance 
between work and life; rapid development of tertiary industries; growing aware-
ness of the importance of resources environments; and continuously emerging 
models of economic and individual development. Therefore, the flexible, quick 
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and diverse development of regional economy in the wealth-driven stage requires 
the coordination of institutions, policies and measures to match the pulse of the 
wealth-driven times, orient the values of the wealth-driven stage and maintain 
the sustainability and vitality of the economy. Overall continuous innovation and 
foresighted leading – in the whole process and over the full range of factors – are 
the inevitable options for regional competition at this stage.
The dual nature of regional government as “quasi-state” (“quasi-macro”) and 
“quasi-enterprise” (“quasi-micro”) constitutes a pattern of competition of “double 
entities” between regional governments and between enterprises by means of 
the mechanisms of market economy and an optimal combination of “effective 
government” and “effective market” in modern market economy. The organic 
integration of “effective government” and “effective market” is the mature market 
economy in the real sense.
Economic globalization and regional economic development are of great signifi-
cance in the twenty-first century. Regional economic competition and integration 
around the globe, in particular, have facilitated economic globalization and, 
eventually, promoted the prosperity and development of the global economy.
Theoretical studies in regional economy have, over the past decade or so, 
attracted increasing attention from economists. Dr. Chen Yunxian’s research 
has been devoted exclusively to this area, focusing on the regional government 
that lies behind regional economic development. He has published Foresighted 
Leading – Theoretical Thinking and Practice of China’s Regional Economic 
Development (Springer, Germany, 2013), Government Foresighted Leading – 
Theory and Practice of the World’s Regional Economic Development (Routledge, 
Oxford, 2017), Mezzoeconomics – Innovations and Developments in Theoretical 
Configuration of Economics(American Academic Press, 2018) and Regional 
Government Competition (Routledge, Oxford, 2019), for which publication is 
well underway.
This monograph takes the classification of resources as the starting point 
for the analysis of regional government competition. Regional resources may 
be classified into operational, non-operational and quasi-operational types on 
the basis of the three major functions of regional government, i.e. economic 
development, urban construction and social wellbeing. In the light of such an 
analysis, resources that correspond to economic development in market economy 
fall into the operational type, i.e. industrial resources, and enterprises are the 
major economic entities for this type. Resources that correspond to social 
wellbeing fall into the non-operational type in market economy; this covers 
social welfare and public products and its major economic entities are regional 
governments. Resources that correspond to urban construction fall into the 
quasi-operational type in market economy, i.e. urban resources, and its major 
economic entities can be both enterprises and government. Regional urban 
resources are chiefly employed for public services that provide guarantees for 
the normal operation of social and economic activities in a region or a country, 
as well as for all the necessary facilities for public services, so as to underpin 
social production and residential livelihood. The quasi-operational type is so 
called because these resources lie in the “borderline areas” in economics, which 
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traditionally falls into the “overlapping zone” between government and market 
and can be undertaken by either enterprises or government in order to achieve 
the purpose of serving social wellbeing.
Based on the classificatory analysis of three types of resources and their allocat-
ing power, market and government can be divided into weak, semi-strong and 
strong types. Viewed from the perspective of resource allocation, weak effective 
government chiefly regulates the allocation of non-operational resources, semi-
strong effective government both non-operational and operational resources and 
strong effective government quasi-operational resources in addition to the other 
two types. The optimal resource allocation can be realized through functional 
complementation of government, enterprises and market mechanisms, in which 
case government can be considered effective.
It follows that regional governments compete mainly in the allocation and 
regulation of quasi-operational resources. Regional government exercises macro-
level regulation in the “quasi-state” role and participates in regional market 
competition in the “quasi-enterprise” role. Whether regional government can 
exert foresighted leadership in the allocation and regulation of quasi-operational 
resources is determined by the innovative capabilities of regional government; 
these are represented by its policy-making and concrete measures for notional, 
institutional, organizational and technological innovation.
Regional government’s focuses on notional, institutional, organizational and 
technological innovation may vary in different stages of economic development, 
matching respectively with factor-driven, investment-driven, innovation-driven 
and wealth-driven stages. Regional government’s major competitive force in 
the innovation-driven stage is the effective integration of institutional and 
technological innovation; overall innovation will become the key force for 
regional government to expedite economic growth in the wealth-driven stage.
The “double-strong mechanism” of strong market and strong government, 
which involves regional government ameliorating and perfecting the allocating 
modes for three types of resources, is a representative model in the modern 
market economy. The combination of the three modes of market developing itself 
from weak to strong and the three modes of government allocating resources 
from weak to strong generates nine different models. The emergence of the 
“double-strong mechanism” of strong effective market and strong effective 
government marks the start of the modern market economy’s maturity and 
represents the most advanced stage of market economic development. Mature 
market economy results from the effective integration and operation of effective 
government and effective market.
This monograph concludes with the notion of “establishing the new engine 
for global economic development”. The mature market system that comprises 
effective government and effective market requires the role to be promoted and 
given full play in order for enterprises to compete in the allocation of industrial 
resources, and for government to compete in the allocation of urban resources 
with a view to establishing new engines for global investment, innovation and 
governance that integrate tangible and intangible factors worldwide. The new 
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engine for global investment embodies promoting supply-side structural reform, 
strengthening infrastructural investment and construction, enhancing financial 
matching capabilities and so on. The new engine for global innovation embodies 
notional innovation in ideological public products, technological innovation 
in material public products, managerial innovation in organizational public 
products and regulatory innovation in institutional public products. The new 
engine for global governance implies the making of rules for peaceful and stable 
international security and order; for fair and efficient international economic 
competition; and for shared cooperative and win–win international governance. 
These new engines will prove to be of primary significance to global economic 
governance and growth.
The CPC Central Committee, with Xi Jinping as its core, has come up with 
the overall layout of “five in one” and “four comprehensive” strategy, calling on 
the Chinese people to firmly establish and carry out the development philosophy 
of innovation, coordination, greenness, openness and sharing; accommodate the 
new normal of economic development; and endeavor to push the constructive 
cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics to new heights. All this has cre-
ated unprecedented opportunities and conditions for Chinese economists, who 
should base themselves on China’s modern practices, absorb the essence of 
Chinese civilization, aim at the forefront of world academics and bring forward 
innovation and breakthroughs in economic theories so as to move toward the 
forefront of world economic theorization and lead its development.
Yong Heming is Professor and President of Guangdong University of Finance.
Peng Jing is Associate Professor at Guangdong University of Finance and 
Economics.
Chen Dinggang, PhD, is Lecturer at Guangdong University of Finance.
Chen Zimin is a member of GDUF Translation Team of Financial and Eco-
nomic Works.
Translators
1.1  Regional government: a demarcation
1.1.1  Nature of regional government
“Region” is a multi-faceted, multi-layered and highly relative concept and can 
be interpreted from various perspectives. The perspective of politics refers to 
a region as an administrative unit under national jurisdiction; the sociological 
perspective regards it as a community of human beings with the same language, 
belief and ethnicity in a society; and the geographical perspective defines it as 
a geographical unit on the planet.
However, economics posits that a region is a relatively large territory with 
various types of resources for a range of productive and non-productive social–
economic activities. This definition is three-pronged:
(a) Region is a relative concept. It does not exist unless an overall boundary is 
given. For example, relative to the whole world, all continents and nations 
can be viewed as regions. Relative to a nation, various localities within it 
can be viewed as regions, and so on. 
(b) Region is not a natural object but a result of human perception upon natural 
objects: a conceptual representation. 
(c) Regions share some common characteristics. They are divided according 
to their commonalities in certain aspects, and different criteria will lead to 
varied regional divisions.
“Regional government” refers to an organization which manages an adminis-
trative region of a nation. It is often used in relation to “national government” 
or, in a federal state, “federal government”. Regional government (not including 
special administrative regions) in China is set at the provincial, municipal, county 
and township level. A fully functioning regional government should consist 
of three elements: (a) a relatively stable region, (b) a relatively concentrated 
population and (c) institutions that govern the region.
Government is characterized by publicity and coerciveness. The publicity 
of a government indicates that it is a formal representative for the whole 
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society, representing all relevant tangible organizations and thus reflecting and 
representing the will and interests of the whole society. As an integral part of 
the multi-layered governance system, regional governments have one feature in 
common, i.e. serving the general public, whether they function as representative 
institutions set by the national government or as entities that possess relative 
administrative powers. In addition to “super-economic coercive” legislative, 
judicial and administrative powers, the coerciveness of government also resides 
in its “economic coercive” powers, which are embodied in the financial, admin-
istrative and resource allocating power of regional government.
The “super-economic coercive” power and the “economic coercive” power 
of regional government are contingent upon the game between the region 
and the nation and the region’s social and economic strength of development. 
Therefore, regional government can exercise two types of power – political 
power, or the power of “quasi-state”, and economic power, or the power of 
“quasi-enterprise”. The former refers to regional government exercising the 
authorities granted by the state to oversee public expenditure and maintain 
market order within that region by means of taxation, business administration, 
public security and market regulation. It also guarantees justice, openness and 
fairness by means of legislation and jurisdiction. The latter refers to regional 
government gaining benefits through its financial, administrative and resource 
allocating power, which is achieved through such organizational forms as state-
owned, state-controlling and state-holding enterprises; control of land, mines 
and resources; and policy implementation.
States all over the world fall into unitary and composite types. The functions 
of regional government vary with the structural type of the state. In a unitary 
state, sub-national units such as administrative regions and autonomous regions 
are established according to geography. The national government has the ultimate 
and supreme authority. Regional government exercises only the powers that the 
national government chooses to delegate, in accordance to its constitutions and 
laws. Regional government, under the leadership and supervision of the national 
government, has the right to administer local affairs. National government 
provides guidance and supervision over the regional government by means of 
policies and laws. Countries like the UK, France, China, Japan and Italy fall 
into this type. In a composite state, more than two member nations, states or 
provinces are allied by agreements or constitutions. The range of powers of 
the state and its member states are stipulated by the constitution. All regional 
governments enjoy a high degree of autonomy within the range of their powers. 
They exercise their powers directly upon their people without interference from 
other regional governments. Since each regional government performs its duties 
in accordance with its position in the overall system and its range of power, its 
interests and behavioral patterns and those of the national government may not 
be always consistent. They manage affairs out of their own interests. Countries 
like the USA, Australia, Canada, Germany and Brazil fall into this type. Whether 
in a unitary state or a composite state, it is difficult, technically speaking, for 
the national government to integrate all levels of administration at low cost. 
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Thus, it is necessary to take advantage of regional governments to look into 
regional needs and tackle regional problems. That gives regional governments 
greater importance and highlights their roles.
Relative to the national government and non-governmental entities in a 
region (including residents, enterprises and other organizations), regional gov-
ernment has two prominent roles to play: the representative for the interests 
of both the national government and regional non-governmental entities, and 
the intermediate agent or bridge for the exchange of information between 
the national government and regional non-governmental entities. Regional 
government serves in a “dual role” in between the national government and 
non-governmental entities. On one hand, regional government acts as the 
agent of the national government, exercising macro-level regulation on regional 
economy, and plays the “quasi-state” role, acting on behalf of the state so as 
to guide and lead economic regulation and boost development. On the other 
hand, regional government acts as the agent of non-governmental entities in 
a region, striving for support from the national government, distributing local 
resources and maximizing the benefits of local economy by means of institutional, 
organizational and technological innovation – hence the “quasi-enterprise” role.
Regional governments have been transformed into relatively independent 
“stakeholders” as a result of a series of fiscal and financial reforms that aimed 
to delegate powers to regional governments in countries worldwide. Decades 
of market-oriented reforms have continuously enhanced the autonomy and 
financial status of regional governments. In fact, regional governments have 
already become relatively independent economic entities. The dual roles of 
regional governments put them in a unique position both of leading social 
economic activities and in being led. To one end, relative to the national govern-
ment, regional governments serve as decision makers and quasi-micro entities, 
attempting to gain more economic benefits. To the other end, relative to the 
market and enterprises, regional governments serve as the first level of units in 
the administrative system of the state and executors of the national government, 
striving to maintain stability of macro-economy in the region.
1.1.2  Features of regional government
According to traditional western economics, the government, be it national 
or regional, is supposed to do only what the market cannot do, which means 
that the government exercises marginal regulation only in the case of market 
failure, and that the government exercises inactive regulation. The government’s 
major responsibility is to maintain proper market order. However, practices in 
countries like China show that in today’s market economy, the role of govern-
ment is a composite – serving as both guardian of market order and participant 
in competition against other regional governments. As a single entity within 
its jurisdiction, regional government exercises macro-level regulation, and it 
becomes a participant of competition in a broader market when it deals with 
other regional governments – hence a competitive regional government system. 
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Competition between regional governments enriches government functions and 
does not prevent the market from becoming the decisive factor of resource 
allocation. A free market and a system of regional governments with composite 
roles constitute two pillars of the modern market economy.
The above analysis of the internal and external roles of regional government 
determines that regional government should be studied from both macro- and 
micro-level perspectives. From the macro-level perspective, the income of regional 
government should be addressed to see how it is influenced by various factors 
such as industrial structure, economic growth of the region and so on. From 
the micro-level perspective, its optimized performance, such as participation in 
competition, incentive policy-making and acting as an agent, should be ana-
lyzed. Given the special role of regional government, studies will be conducted 
concerning how regional government functions are to be enhanced, how a 
political system that facilitates GFL is to be fostered and how a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for regional government competition is to be constructed. 
This monograph puts forth four major theories to expound the special nature 
of regional government: the GFL theory, the “dual role” theory of regional 
government, the “dual-entity” theory of market competition and the theory of 
“double-strong mechanism” for effective allocation of resources.
1.1.2.1 Regional GFL
Let the market do what it can do and government do what the market cannot 
do or cannot do well; both of these should be put in place. GFL aims to give 
full play to government roles in economic guidance, regulation and warning 
and to take the lead in promoting scientific and sustainable growth in regional 
economy with recourse to market rules and forces; it does so by means of 
investing, pricing, taxation, legal and other measures and through innovation 
in notion, institution, organization and technology.
1.1.2.2 The duality of regional government role
Regional government plays both “quasi-state” and “quasi-enterprise” roles, 
acting on behalf of the state to exercise macro-level regulation in regional 
economy and on behalf of a region’s non-governmental entities to participate in 
competition against other regions in order to maximize its economic interests.
1.1.2.3 The “dual-entity” system for market competition
Given the active competition between regional governments, two competing 
entities exist in the system of market economy – namely, “micro-level enterprises” 
and “regional governments”. To put it another way, a natural person or a 
legal person of an enterprise may become a competitor in the market; so may 
regional government, though enterprises and regional governments compete 
at different levels.
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1.1.2.4 The “double-strong mechanism” for mature markets
A mature market economy should be a combined economic system of “strong 
market” and “strong government”. A strong market contributes to efficient 
resource allocation, whereas a strong government fosters and safeguards a sound 
market environment. A strong government does not mean replacing a strong 
market, as a strong market needs the support of a strong government. Only 
when the double-strong mechanism is in place can market failures be remedied 
and government malfunction be reduced.
1.1.3  Functions of regional government
An overview of national government functions all over the world shows that 
their major responsibilities are to maintain social stability, boost overall devel-
opment and deal with emergencies. Their major obligations, as revealed by an 
investigation into regional government functions, are economic development, 
urban construction and livelihood improvement. China’s reform and opening 
up demonstrate that regional governments have made significant efforts to 
perform the three functions and admirable contributions to the fulfillment of 
their obligations.
Regarding economic development, let’s look at Shunde, Foshan (Guang-
dong Province, China) for an example. In 2005, the total output in Shunde 
District reached 60.1 billion RMB, with the secondary industry accounting for 
61 percent. Household appliances and electronic products take up 70 percent 
of the total output of the secondary industry. In addition, the three electric 
tycoons in Shunde – Midea, Kelon and Galanz – nearly monopolized the 
household appliance industry. The Shunde District government was well aware 
that excessive reliance on one single industry, and possible poor performance 
by the key enterprises in that industry, might incur regional economic problems 
and even crises. In order to prevent that scenario from happening, the district 
government, proceeding from the industrial reality, proposed and implemented 
the “Triple-Three Strategy” for its industrial restructuring and overall industrial 
development. Specifically, this was three categories of industry (the coordinated 
development of the primary industry, the secondary and the tertiary industry); 
three pillar lines (no fewer than three pillar lines to be fostered and supported 
within each category of industry); and three leading enterprises (within each 
pillar line of industry, no fewer than three locomotive enterprises to be nurtured). 
The strategy aimed at fostering industrial chains, accumulating industrial clusters 
and achieving sustainable development.
Considering problems that arose out of weak industrial foundation and 
capital shortage in the development of its SMEs, the government of Shunde 
District innovatively established credit guarantee funds for its SMEs by setting 
up specialized fiscal funds in collaboration with underwriting institutions and 
commercial banks to offer credit guarantees and loans to the well-performing 
SMEs without adequate assets for mortgage. Practice has shown that the Shunde 
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District government’s economic guidance, regulation and early warning con-
tributed substantially to the more sophisticated development of the primary 
industry, the upgrading of the secondary industry and the speedy growth of the 
tertiary industry; to the transformation of traditional industries, the flourishing 
of emerging industries, the rapid growth of high-tech industries and a scalar 
formation of large, medium and small enterprises and the ensuing complementary 
industrial clusters; and, consequently, to the Shunde District’s leading position 
among over 2800 counties in China in terms of economic growth over the 
past few decades.
Similar practices in western developed countries have also been conducted to 
steer, boost and adjust industrial development. For instance, the NNMI (National 
Networks of Manufacturing Innovation) is one key measure the US has taken 
to implement its strategy of “reindustrialization”. Following the 2008 financial 
crisis, the US formulated “A Framework for Revitalizing American Manufac-
turing” and “Manufacturing Promotion Act”. In June 2011, the “Advanced 
Manufacturing Partnership” (AMP) was launched, which was followed by the 
“National Network for Manufacturing Innovation” (NNMI) in March 2012. 
The NNMI consists of interrelated IMIs (Institutes for Manufacturing Innova-
tion) with common goals but various focuses, and an investment plan for US 
$1 billion to build up 15 IMIs in different parts of the US. A more ambitious 
plan was made in July 2013 to build up 45 within ten years, and a budget was 
put in place in the 2015 fiscal year.
As is observed here, the program is, first of all, in line with the US’s national 
strategies and concentrates on projects that accommodate the specific needs of 
regions and industries. Second, the program centers on resource optimization 
and restructuring and integrates existing resources of innovation by adopting a 
combination of “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. Third, the program 
operates with a public–private partnership guarantee, steady initial federal sup-
port and matching follow-up funding from universities and private institutions. 
Fourth, the program is managed through coordinated networks, with each IMI 
connecting the innovation resources of the region, the state and the world. The 
NNMI has established a committee to lead coordination and collaboration; this 
allows government, with its connection to the market and its role in optimizing 
government investment and balancing the interests of related parties, to play 
a guiding and leveraging role in investment, steer the direction of industrial 
R&D, improve high-end manufacturing layouts and accelerate innovation and 
commercialization.
The UK’s Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP) is also worth mentioning 
here. In order to upgrade innovative capabilities of enterprises, the UK govern-
ment implemented KTP to achieve the transfer of knowledge, technologies and 
skills from research institutes to enterprises and strengthen enterprise–academic 
partnerships, with personnel of expertise as the intermediary. The KTP program 
is funded by the government and public institutions as well as enterprises, which 
provide matching financial support. The UK government formulated applica-
tion criteria and approval procedures and worked out assessment measures. 
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In so doing, the KTP program expanded government services for enterprises, 
stimulated enterprises’ investment in innovation, integrated innovation resources 
of talents, enterprises and institutions and upgraded industrial structure.
Regarding urban construction, let’s take China as an example. As of 2006, 
against the backdrop of reform and opening up in China, Foshan, Guangdong 
Province has achieved 30 times the economic growth with only three times the 
construction land, as land shortage has posed a harsh challenge to its future 
development. The Foshan Municipality issued in 2007 The Provisions Regarding 
the Acceleration of Transformation of Old Towns, Factory Sites and Countryside 
Residences (abbreviated as “three-outmoded transformation”). In 2009, The 
Plan for Three-Outmoded Transformation (2009–2020) was passed, releasing 
253,000 acres of land, following the principle of government making policies, 
land users/owners providing land and developers making investments. A total 
investment of 35.7 billion RMB was drawn into the plan in the first three years, 
and that activated over 730 projects of three-outmoded transformation, taking 
up 30,000 acres of land with an increase in construction area of 23.99 million 
square meters. The model of “government facilitation, market operation and 
enterprise participation” for three-outmoded transformation, which effectively 
addressed the issues of regional construction, drastically raised the efficiency of 
land use and promoted industrial restructuring; it was summarized as the “Foshan 
Experience” and recommended as a role model for other regions to follow by 
the Guangdong provincial government and the central government of China. In 
2010, Foshan Municipality government proposed the notion of “fourizations and 
smart Foshan”, i.e. strengthening the comprehensive competitiveness of Foshan 
by means of industrialization, urbanization and internationalization through 
informationalization; this would enable Foshan to become safer, greener, more 
efficient and more harmonious through greater efforts in developing smart traffic, 
smart environmental protection, smart land control, smart security system, smart 
city regulation, smart education, smart medical service, smart cultural service, 
smart business service, smart administration, etc. Consequently, industrialization 
will be transformed, urbanization will be expedited and internationalization will 
be enhanced in Foshan. It turns out that the government has a significant role 
to play in figuring out modern approaches to city governance; this is also true of 
western developed countries. The revival of the “industrial toxic city” in Germany 
is a good example here. The Ruhr industrial region made great contributions to 
German economy, but serious pollution problems arose out of it. To address the 
problems, the Nordrhein-Westfalen government put forward a long-term scheme 
from 1968 to 1979 and then to 1989 that started with industrial restructuring 
and the development of emerging industries and was followed by ecological 
transformation of industrial legacies, ecological restoration and environmental 
improvement. As a result, the region was renewed as one that featured good 
cultural preservation, industrial upgrade, better infrastructure, rapid growth of 
the city and sound environments for living, business and development.
Regarding livelihood improvement, let’s use as an example the scheme of 
livelihood improvement of the Guangdong provincial government, China. This 
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was proposed in 2016 and covers the following ten aspects of people’s liveli-
hoods: (1) raise the basic standard of livelihood; (2) enhance poverty-relief 
efforts; (3) reinforce housing services to low-income groups; (4) improve living 
and manufacturing conditions in rural areas; (5) improve medical service in 
rural areas; (6) promote fair distribution of educational resources; (7) boost 
entrepreneurial activities and employment; (8) tackle pollution and build eco-
logical environment; (9) consolidate public security; and (10) beef up disaster 
prevention and relief efforts. Every aspect was quite to the point and was put 
into place to guarantee public satisfaction.
Another good example is the New Village Movement in South Korea in the 
1960s, at which time farmers accounted for 70 percent of its total population 
and agriculture was on the verge of collapse. Under those circumstances, the 
South Korean government campaigned for the New Village Movement by means 
of policy orientation and concrete measures. The movement endeavored to 
build up new villages by supporting rural construction projects and cooperative 
financing managed by agricultural associations. It brought forth an economic 
boom in South Korea, known as “Miracle on the Han River”. It has become 
an exemplary case of how developed countries improve livelihood by resolving 
the imbalance between urban and rural regions.
1.1.4  Economic goals of regional government
Consumers and enterprises, in the role of micro-economic entities, are mainly 
concerned with prices. Regional government can guide family consumption and 
enterprise production decisions by resorting to price signals in order to achieve 
the greatest possible utility of consumption and profits of production. In reality, 
the scope of concern on the part of families or enterprises as micro-economic 
entities falls into micro-economics; those outside their scope of concern, which 
are not controllable by prices, do not belong to micro-economics and are 
categorized into market failure as externalities.
As macro-economic entities, governments are chiefly concerned with aggre-
gate economy – the status of national income and its accrual. However, a 
macro-economic perspective fails to capture the concrete operation of a region, 
industry or regional bloc. The economic links between regions and industries 
often go beyond the control of enterprises but fall short of national regula-
tion because regional behaviors and economy are not subject to the laws and 
principles of macro-economic management. Those behaviors that lie beyond 
national government control should be considered government malfunction. 
This demonstrates that there is a blind spot that skips the notice of both micro- 
and macro-economic entities, as it is somewhat too “broad” or “high up” for 
individual enterprises and too “regional” or “local” for national government. 
This blind spot lies in between micro- and macro-economic regulation and 
in between aggregate and individual economy; it is a collection of individual 
economies as well as a decomposition of aggregate economy, and that is where 
regional government should have a role to play. Therefore, in between these 
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areas, regional economic growth can be achieved beyond individual enterprise 
behavior and more concrete macro-level regulation, and that is exactly where 
the economic goals that regional government strives to achieve reside.
It becomes obvious that regional government should address issues concerning 
the production and consumption of a region, industry or production bloc on 
the level that lies beyond individual enterprises and the level that goes beyond 
regional contributions to the nation. It follows that regional government must be 
involved in economic competition against the backdrop of the broader market, 
while exercising macro-level regulation on local issues such as price, employment, 
economic growth, etc.; hence its dual role – one that is similar to that of a 
producer or “quasi-enterprise” and one that is similar to that of national govern-
ment or “quasi-state”, which connects macro-economy and micro-economy and 
positions regional government as the entity that fulfills mezzo-economic goals. 
More specifically, the economic goals for regional government involve optimal 
distribution and utilization of regional economic resources, which affect regional 
competitiveness and sustainability.
1.1.4.1  Gaining regional first-mover advantages and 
optimizing resource allocation
Regional economic development goes closely with regional government competi-
tion. Regional government spares no efforts in establishing specialized markets, 
restructuring industries, introducing advanced technologies, organizing R&D 
projects, building infrastructure, guiding business investment, attracting foreign 
investment and so on; these are basically motivated by competition between 
regional governments. However, this will not happen if the market mechanism 
has not been applied to regional government behavior and if market competition 
mechanisms have not been applied to competition between regional govern-
ments in China.
Market competition between regional governments is to a great extent 
reflected in their planning and guidance, which pose serious challenges to the 
regional government’s capacities of strategic positioning, resource mobilization 
and coordinated planning. Regional government planning and guidance differ 
totally from the in-process and post-process intervention advocated by laissez-
faire government, government interventionalism and Keynesian government 
intervention. They stress foresighted pre-process analysis, prediction, planning 
and regulation of economic activities, which are based on the government’s 
thorough consideration and judgment of the market and on how to give full 
play to market mechanisms in resource allocation.
1.1.4.2  Ensuring the stability and effectiveness of overall 
economic development
By exercising foresighted leading, regional government embodies long-term 
strategic visions, manageable internal competition and effectiveness of enhancing 
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sound economic development. A regional government system of foresighted 
leading and orderly competition frees national government from the laissez-faire 
regulation and micro-economic intervention that were needed under a planned 
economy. Therefore, national governments have much more leeway to focus 
on macro-level planning and regulation for regional and industrial development 
and to formulate national strategies for long-term development and policy 
implementation. Issues concerning the development and regulation of particular 
regions and industries are left to regional government, a mezzo-economic 
entity, which is in a better position to more accurately and effectively exercise 
micro-level administration and regulation while also taking into consideration 
the stability and flexibility of overall economic development.
1.1.4.3  Promoting scientific and sustainable growth of regional 
economy
Regional government tends to be proactive and responsive. When economic 
turmoil arises, regional government can “cushion” their impact level by level 
and thus mitigate the effects to the least extent. When harbingers of poor eco-
nomic performance occur at the micro-level, regional government can conduct 
timely interventions, which will remedy the oversights caused by macro-level 
regulation. In addition, regional government can help to improve the operation 
of the national economic control system, in the sense of mitigating the risk 
of centralized control. Experience of reform proves that the mezzo-economic 
regulative system plays an irreplaceable role in the overall national economic 
system. According to the control theory, the multi-objective optimization of a 
national economic system is to seek the maximum function. However, in the 
case of centralized control, the number of variables will increase drastically, which 
means the sharp increase of dimensions to be considered for the optimization of 
the system eventually causes formidable difficulties for an accurate calculation. 
Meanwhile, centralized control has a high degree of rigidness, as the center for 
control is the only unit that responds to random changes and environmental 
changes. Centralized control enhances the long-term stability of the system, 
but sharp conflicts will inevitably arise between the unchanged structure of 
the system and the innovatively changing parts thereof. Moreover, it may also 
reduce the operational reliability of the system. When something goes wrong 
with the center, it will be difficult for each sub-system to take preventative or 
remedial measures so that systemic deterioration will ensue. On the contrary, if 
control is delegated to various entities at different levels, sub-systems will have a 
certain degree of autonomy, hence multi-level (or decentralized) control, which 
allows the separation of power in a multi-level control system that may tackle 
the above-mentioned problems of a centralized control system. The multi-level 
control system is capable of adapting to environmental and internal changes 
as its sub-systems are independent and adaptive. In addition, each sub-system, 
which operates effectively according to the rules of a larger system, will have 
its control efficiency considerably improved, with the addition of self-received 
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and self-processed information; overall efficiency will thus be greatly enhanced, 
so that regional government realizes its goal of sustainable economic growth.
1.2  Basics of regional government competition
1.2.1  The concept of dual-entity competition between regional 
governments
The dual-entity theory for market competition posits that two competing entities 
exist in the market – enterprises and regional governments. Competition between 
enterprises must abide by market laws. Such competition also exists between 
regional governments, who should obey similar laws. It follows that a double-
layered system of competition exists in the market, each layer independently 
of each other. No competition takes place between enterprises and regional 
governments, but their roles in the market are complementary.
The dual role of regional government determines the dual-entity mechanism 
in the market system. Regional government per se constitutes the subjective 
entity of regional competition, whereas objective entities are the objects for which 
regional governments vie in the market, including a wide range of tangible and 
intangible resources in the region. Regional government competition targets 
optimizing resource allocation, enhancing efficiency of regional economy and 
gaining more benefits for the region. The competitive behaviors of regional 
government include providing enterprises with technological, personnel and 
financing services, promoting cultural programs, mobilizing innovation, offering 
policy guidance, building infrastructure and safeguarding market competition 
mechanisms.
1.2.2  Relatedness and differences in competition between 
enterprises and between regional governments
Competition between enterprises takes place in their fight over industrial 
resources, while regional government competition targets urban resources. The 
two types of competition are relatively independent and yet complementary. 
Their relatedness and differences can be summed up as follows:
First, they differ in the fields of competition. Enterprises are micro-economic 
entities. They mainly compete for commodity markets and focus on industrial 
resources allocation. Market equilibrium theory, which takes manufacturers as 
its main subject, occupies a dominant position in western classical economics. 
Enterprises regard the pursuit of profit maximization as a precondition and 
assume competitive forms of supply, demand, market equilibrium prices, perfect 
market competition, monopolistic competition, oligopolistic market, different 
market structures and competitive strategies, etc. Enterprise competition is the 
precondition and basis for regional government competition.
Regional government is the subject of mezzo-economics. Competition 
between regional governments focuses on factor markets and city resources 
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allocation. Factor markets include land, capital, labor forces, property rights, 
and hardware and software markets such information. Regional government 
improves its competitiveness through the quantity, quality, structure and layout 
of urban resources. Regional government can also make policies and initiatives to 
regulate the allocation of regional factors, to attract and influence the direction 
of factor flow outside the region so as to optimize the allocation of resources 
and eventually enhance regional competitiveness. Factor market competition 
affects enterprise commodity market competition.
Second, they differ in means of competition. Enterprises seek to maximize 
profits mainly by increasing labor productivity – to effectively influence costs, 
prices, supply and demand and scale – and by optimizing the allocation of corpo-
rate resources to promote their cost minimization. Regional government makes 
every effort to increase total factor productivity as its chief means of sustainable 
growth. After simple dilatation through competing for tangible factors, such as 
land, projects and capital, the bottleneck of diminishing capital profits makes 
extensive economic growth difficult to continue. When nothing more can be 
added to regional input of all tangible factors, regional government will have to 
depend on the investment, increase and improvement of intangible factors such 
as technological advancement (with innovation as the core), resource allocation 
optimization and structural adjustment as well as institution, organization, 
legislation, environment, etc. as the new driving forces of regional economy 
development and urban construction.
Third, they differ in paths of competition. Enterprises are investment-growth 
oriented. The continuous improvement of business performance comes from 
the constant input of production factors, including capital, labor, land, technol-
ogy, entrepreneurship and so on. The initial strategy for businesses investment 
is mainly extensive expansion of quantity, followed by the quality-enhancing 
stage and then the stage of business management. In all these stages, sustained 
and effective inputs become critical. Regional government is efficiency growth-
oriented. In light of the experiences of regional economies in the world, their 
economic growth path starts from the factor-driven stage (also known as the 
resource allocation stage), to the investment-driven stage (also known as the 
efficiency improvement stage) and then to the innovation-driven stage (also called 
the sustainable growth stage). Regional government makes efforts to optimize 
the combination of tangible and intangible factors, with efficiency improvement 
as the focus of its growth.
Fourth, they differ in orientations of competition. Enterprises regard demand-
side expansion as their orientation. Business competition starts from market 
demand, demand quantities, demand structure, corporate strategies and tac-
tics. The ability to adapt to market requirements becomes essential to their 
survival and success. Regional government regards supply-side optimization 
as its orientation. Regional government’s determined direction for economic 
development, urban construction and facilitation of people’s livelihood is to 
promote supply-side structural reforms by effectively allocating the supply of 
land, capital, projects, technology, work forces and other tangible resources, 
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by effectively regulating the supply of prices, taxation, interest rates, exchange 
rates, law and other intangible resources and through innovation in institution, 
organization and technology.
Finally, they differ in modes of competition. Enterprises adopt the ERP 
mode to exercise effective and integrated management of materials, finance, 
information and customer resources and to achieve inter-regional, inter-sector 
and inter-industrial coordination and effective allocation in terms of logistics and 
personnel, financial and information flow. Guided by market demands, enterprises 
will strive for effective integration of resources, adjustment of functions, improve-
ment of production efficiency and eventual enhancement of competitiveness. 
Regional government, however, may establish the DRP mode to effectively 
allocate resources such as land, population, finance, environment, technology 
and policies, design layouts and make appropriate arrangements according to 
regional planning and strategies. Equipped with systematic management notions 
and approaches, regional government employs layout design and planning as 
the basis to make judgment upon market changes, deploy regional resources, 
enhance regional competitiveness, realize the best regional TFP and achieve 
sustainable economic and social development in the region.
1.3  DRP model of regional government resource 
allocation
1.3.1  The concept of resources
According to Cihai (online), a large-scale authoritative Chinese dictionary and 
encyclopedia, 资源 (resource) is “a source of material, often referred to as a 
natural source of fortune”. In MBA Think Tank Encyclopedia (online), the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) defines a resource (in particular a 
natural resource) as an environmental element or condition from which economic 
values can be generated at a certain time and location to improve the wellbe-
ing of humankind at present and in the future. These two definitions interpret 
resources in a narrow sense and confine the term to the category of natural 
resources. The term is defined by Bergstrom and Randall (2016) as material 
that humankind discovers and finds usable and valuable. Their definition is so 
broad as to cover all useful and valuable materials. Yang and Pu (1993) propose 
the following definition in Resource Economics: An Economic Analysis of Optimal 
Resource Allocation: a concept relative to a particular time and location and a 
sum of input or potential input of factors in economic activities at that particular 
location in conformity with the preference of consumers and the sophistication 
of science and technology during that period.
Our understanding treats “resources” as, first and foremost, a type of existing 
or potential input factor, including natural and social resources, which forms 
the basis for all human activities. Second, resources have values in themselves 
which can be turned into social wealth through human activities. Lastly, the 
term “resource” is a holistic concept that should be defined with reference to 
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the economic activities of a state, region, department or other economic entities 
over a certain period.
1.3.2  Resource allocation and its stratification
Resource allocation is a common issue in economic management; it refers to 
a rational distribution of limited or relatively scarce resources so that products 
and services can be generated with the least consumption of resources and 
maximum gain of benefits. Appropriate resource allocation makes it possible 
to manufacture more products; provide more services with limited resources; 
realize the supply–demand equilibrium; and ensure that resources are effectively 
utilized in accordance with different categories of products and services, the 
sub-categories of the same products and services and the different producers 
concerned.
Resource allocation can be conducted at the micro, mezzo and macro level. 
Micro-allocation is the most basic; it examines how entities such as enterprises, 
universities, research institutions, regional government, etc. distribute and utilize 
their resources internally to yield desired results in a more efficient manner. It 
helps to increase economic and social wealth. It is the most basic level because it 
is based on the operation of individual entities and considers resource synergizing 
and utilization as its major concern and the heightening of output level as its 
major objective. This level of allocation chiefly investigates the direct benefits of 
resource utilization and regards the most effective utilization as its objective; it is 
the initiatives of generating effects, and the capabilities of resource organization 
and employment on the part of entities of economic activities, that turn out to 
be determinant to the effects of resource allocation.
Mezzo-allocation lies at the intermediate level of a department or a region. 
Entities at this level consider the conditions of a department or a region from 
the perspective of the market and regional government. They give full play to 
regional advantages and intensify the association between resources and produc-
tion so as to gain a higher level of overall benefits for the department or region. 
The mezzo level may allocate resources within a broader scope and in a more 
direct and concrete fashion, serving as an intermediate link or a bridge between 
macro- and micro-economic regulation, with a high degree of independence. 
Mezzo-allocation may exercise impacts upon the efficiency of allocation at both 
the micro- and macro-levels. Mezzo-level allocation in the context of regions 
is the main focus of this book.
Macro-allocation lies at the highest level. It deals with how state departments, 
proceeding from the global economic outlook, allocate resources – for regions, 
sectors, industries, operating entities, projects and programs and scientific fields – 
with a view to achieving sustainable development, social stability and prosperity 
and conducting directional regulation on micro- and mezzo-allocation through 
laws, mandates, market parameters and administrative directives.
The three levels of resource allocation are inseparably connected. They 
have their respective roles to play but form an integrated organic whole. 
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Macro-allocation is concerned with planning and guidance, mezzo-allocation 
with adjustment and optimization and micro-allocation with implementation 
and enforcement. Rational planning and regulation at macro and mezzo levels 
can exert directional influence and provide solid assurance upon micro-level 
implementation and enforcement. The difference between macro- and mezzo-
allocation is that the latter tends to be more technical and more susceptible to 
micro-level factors. Macro-level planning and guidance tend to appear in the 
form of laws and policies and are hardly susceptible to micro-level factors – and 
are therefore highly independent. Mezzo-level regulation and optimization not 
only affect macro-level planning and regulation but also exert direct impacts 
upon micro-allocation. Given a fixed volume of resources, the rationality of 
mezzo-allocation will directly affect the efficiency of resource utilization at the 
micro level. In a similar vein, the rationality and efficiency of micro-allocation 
will directly affect the full utilization of limited resources and the mezzo- and 
even macro-allocation of overall resources.
1.3.3  Categories of regional government resources
1.3.3.1  Direct resources and indirect resources
From the perspective of regional government’s control, resources can be divided 
into two types: direct resources and indirect resources.
Direct resources are directly allocated by regional government, including state-
owned resources, fiscal revenues, civil servants, policy resources, etc. Regional 
government possesses absolute authority over these resources and can allocate 
them directly according to their will.
Indirect resources are not directly allocated by regional government, but 
their allocation can be guided and regulated through policy-making. These 
resources include privately owned capital, labor, land, entrepreneurship, etc. 
These resources are at the disposal of their owners. What regional government 
can do is to regulate their flow and enhance their efficiency of use through 
fiscal, income, currency and other policies and exert indirect influence on the 
efficiency of their allocation.
1.3.3.2  Tangible resources and intangible resources
From the perspective of whether they are visible and whether they can 
be evaluated with currency, resources can be divided into tangible and 
intangible types.
For enterprises, tangible resources mainly include material and financial 
resources. Material resources consist of land, factories, production facilities, 
raw material and so on which belong to the physical resources of an enterprise. 
Financial resources refer to capital that is used for investment or production, 
including receivables, securities and so on. Intangible resources include patents, 
technology, knowledge, network, culture, reputation, skills and so on. They fall 
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into the category of scarce resources. They represent the necessary input of an 
enterprise to create economic value.
Whether in the long or the short run, enterprises allocate resources accord-
ing to the principle of maximum profits. They need to calculate the long- and 
short-term total costs, total income, average cost, average income, marginal 
income and marginal cost. Then they decide on the output, following the 
principle of maximum profits in the long term and the short term. Certainly, 
the principle may vary with different types of markets, but it presupposes the 
efficient allocation of resources. The more complete the market competition, 
the more efficient the allocation of resources.
Among the material resources at a regional government’s disposal are land, 
minerals, forests, population, etc. Financial resources can be used by regional 
government for investment. Intangible resources include those humanistic 
resources that are immaterial and invisible, such as regional culture, regional 
policy systems and supporting measures, distribution of regional industries 
and their development, regional scientific and technological development, 
administrative skills of regional government, etc. Intangible resources are more 
influential than tangible resources and can be essential to success in regional 
competition. Tangible resources, such as materials and capital, are to some 
extent intrinsic, and their scarcity can be rather confining. In contrast, intangible 
resources, which undergo a long process of formulation, can be exploited 
without limit and have advantages that are difficult to emulate and surpass. 
Regional government’s administrative skills constitute the most crucial part 
of intangible resources. Their values reside in linking value chains of various 
intangible resources. They play a vital role in the efficient allocation of both 
tangible and intangible resources and determine the output competitiveness 
and regulative competitiveness of a region.
Resource allocation determines the output level of a region. Regional govern-
ment regards effectively allocating regional resources, striving for the greatest 
efficiency of production and developing regional productivity as its fundamental 
responsibilities.
1.3.3.3  Mobile resources and non-mobile resources
From the perspective of mobility, resources can be divided into mobile and 
non-mobile types.
Mobile resources flow between regions and include financial capital, human 
resources, technological resources and so on. The flow is driven by high profits 
or low costs, which will eventually contribute to the balanced development of 
the regions concerned. However, it may temporarily cause a new imbalance of 
development between regions. The direction of flow, which has proved extremely 
crucial to the competitiveness of a region, therefore becomes the primary focus 
of regional competition. As for human resources, as the most important platform 
for personnel training and employment, developed countries draw in top talents 
from around the world and thus boost their best human resources.
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However, with rapid economic growth and the improved social environment, 
developing countries are becoming increasingly appealing to talents from different 
parts of the world. As some developing countries begin to implement policies to 
attract talent, the direction of talent flow will be reversed. In terms of technological 
resources, patent applications happen mostly in the US, Japan, Europe, China 
and South Korea. Exchanges and transfers of technology between regions are 
becoming more frequent. Capital flows from developed countries to developing 
countries, where the cost of labor is lower. Recently, it has begun to flow back 
to developed countries as labor cost in countries like China has increased.
Non-mobile resources, such as land, mine, forest, etc., cannot circulate, as they 
belong to part of the natural endowment of a region. Admittedly, when land 
property rights are clear and transferrable, land resources do become transferable 
to some degree, which is conducive to efficiency and output of land resources.
1.3.3.4  Operational resources, non-operational resources and  
quasi-operational resources
The twenty-first century witnesses the simultaneous development of economy, 
urban construction and social welfare. Viewed from the global perspective, 
national governments worldwide regard ensuring stability, boosting development 
and handling emergencies as their fundamental responsibilities; regional govern-
ments regard their major functions to be developing the economy, facilitating 
urbanization and improving livelihoods.
The three functions of regional government embody its allocation, manage-
ment and policy-making for regional resources; these imply regional govern-
ment’s economic classification, optimized allocation and policy matching for 
natural, labor, capital, industrial and urban resources, and so on.
Resources that are associated with economic development are called operational 
resources in market economy, and the major type is industrial resources. Different 
regions may choose to be oriented towards one of the three categories of industry 
according to their special economic, geographic and natural conditions. However, 
there are quite a few cases in which the primary or secondary industry develops 
along with the tertiary industry, such as logistics, exhibition, finance, tourism, 
intermediary services, commerce and retail, etc. In the west, institutions that 
manage operational resources are mainly businesses. In China, such institutions 
and agencies include those that administer development and reform, statistics and 
commodity price; public finance, taxation, commerce and industrial and com-
mercial administration; industry, transportation, security, energy and tobacco; sci-
ence and technology, information, communications and property rights; business, 
customs, maritime affairs, ports, postal service, quality inspection, foreign affairs 
and tourism; and auditing, land administration and food and drug administration, 
etc. Government organizations administering operational resources may vary in 
different countries, but their policies for the allocation of such resources focus on 
how to use them to invigorate economy through planning and guidance, support 
and regulation and supervision and administration, which is well accepted now.
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Resources that are associated with public livelihood are called non-operational 
resources in market economy and cover social welfare and public goods in the 
following fields: economy, culture, science and technology, history, geography, 
environment, public images, notions, emergency treatment, security, relief and 
other social needs. In the west, responsible agencies are chiefly social organiza-
tions. In China, however, non-operational resources fall under the administra-
tion of governmental institutions involving the following areas: public finance, 
auditing, authorized strength, literature and history, counseling, documentation, 
civil affairs, social security, poverty relief, woman and child affairs, DPF (Dis-
abled Persons Federation), Red Cross, ethnic affairs, religion, overseas Chinese 
affairs; ecology, earthquake, meteorology; and emergency, safety, public security, 
jurisdiction, supervision, firefighting, armed police, border defense, coast defense 
and anti-smuggling. Countries may have different names for organizations in 
charge of these affairs, but they allocate resources basically on the same principle 
of “social provision, general underpinning, fairness and justice, and effective 
promotion”, which is also generally accepted.
Resources that are associated with urban construction are called quasi-
operational resources in market economies and are mostly city resources used 
to form a public service system that ensures the normal operation of social and 
economic activities in a country or a region. They are also used to provide hard 
and soft infrastructure for social production and public livelihood, including 
traffic, postal service, electricity and water supply, greenery landscape, envi-
ronmental protection, education, science and technology, culture, sanitation, 
sports and other public facilities. The level of such infrastructure determines the 
image, attributes, taste, function and influence of a country or a region. Sound 
infrastructure will advance all-round development of the region and optimize its 
spatial design and structure. These resources are so called because they are in 
the “borderline areas” in western economics or, in traditional economic terms, 
in the “overlapping areas” between government administration and market 
operation, where they can be managed by both the market and government to 
serve social development and welfare. In China, quasi-operational resources are 
administered by government organizations responsible for the following areas: 
state-owned assets and key projects; land, environmental protection and urban 
and rural construction; labor force and public resource transaction; educa-
tion, science and technology, culture, sanitation, sports, news and publication, 
radio, television and film and research institutions; agriculture, forestry, water 
conservancy and maritime fishery; and so forth.
1.3.4  The theory of efficient regional resource allocation
1.3.4.1  Total factor productivity (TFP) as a test criterion for the 
effect of regional resource allocation
First, productivity is the ratio of total national output to the total input of 
various factors over a certain period of time and, together with the input of 
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capital, labor and other factors, contributes to economic growth. It reflects to 
what extent a nation or a region can cast off poverty and develop its economy 
over a certain period and how technical progress impacts on economic growth. 
TFP, in economic terms, refers to the efficiency of utilizing resources such as 
labor, material and capital. It is a variable which accounts for effects in total 
output growth relative to growth in traditionally measured inputs of labor and 
capital. It is calculated by dividing output by the weighted average of labor and 
capital input, with the standard weighting of 0.7 for labor and 0.3 for capital. 
If all inputs are accounted for, then TFP can be taken as a measure of an 
economy’s long-term technological change or dynamism. So TFP is a measure 
of productivity that concentrates on efficiency promotion, technical advance-
ment and scale effects. It is only a relative measurement of how technological 
progress improves efficiency.
TFP originated from the Cobb–Douglas equation. In 1928, after analyzing a 
great amount of historical data, Paul Douglas, Professor of Economics at Chicago 
University, in collaboration with mathematician Charles Cobb, proposed the well-
known Cobb–Douglas production function, or the C–D production function.
They investigated the impact of capital and labor on output in the US between 
1899 and 1922 on the basis of data from relevant historical literature. They 
posited that, provided the unchanged technical conditions, the relation between 
output and input of labor and capital could be represented by the formula:
Y AK L= α β  (1-1)
In the formula, Y represents output, A technical level, K capital input, and L 
labor input; α and β are the output elasticity of capital and labor, respectively.
α is output elasticity of capital, which means when the input of capital increases 
by 1 percent, the output increases by α percent. β is output elasticity of labor, 
which means that when the input of labor increases by 1 percent, the output 
increases by β percent. A is a constant, or efficiency coefficient. Under normal 
circumstances, α β+ = 1. In the description of C–D production function at 
the early stage, A is considered a constant. In fact, the most straightforward 
interpretation is that the C–D production function is the relation between 
output and input at a certain time. Therefore, on condition that α is known, 
the technical level represented as A can be measured as follows:
A Y K L Y K L= = −/ ( ) / ( )α β α α1  (1-2)
The proposition of the C–D production function marks a turn in production 
theory from pure theoretical deduction to empirical analyses of production, 
thus laying a solid foundation for the development of modern economics. 
However, it is not without defects. Some hypotheses of the equation are at 
odds with reality. For example, technical progress may have different impacts on 
different samples. In addition, in the study of production function, sample data 
are often collected in the light of time sequence. Different samples represent 
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different times. However, technical progress is closely related to time. Thus, 
the conclusion is not valid if the impact of technical progress on productivity 
is not taken into account.
Due to the above defects, researchers made substantial modifications to the 
C–D function which rendered it more applicable. Its theoretical value and 
applicability were becoming more widely accepted. J. Tinbergen, R. M. Solow, E. 
Denison and Dale W. Jorgenson all made significant contributions in this aspect.
In 1942, J. Tinbergen, a Dutch economist, argued that a time exponent 
should be added to measure technical progress. Then the constant A in the 
C–D production function is replaced with a time-varying parameter At. The 
exponential form is: A A et rt= 0 (A0, r are constant). Meanwhile, the input of 
capital and labor are marked with the time as in K(t) and L(t). The original 
C–D function is revised as follows:
y t A e K t L trt( ) = ( ) ( )0
α β  (1-3)
Equation (1-3) is Tinbergen’s dynamic C–D production function. The new 
model changes the initial function, in which the relation between input of 
production factors and output should be measured on condition of unchanged 
technical level, which makes it possible to measure technological dynamism in 
production.
In 1957, Robert M. Solow introduced a technical coefficient into the produc-
tion function, thus generating an explicit formulation of technical progress. He 
established the residual method for measuring technical progress. Based on the 
hypothesis of neutral technical progress, he further develops the well-known 
formula of growth rate:








= + +α β  (1-4)
The formula suggests that the growth of output is dependent on the increase 
of input of capital and labor as well as technical progress.
Solow (1957) offered a unifying account of economic theories of production 
and proposed an econometric approach to production function. It was the first 
time that the factor of technical progress was considered in a model of economic 
growth. In quantitative studies, Solow considered the technical progress rate 
as the reason for the part of growth that cannot be explained through capital 
accumulation or increased labor. The number is later came to be called “growth 
residual” or “Solow residual”. In his 1957 paper, Solow proposed a revised 
model of the C–D production function:
Y A t K L= ( ) α β  (1-5)
There are two forms of A(t):
A t A t( ) = +( )0 1 λ  (1-6)
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A t A e t( ) = 0 γ  (1-7)
In Equation (1-6), λ  has explicit economic significance, representing the 
rate of technical progress, while γ in Equation (1-7) does not. However, if the 
rate of technical progress is extremely low, even when λ → 0, on the condition 
that ln 1 +( ) =λ λ, it follows that:
ln ln ln lnA A A tt t0 0 01 1+( )( ) = + +( ) = +ϕ ϕ ϕ  (1-8)
ln lnA e A tt0 0
γ ϕ( ) = +  (1-9)
Therefore, γ in Equation (1-7) can also be regarded as the rate of technical 
progress (in fact, in addition to technical progress, γ also represents other 
determinants, including policies, education, brand and so forth). A revised C–D 
production function is shown below:
Y A K Lt= +( )0 1 ϕ α β  (1-10)
Y A e K Lt= 0
ϕ α β  (1-11)
Apart from the two models above, there are other revised forms of the C–D 
production function. Derivation is as follows: log the two sides of Equation 
(1-11) such that:
ln ln ln lnY A t K L= + + +0 ϕ α β  (1-12)













= + +ϕ α β  (1-13)
Because the time of the data is disperse, on condition that the time span is 


























, ,  can be calculated with the observed 
value of samples. Then ϕ α β, ,  can be calculated by Multiple Linear Regression. 
The result may diverge greatly from that calculated with Equation (1-12). It is 
found that the data in reality are inconsistent with the result of the non-linear 
regression Equation (1-14) because the value of t is one year. The time span 
is so long that there might be considerable technical change, which may lead 
to inconsistent results. That is why there are limitations in partial differential 
equations.
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, , . Solow’s residual 
value growth equation can be transformed as:
  Y K L= + +ϕ α β  (1-15)
In the Equation (1-15),   Y K L, ,  represent the growth rate of output, the 
growth rate of capital input and the growth rate of labor input, respectively. α β,  
are elasticity of output to capital input and labor input; ϕ  is the growth rate of 
TFP. The growth rate equation can be rewritten as ϕ α β= − −  Y K L , denoting 
that TFP is the balance of the weighted linear combination of the growth rates 
of output, capital input and labor input. Solow calls it “growth residual”; it is 
also known as “Solow residual”. Solow believes that growth residual is brought 
by technical progress.
The significance of Solow residual is that it expands the notion of the 
production function by introducing the production factor of technical progress 
into productivity analysis. A new model of TFP growth rate is thus established, 
which makes it possible to measure the relation between the output growth 
rate, TFP growth rate and input growth rate of various production factors. And 
the contribution of the input of production factors to economic growth can 
also be measured by the growth equation. To sum up the above theories, the 
notion of TFP suggests that the regional government should focus on quality 
rather than quantity in resource allocation. It becomes a practical test criterion 
for the effect of resource allocation. The technical progress that drives TFP 
consists of innovation in notion, institution, organization and technology, as 
well as specialization and production innovation.
1.3.4.2  Pareto optimality as the theoretical parameter for effects 
of regional government resource allocation
Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is an ideal state of allocation of resources, 
from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or 
preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference 
criterion worse off. A Pareto improvement is a change to a different allocation 
that makes at least one individual or preference criterion better off without 
making any other individual or preference criterion worse off, given a certain 
initial allocation of goods among a set of individuals. An allocation is defined 
as “Pareto efficient” or “Pareto optimal” when no further Pareto improve-
ments can be made. There are three aspects of Pareto optimality: (a) efficiency 
in production, (b) efficiency in exchange and (c) efficiency in production and 
exchange. The required conditions for the three aspects are: (a) the marginal rate 
of substitution between any two products must be the same; (b) the marginal 
rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between any two factors must be the 
same; and (c) the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two products 
must equal the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between them.
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Pareto optimality measures effects of resource allocation from the perspective 
of efficiency and fairness from the perspective of social welfare. Hence, Pareto 
optimality seeks fairness in the sense of efficiency. However, the absolute Pareto 
optimality does not exist in reality. The prerequisite for Pareto optimality is 
a free market system and the identical and yet unchanged preference of each 
consumer. A free market system does not exist in reality. And every consumer 
has his own preference, which may change over time. Therefore, Pareto opti-
mality is only a theoretical assumption. But it could be approached indefinitely 
through raising efficiency. In this sense, Pareto optimality is of vital significance 
in judging whether an economic institution or policy in a region is conducive 
to resource allocation. Take Pareto optimality of resource allocation without 
constraints as an example.
Assuming in one economy, the number of consumers is M; the number of 
resource types is K; the cost of the kth type of resource is Ck, such that the 
quantity of the kth type of resource allocated to the mth consumer is Xk
m 
(m M k K= =1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,  ), which is a decision variable. The utility of the 
mth consumer is U m, expressed as U U X X Xm m m m K
m= ( )1 2, , , , such that the 
sufficient condition (second order condition) for Pareto optimality in resource 
allocation is: d2 0 1 2U m Mm < =( ), , , , and the necessary condition (first order 





































In Equation (1-16), i j M, , , ,= 1 2 , i j≠ , l n K, , , ,= 1 2 , l n≠ . It means 
that when the resource allocation reaches Pareto optimality, the marginal utilities 
of the same type of resource for different consumers are the same.
Pareto optimality represents the maximum fairness in resource allocation. It 
is an important theory for measuring the effect of regional resource allocation.
1.3.4.3  A comparative analysis of TFP in a region
Table 1.1 shows TFP and average annual growth rate of some major countries 
(1999–2006) according to Equation (1-16).
The average of TFP in major countries from 1999 to 2006 reveals that northern 
European countries like Norway and Sweden rank highest, while the ranks of 
countries in Europe and the US are above 20. Brazil, Russia and China are at 
the bottom. The TFP of China is only 1.194. It indicates that the cutting-edge 
technologies and mature institutions in European countries and the US play a 
critical role in boosting economic growth. Economic growth in China is merely 
driven by external expansion without much impact from technical progress. In 
terms of average annual growth rate, Hungary, Russia and Korea are the fastest, 
with rates over 5 percent. For most of the developed countries, the steady-state 
economy makes it difficult to spur economic growth, which largely depends on 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to extend their PPF (production-possibility frontier) would fail to maintain 
appropriate growth. This is why France, the US and Japan are at the bottom in 
the ranking of growth rate. The rate of Japan even goes below zero, to −1.816 
percent. The growth rate of China is 1.287 percent, which is not a very high 
number. Judging from TFP over the years, the value is not stable. It seems to 
be related to the lack of government leading in institutional, organizational, 
notional and technical innovation. Therefore, an efficient resource allocation by 
the government may significantly improve TFP.
1.3.5  Design of DRP based on regional government competition
Regional government competition aims to raise TFP through optimizing regional 
resource allocation. Regional government competition is, in essence, the competi-
tion of GFL – the regional government’s decision-making capabilities in resource 
allocation. The increasing amount of information makes it more difficult to make 
decisions. The previous “wading across the stream by feeling stones” approach 
becomes inappropriate in today’s management, which calls forth a data-driven 
and scientific approach. The DRP (distribution requirement planning) provides 
such a theoretical framework for decision-making in regional administration.
1.3.5.1 The rationale for DRP design
The DRP of regional government aims at improving TFP. Therefore, how to 
raise TFP is the basic concern in the design of DRP. The increase of TFP can 
be driven by innovations in notion, institution, organization and technology. The 
four types of innovation have different orientations. For example, technological 
and organizational innovation is oriented towards enterprises and concerned 
with the allocation and management of operational resources. Institutional and 
notional innovation, on the other hand, is oriented towards government and 
concerned with the allocation and management of non-operational resources. 
Hence, regional government should conduct institutional and notional innova-
tions and lead enterprises to make technological and organizational innovations 
as well so as to achieve rapid growth of TFP.
1.3.5.2 The criteria for DRP design
DRP is a systemic approach to regional resource allocation, which can be used 
to collect and process resource information inside and outside the region and to 
conduct targeted analysis and management over regional resources. The approach 
helps to achieve projected goals and benefits by optimizing resource allocation 
and enhancing regional administration. Therefore, the design of a DRP model 
should aim at improving the region’s mode of administration, administration 
level, comprehensive capacities and economic benefits.
The evaluation standard refers to a series of principles and criteria which 
are used to judge whether a project is a success or not. Stakeholders refer to 
26 Regional government
the individuals or organizations who are actively involved in the project. They 
are the individuals or organizations whose interests are positively or negatively 
impacted by the implementation of the project. Different stakeholders might 
have varied demands and expectations for the project, which might sometimes 
run against each other. Therefore, to achieve a successful project, one needs 
to weigh up all these demands and expectations and formulate an evaluation 
standard that is acceptable to all stakeholders.
The design of a DRP model should take into consideration the following four 
criteria. The first should be a more integrated management system. DRP provides 
a technical solution to the integration of regional administration. DRP is software 
that enables integrated management on material resources, capital, institutions, 
policies and information in a region. The application of the software extends 
across multiple sectors and even various regions. To achieve the projected goal, 
the basic requirement is that the software should take effect as expected. It is 
used to establish a database for decision-making and information sharing for 
the region. All the data that are used in DRP should be timely, accurate and 
effective, with an accuracy rate over 95 percent.
The second criterion should be a more rationalized operation flow. DRP is 
a solution for improving management efficiency. The prerequisite for DRP to 
take effect is that it should be used to manage the operating process in the 
region. The regional government should use DRP to conduct effective planning 
and regulation on every single link in the supply and demand chain of resource 
allocation. It reveals whether GFL of regional government has been brought 
into full play. Therefore, the application of DRP will bring a more rational 
administrative operation flow and thus ultimately achieve the following goals: (a) 
drastically enhanced regional competitiveness; (b) significantly improved regional 
administrative efficiency; (c) a regional administration that is more adaptive to 
the market change; and (iv) more effective GFL.
The third criterion is a more dynamic performance monitoring system. 
DRP contributes to the effectiveness of regional administration and decision-
making. DRP offers rich information for regional administration. Whether the 
information could be utilized to promote the promptness and effectiveness of 
government decision-making is considered a criterion to evaluate the design 
of DRP. If government fails to utilize the data offered by DRP to establish 
a monitoring system on its performance, it means that DRP has not been 
adequately applied.
The fourth criterion is a continuous administrative improvement system. The 
establishment and application of DRP will eventually be reflected in the obvious 
improvement of regional administration. A comprehensive evaluation of regional 
government performance may be conducted in the light of regional evaluation 
criteria so as to determine the extent of improvement of regional administration. 
The real value of evaluation resides in setting up a mechanism for continuous 
self-assessment and administrative improvement.
The application of DRP will bring significant improvement and innovation 
in the following aspects: administrative methods, mechanisms and foundation, 
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operating process, organizational structure, scale economy, input and output, 
profit, regional competitiveness and adaptability, regional labor force, regional 
image, scientific decision-making and information-based construction.
The application of DRP generates economic benefits by bringing improvement 
to the following areas: regional government’s financial analysis, regional economic 
growth, market prediction, foresighted leading of enterprises, resource alloca-
tion, TFP promotion, pollution reduction, resource waste reduction, budget 
management enhancement, cost reduction of resource allocation, output quality 
improvement and regional influence extension.
The application of DRP enhances the overall assessing capabilities of regional 
government in economic growth rate, resident consumption level, resident 
income level, fixed asset investment, financial balance, import and export, unem-
ployment rate and price level in the region. Government can thereby optimize 
resource allocation and upgrade the goals and benefits of regional administration.
1.3.5.3 The framework for DRP design
Internally, DRP integrates various types of resources for the region. It enables 
optimal planning and allocation for the effective utilization of resources. It also 
brings more transparent and automatic management through real time processing 
of resource information. Easy access to information of the region will enhance 
the adaptability of regional government.
Externally, DRP enables the exchange of information with economic entities 
outside the region via its network. A larger regional community can thereby be 
established through horizontal or vertical integration. DRP is used for internal 
integration of resources and external exchange of resource information, though 
the former is its major function. The system runs without limit of time and space 
and thus empowers government to exercise fast and effective administration.
In sum, DRP is an information-based system that links resources within and 
outside of the region. It helps prevent unwanted waste of management and 
resources. With fast access to proper information, administrators can make cor-
rect decisions. The system of DRP cannot be put into place without Internet 
and big data technologies.
Let us discuss the development of DRP based on big data. Big data is an 
Internet-based system of enormous and diversified data sets. It is a modern 
data processing application. Great value hides underneath data which may be 
of strategic significance to economic development, environmental protection, 
social management, scientific research and many other fields. Big data will play 
a significant role in regional economic development.
Regional government can establish a DRP system based on big data. By 
exploiting some crucial information hidden in the data within and outside the 
region, the government can better allocate resources, reduce waste, increase 
efficiency of economic activities, lower the cost of economic development, 
promote industrial upgrade and achieve sustainability. The DRP system therefore 
injects new driving forces into the economy.
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In today’s fast-changing information age, big data empower regional gov-
ernment to respond to the changing environment accordingly by processing 
massive amount of real time information, making accurate predictions and thus 
establishing a sophisticated warning system. Big data enhance the government’s 
responding capabilities and transform the management from a static into a 
dynamic one.
Now let’s come to the framework for DRP design. According to the strategic 
goals of regional government, DRP can be designed as illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
DRP provides a model of resource allocation for a relatively long period (e.g. 
three or five years). In this model, government is supposed to formulate strategic 
goals at the beginning of the period. In order to make the goals more scientific, 
rational, mobilizing and feasible, government should do the following: (a) con-
duct an analysis on macro-environments, e.g. current economic conditions, 
national policies and so on; (b) conduct a survey on society, people’s lifestyles 
and the trend of technological development; (c) make a comparative analysis of 
regional advantages and disadvantages against comparable neighboring regions in 
the following aspects: humanities, social administration, city regulation, economic 
development, population, education, etc.; and (d) make an analysis of various 
types of resources owned by the region, including personnel resources, financial 
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Regional government optimizing model





















Implementation of plans / feedback
Public participation
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Figure 1.1  A DRP model for regional government resource allocation
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After setting strategic goals, government exercises resource allocation in 
accordance with the regional government optimizing model. In this model, 
resource allocation is a multi-objective plan concerning a wide range of resources. 
The objectives include economic growth, employment, enterprise development, 
environmental protection, natural conditions, information resource, energy, land, 
policies, etc. In addition, public participation, support and opinions on resource 
acquisition should be taken into account to ensure democracy, rationality and 
fairness.
The regional government optimizing model can be further applied to map 
out the plan for “three categories of resource” and relevant measures. More 
specifically, the government drafts rules for enterprises, residents and regional 
government, which are entities in market competition, social affairs and regional 
competition, respectively. Government may revise strategic goals and plans 
according to the feedback in implementation.
1.3.5.4  The optimization of regional government resource allocation 
(DRP) based on the linear programming approach
Linear programming (LP) is an important approach in operational research. As 
one of the earliest approaches, it has developed quickly and generated sophis-
ticated methods. It is a mathematical method that assists people in achieving 
scientific management. More specifically, linear programming is the mathematical 
theory and practice for the optimization of a linear objective function, subject 
to linear constraints. The method has been extensively applied to military 
operations, economic analysis, business management and engineering. It proves 
useful in achieving the best decision-making in the allocation of limited labor 
forces, materials and financial resources.
It usually takes three steps to construct a mathematical model to solve a 
problem in practice: (a) seek decision variables according to the elements 
that might affect the objective; (b) determine the objective function by the 
relation between the decision variables and the objective; and (c) determine 
the constraints over the decision variables by the conditions that the decision 
variables are subject to.
The mathematical model thus established has the following features. First, 
every model has several decision variables (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn), in which n 
denotes the number of variables. Every decision variable represents one solution, 
and the value is usually not negative. Second, the objective function is the linear 
function of decision variables. It can be maximized or minimized depending on 
the specific issue, both of which can be called optimization. Third, the constraint 
is also the linear function of decision variables.
After a brief discussion of the linear programming approach, let’s come to 
the parameters, model construction and case analysis. Parameters: M→ the 
number of types of government tasks, e.g. the growth rate of GDP, national 
income level, employment, education, medical service, environmental protection, 
social stability, etc.; N→ the number of types of resources, e.g. fiscal revenue, 
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land, personnel, information, policies, etc.; Xm → the objective value of the 
m th task, e.g. maintaining 10 percent GDP growth, increase 8 percent of net 
national income;Yn → the limit of the nth resource; amn → the quantity of the 
nth resource needed for the mth objective; Xm
0 → the minimum number for 
the mth objective; pm → the value gained by the government through achiev-
ing the objective of m. cmn → the cost of the nth resource to achieve the mth 
objective. Conditions: in the parameters above, 1 ≤ ≤m M , 1 ≤ ≤n N , the range 
of time should be the medium or long run plan of the government, e.g. annual 
budget or a five-year plan; the unit of all parameters is 1. Thus, all parameters 
could be calculated by elementary arithmetic.
Now let’s construct a model in which the objective of each task is a decision 
variable:
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Illustration of the model: Xm (1 ≤ ≤m M ) is the decision variable; the rest 
is constant. What the model implies goes as follows: given the resource, price 
and cost needed for the objective of each mission, let us work out the value of 
the objective to maximize the benefit. Equation (1-17) represents the objec-
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denotes the total cost after using all the resources to achieve the objectives. In 







denotes the limited number of each resource 
to achieve the objectives. X Xm m≥ >
0 0 denotes the minimum objective value 
in each task. If the value is expected to be small, the equation above comes 
through transformation. Equations (1-17) and (1-18) generate the optimized 
objective value and the necessary resources of each task. Now let’s construct a 
model in which each item of resource allocation is a decision variable:




































Illustration of the model: amn (1 1≤ ≤ ≤ ≤m M n N, .) is the decision variable; 
the rest is constant. What the model implies goes as follows: provided the objec-
tive value of each task, the unit cost of each resource and the limit of resources, 
work out the consumption of each resource in each task to minimize the total 








denotes the total cost of 








denotes the limited number of each resource to fulfill the objective. Equations 
(1-19) and (1-20) generate the optimal arrangement of each resource in each task.
Calculation: the basic method to solve the linear programming question is 
the simplex method. To increase the speed of calculation, other methods are 
employed, such as the revised simplex method, the dual simplex method, the 
decomposition algorithm and various polynomial time algorithms. The above 
model can be solved when the value of each parameter is determined.
Now let’s make a value analysis. Assume that the government sets two tasks, 
and there are two items of resources available. Now the value of related param-
eters are as follows: p p c c c c a1 2 11 12 21 22 119 12 2 5 2 1 5 1 1= = = = = = =, , . , , . , , ,
a12 2= , a21 3= , a22 4= , Y1 60= , Y X X2 1
0
2
080 10 10= = =, , .
In a model in which the objective of each task is a decision variable (X X1 2,  
are decision variables, and the rest is constant),apply the above numbers to 
Equations (1-17) and (1-18). A simplex method comes in the form:
X1 20= , X 2 10= , max ,f X X1 2 85( ) =
That is: under the constraints of cost and resources mentioned above, let the 
objective of the first task be 20 and that of the second task be 10; the maximum 
benefit for the region is 85.
In a model in which each item of resource allocation is a decision variable 
(a11, a12, a21, a22  are decision variables, and the rest is constant), apply the above 
numbers to Equations (1-19) and (1-20). A simplex method comes in the form:
a a a a11 12 21 220 3 0 2 0 9 1 9= = = =. , . , . , . , min , , , .f a a a a11 12 21 22 55 5( ) =
That is: let the first type of resource in the first task be 0.3 and the second 
type be 0.2. Let the first type of resource in the second task be 0.9 and the 
second type be 1.9. The minimum cost government pays is 55.5.
The case analysis above demonstrates that the regional government resource 
allocation model helps government to determine the objectives of various tasks 
and achieve minimum cost by proper resource allocation. Therefore, DRP is a 
vital tool for effective resource allocation (achieving regional economic growth). 
It provides an important rationale for a regional government to formulate 
sustainable policies and initiatives.
2.1  Theories of government resource allocation
2.1.1  Marxist economics and resource allocation
In Marxist economics, the theory of resource allocation mainly deals with the 
value distribution of resources and their categorization. The theory of labor 
value elaborates on the nature (quality and quantity), the representation and the 
operating law of value. It discusses the resource allocation model in a commod-
ity economy from the perspectives of labor time, exchange of equal values and 
market demand. The theory of production focuses on surplus value of produc-
tion. Surplus value production is the basic characteristic of capitalist commodity 
production. In fact, it explains the allocation of production factors. Whether the 
allocation is rational depends on whether it contributes to surplus value or profits. 
It is rational when it does and vice versa. The theory of circulation concerns 
individual capital circulation and social capital circulation. The discussion on 
capital flow in the individual capital circulation is actually a demonstration of 
rational allocation of capital factors. The discussion concerning social capital 
illustrates that allocation of social resources should be market-oriented so that 
production can be developed in an appropriate and coordinated manner, and 
resources can be properly utilized. The theory of distribution examines how 
surplus value is turned into profits and average profits, interests and land rent. 
Capital flows into sectors with high profit rates. Currency owners gain interests 
by lending while land owners earn rent by selling the use right. They emphasize 
efficiency in utilizing capital and land. Therefore, profits, interests and land rent 
are powerful economic leverages for resource allocation.
Although Marxist economics fails to explicitly discuss the issue of resource 
allocation as modern schools of western economics do, the theories proposed 
therein are indispensable parts of the overall resource allocation theory.
2.1.2  Externality, public goods and government 
resource allocation
The term “externality” was originally proposed by Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), 
one of the founders of neoclassical economics, in 1890. The term “external 
economy” occurred for the first time in his book Principles of Economics (1890). 
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In 1920s, Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877–1959), a student of Alfred Marshall’s and 
a founder of public finance, further investigated the issue of externality in his 
famous book The Economics of Welfare (1920). Pigou accepted the notions of 
internal economy and external economy proposed by Marshall and established 
the theory of externality from the perspective of optimal social resource alloca-
tion and marginal analysis. Pigou maintained that in economic activities, if a 
factory causes some undesirable loss to other factories or the entire society, that 
is external diseconomy. When it occurs, the market cannot correct the impact. 
Thus, the government’s interference is needed.
The analysis of externality goes as follows: (a) externality is produced by not 
only production activities but also consumption activities. For example, when 
production of one product is involved with positive externality, the output 
determined by the market would be too low and the price would be too high. 
The government would try to expand its supply. Otherwise, the government 
would reduce the supply; and (b) externality refers to the spillover return or cost 
of private consumption or production. That is, the externality drives resource 
allocation away from Pareto optimality in complete competition. “Public good” 
is the extreme case of externality. In his classic paper The Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure (1954), Samuelson defined a public good, or as he called it in the 
paper, a “collective consumption good”, as follows: “[goods] which all enjoy in 
common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads 
to no subtractions from any other individual’s consumption of that good”. This 
is the property that has become known as non-rivalry. In addition, a pure public 
good exhibits a second property called non-excludability: that is, it is impos-
sible to exclude any individuals from consuming the good. Because, for a pure 
public good, the marginal cost of marginal consumption is zero, it is technically 
impossible or extremely costly to prevent any consumer from enjoying a public 
good. Therefore, the government should use the power commissioned by the 
public to provide public goods such as defense, security and public facilities. 
There are some quasi-public goods of different degrees of rivalry between public 
goods and rivalrous goods. This type of goods is often offered by government 
investment or by co-investment of government and private investors.
Generally speaking, if competition is not free, or there is externality, or there 
are public goods, or there is a lack of market, or information is limited, resources 
cannot be allocated effectively. Even if the economy is in complete competition, as 
long as there is externality or public goods, the resource allocation cannot reach 
Pareto optimality. In this case, the government needs some role to play in resource 
allocation. Because the market cannot effectively offer public goods and services to 
the society, government needs to use its authoritative power to regulate resource 
allocation so as to promote the efficiency of various social resources and factors.
2.1.3  Development economics and government 
resource allocation
Between the 1950s and 1970s, the first generation of development economists 
advocated that for government to dominate resource allocation through plans and 
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planning guidance. In the 1950s, the government’s plan was highly advocated, 
while the market price system was downgraded by structuralism. The develop-
ment economists at this stage (1950–1975) believed that developing countries 
don’t rely on the market price system. With a limited number of entrepreneurs, 
these countries need to forge ahead with major reforms, with government as the 
implementer. The theory of development economics at this stage is characterized 
by pessimism over external economy and optimism over internal economy. Based 
on observations on developing countries, they posit that the governments of 
these countries should achieve economic restructuring and growth by means of 
promoting capital accumulation, utilizing surplus labor reserve, exercising import 
substitution, deregulating foreign exchange and planning resource allocation.
The economic models which propose the above policies include the Rostovian 
take-off model, Ragnar Nurkse’s “balanced growth” model, Rosenstein-Rodan 
and Mandelbaum’s “theory of the big push” and Lewis’s “Economic Develop-
ment with Unlimited Supplies of Labour” model, all of which are centered on 
capital accumulation. They hold that capital accumulation ensures GDP growth, 
increase of per capita income in growing population and development. Some 
structuralists are more concerned with the rigidity of demand and supply, lagging 
indicators, shortage and surplus, systemic inflation and export disadvantages. 
They criticize the market price system and call for government intervention in 
resource allocation through planning.
Between the 1960s and the 1970s, attention was turned from tangible capital 
to human capital, thus generating doubts of and criticism on the theories of 
development economics. In the 1960s, people began to realize that labor plays 
a decisive role in development. A combination of good knowledge, good health 
and skills would also contribute to the increase of TFP. Despite the optimism of 
development economists over their theories, some developing countries, guided 
by their theories, were still unable to get rid of high unemployment, poverty 
and uneven distribution of income. To explain these phenomena, some began 
to criticize policies that brought bad consequences. For example, some public 
policies incur non-market failure, negligence over agriculture, low efficiency of 
state-owned enterprises, negative impacts of export substitution and deficit of 
international payment.
From the late 1960s to early 1970s, the defects of industrial planning and 
comprehensive planning became more prominent. Criticism was targeted 
towards government failures such as defects of planning, insufficient informa-
tion, unexpected disorder of national economic activities, defects of institutions 
and deficiencies of public policies. In the 1990s, Paul R. Krugman criticized 
development economists for pushing their theories out of the mainstream of 
economics. In 1952, Arthur Lewis explained the practice of developing coun-
tries as follows: governments of the underdeveloped countries need to make 
efforts in establishing industrial centers, regulating foreign exchange, formulating 
laws concerning public service and economy, etc. Governments of developed 
countries, on the other hand, could have entrepreneurs do the job. In addition, 
developing countries need to rely on a system of civil servants, which is worse 
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than that of developed countries, and with limited abilities, they are faced with 
too many tasks.
Since the 1980s, second-generation neoclassical development economists have 
advocated that government should play effective roles in remedying market fail-
ures and in correcting new market malfunctions. From 1975, second-generation 
development economists considered development economics as an applied sci-
ence based on neoclassical economics. The focus shifted from macro-level 
modeling of the overall economy to micro-level modeling of production units 
and families. They emphasized human capital, considered technical progress 
as supplementing the Solow Model of capital accumulation and showed more 
interest in varied modes of development in different countries.
As for the relation between government and market, development economists 
now believe that it is not an “either/or” option in the mechanism of resource 
allocation. Government is an essential factor in the formulation of an economic 
system. It may substitute or supplement other institutional factors. Govern-
ment should do the best it can in the domain where it may play a role. The 
challenge is how to gain the greatest benefits from government behaviors at 
the lowest cost. Government may function in the following aspects: dealing 
with market failure (incomplete information and high cost, incomplete market, 
turbulent externality, increase of marginal profits, multiple equilibriums and 
path dependence, transaction cost, etc.), providing public goods, reducing 
poverty, improving income distribution, building infrastructure, protecting 
environments and so on.
Now let’s come to the transaction cost theory in institutional economics and 
resource allocation. Before the 1960s, under the influence of Pigou’s traditions, 
economic theories generally hold that government’s intervention should be 
employed to deal with externality, for example, imposing tax or giving subsidies 
on external causers. This tradition was later revised by Ronald Harry Coase 
(1910–2013), the 1991 Laureate of the Nobel Prize in Economics, in his paper 
“The problem of social cost” (1960), which proposed the formalized “Coase 
theorem”, which suggests that well-defined property rights are the prerequisite 
for market transaction. Coase argues: (a) if property rights are well defined, and 
all transaction costs are zero, then efficiency of resource utilization is irrelevant to 
who owns the property; (b) if property rights are well defined, and all transaction 
costs are zero, then Pareto optimality (or economic efficiency) could be achieved.
It follows from the Coase theorem that we could use market transaction rather 
than legal procedures to solve external problems. In spite of some limitations, 
the Coase theorem is of vital significance because it tackles the problems of 
externality in resource allocation by clarifying the relationship between property 
rights and economic efficiency. That paper points out that on the condition that 
the transaction cost is positive, efficiencies of resource allocation will vary from 
one institution to another. Douglass C. North (1920–2015) neatly summarizes 
that when transaction cost is positive, institutions matter. This observation 
reflects the basic notion of institutional economics: institutional structures and 
change are important factors that affect economic efficiency and development.
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2.2  Categories of allocation in the “dual role”  
theory of regional government
Theories in the west have conducted a great deal of discussion concerning the 
functions and the boundary of market and government in resource allocation. 
And the discussion has not been finalized. Some theories may overemphasize 
functions of the market and exclude the active role that the government can 
play. Some theories highlight the function of the government, which violates 
the law of the market. In mainstream western economics, the government’s 
role in resource allocation often finds no theoretical rationale. However, there 
are more government behaviors involved in resource allocation in practice. 
Therefore, it is necessary to expand traditional economics to better account for 
government resource allocation. The role of government in resource allocation 
should be revisited.
In their book Mezzoeconomics (2015), Chen and Gu establish a theoretical 
framework that accounts for the relations between externality and internality, 
private goods and public goods, resource allocation and institutional defects 
and market failure and government failure. It is suggested that regional gov-
ernment is the object of research in mezzo-economics. Regional government 
competes against other regions while exercising macro-regulation over the 
region. It sustains regional growth through foresighted leading in fostering 
core competitiveness. It is in this sense that regional government plays the role 
of “quasi-state” and “quasi-enterprise”. That latter role leads to the existence 
of dual competing entities in modern market economy – that is, enterprises 
and regional governments compete with their counterparts at different levels 
in the market so that the allocation of private goods and public goods as well 
as quasi-public goods will be optimized. The mezzo-economic theory offers a 
better perspective on the issues of externality, internality, government failure 
and market failure.
2.2.1  The dual-entity theory of market competition
Let us begin by discussing the defects of market theories in traditional western 
economics. Competition, price, supply and demand are factors that determine 
how the market works. The relations between them are issues that will continue 
to be discussed in the market theory of micro-economics. Traditional western 
economics posits that the competition structure of the market is the exogenous 
variable that determines prices, whereas supply and demand are endogenous 
variables. The objective of market equilibrium is price equilibrium. At the 
price equilibrium point, all economic entities can achieve maximum profit or 
utility. In different structures of market competition, models that determine the 
price equilibrium point vary, and so do the ways of seeking excess profit. In 
a completely competitive market, the only way to seek excess profit in a short 
period is to lower production cost. In a monopoly market structure, the key 
to gaining excess profit is to acquire the “monopoly power”.
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Under the condition of complete competition, supply and demand are without 
constraint. Curves of supply and demand fluctuate freely. The reach of market 
equilibrium price is not affected by exogenous variables, only subject to the 
influence of “complete competition”. Hence, “complete competition” drives 
all enterprises and consumers to accept the equilibrium price. But they cannot 
influence or determine the price. The price, therefore, indicates the upper limit 
of an enterprise’s marginal cost. The enterprise that cannot produce at or lower 
than the marginal cost will be excluded by the market and eventually eliminated 
in the “complete competition”.
When the competition is constrained, monopoly occurs. From monopolistic 
competition, oligopoly, to complete monopoly, curves of supply and demand 
are increasingly “controlled”. In this case, price is no longer determined by 
the free flow of supply and demand curves but maneuvered by monopolistic 
power. Those enterprises with monopoly power will “manipulate” supply and 
demand for excess profit. In a monopolistic competition market, monopoly 
power comes from product differentiations. Some enterprises rely on product 
or service differentiations to affect consumers’ preference. They are empowered 
to move the demand curve to a certain extent over a certain time span. They 
have the ability to determine the market price, thus gaining excess profit. In a 
monopolistic competition market, a few enterprises manipulate the supply curve 
via conspiracy, thus affecting the price and gaining excess profit. In this case, 
the key is conspiring relations between the enterprises concerned. However, the 
process of conspiracy is a complicated game. In a market of complete monopoly, 
a certain product is provided by only one enterprise, who possesses the greatest 
monopoly power. It can manipulate supply and demand at will, thus controlling 
the price for excess profit.
The above analysis offers a splendid theoretical landscape: under the condi-
tion of complete competition, all parties in the market gain maximum benefits 
or psychological utilities; under the condition of monopoly, the key to gaining 
excess profit is monopoly power. However, the most obvious defect of this 
theory is that it considers the enterprise as the only competing entity in the 
market. The government is overshadowed as merely the exogenous variable 
rather than the competing entity that affects the market. The government does 
not enter the market and does not participate in market competition. This 
assumption oversimplifies matters in reality. In fact, the government is not a 
type of force that stands outside the market but rather is one involved in market 
competition. That is, competition takes place between enterprises and between 
regional governments. In fact, the success of China’s economic model is the 
result of two-layered competition in the market. It is therefore necessary to 
revisit market competition theory.
It is now time to discuss the dual-entity theory for two-layered market 
competition, which suggests that there are two types of competing entities 
that do not compete with one another: enterprises and regional governments. 
Competing relationships only occur between enterprises and between regional 
governments, but not between enterprises and regional governments. The 
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competition between enterprises follows the law of market economy, whereas 
that between regional governments follows the law of super-economy. Enterprises 
compete for economic benefits, the pursuit of which is constrained by the law 
of economy; this has been well explored in traditional western economics. Then, 
according to the super law of economy, the ultimate goal of regional govern-
ment competition is more than just economic benefits. The multi-objective 
competition at this level is not merely subject to the law of economy. It is a 
new subject that deserves serious investigation.
Regarding enterprise-level market competition, its modes and degrees are 
closely related to market types. Under the condition of complete competition, 
there are plentiful economic entities in small scales. Thus, they are not in a 
position to affect the supply–demand relationship through buying and selling, 
nor can they affect the market price. Every one of them is a passive recipient of 
the market price. Meanwhile, market products are the same quality – products 
do not vary from one producer to another. Because a product of any individual 
seller is the same as that of other competitors, there is no way to manipulate 
the price. Various types of resources circulate freely without constraints in a 
market of complete competition. Labor also circulates without obstacles across 
regions, sectors, industries and enterprises. Any owner of production factors 
cannot monopolize input of factors. New capital flows into the market freely 
and the existent capital can withdraw from the market without difficulty. Market 
information is complete and balanced. That means both enterprises and residents 
can gain complete market information without deceit. As a result, competition 
between enterprises is chiefly realized through reduction of cost. In the long run, 
enterprises can only gain average profit rather than surplus profit. The market is 
the most effective when the enterprise is in the long-term equilibrium. However, 
this kind of market with complete competition is so idealized that non-differential 
products will not be able to meet diversified demands of consumers. Therefore, 
a market of complete competition is an idealized proposition and can only serve 
as a frame of reference for actual market analysis.
A monopolistic market is a market structure in which only one enterprise 
offers all products and services to the market in one industry. The products 
cannot be substituted by other products. There are barriers for other enterprises 
to enter such an industry. Monopoly occurs for several reasons. First, material 
and technical conditions are the major reason why only a few or one enterprise is 
present in an industry. Second, some man-made or legal factors constitute entry 
barriers of an industry. Finally, some enterprises possess scarce resources due to 
their geographical advantages. Monopolistic enterprises gain long-term excess 
profit. Monopoly leads to poor output, high market price and low efficiency 
of resource allocation. Therefore, governments should adopt anti-monopoly 
policies.
Numerous consumers and enterprises exist in a monopolistic competition 
market. Manufacturers sell products that are differentiated from one another but 
are substitutable to a great extent. Thus, competition and monopoly co-exist in 
the market. In the long run, enterprises can enter or exit an industry freely. In 
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the short run, however, enterprises of monopolistic competition can only adjust 
the variable input of production factors, and there is no enterprise that enters or 
exits the industry. The economic efficiency of a monopolistic competition market 
is intermediate between that of complete competition market and that of a non-
monopolistic competition market. It is considered to be the market type that is 
most conducive to technical progress. In a complete competition market, there 
is no protection over technical innovation, and thus there is no motivation. In 
a monopolistic market, on the other hand, there is no competition and thus no 
pressure for technical innovation. In a monopolistic competition market, there is 
protection over technical innovation, e.g. property rights, and there are products 
of the same kind competing with each other in the market, producing external 
pressure for innovation. Therefore, enterprises of monopolistic competition are 
believed to be the major driving force for innovation.
In an oligopolistic market, a market or industry is dominated by a small 
number of sellers. Means of competition are varied and the market price is 
relatively stable. The greatest difficulty facing an oligopolistic enterprise is that it 
does not know how its competitors may react when making decisions. Generally 
speaking, in an oligopolistic market, the market price is higher than marginal 
cost and the minimum average cost. Hence, an oligopolistic enterprise is lacking 
in the efficiency of promoting output and technology. However, due to the fact 
that there is competition in an oligopolistic market, and it is fierce sometimes, 
the efficiency is higher than a monopolistic market. On the other hand, in an 
oligopolistic market, products are differentiated to meet various preferences of 
consumers. Moreover, due to its large scale, an oligopolistic enterprise is in a 
better position to use advanced technologies. Fierce competition will speed up 
production and technical innovation. Therefore, a certain degree of efficiency 
can be found in oligopoly. In many countries, people attempt to resolve the 
low efficiency of oligopoly to encourage its competition.
Now let’s turn to market competition at the level of regional government. 
Competition is an essential attribute of market economy. Competition between 
regional governments is also based on market economy. Regional government 
takes on a “dual role” in a country or a region of market economy. Its dual 
role determines the dual-entity competition mechanism in the market system.
Market competition at the level of regional government occurs between 
regional governments. Competition should be prevented between regional 
governments and enterprises. In other words, the competition between enter-
prises and that between regional governments are at two levels. There are no 
cross-cut competitive relations, so that regional government will not use its 
power to seize market resources which should have gone to enterprises. The 
independent operation of enterprise competition should be maintained at the 
micro level and full play should be given to the market mechanism. In this 
regard, there exists no essential conflict between the government positioning 
advocated by mezzo-economists and that by micro-economists, for both respect 
the free competition between enterprises and oppose any damages to enterprise 
competition by government.
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As one of the competition entities, regional government is required to have 
the following features. First, a regional government is a formal organization 
that has a name, governance framework, rules and regulations. It is established 
in accordance with the principles and procedures prescribed by national laws 
and regulations. Its functions and their fulfillment must conform to national 
laws and regulations.
Second, regional government is a social organization under the condition of 
market economy. Different from macro-level government that purely performs 
macro-level administration and regulation, regional government has a dual 
identity of “quasi-enterprise” and “quasi-state”, which gives it the dual attri-
butes of the economic nature of enterprises and the public welfare nature of 
government. As one of the regional competitors, regional government requires 
a primary focus on their “quasi-enterprise” role, i.e. their economic nature. As a 
“quasi-enterprise”, regional government will center on regional economic activi-
ties, implement all-round economic accounting and pursue and commit itself 
to the continuous enhancement of regional economic benefits. The pursuit of 
regional economic benefits is the major motive and purpose for the competition 
between regional governments.
Third, regional government with “dual role” characteristics is administratively 
subordinate to its higher-level institution and enjoys some independence in 
legal and economic affairs within its region as a unit to own independent 
property rights of clear-cut boundaries. Regional government has full capacity 
for economic conduct and independent regional economic interests; implements 
independent economic accounting within an administrative region; makes its 
own decisions; and exercises autonomy, self-administration, self-discipline, self-
reliance, self-restraint, self-motivation, self-transformation, self-accumulation and 
self-development. As a whole, it is fully independent externally and socially, which 
means that it independently exercises administrative powers and assumes adminis-
trative obligations and responsibilities according to law. In economic interactions, 
regional government should water down the awareness of administrative levels 
and subordinate relations so as to be fully equal in their economic standing.
As a competitor, regional government has diversified goals, such as maintaining 
stability, increasing employment, promoting growth, reducing inflation, seeking 
regional financial revenues, pursuing departmental interests and maximizing the 
political and economic interests of government officials.
Certainly, a competitor faces constraints: competition is not unconditional and 
a competitor is fettered by many constraints in competition. Objective constraints 
include location of jurisdiction; political, economic and cultural foundations; rules 
and regulations of higher governments, etc. Subjective constraints include the 
preferences of voters and the revelation thereof. Preferences and revelation of 
competitors indicate that different competitors have different subjective values 
for one and the same public product, thereby forming their different preferences 
for different public products.
In terms of preferences, there exists the problem of information asymmetry. 
On the one hand, not everyone is willing to reveal their genuine preferences, 
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and there is a possibility of purposeful concealment of preference information; 
on the other hand, the revelation of preferences may be through an entrusted 
agent, who may distort the revelation. Cognitive pattern and learning of com-
petitors show that cognition is the intangible construction of reality based on 
the perceptions that arise in the mind. It operates almost imperceptibly in the 
way of thinking to help people explain reality.
Meanwhile, cognition is restrained by culture to some extent. Therefore, 
people from different cultures make different explanations of reality. That is to 
say, human knowledge is determined by social experience: one competitor may 
understand the same reality in a way different from another competitor with 
different experiences. So, the performance of functions by regional govern-
ments and the pursuit of personal interests by competitors are accompanied 
by a series of cognitions or perceptions of their own environment. This is why 
the economic competition of regional governments itself may be deemed as a 
dynamic process of spurring participants to continuously learn and change their 
mode of cognition.
The objects of competition between regional governments are the targets 
of such competition through the market. Under the conditions of market 
economy, the objects of competition are the tangible and intangible resources 
in a region. The former includes material resources (land, mines and forests), 
human resources and financial resources; the latter includes regional cultural 
quality, policy system, supporting measures, industrial distribution, state of devel-
opment, status of scientific and technological development and the management 
capability of regional government. Because of the natural attributes of tangible 
resources, competition between regional governments should be more reflected 
in intangible resources; these not only are more flexible and creative in market 
value but also enable the competition between regional governments to get rid 
of the fetters of natural resources, ensure fairness to some extent and facilitate 
the innovation spirit and capability of regional governments.
The purpose of competition between enterprises is the maximization of profits, 
and that of competition between regional governments is the optimal allocation 
of regional resources and the continuous enhancement of the efficiency and 
revenues of regional economy. The purpose of competition between regional 
governments provides them with the initiative in developing regional economy, 
limits the scope of competition to specific regions and intensifies the primary 
task of regional governments, which is to focus on the overall regional interests 
and achieve the balanced development of regional economy.
In fact, the purpose of competition is determined by the “quasi-enterprise” 
characteristic of regional government, but the other identity of regional gov-
ernment, the quasi-state role, requires regional government to allow for the 
administrative obligations stemming from higher-level government in the national 
governance hierarchy rather than focusing only on economic interests in the 
same way as enterprises. Therefore, the final establishment of the competition 
objectives of regional government actually involves the setting of indexes for 
its performance appraisal. How its performance should be evaluated plays an 
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important role in guiding the conduct of regional government and its final 
achievement of the purpose. So, the government at a level higher than regional 
government must follow market laws, make good use of market competition 
mechanisms and objectively draw up the plan for evaluation of the performance 
of regional government from a broader perspective. Only by doing so is it pos-
sible for competition between regional governments to develop in an orderly 
manner and meet the goal of facilitating the overall allocation of resources.
Micro-economics discusses the different forms of competition under differ-
ent market types, e.g. cost competition, product differentiation competition 
and the balance of power between several large oligopolistic enterprises except 
for consumers. What lies behind these forms of competition is the contest of 
enterprises in technical and human resources, financial strength, market under-
standing, innovation capabilities and management level.
In their capacity as “quasi-enterprise”, regional government also implements 
financial budget control, which is similar to the management of enterprise costs, 
and aims at the highest revenues at the lowest cost. An enterprise uses different 
forms of competition when confronted with different types of market. Likewise, 
regional government adopts corresponding guiding means under the general 
trend and follows the status quo of the market and enterprises to achieve the 
growth of regional economic interests and carry out the competition with differ-
ent regional governments. Under the precondition of enhancing tax utilization 
efficiency, everything provided by regional government for enterprises – includ-
ing good technical services, talent services, fund services, cultural atmosphere, 
innovation support, policy guidance and infrastructure – and all the efforts they 
make to break the obstacles against market competition will become the major 
aspects of competition between regional governments. The entire competition 
shall be based on the highly efficient use of the financial budget.
Some discussions should be conducted concerning the relation between the 
two-layered competition types in the dual-entity system. Comparison is first to 
be made of inter-enterprise competition and the economic competition between 
regional governments.
The purpose of competition is to obtain the objects that are supposed to 
meet common needs. In other words, competition is the result of needs, 
without which competition will not be generated. For both enterprises and 
regional governments, the original drive of competition is to satisfy “needs”. 
Inter-enterprise competition differs from the economic competition between 
regional governments in types, process, entities, objectives, types of market, 
types of products and institutional arrangement, as shown in Table 2.1.
Although market competition can be analogous to the economic competition 
between regional governments to a great extent, the two types differ considerably 
in many ways, for example, in objective functions, constraint conditions and 
relevant variants of the competitors. The starting point of both is the maximiza-
tion of interests, but for enterprises, interests include “profits” only, while for 
regional governments, interests include both economic benefits and political 
benefits. For regional government, the means of competition is to provide public 
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products, and the mode of action is to use illiquid economic elements to boost or 
constrain liquid economic elements. The economic competition between regional 
governments propels them to provide better regional public products and 
services – e.g. building good infrastructure for transport, communications and 
energy, simplifying administrative formalities, enhancing administrative efficiency 
and safeguarding the economic order. That means that regional governments 
need to continuously increase the input of illiquid elements to attract the inflow 
of scarce elements, such as funds, technology, talents and information; enable 
enterprises to take part in economic competition at lower business cost; intensify 
the industrial concentration and upgrading within the region; and promote the 
prioritized development of regional economy. Meanwhile, the excessive and 
even vicious competition between regional governments will also cause regional 
protectionism and the use of administrative power to restrict the outflow of 
economic elements. Therefore, the rationale for the economic competition 
between regional governments has its distinctive characteristics.
The dual-entity competition is a two-level competition system consisting of 
competition between enterprises and that between regional governments. The 
two systems are mutually independent and yet related to jointly constitute a 
dual-entity competition system in market economy.
First, enterprise competition and regional government competition are mutu-
ally independent double-loop operational systems. The former takes place only 
between enterprises, in which case government may only function as the main-
tainer of market competition environment and its fairness through policy-making, 
Table 2.1  Comparison of inter-enterprise competition and the economic competition 
between regional governments
Items Enterprises Regional governments
Competition process Economic process Political process
Types of market Four types of market Similar to monopolistic 
competition and oligopolistic 
market
Types of competition Competition of 
products and cost
Competition of resources and 
institution
Market players Entrepreneurs Regional governments
Goals of competition Maximization of 
profits
Multiple goals including 
maximization of regional 
revenues
Types of products General products and 
services
Formal institution
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institutional arrangement and environment, instead of being an equal subject 
like enterprises to get involved in enterprise competition or directly intervening 
in the micro-economic affairs of enterprises. The latter unfolds only between 
regional governments, which are market players engaged in equal competition 
to compete in the capability of allocating regional resources and the created 
efficiency and benefits of regional economy. With the basis of respecting market 
competition laws, it will not incorporate inter-enterprise competition into the 
system. Thus, they are competition systems operating at two levels, independently 
of each other.
Second, the competition system of regional governments is based on the 
competition system of enterprises and plays the role of maintaining and guid-
ing the latter. Enterprise competition is the fundamental attribute of market 
economy and a major factor for market economy to become revitalized. An 
economy without enterprise competition cannot be called a market economy, 
so enterprise-level competition is the foundation for market competition. The 
system of competition between regional governments also has as its basis the 
competition between enterprises within the region and centers around services 
for it. Without inter-enterprise competition, the competition between regional 
governments will evolve into a power struggle and be completely devoid of the 
basic attributes of a market economy. It follows that under the market economy 
system there is bound to exist enterprise-level competition, which in turn 
drives the competition between regional governments. All this stems from the 
operation of market mechanisms. Obviously, the competition between regional 
governments highlights “foresighted leading” in such aspects as institution, 
policy-making, environment creation and competition purposes. Therefore, the 
competition between regional governments takes place on a level higher than 
inter-enterprise competition, playing definitive roles in guiding and helping the 
latter. The two are not completely separate or cross-relations but form a close 
connection of mutual underpinning and influence on the basis of the “fore-
sighted leading” mechanism of the former. Instead, they are two independent 
competition systems of seamless connection, which signifies that the “boundary 
delimitation” between them has become a crucial issue for successfully handling 
the two systems.
2.2.2  The dual role theory of regional government
The conceptualization of dual-entity in market competition originates from 
the “dual role” theory of regional government. The dual role theory suggests 
that regional government plays the quasi-state role, representing the national 
government and conducting macro-level administration and regulation of local 
economy within the region; it also plays the quasi-enterprise role, representing 
non-governmental social entities in the region in allocating local resources, 
contending for the support of higher-level government and competing with 
other regional governments through institutional, organizational, technological 
and notional innovations to maximize local economic benefits.
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Regional government plays the dual role in the market. As a participant, its 
direct participation in economic activities or its indirect participation in non-
governmental organization have played a significant role in national economic 
development, for which ample effective evidence can be found over the past 
decades. As a regional policy maker and executor, it directly affects the com-
petition pattern and development ecology of some industries. As the reform 
for fiscal decentralization goes deeper, regional government is now more than 
ever pursuing its own benefit maximization as independent economic entities. 
There has been an obvious tendency toward “enterprise-like government”. While 
representing the central government in macro-level administration and regula-
tion of local economy, regional government represents local non-governmental 
entities in implementing the decisions of the central government and seeking 
its support to maximize local economic interests. That has given rise to the 
multi-dimensional roles of regional government, i.e. as an agent of higher-
level government, as a representative of the interests of regional NGOs, as 
an administrator within its jurisdiction, as a provider of public goods, and 
finally as an economic organizer in its own right to seek maximized interests. 
The multi-dimensional status creates different target functions and constraint 
conditions for regional government.
Finally, let’s try to define the three categories of resources that are to be 
allocated by regional government. Maintaining stability, fostering development 
and tackling contingencies are the three critical tasks facing countries across 
the globe. To the end of fostering development, government must perform 
its functions in economic growth, urban construction and social welfare. In 
economic terms, the performance of the functions in these three areas is explicitly 
manifested in how the government aligns its policies with the categorization 
and allocation of tangible and intangible resources, including resources that are 
already at the country’s disposal and resources that are potentially up for grabs.
Category A: resources that are pertinent to social welfare, referred to as 
“non-operational resources” in a market economy. Resources in this category 
exist mainly in the form of social public goods, which cover a wide range of 
dimensions, including social security, culture, science and technology, history, 
geography, environment, images, spirit, ideas, emergency response, safety, assis-
tance and other social needs. Policies and principles for the allocation of resources 
in this category can be encapsulated with the following words – “providing social 
security, guaranteeing basic needs, ensuring equity and fairness and striving for 
improvements”.
Category B: resources that are pertinent to economic growth, referred to as 
“operational resources” in a market economy. Such resources exist mainly in the 
form of industrial resources, including resources in the primary, secondary and 
tertiary industries. Given the differences in economic, geographic and natural 
conditions, countries might vary greatly in the level of development in these 
three types of industries, although success stories are often recorded in countries 
that have opted to refine the primary industry, optimize the secondary industry 
and expedite the tertiary industry. Policies and principles for the allocation of 
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resources in this category can be summed up as follows: “planning and guiding; 
supporting and adjusting; regulating and managing”.
Category C: resources that are pertinent to urban construction, referred to as 
“quasi-operational resources” in a market economy. Such resources exist mainly in 
the form of urban resources, including public service systems (for keeping national 
economic and social activities running on a day-to-day basis) and software and 
hardware infrastructure (for providing public services necessary for productive 
and living activities). Specific examples include public utilities, transportation, 
postal and telecommunication services, power and water supply, gardening and 
greening, project development, education, science and technology, culture, 
sports, press and publication, radio and cable broadcasting, etc. Such resources 
are deemed as “quasi-operational resources” in that they can be developed and 
managed by the government, in which case they are non-operational and not 
for profit, or placed into the invisible hand of the market, in which case they are 
operational resources and for commercial purposes. Whether they are developed 
and operated by the government or by the market can be determined by these 
three key factors: the government’s fiscal standing, market demand and the 
level of public acceptability.
2.3  Operational resources
2.3.1  Implications of operational resources
Resources that are associated with economic development are called operational 
resources in market economy, and the major type is industrial resources. Different 
regions may choose to orient towards one of the three categories of industry 
according to their special economic, geographic and natural conditions. Admit-
tedly, there are cases in which the first and second sectors develop in one region 
along with prosperity in the third sector, including logistics, exhibition, financial 
service, tourism, agent service, retail sales, etc. It is another way of indicating 
goods, industries and their matching services. Therefore, operational resources 
should cover three aspects: (a) products or goods; (b) sector or industry (indus-
trial chains); (c) facilities and institutions related to those products or sectors. 
Allocation of this type of resources can be optimized via market mechanisms, that 
is, through the operation of enterprises, hence the term “operational resource”.
In the west, institutions that manage operational resources are mainly com-
mercial businesses. In China, such institutions and agencies include those that 
administer development and reform, statistics and commodity price; public 
finance, taxation, commerce and industrial and commercial administration; 
industry, transportation, security, energy and tobacco; science and technology, 
information, communications and property rights; business, customs, maritime 
affairs, ports, postal service, quality inspection, foreign affairs and tourism; 
auditing, land administration and food and drug administration, etc. Govern-
ment organizations administering operational resources may vary in different 
countries, but their policies for the allocation of such resources focus on how 
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to use them to invigorate economy through planning and guidance, support 
and regulation, and supervision and administration, which is well accepted now.
For example, consumer goods and production materials as well as such 
services as general telecommunications and transportation can all be gained 
through market choices on the part of enterprises, families and individuals, 
which suggests that those goods and service providers have to survive through 
market competition. It is through this competition mechanism that the market 
drives the optimal allocation of operational resources, thus maximizing utility 
for consumers and profits for enterprises. 
The household appliance industry is a typical example of how operational 
resources are allocated through market mechanism. Household appliance manu-
facturers continuously press ahead with technical innovation and control their 
costs in order to gain competitive advantages and greater market share. The 
industry also spurs other industries like artificial intelligence and environmental 
protection, which trigger another round of reform in business concepts, tech-
nologies and business modes. These examples show that only when operational 
resources are allocated by the market can their potential be fully unleashed and 
more value created.
2.3.2  Principles for operational resource allocation
The competitive nature of operational resources suggests that the resources 
should be allocated in accordance with market rules. The market offers or allocates 
the resources with a certain price, ensuring that people will make decisions on 
production and product use in consideration of cost and benefit. The allocation 
of competitive resources is left to the market to increase economic efficiency. 
Exclusiveness of operational resources means that enterprises can gain the benefits 
from the resources and the market is willing to offer them. In sum, operational 
resources such as commodities, industries and their related service sectors should 
be allocated and managed in conformity with the market mechanism and laws.
Operational resources belong to private goods rather than public ones, so 
regional government should not interfere in their operation. Rather, government 
should exercise regulation on operational resources in the region by means of 
capitalization, letting the market, society and various types of investors inside 
and outside the region operate them. The resources should be invested in 
accordance with market demand, social supply and trend of global economic 
development. What government should do is to optimize the market structure, 
promote comprehensive development of a market-oriented system and prevent 
market turbulence in light of predictions.
Operational resources should be allocated by the market. Hence, government 
should follow market rules. In so doing, government needs to formulate some 
basic principles or policies that conform to the market rules and specify what 
type of policy should be made, e.g. policies of deregulation, supportive policies, 
anti-monopoly policies, emergency-relief policies, etc. All of these policies will 
combine to form a policy ecology in line with the market rules.
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There are three points that regional government should accomplish in allocat-
ing operational resources: it should (a) plan and lead the industry; (b) support 
and regulate the market and enterprises as a whole; and (c) exercise supervision 
and management over the region and local markets.
2.3.3  Policy support for operational resource allocation
Regional government should make industrial policies that plan and guide the 
use of operational resources. For example, in 2013, the CPC Central Commit-
tee pointed out that government should forge ahead with the reform of the 
economic system and make the market the decisive factor in resource allocation. 
More specifically, government should adhere to and improve the basic economic 
system; speed up the improvement of the modern market system, macro-control 
system and an open economic system; and accelerate the transformation of 
economic development modes and the construction of an innovative country. 
As for the market allocation of operational resources, government should take 
a non-intervention policy.
Another case in point is that in 2005, the Shunde District government 
proposed the “Triple-Three Strategy”, namely three categories of industry (the 
coordinated development of the primary industry, the secondary and the tertiary 
industry), three pillar lines (no less than three pillar lines to be supported within 
each category of industry) and three leading enterprises (within each pillar 
line of industry, no less than three locomotive enterprises to be nurtured). 
The Shunde District government was in a position to support and encourage 
the development of some industries. When the industries were adjusted back 
onto the right track, the government began to take a non-intervention policy. 
This strategy helped Shunde District to become one of the most economically 
developed regions in China.
For the market and enterprises as a whole, regional government should not 
impose direct intervention but rather give full play to its role of support and 
regulation through policy-making. Take risk-management policies, for example. 
A case in point is the US government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis. 
To deal with the crisis, the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury issued a series 
of policies rarely seen in history. The Federal Reserve implemented seven new 
liquidity management measures to adjust the discount window loan policy 
and offered bailouts to financial institutions. The US Treasury Department 
implemented a fiscal stimulus package of US $150 billion in January 2008 
and took over FreddieMac and FannieMae in July 2008. In October 2008, 
it launched the largest ever financial rescue plan of US $700 billion. Another 
example is the ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China. The 
carriers of the existing assets were transformed into ones which could better 
utilize the capital market. The carriers were restructured into enterprises of 
public–private partnership, stock-holding, joint venture and cooperation, and 
then sold to private investors at auction. In this way, they became carriers 
of operational projects in the form of sole proprietorship. As for some new 
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operational projects, which were the carriers of the incremental assets, the 
government paved the way for their development according to regional plans. 
When there was a temporary shortage of capital or investors, the government 
offered loans to establish a governmental enterprise. Then the enterprise would 
be restructured in due course to prevent the incremental assets from being 
managed in the system of state-ownership.
The supervision and management of regional government over enterprises 
and local markets is also a vital link in the policy support of operational resource 
allocation. The US government, more often than not, issues anti-monopoly 
policies to ensure that resources are allocated under market rules. For example, 
the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 
and Clayton Antitrust Act also in 1914 all prohibit monopoly agreements and 
behaviors and curb market centralization and enterprise mergers for the purpose 
of protecting consumer rights and interests and forbidding unfair competition.
2.4  Non-operational resources
2.4.1  Implications of non-operational resources
Resources that are associated with public livelihood are called non-operational 
resources in market economy and cover social welfare and public goods in the 
following fields: economy, culture, science and technology, history, geography, 
environment, public images, notions, emergency treatment, security, relief and 
other social needs. In the west, responsible agencies are chiefly social organiza-
tions. In China, however, non-operational resources fall under the administra-
tion of governmental institutions involving the following areas: public finance, 
auditing, authorized strength, literature and history, counseling, documentation, 
civil affairs, social security, poverty relief, woman and child affairs, DPF (Dis-
abled Persons Federation), Red Cross, ethnic affairs, religion, overseas Chinese 
affairs; ecology, earthquake, meteorology; and emergency, safety, public security, 
jurisdiction, supervision, firefighting, armed police, border defense, coast defense 
and anti-smuggling. Countries may have different names for organizations in 
charge of these affairs, but they allocate resources basically on the same principle 
of “social provision, general underpinning, fairness and justice, and effective 
promotion”, which is also generally accepted.
2.4.2  Principles for non-operational resource allocation
As for non-operational resources which go beyond the market, it is government’s 
responsibility to manage their allocation in accordance with the guideline of 
“general underpinning, fairness and justice, and effective growth”. That is why 
fiscal revenues, which come from the people and serve the people, should weaken 
its constructive function and strengthen its public welfare nature.
The principle for non-operational resource allocation is to guarantee the 
provision of “social public goods”, viz. to enforce the principle of “livelihood 
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underpinning, fairness and justice, and social welfare”. Due to their non-exclusive 
and non-competitive nature, social public goods cannot be exchanged in the 
market according to the basic principle of “whoever produces gains”. Enterprises, 
whose main task is to seek maximum profits, can hardly be motivated because 
they cannot gain market recognition by offering social public goods. These 
goods, however, are relevant to livelihood and public interests. They are of great 
strategic significance to the whole society and the national economy. Therefore, 
the allocation of non-operational resources must be done by government. In 
other words, government is responsible for providing free public goods or 
services via public production or provision.
In regard to non-operational resource allocation, government needs to formu-
late a series of laws, regulations, mandates and plans to form a policy ecology that 
is oriented toward public interests. The policies should aim at addressing public 
issues, reaching public goals, achieving public interests and guiding behaviors 
of related organizations and individuals. Government should ensure fairness, 
social stability and social security. The most fundamental policies should cover 
public goods investment, transfer payment, pricing of public goods, etc. Policies 
concerning public goods investment stipulate that government should invest in 
public infrastructure and public services, providing financial support to ensure 
their operation. Policies concerning transfer payment stipulate that monetized 
investment should be made in projects of social safety and social welfare through 
social security and financial subsidies. Government should also adopt policies of 
tax reduction to ensure social stability and basic welfare in case of crises. These 
policies should function in the same way as the national government functions 
by its nature. Policies of public goods pricing vary depending on the purposes 
of their provision. They may also be influenced by their categories, operations 
and management. For example, in the fields of national defense, diplomacy, 
jurisdiction, public security, administration and environmental protection, gov-
ernment should adopt the zero-price policy so as to provide pure public goods 
and cover all their cost with tax revenues.
2.4.3  Policy support for non-operational resource allocation
As indicated above, the making of policies concerning non-operational resource 
allocation should follow the guiding principle of “general underpinning, fair-
ness and justice, and effective growth”, with focuses on distributing social 
resources, regulating social behaviors, addressing social issues and boosting 
social development.
The principle of fairness, justice and effective growth calls for GFL in social 
resource allocation from the perspective of long-term development. For example, 
government should make strategic planning for land resources to ensure their 
effectiveness and sustainability. The regulation of social behaviors requires that 
policies be made to protect property rights, guarantee contract implementa-
tion, provide and monitor public goods and services and encourage infusion 
of correct social values.
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The principle of general underpinning requires that government should for-
mulate policies that address the basic issues of livelihood such as social security, 
pension insurance, medical insurance, unemployment assistance, personnel train-
ing, maternity, work injury insurance, disaster relief, salvation, etc. Government 
should consciously steer social resources into establishing a platform for social 
development and stability. The policy support for social development should 
proceed from a global vision, aiming to establish a human welfare society that 
features sufficient nutrition, no disease, ample opportunities for business, educa-
tion and employment, active participation in communities, self-realization, etc. 
Government should focus on comprehensive social development rather than 
merely economic growth.
The “scientific outlook on development” in China represents a political theory 
that aims at promoting social development, reinforced by the implementation of 
a strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education; a strategy 
of strengthening the nation with talented personnel; and a strategy of sound, 
rapid and sustainable development, on the basis of the law of development, 
innovations in thinking, transformation of development modes, cracking of hard 
issues and promotion of quality and efficiency, so that a solid foundation is laid 
for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.
2.5  Quasi-operational resources
2.5.1  Implications of quasi-operational resources
Resources that are associated with urban construction are called quasi-operational 
resources in market economies and are mostly city resources used to form a 
public service system that ensures the normal operation of social and economic 
activities in a country or a region. They are also used to provide hard and soft 
infrastructure for social production and public livelihood, including traffic, 
postal service, electricity and water supply, greenery landscape, environmental 
protection, education, science and technology, culture, sanitation, sports and 
other public facilities. The level of such infrastructure determines the image, 
attributes, taste, function and influence of a country or a region. Sound infra-
structure will advance all-round development of the region and optimize its 
spatial design and structure. These resources are so called because they are in 
the “borderline areas” in western economics or, in traditional economic terms, 
in the “overlapping areas” between government administration and market 
operation, where they can be managed by both the market and government to 
serve social development and welfare. In China, quasi-operational resources are 
administered by government organizations responsible for the following areas: 
state-owned assets and key projects; land, environmental protection and urban 
and rural construction; labor force and public resource transaction; educa-
tion, science and technology, culture, sanitation, sports, news and publication, 
radio, television and film and research institutions; agriculture, forestry, water 
conservancy and maritime fishery; and so forth.
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2.5.2  Principles for quasi-operational resource allocation
Regional government competition may have a two-fold implication. From the 
broad perspective, it means competition of regional total factors, embodied in 
operational, non-operational and quasi-operational resources and their matching 
policies. From the narrow perspective, it means the exploitation, operation, 
maintenance and policy support of quasi-operational resources. Therefore, the 
system of DRP may also be defined from broad and narrow perspectives. From 
the broad perspective, it concerns the allocation of the three types of resources, 
whereas from the narrow perspective, it only concerns the allocation of quasi-
operational resources.
The conceptualization of “quasi-operational resources” and its analysis 
highlight the originality of this monograph and a major breakthrough in its 
theorization, as regional government competition mainly centers round quasi-
operational resources rather than operational resources and non-operational 
resources. Despite the fact that both types are economically motivated, regional 
government competition concentrates more on the effective allocation of quasi-
operational resources. The DRP model and the innovation in regional govern-
ment competition fall exclusively on quasi-operational resources.
Whether quasi-operational resources should be allocated and operated in the 
same way as operational resources or as public welfare resources is determined 
by a variety of factors, such as regional development, financial status, capital 
flow, market needs, social acceptability, etc. Generally, there are three principles 
to follow. The first is the principle of market rules. Quasi-operational resources 
have a dual property of being allocated either by the market or by government. 
They form a cross area in which both market and government mechanisms may 
come into play. Likewise, regional government plays a dual role of “quasi-state” 
and “quasi-enterprise”. The latter role determines its competitive behaviors in 
the allocation of quasi-operational resources.
However, regional government should allocate quasi-operational resources in 
full considerations of the market, as the market plays a critical role in resource 
allocation. Government should exercise its administration according to market 
rules and strengthen its adaptability to the market. Competition between regional 
governments should be benign and contribute to market efficiency, economic 
growth and social benefits. The role of regional government, therefore, should 
be shifted from an administrator that stays away from market competition to 
a quasi-enterprise that participates in competition and promotes management 
efficiency.
Both regional government and the market may be engaged in the allocation 
of quasi-operational resources. That is to say, they are substitutive for each other, 
forming a type of “either this or that” relationship. When regional govern-
ment performs its function, the market mechanism will lose part of its impact. 
Likewise, when the market comes into play, government function will lessen 
its effects. This substitutive relationship gives rise to the question of how to 
achieve optimal combination on the government–market interface. The optimal 
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point is determined by the point of contact between the equal-production curve 
and the equal-cost curve, which is the point where the output is maximized at 
a given cost or the cost minimized at a given output. It thus conforms to the 
principle of maximizing resource allocation efficiency.
The second is the principle of regulating market operations. There are two 
concerns in the allocation of quasi-operational resources: determination of 
carriers and capital operation. As for the determination of carriers, in order to 
allocate, operate and manage quasi-operational resources via market mecha-
nism, regional government can establish the project carrier by means of sole 
proprietorship, joint venture, cooperation, joint-stock and even public–private 
partnership. The carrier will make effective investment, optimize structures, 
and boost social development in light of the market demand, social supply and 
trends of economic development. It can conduct effective regulation according 
to predictions over the market.
In the past, government merely focused on providing public services and 
goods, neglecting the benefits and returns of the input, thus leading to waste 
of resources. The carrier will help improve urban administration and prevent 
possible damages and losses. Therefore, regional government should transform 
the carriers of the existing assets into ones which can utilize the capital market. 
The carriers should be restructured into enterprises of public–private partner-
ship, stock-holding, joint venture and cooperation, and then auctioned to 
private investors. In this way, they become carriers that follow the market rules 
and participate in market competition. As for some new operational projects, 
which were the carriers of the incremental assets, they should be established 
in the form of sole proprietorship, joint venture, cooperation or shareholding. 
Conditions should be created for them to become competitors in the market, 
and government should be prevented from becoming the sole carrier of those 
resources.
As for capital operation, in order to allocate and exploit quasi-operational 
resources via market mechanism, regional government should raise funds in 
capital markets by means of issuing bonds or convertible bonds, issuing shares, 
establishing project funds or taking advantage of some domestic and overseas 
investment projects, backdoor listings, securitization of project assets, projects 
merging, bundling operation, leasing, mortgage, replacement, auction, etc. 
Regional government can also raise capital through concessions such as DBO 
(design–building–operation), BOT (building–operation–transfer), BOO (building–
owning–operation), BOOT (building–operation–owning–transfer), BLT 
(building–leasing–transfer), BTO (building–transfer–operation), TOT (transfer–
operation–transfer), etc. Regional government may also adopt a certain 
mode of operation or combine various modes according to the features and 
conditions of a “quasi-operational” project. For example, regional government 
may establish a carrier with the 3P mode (Public+Private+Partner, also known 
as the PPP mode), operate on the concession of BOT or TOT or restructure 
a project into a listed enterprise in due course. In this way, government can 
resolve the capital bottleneck and achieve the sustainability of city resources. 
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And the limited public finance can be leveraged to meet the increasing demands 
for public goods and public welfare.
The third is the principle of participating in market competition. The enter-
prise-like nature of regional government determines that it can participate in 
market competition in quasi-operational resource allocation. In terms of its 
internal management, regional government can learn from the fruitful theoreti-
cal models and practical experience of business management and establish an 
efficient mode of management. Government may become important drivers of 
institutional, organizational, technological and managerial innovation. In the 
meantime, regional government is characterized by strong economic indepen-
dence. To achieve maximization of economic benefits, government is motivated 
to carry out institutional and technological innovation. The executives in the 
region gain the reform courage and foresighted thinking, displaying a type of, 
as Schumpeter calls it, political entrepreneurship.
To conclude, the guiding principle of “government promotion, social par-
ticipation and market operation” is followed in the process of quasi-operational 
resource allocation, exploitation, operation and management. It suggests that 
regional government is one of the competitors in the market, that it must follow 
market rules and that it is a guide, a coordinator and a supervisor, performing 
macro-economic functions. Regional government should provide policy support 
for quasi-operational resource allocation according to this principle.
2.5.3  Policy support for operational resource allocation
Operational resources are allocated by market mechanisms, whereas non-operational 
resources are allocated by regional government. It is the quasi-operational 
resource allocation that reflects foresighted leading on the part of regional gov-
ernment. The policy support for quasi-operational resource allocation includes 
a series of foresighted leading initiatives, among which the PPP model is the 
most significant.
The PPP model arose initially from the new public management movement 
that aimed at enhancing the role of market in public service provision. It called 
for the introduction of private sectors in the operation and construction of 
public projects. In fact, the PPP model is a quasi-public goods provision system 
that connects public departments of the whole society, enterprises, professional 
organizations and other public entities. The system addresses the problem of 
capital shortage and raises operation efficiency of public projects. Notably, the 
transaction cost theory and the principal–agent theory provided impetus for 
this reform. In the early eighteenth century, the PPP model was applied to the 
construction of the toll road in Europe. In the 1970s, countries like the UK 
and the US started to invite private entities to participate in the construction 
and operation of public projects. In the meantime, the PPP model was applied 
to public administration, thus generating a series of policies that promoted public–
private partnership. In the mid-1980s, some moderately developed countries 
and developing countries began to adopt the PPP model. One typical example 
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is the construction of Sha Tau Kok Power Station B in Shenzhen by Hopewell 
Holdings Limited, a Hong Kong–based enterprise. Later, the application of 
this model was soon extended to other modes of business such as concessions, 
O&M, leasing, etc. Countries and regions around the world attempted to 
use PPP to build major infrastructure projects. Now PPP has become one of 
the most important operating models for multi-principal cooperation in the 
international market.
Focusing on projects of quasi-operational resources, policies regarding the PPP 
model should ensure the cooperative relationship between governments, profit-
making enterprises and non-profit organizations. While consideration should be 
given to the investment objective of the private sectors, all partners should share 
responsibilities and financing risks to provide the society with public goods and 
services. In this way, full use will be made of limited resources. In a word, to 
provide policy support for the PPP model, government needs to consider how 
to formulate policies of partnership, profit-sharing and risk-sharing and how to 
exercise foresighted leading.
First, a law and regulation system must be established. The allocation of 
quasi-operational resources demands both market and regional government 
involvement. The boundary between the two sides and the mode of partnership 
must be ruled by laws and regulations. In practice, the operation of quasi-public 
projects is more complicated when the market comes into play. More uncertain-
ties may occur because of the massive amount of investment, the long-term 
partnership, the combination of private and public capital and the interaction 
between regional government administration and market cycles. Hence, a sound 
contract system and a good dispute resolution mechanism should be in place 
for the long-term operation of a project. There is the definite need to speed up 
the establishment of relevant laws and regulations, with priority given to those 
that regulate government behaviors, and to formulate laws and regulations for 
the purpose of protecting rights of non-governmental entities. Without these 
laws and regulations, it would be difficult to promote the PPP model. Only 
when the rights of non-principal entities are protected by legislation can more 
private capital be drawn into projects of quasi-operational resources.
Judging from the legal system concerning PPP in China, there is a lack of 
state-level policies for quasi-operational resource allocation, and some local or 
industrial measures or regulations are far from authoritative. Therefore, regional 
government is supposed to bring its foresighted leading into play in this aspect 
by formulating a unifying, fundamental and justifiable legal system that addresses 
issues such as delimiting roles of departments, coordination, approval, supervi-
sion, etc., and by mapping out comprehensive regulations that cover all links 
in a quasi-public project such as approval, bidding, construction, operation, 
management, quality supervision, fees and its adjustment, exclusiveness, dispute 
resolving mechanism, transfer, etc.
Second, an institutional system of contractual culture should be set up. In order 
to introduce market mechanisms into quasi-operational resource allocation, there 
is the necessity of upholding the contract spirit, which is an essential component 
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of the market economy and of establishing the contractual partnership between 
regional governments and non-governmental entities with the principles of free-
dom, equality, mutual benefit and rationality. The contractual relationship may 
be established between regional government and the public, between regional 
government and private entities and between non-governmental enterprises 
and professional and social organizations which are involved with quasi-public 
projects. The relationship between regional government and private entities 
are of particular importance, as it is realized in the form of contracts through 
negotiation of the two parties on specific items or issues, through cooperation 
of government departments and private sectors for the provision of public goods 
and services, and with credit-based business culture and contract spirit serving 
as its foundation, which poses a great challenge to government administrative 
power. Therefore, a high level of government by law is needed in the first 
place. Then regional government must strengthen its institutional constraints, 
recognize the importance of contract spirit and contract binding and infuse the 
contract spirit into the whole society.
Third, innovation and foresighted leading become crucial in the creation of 
financing models. Regional government needs to accelerate the improvement of 
policy support for the financing of quasi-public projects. Consideration should 
be given to building a government-led fund which provides financing services 
to those PPP projects that are not able to raise money from the capital market. 
The investor repays the fund after the project has gone off to a success. In this 
way, the capital raised by regional government can flow back to the pool and 
run into recycling. Consideration should also be given to taking advantage of 
the extant policies, such as setting up specialized funds for PPP projects or 
establishing exchange platforms for investments in PPP projects.
In addition to financing policy support, regional government should encourage 
financial institutions to create financing products and new modes of financing 
management. For example, a project financing channel can be established to 
offer multiple choices of financial instruments, such as commercial bank loans, 
trusts, funds, project income bonds, asset securitization and so on. By so doing, 
the appropriate mode of financing can be chosen for a project so as to lower 
financing costs, increase capital operation efficiency and thus give full play to 
the PPP model.
Finally, foresighted leading and the improvement of supervising mechanisms 
must be put into effect. Projects of quasi-operational resources are public goods 
in nature and pertain to public interests. Hence, regional government is obliged 
to protect public interests by supervising their operation. In the PPP model, 
regional government is a contract performing party as well as a supervisor. On 
the one hand, it ensures that market participants will gain rational returns, and 
on the other hand, it must represent the interests of the public and regulate the 
profits gained by non-governmental entities. Therefore, government responsibil-
ity must be strengthened for supervision to prevent potential financial risks.
Regional government competition, which is achieved through the effective 
allocation of regional resource factors, can be interpreted in both the broad 
and narrow sense. The former covers competition in the allocation of total fac-
tors, i.e. operational resources, non-operational resources and quasi-operational 
resources, while the latter tends to take place in the structural adjustment and 
effective allocation of quasi-operational resources.
The realization of corporate profits and the growth of regional income are 
both issues of input and output and cannot do without the investment and 
allocation of resources, but the ways that resources are defined and allocated 
have become dynamic processes of constant adjustment and change. On the 
one hand, the concept of resources has transitioned from traditional physical 
resources to the expanding scope of intangible resources. On the other hand, 
the dominant factors affecting their allocation are constantly shifting from simple 
factors to total factors such as technology and innovation. Porter (1990) points 
out that a country’s economic development undergoes four phases, which 
are characterized as factor-driven, investment-driven, innovation-driven and 
wealth-driven. From the perspective of the development of global economies, 
the resource allocation pattern of regional government has also experienced 
dynamic changes from factor-driven, investment-driven, innovation-driven and 
to wealth-driven. The policy eco-environment of regional government may vary 
with these phases, and so will the resource allocation means depending on the 
particular time given, so regional government must effectively judge the core 
driving force of economic growth over a given period of time and adopt a series 
of resources allocation means to guide the ecology of policy.
3.1  Features of resource allocation in  
the factor-driven phase
3.1.1  Factor-driven resource allocation: its implication
Any output requires the input of resources, and their allocation paths determine 
the extent of output efficiency. Resources generally appear in the form of factors 
of production in the production process, and production functions are generally 
Resource allocation in 
“the four phases”
3
58 Resource allocation in “the four phases”
defined as follows: in the given conditions of production technology, the material 
numerical relationship of the input combination of production factors to the 
maximum production output over a certain given period is a technical expression 
of the relationship between input and output in production, which can be shown:
Q = f (l, K, E, N)
Q stands for production output, L for labor, K for capital, E for a variety of 
natural resources headed by land and N for entrepreneurship, which may also 
represent the administrative capabilities of regional government.
In the initial phase of economic development, technology may remain at a 
low level, and no significant improvement may be foreseen in the near future. 
Lack of capital is often commonplace due to ineffective and inadequate accu-
mulation. As a result, economic growth tends to be achieved and sustained 
simply through the increasing input of labor, land, natural resources and other 
production factors. This mode of economic growth is simple and easy and can 
be highly productive in the short run. However, the bottlenecks in capital and 
technology will inevitably appear in the long run so that marginal productivity 
will decline, and its potentials and sustainability for development will become 
limited. Therefore, this factor-driven approach may only work in the early stage 
of economic development.
3.1.2  Characteristics of land resource allocation
In the agricultural society, land is considered a primary factor that affects eco-
nomic growth; those regions that are economically well developed are mostly 
endowed with rich natural resources and abundant labor forces and land supply, 
while those with limited land and sparse population tend to be economically 
underdeveloped. This can also be said of a region or an enterprise, the devel-
opment of which depends on the enormous input of production factors and 
their scale expansion in the short run. But in the long run, such factor-driven 
growth is not sustainable and can only be a preliminary means of short-term 
expansion. In the industrial society, land is easily superseded by capital, and 
constraints in land input are more readily overcome by technological progress. 
As a result, the impacts of land factors on economic growth gradually fade away, 
which has been evidenced by the gradual declining role of land investment in 
western developed economies. However, land resources have a significant role 
to play in regional government competition in China, without which rapid 
industrialization and urbanization will become impossible. Land expansion has 
become the chief instrument for China’s regional government to conduct urban 
operation and seek economic growth. China’s economic growth over the past 
decades has relied heavily upon the utilization of land development by regional 
government in China.
Land transfer has always been a major form of competition for regional govern-
ments in China. The fierce competition for it has forced regional governments 
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to seek the initiative of land management and development in a more active 
manner, as land is not simply “land” but has its own roles to play in attracting 
investment, financing and revenues. Regional government can maximize the 
output of land resource allocation by implementing a series of operational 
mechanisms such as expanding its scale, mode, price and income distribution, 
and thus attract more investment, achieve urban expansion, maintain fiscal bal-
ance and ultimately exercise the mode and path of economic growth. Land is 
no longer merely a production factor in the traditional sense as far as regional 
government competition is concerned. It has become a strategic resource that 
regional government can operate by means of land transfer, which amply dem-
onstrates its nature as quasi-operational resources.
It has become apparent from the empirical study of China’s inter-provincial 
spatial data (1998–2012) that there are three ways that the allocation of quasi-
operational land resource may affect economic growth. First, it exercises its 
impacts upon economic growth not only as an instrument of investment but 
as an institutional instrument as well; the scale of land transfer, the income 
derived from it and the competition for it may all have significant positive effects 
on economic growth. Second, judging from their characteristics in different 
regions, its impacts turn out to be most obvious in the eastern coastal regions, 
as the revenues from land transfer have had greater favorable effects than land 
factor inputs. Third, urbanization and industrialization are the two probable 
channels through which land resources may affect economic growth. Revenues 
from land transfer can propel urban construction, urbanization and eventually 
economic growth, and low-cost land transfers for industrial development can 
attract investments, facilitate regional industrial development and ultimately 
drive regional economic growth.
3.2  Features of resource allocation in the investment-
driven phase
3.2.1  Investment-driven resource allocation: its implication
Investment-driven resource allocation, also known as efficiency-driven resource 
allocation, is a mode of economic growth through capital generated by invest-
ment. Capital is one of the factors of production, and the separation of the 
investment-driven mode from the factor-driven mode is due to the fact that the 
force that drives economic growth has undergone a gradual shift from resource 
endowment to capital advantage, whose power, relative to those of other factors 
of production, has become more outstanding and even predominant, without 
temporal and spatial constraints. In addition, the investment-driven mode gives 
greater prominence to efficiency.
Practices have shown that the simple investment expansion of natural and labor 
resources in the long run, given that capital input remains basically unchanged, 
will inevitably lead to capital bottlenecks and the decline of marginal productivity, 
so capital investment must go alongside labor input with a certain proportion 
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of growth. Thus, the “long-term production function” is derived, assuming that 
technical sophistication is given, operations are sound and all the input of factors 
are effective; capital must go along with labor and other factors so as to achieve 
the maximum long-term output. The optimal approach should be a series of 
tangent links of isocost curves and isoquant curves through a combination of 
capital and labor, called production expansion lines.
3.2.2  Characteristics of infrastructure investment and allocation
Infrastructure, which is a typical type of quasi-operational resource and the major 
object of competition for regional government, can be distinguished in the 
broad and the narrow sense. The former mainly refers to economically related 
facilities, including transportation, telecommunications, electricity, water supply 
and drainage and other public works, while the latter, in addition to what is 
mentioned above, covers education, public health, law and order, administration, 
etc. Infrastructure is characterized by its fundamentality, investment- and time-
inseparability, spatial dependence, monopolization, externalities and publicity. 
As a major public product of regional government, infrastructure is one of the 
fundamental conditions for regional economic development. Similarly, educa-
tion, scientific research and technological development are all major regional 
public products, serving as important resources and bases for maintaining and 
promoting regional economic competitiveness.
Both government and the market can be participants in the competition of 
some infrastructure projects. Government should permit corporate groups and 
qualified private enterprises to invest in profitable public welfare and infrastructure 
projects. In his analysis of the formation and growth of public investment in the 
US, Holtz-Eakin (1994) divides public investment into four categories on the basis 
of its final purpose, i.e. education, roads and highways, sewage treatment facilities 
and public utilities, while Etsuro-Shioji (2001) combines the last three into one 
category of infrastructure public investment, hence only two categories. According 
to Holtz-Eakin’s estimate, the proportion of the four public investments above 
in total government investment in 1988 went as follows: education 20.2 percent, 
roads and highways 34.5 percent, sewage treatment facilities 7.5 percent and 
public utilities 13.2 percent. In Japan, public investment is defined so broadly as 
to include a total of 14 categories, which Etsuro-Shioji (2001) restructured into 
four, i.e. education, infrastructure (including public housing, sewage treatment, 
waste disposal, water supply, urban parks, roads, ports, airports, industrial water 
treatment), state-owned land protection (including mountains, rivers and coasts) 
and agriculture and fishing. Its corresponding proportion in public investment in 
1990 is 12.1 percent, 60.6 percent, 13.5 percent and 13.7 percent respectively.
Justman, Thisse and Ypersele (2002) believe that in terms of competition in 
infrastructure services, regional government competes, more often than not, 
for diversification. Diversified infrastructure can not only reduce the waste of 
financial expenditure but also, more importantly, make it difficult for rivals to 
imitate, which contributes to the inter-regional differentiation of competitive 
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advantages, the satisfaction diversified regional needs and the formation of a 
virtuous circle by stimulating other regional governments to enhance their 
infrastructure diversification.
Bucovetsky (1982) makes an analysis of government competition based on the 
investment public goods. He thinks that government infrastructure investment 
can produce agglomerated productive effects; that is to say, sound infrastructure 
and public environment will be conducive to the mobility of skilled labor forces 
in the region, while competition of investment in inter-regional public goods 
can be destructive. Through Nash equilibrium analysis of public goods invest-
ment models, he concludes that even if initial conditions of each jurisdiction 
are the same, the equilibrium may not be symmetrical. The problem is not 
just the excessive investment in public goods in each jurisdiction but rather 
the willingness of too many jurisdictions to invest. The stronger the mobility 
of factors in different jurisdictions is, the fiercer their competition becomes, for 
competition between regional governments for mobile factors may deplete the 
rents generated by investment in public goods.
Wilson (1999) investigated the impacts of public goods invested by regional 
governments with an inclination for self-interests upon public goods expenditure 
in the region. They argue that regional government officials are very much 
motivated to invest in public goods because it can exert a positive effect on the 
efficiency of its labor force and capital, and that more tax sources are available 
to regional governments. Consequently, the positive correlation between public 
goods input and tax revenues becomes intensified. Assuming that capital can 
flow freely between jurisdictions, regional governments will plunge themselves 
into “spending competition”, thereby reducing the welfare of the residents of 
the region when capital cannot flow freely.
Fiva and Rattso (2007), using the methodology of space econometrics, make 
an empirical estimation of the consequences of welfare competition between 
governments. The competition for welfare between regional governments will 
not lead to the inadequate provision of public goods in a certain region, as 
regional governments’ inherent motive and huge financial capacity often leads 
to excessive public goods spending.
Keen and Marchand (1997) examine the employment of infrastructure by 
regional governments to attract capital flows, which is thought to result in an 
oversupply of productive infrastructure and an inadequate provision of basic 
living facilities.
Chinese scholars Zhang Jun et al. (2007) make a careful study of the issues 
concerning infrastructure construction in China and find that after the supervision 
of economic development level, deepened financial reforms and other factors, 
the scale of competition between regional governments in “inviting investments” 
and the transformation of government governance is a major explanation for 
decision-making regarding infrastructure investment in China, which indicates 
the ultimate importance of decentralization, Tiebout competition and the transi-
tion to development-type government for the incentives for investments in 
government infrastructure.
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American economists Richard Abel Musgrave (1910–2007) and Walt Whitman 
Rostow (1916–2003)believed that in the early phase of economic development, 
regional government investment occupies a higher proportion of total social 
investment, and the public sector provides social infrastructure for economic 
development, such as roads, transport systems, sanitation systems, law and 
order, health and education and other investments in human capital. These 
investments are essential to the countries’ “take-off” in the early phase of their 
economic and social development and to their development in the mid-term 
phase. Regional government investment should continue in the mid-term phase, 
but only as a supplement to private investment. Whether in the early or in the 
med-term phase, there exist market failures and market imperfections, which 
hinder economic development. Regional government intervention must be in 
place to compensate for market failures and overcome market imperfections. 
Musgrave believed that the proportion of total investment in GDP is rising in 
the process of overall economic development, but that of regional government 
investment in GDP will decline. As an economy grows into maturity, the level 
of per capita income rises sharply. The pursuit of a better quality of life poses 
higher demands for regional governments, which force regional governments to 
provide better environments, more developed transport, faster communications 
and higher levels of education and health services, and thus a higher share of 
public investment. In addition, with the development of the economy, market 
failures are increasingly prominent, which requires regional government to 
implement legislation, increase investment and provide services to curb conflicts 
and contradictions. The consequence of these initiatives is the growth of public 
expenditure. In short, the rise and fall of public expenditure depends on the 
differences in the phases of economic development and the income elasticity of 
public goods provided by regional governments.
The US economy is already in its mature phase, so its regional government 
expenditure focuses on public service areas, such as national security, educa-
tion, medical care and old-age pensions. China is still in the med-term phase 
of development, with some provinces and cities still in the early phase of their 
development, so regional government investment in economic construction has 
accounted for a relatively higher proportion in its expenditure.
3.3  Features of resource allocation in the innovation-
driven phase
3.3.1  Innovation-driven and total factor productivity
Innovation-driven development revolves around the growth of TFP. When 
production efficiency of tangible resources, such as labor, capital and land, 
are released to the maximum and all show a trend of diminishing marginal 
productivity, what regional economic growth stems from this becomes a subject 
of great interest to economists. In the 1950s, Robert M. Solow, the Nobel 
Laureate in Economics, proposed the concept of “TFP”. TFP growth, in 
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essence, refers to the efficiency of technological progress, i.e. the growth of 
the productivity brought about purely through technological progress beyond 
all the factors of physical production (labor, capital, land, etc.). In a functional 
expression, the growth of TFP is the increase in the amount of production 
that is brought about by changes in intangible resources when the input of 
physical factors of production remains unchanged. The “total” in TFP does 
not mean the productivity of all factors but the part of economic growth that 
is not ascribable to the growth of tangible factors of production but ascribable 
to the productivity of intangible resources, such as pure technological progress, 
which is an important part of the source of long-term economic growth. The 
so-called pure technological progress includes the improvement of knowledge, 
education, technical training, scale economy, organization and management, 
but this kind of pure technological progress does not mean more investment 
of advanced facilities, higher-tech labor and more robust land expansion, and so 
on; these types of input are still capital, labor, land and other tangible factors 
of production, and “TFP” must be some non-specific technological progress 
brought about by the increase in productivity.
For regional government, the simple expansion of tangible factors such as 
land and capital creates a bottleneck of diminishing capital returns and makes 
the extensive mode of economic growth unsustainable. The establishment of 
long-term policies and institutional arrangements for sustainable growth becomes 
the source of economic growth; technological advancement, resource allocation 
and economic restructuring, which are TFP-oriented and innovation-focused, 
have inevitably become the new driving force for regional economic growth.
In the 1990s, Japan, faced with the challenges of its aging population, 
implemented the development strategy of more material capital investment. 
The constant increase in the amount of per capita capital of its labor force 
led directly to the decrease of TFP’s contribution rate from 37 percent to 
−15 percent over the same period, as represented by technological innovation, 
which weakened the driving force for its economic growth and eventually pulled 
it into a long-term standstill. Evidently, with economic growth refined to its 
unprecedented level, the mode of economic growth has to shift its track from 
the increased investment of capital, land, labor and other factors of production 
to the enhancement of TFP. Innovation must become a more important source 
for TFP. Innovation driving means TFP driving, which means quality economic 
growth and the basic force to keep sustainable growth.
3.3.2  Innovation-driven and regional government competition
Innovation-driven economic development is based on the assumption that high-
tech, management, organization and institution are primary resources. They 
can bring forth industrial aggregation by integrating science and technology 
and economy via marketization and networking, enhance production efficiency 
and transform management notions and means, organizational structure and 
patterns and institutional conceptualization and implementation. Innovation is, 
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in essence, a process of “creative destruction”. As Schumpeter once indicated, 
it is not merely external factors that push the economic system from one state 
of equilibrium into another. There exists within the economic system a source 
of energy that may achieve any state of equilibrium by means of automatic 
destruction.
Innovation is a new combination of factors of production by entrepreneurs. 
Currently, market competition is not that of prices but of innovation, the 
result of which is that entities with better productivity performance will grow 
stronger, while those with poor performance will be ousted from the market, 
and the entire economy will enter into total factor productivity (TFP) driv-
ing mode. What regional governments should do is create a sound “creative 
destruction” environment, which makes it possible to give full play to GFL 
while maintaining the decisive role of market. Regional governments will make 
competition entities well aware of the impetus for promoting TFP and allow-
ing resource reallocation and technological advancement to play a dominant 
role in economic growth; this will be accomplished by adopting the principle 
of survival of the fittest, creating a favorable environment of fair competition 
and initiating a series of innovations in theorization, institution, organization, 
talents and so on.
Resources can be tangible and intangible, and innovative-driven resource 
allocation focuses more on the effective allocation of intangible resources. 
Innovation drivers to which regional government resort include innovation in 
science and technology, administration, organization and institution. Owing 
to competition in science and technology, administration, organization and 
institution, the allocation of resources in the innovation-driven phase actually 
refers to the allocation of “quasi-operational resources”.
3.3.3  Characteristics of resource allocation in the innovation-
driven phase
The resource allocation in the innovation-driven phase is mainly manifested 
by the inclination and aggregation of human resources, capital, technology, 
management, policy-making and others towards new technology, management, 
organization and institution.
The development in the US, Japan, Finland, South Korea and other innovative 
countries suggests that the innovation-driven phase generally needs the following 
conditions: the contribution rate of science and technology toward economic 
development exceeds 70 percent; the ratio of research and development in 
innovation investment to GDP exceeds 2 percent; original innovations should 
account for a great part, and the dependence index of external technology 
should go below 30 percent; there should be high innovation output and a 
large number of patents; in terms of industrial development, innovation should 
be embodied not only in the cutting edge of science and technology but also 
in the international competitive advantage of products or services as well, 
and in this phase will form better developed industrial clusters and stronger 
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immunity against economic fluctuations and external impacts; in terms of social 
development, the driving force of innovation extends from economic growth to 
many other domains, such as social development, environment improvement, 
institutional optimization; and so on.
In terms of capital investment in global innovation in science and technology, 
the total R&D funding in 2013 amounted to US $1.3958 trillion, with an average 
growth rate of 5.2 percent between 2010 and 2013 and a steady growth trend. 
However, the global R&D funding remained concentrated in a handful of coun-
tries, with the US continuing to take the lead and accounting for 30.8 percent, 
followed by China (14.3 percent), Japan (11.1 percent), Germany (7.4 percent), 
France (4.3 percent), South Korea (4.1 percent) and the UK (3.4 percent). The 
total amount of investment in other countries and regions accounted for only 
24.6 percent. In terms of its growth rate (see Table 3.1), the R&D funding in 
China and South Korea grew much faster than the global average, while that in 
the US and Germany had grown slowly, that in France and the UK had gone 
below the global average and in Japan the growth rate was negative.
Table 3.1 indicates that China’s R&D investment continued to show an 
increasing trend over recent years and reached the level of medium-developed 
countries. In 2014, its total amount was over 1.3 trillion yuan, ranking second 
in the world. China’s R&D funding intensity reached 2.05 percent, with an 
increase of 0.04 percent in 2013, an increase of 0.32 percent over 2010 and 
an increase of over 2 percent in the past two successive years, higher than the 
average rate of 1.94 percent in 28 of the EU countries. Although there was 
still a gap compared with the rates of 3 percent or 4 percent in some developed 
countries, a trend of steady growth was clear. A decomposition of the input 
shows that R&D funding from enterprises was 981.7 billion yuan, accounting 
for 75.4 percent of R&D funding. The financial technology allocation amounted 
to 645.5 billion yuan, accounting for 4.25 percent of total fiscal expenditure.
Table 3.1 R&D funding in major countries (2011–2014)
(in million dollars, prices for the indicated year)
Year/ Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 Growth rate 
per year
China 134443 163148 191205 211826 16.4
USA 429143 453544 456977 – 2.1
Japan 199795 199066 170910 164925 −6.2
Germany 104956 101993 109515 109941 0.16
France 62594 59809 62616 63826 0.1
South Korea 45016 49225 54163 60528 10.4
UK 43868 42607 43528 50832 0.5
Globally 1325026 1368363 1395802 – 5.2
Source: www.most.gov.cn/kjtj/, Ministry of Science and Technology, P.R. China.
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According to the import and export statistics of China customs (Figure 3.2), 
the volume of China’s high-tech products trade declined for the first time in 
2014, with imports falling by 1.2 percent from the previous year. The export-
ing of computers and communication technology dominated the high-tech 
product trade, accounting for 69.4 percent of the total exports of high-tech 
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Figure 3.1 Investment intensity of R&D funds in China (2010–2014)
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Figure 3.2  Total import and export of high-tech products and their share in total 
imports and exports (2002–2014)
Source: www.most.gov.cn/kjtj/, Ministry of Science and Technology, P.R. China.
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Asia, and the main target markets for exports were the Hong Kong region, 
the US and the European Union. General trade exports accounted for a steady 
increase in the proportion of China’s export trade in high-technology products, 
reaching 19.9 percent. The percentage from foreign-owned enterprises in China’s 
exporting of high-tech products was still the largest, reaching 56.3 percent.
China’s proportion of patent applications in 2014 amounted to 39.3 percent of 
the global total, with their structure being further optimized and the applications 
and authorizations of invention patents significantly increased over 2013. China’s 
invention patent applications amounted to 801,000, 13.6 percent higher than in 
2013, while its patents for utility models and image designs declined. Invention 
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Figure 3.3 Applications of invention patents at home and abroad (2004–2014)
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Figure 3.4 Authorized invention patents at home and abroad (2004–2014)
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the previous year. Enterprise invention patent applications continued to grow 
rapidly, taking up 60.5 percent of domestic invention patent applications and 
56.5 percent of total patent authorizations, and the top ten were all domesti-
cally funded. In 2014, China reached 4.9 patents per 10,000 people, and that 
number increased to 8.9 by June 2017. In 2014, China’s PCT international 
patent applications reached 26,000, keeping its international rankings in third 
place, and the three-party patent ownerships reached 1897, maintaining sixth 
place in the international ranking.
In terms of the scale of human resources in the field of science and technol-
ogy, its growth continued to maintain the advantage of scale internationally. 
Its scale reached 75.12 million in 2014, going up by 5.7 percent from 2013. 
Among them, university degree holders or above totaled 31.7 million, and that 
number was 21.1 million in “The Science and Engineering Indicators 2016” 
released by the US government. According to the full-time equivalent statistics, 
China’s R&D personnel totaled 3.711 million per year in 2014, an increase of 
2.7 percent from 2013, and the total number of researchers was 1.524 million 
per year in 2014, a 2.7 percent increase over 2013. In developed countries, 
the US boasted the largest scale, which amounted to 1.265 million per year 
in 2012. It turns out that China’s input of R&D personnel has become the 
largest in the world in terms of both headcounts and full-time equivalents, and 
it is still on the rise. According to the OECD statistics concerning 41 major 
countries and regions, its proportion went from 18.4 percent in 2009 to 21.4 
percent in 2014, while that of the US fell from 19.9 percent to 17.8 percent.
However, viewed globally, indicators of China’s input intensity of R&D 
personnel are still falling behind the international level. In 2014, the number of 
R&D personnel in China was 48.0 persons per year/million, and the number 
of R&D researchers went down to only 19.7 years/per year/10,000, but 
in 2010 it had already reached 15.9, which shows that its growth was slow. 
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Figure 3.5 The trend of total R&D personnel in China (2000–2014)
Resource allocation in “the four phases” 69
such developing countries as Turkey and Brazil in terms of the ratio of R&D 
personnel per 10,000 employed labor force, which was over three times that of 
South Korea, France and other developed countries. China’s ranking was the 
last but one in 2014, and that of the developed countries was generally more 
than four times that of China. 
 The above analysis shows that China has been fully prepared to undergo a 
major transition from the investment-driven to the innovation-driven resource 
allocation model. However, no innovation can maintain its momentum and 
sustainability without the underpinning and protection of organizational and 
institutional innovation. Innovation in the construction of policy ecology, which 
covers such factors as management, organization and institution, together with 
government leading, is the key to innovation driving. 
 3.4  Features of resource allocation in the wealth-driven 
phase 
 3.4.1  Wealth-driven resource allocation: its implication 
 Ecological economist Manfred  Max-Neef (1995 ) proposed the “threshold 
hypothesis”, which describes such a state of economic growth, i.e. every country 
undergoes a specifi c phase in which economic growth will lead to a threshold of 
improvement in the quality of life, and beyond this threshold point the quality 
of life may decline. This hypothesis actually raises suspicions concerning the 
meaning of economic growth, i.e. when economic growth causes environmental 
 Table 3.2 Countries with a total R&D population of over 100,000 per year 




 R&D population 
per 10,000 







 R&D researchers 
per 10,000 
employees  (people 
per year/10,000 
employees) 
 UK  2014  38.8  126.3  27.4  89.0 
 Canada  2013  22.7  125.6  15.9  88.2 
 USA  2012    126.5  87.4 
 Netherlands  2014  12.3  140.9  7.6  86.4 
 Germany  2014  60.1  140.7  36.0  84.2 
 Spain  2014  20.0  111.1  12.2  68.0 
 Russia  2014  82.9  115.9  44.5  62.2 
 Poland  2014  10.4  66.4  7.9  50.0 
 Italy  2014  24.6  101.2  12.0  49.3 
 Turkey  2014  11.5  44.5  9.0  34.6 
 Brazil  2010  26.7  21.7  13.9  11.3 
 Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, January 2016. 
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and social pressures, the region may experience a shift from the ecological surplus 
to the ecological deficit; social welfare will be hurt with continuing economic 
growth, which obviously goes against the original intention of economic growth. 
Sound economic development should bring increasing social welfare under the 
conditions of a constant ecological scale. That is the driving force in the fourth 
phase of economic development Porter proposed in his wealth-driven theory.
3.4.2  Resource allocation in the wealth-driven phase
Resource allocation under the wealth-driven model aims at the simultaneous 
promotion of economic growth and social welfare, taking the economic and 
social welfare generated through the unit natural capital consumption as the main 
measure index for the ecological performance; the social economic development 
derives its momentum from people’s unremitting pursuit of good homes and 
happy life. As a result, the implication of wealth is further extended to include 
the experience of lives and the return of humanistic values beyond economic 
interest.
Research findings show that when wealth growth reaches a certain degree, 
people begin to pursue the all-round development of individuality, literary and 
art tastes, sports and health care, leisure and tourism and other enjoyments of 
life, which brings forth new economic models and new types of industries that 
match them and emerge as a new driving force for economic development. 
Economic development under the wealth-driven model tends to assume the 
following characteristics. First, traditional industries, which can absorb fewer and 
fewer labor forces, are unable to provide more employment opportunities for the 
fast-growing population, while the newly emerging service-oriented industries, 
which benefit enormously from their innovative development, can provide a 
great number of employment opportunities. Second, with the intensification 
of people’s awareness of resources and environmental protection, the excessive 
consumption of natural resources and environmental damages caused by the 
traditional industry have become increasingly unacceptable to the public. Third, 
the market potential of traditional industries are basically stereotyped and thus 
unable to provide opportunities for new participants to accumulate quick wealth, 
while the profit-seeking motive of capital is constantly generating and triggering 
off new wealth-creating industries. Thus, the wealth-driven phase is also a phase 
for discovering new economic models that emphasize human enjoyment and 
development and the potential for wealth creation and space for full employment.
The prominent feature of resource allocation in the wealth-driven phase is 
the aggregation and efficient allocation of high-quality resources under new 
economic models and in newly emerging industries, including an enormous 
input of “quasi-operational resources”, such as infrastructure investment, regional 
government administration, organizational models and institutional innovation.
The UK can be cited as a good example to illustrate this. By the end of the 
twentieth century, its traditional demand started to shrink, and capital intensifica-
tion did not lead to faster economic growth. People began to find new economic 
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models and create new industries. However, there appeared in the early years 
of the UK’s wealth-driven economy such problems as too much reliance on 
mergers and acquisitions to create wealth; keener interest in foreign investment 
than domestic investment; and hedonism overriding hard work and enterprise, 
as well as high taxes, lower labor efforts and gradual labor confrontations. The 
occurrence of these problems shows that wealth-driven economic growth is a 
double-edged sword: it will lead to the ultimate goal of both economic and 
social development if it is well guided; otherwise it may easily fall into the vicious 
cycle of hedonism and economic stagnation. What is currently happening in 
Europe, especially Greece, Spain and Iceland, reveals that while chasing human 
enjoyments, these countries are losing their economic competitiveness and 
entrepreneurial spirit and have incurred huge financial and social crises. The UK 
later proposed the development strategy for “creative industry”, which made full 
use of the knowledge and information platform provided by the computer and 
the Internet, grasped learning opportunities from the perspective of individual 
needs and acquired full information resources fairly. Revolutionary changes are 
taking place in new types of industrial creation and business models, which have 
become the major power for economic development. Practices in these countries 
and regions are worthy of serious attention and reference by other countries 
and regions upon their entry into the wealth-driven phase.
3.5  Resource allocation policies in the four phases
3.5.1  Resource allocation policies in the factor-driven phase
Smith’s theory of absolute interest, Ricardo’s comparative interest theory and 
Heckscher and Olin’s production factor endowment theory all favor the factor-
driven resource allocation mode. The theory of absolute interest holds that every 
region has certain absolute favorable production conditions, in light of which 
labor division and exchanges are made so as to achieve the most effective use 
of regional resources, thereby enhancing regional productivity and interests. 
However, no convincing solution is provided as to how regions without absolute 
advantages should develop. The theory of comparative advantages holds that 
there is no need to produce all varieties of goods in regions where there are 
absolute advantages in the production of all products and focus should be laid 
on the production of those goods with the greatest advantages of production, 
while in regions where the production of all varieties of goods is at a disad-
vantage, it is desirable to produce what is of the least disadvantage, rather than 
producing nothing at all.
These two types of regions can derive comparative advantages from this 
division of labor and trade. The theories of comparative advantage and absolute 
advantage are based on the premise that the factors of production do not flow 
and therefore turn out to be defective. Heckscher and Olin’s theory of produc-
tion factor endowment holds that factors of production may vary with regions, 
which result in regional differences in comparative advantages. That is also the 
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fundamental rationale for regional division of labor. If impacts of demand are 
left out of account and there are obstacles to the flow of factors of production, 
regions should be in an advantageous position to produce with its relatively 
affluent production factors.
The factor-driven resource allocation model has made great contributions 
to economic growth in developing countries such as China over quite a long 
period of time. China has achieved rapid economic development by employing 
cheap human resources, and southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and 
Thailand are becoming the centers of world manufacturing by capitalizing on 
their advantages of labor resources; enterprises in OPEC and African countries 
rely heavily on natural resources for economic support. Factor-driven resource 
allocation is essential in these regions for steady economic growth.
However, the factor-driven development model is unsustainable in the long 
run, owing to the diminishing marginal income of factors and decreasing pro-
ductivity, along with rising factor cost and factor-driven dividend attenuation. 
The factor-driven model can easily lead to extensive development characterized 
by high input, high energy consumption, high emissions, high pollution, low 
economic efficiency and low labor returns. With mounting pressure from the 
decline in factor dividends, continuing international trade barriers and the rise of 
other emerging economies, this model proves feeble in pushing regions forward 
from the middle-income to the high-income stage. For example, some provinces 
in central and western China with a relatively unitary industrial structure have 
been experiencing an obvious trend of economic decline over recent years. 
Shanxi and Inner Mongolia are provinces with abundant resources, with a GDP 
growth rate of 4.9 percent and 7.8 percent respectively in 2014.
Shanxi was at the bottom of GDP national rating, and Inner Mongolia stood 
at twenty-second. Their GDPs fell by 4.0 percent and 1.2 percent respectively, 
compared with 2013. More seriously, economic collapses have repeatedly struck 
northeast China, where there used to be abundant resource reserves but which 
are currently nearly exhausted. These regions are faced with huge challenges. In 
2014, the economic growth rate in Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin Provinces 
continued to decline, with their GDP growth rates standing at 5.6 percent, 
5.8 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively, and at the last but one, the second 
and the third from the bottom in national GDP ranking, with a decrease of 
1.8 percent, 2.9 percent and 2.4 percent respectively, compared with that in 
2013. Consequently, the factor-driven resource allocation model is coming to 
an end in these regions. However, it will not happen overnight that resource 
allocation in the factor-driven phase can develop its strong points, avoid its 
weaknesses and achieve a leap forward in shifting the driving mode, as regions 
and individual productivity differ in various ways and it requires some time 
for economic development modes to take a shift. Eventually, policy ecological 
leading will have a huge role to play in the factor-driven development model.
In the light of the predicament the factor-driven resource allocation model 
incurs, policy ecological leading should focus on the promotion of industrializa-
tion and urbanization, the consolidation of economic foundation, the adjustment 
Resource allocation in “the four phases” 73
of industrial structure, the reduction of production overcapacity, the monitoring 
of environmental pollution, the improvement of infrastructure and the input of 
public services. Measures must be taken to carry out the transformation of 
government functions, improve institutional efficiency and develop modern 
agriculture, new strategic industries and advanced equipment manufacturing so 
as to enhance TFP efficiency.
From the demand side, regional government should realize that demand 
gaps are unavoidable under certain economic circumstances and that failures to 
make up for the gaps may certainly affect the economic growth rate; the crux 
of the matter is how to make up for them. Demand gaps used to be remedied 
through regional government’s unlimited investment, which in turn gave rise to 
problems such as excessive reliance upon investment stimulus and inefficiency. 
China’s “4 trillion” economic stimulus program in 2008 led to the flow of a 
great part of capital into state-owned enterprises without shortage of funds, 
and that resulted in the accumulation of repeated and ineffective investments 
and the inadequacy in economic hematopoietic mechanisms. Statistics show that 
the comprehensive utilization rate of production capacity in China’s industrial 
enterprises was generally below 80 percent by the end of 2013, and more than 
30 percent of overcapacity existed in iron and steel, coal, electrolytic aluminum, 
cement, flat glass, shipbuilding and other industries in 2014 and 2015. Due to 
government subsidies and government-designated development routes, newly 
emerging strategic industries, such as wind power equipment, polycrystalline 
silicon, photovoltaic cells and many others, mushroomed overnight, causing 
serious overcapacity and slumping profits. This way of investment may easily 
self-circulate and accumulate capacity, for it uses growth to stimulate growth 
and resources to produce resources, merely for the sake of pursuing higher 
growth rates. Therefore, from the demand side, regional government must 
rationally guide investment directions and control investment scale, discard 
previous quantity and scale-oriented catch-up practices and shift its focus on 
quality and efficiency.
From the supply side, the core of policy ecology resides in activating produc-
tion factors, enhancing TFP and ensuring continuous improvement of national 
income. Traditional policy subsidies distorted the price of factor market and 
depressed investment costs. This fundamental defect in institution caused the 
distortion of the investment behavior of regional government and state-owned 
enterprises, the widespread structural excess and the decrease in the efficiency 
of investment and resource allocation. Therefore, at the micro level, reform 
should focus on improving the quality and efficiency of supply, correcting the 
distortion of financial subsidies and stimulating the vitality of market entities so 
that all kinds of factors can easily get into and out of the market, create their 
values freely, realize their values independently and generate the inexhaustible 
impetus of sustained economic growth.
In other words, the supply-side reform should target fewer monopoly areas 
or monopoly links, fewer market access restrictions, lower entry barriers, more 
opportunities for social capital participation and more equal factor prices, 
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including land, capital, labor, stronger resources and environmental constraints. 
Enterprise reforms should also be conducted, and regional competition aware-
ness strengthened. The supply potentials of land need to be further tapped, 
the reform of the land approval system facilitated, the rise of land cost curbed, 
farmland renovation enhanced and the rural property system reform pushed 
forward. Regional government should undertake innovations in administrative 
management systems and macro-level management modes, create favorable 
environments for market entities to fully release wealth and its potentials, and 
employ policy tools with a view to facilitating the optimization and redistribution 
of stock resources and improving the overall quality of national economy and 
international competitiveness.
The policy matching for land and other resources should, first of all, deepen 
the reform of land use and its transfer system; further release “land dividends” by 
means of policies concerning capital attraction through land introduction, finance 
and competition; promote land marketization and capitalization; and improve 
the efficiency of land expansion, land introduction and land finance expenditure. 
Second, regional government should standardize the transfer of industrial land 
and prevent excessive industrial land transfer at low prices so as not to incur 
land use with low efficiency and extensive economic growth. Finally, regional 
government should standardize and coordinate local government competition 
for land transfers and avoid high resource costs and low social efficiency brought 
about by excessive competition in land transfers.
3.5.2  Resource allocation policies in the investment-driven phase
The development history of the driving factors of economic growth demonstrates 
that labor input is relatively easy to obtain and that there is always shortage of 
capital resources, especially when labor input begins to show a decline in marginal 
productivity, the strong demand for capital has accumulated to a certain extent 
and the driving force of capital investment has become increasingly powerful. 
Under such circumstances, investment naturally becomes regional government’s 
most favored instrument for economic growth. Regionally, the growth of GDP 
stems mainly from consumption, investment, government expenditure and the 
pull of net exporting. Among these four driving factors, investment is the most 
powerful instrument and has the most direct effect. For regions where govern-
ment enjoys greater power, investment-driven economic growth is the most 
convenient and rapid means.
In the US and developed countries in Europe, there has always been opposi-
tion to direct government intervention in economic regulation, but in the 
aftermath of the Second World War and with the outbreak of the economic 
crisis, there has been no hesitation in adopting direct government investment as 
a powerful economic stimulus lever to ensure that regional economy becomes 
stabilized in no time. Most of the countries and regions in southeast Asia 
are typical investment-driven economies, and regional government spares no 
effort in investment, which has been playing an active role in building up the 
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economic foundation of these economies and opening up international markets. 
China is also a typical investment-driven economy with high savings rates, high 
investment rates and low consumption rates. According to estimates by World 
Bank economists, the contribution rate to labor productivity generated the 
investment-driven model reached 45.3 percent between 1978 and 1994 and 
64.7 percent between 2005 and 2009.
This model of economic growth has continued in China for over three decades, 
but it must be noted that but the side-effects it has caused cannot be overlooked, 
though it can serve as some sort of stimulus for aggregate demand and GDP 
growth. Strictly speaking, investment-driven economic growth is by nature an 
extension of scale, without shaking off the basic framework of the momentum 
for economic growth driven by physical factors of production, which leads to 
unquenchable thirst for capital and eventually a series of financial crises. On the 
other hand, this model is susceptible to capital dependence, which brings about 
the extensive growth of economy, a great deal of repeated construction with 
low returns, and the probable cover-up and constant distortion of deep-seated 
contradictions concerning economic restructuring and optimization.
Ultimately, it hinders the growth of regional economies. The new normal 
economic growth model China proposed is a reflection upon the model of 
investment-driven economic growth, and investment must be efficient rather than 
simply pursuing scale expansion. The reason why investment has not been driven 
by efficiency is that it has failed to target effective social demands. Therefore, 
from the demand side, regional government should regard it as its primary task 
to stimulate effective demands, satisfy the structural shortage of market supply 
and create new demands, so it turns out to be of vital importance for regional 
government to exercise its leading role in policy ecological construction.
In terms of investment demand, regional government should try every means 
to crack down monopoly, further broaden private capital investment, allow 
private capital to invest and operate in monopolistic industries, promote and 
perfect the construction of the GSP financial system, reduce the financing cost 
of small and medium-sized enterprises, stimulate the growth of investment 
demand and thus effectively support the transformation and upgrading of real 
economy and industries.
In terms of consumption demand, regional government should strengthen its 
guiding role of consumer markets in innovation and allow products to be more 
personalized, services more customized, brands more competitive and consumer 
demands further expanded. Meanwhile, regional government needs to adapt its 
industrial structure to the demands of the current market.
Regarding the creation of the demand for people’s livelihoods, regional 
government should increase investment in energy sources, radio and television, 
culture, medical care, pension, educational and cultural facilities; open up more 
such space for private capital; promote gradual industrial reforms; take appropri-
ate measures to relax restrictions in industrial entry; reduce regulatory controls, 
introduce new investors through capital market and other channels; improve 
and ensure the capacity and level of public services; give outlets for consumer 
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spending; strengthen support to the poor and those in difficulty; and strengthen 
environmental beautification in urban and rural areas. All this constitutes the 
starting point for regional government to expand effective demand.
In terms of tax policy-making, regional government should carry out differ-
ential reduction in taxation, arouse enthusiasm for production and consumption 
on the part of enterprises and inhabitants, reduce the tax burden of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, reform individual income taxes, real estate taxes, 
inheritance and gift taxes, heighten the overall income level of middle- and 
low-income population and narrow down income gaps.
In terms of supply-side adjustment, regional government should concentrate 
its efforts in planning the development orientations of regional industries and 
modifying the supply structure so that the supply derived from investment 
effectively meets and even leads the demand. In the cultivation of institutional 
environment, regional government should implement decentralization, clarify 
the major roles of entrepreneurs and researchers in scientific research and the 
transfer of its findings, create a relaxing social environment for innovation and 
entrepreneurial efforts, perfect the market mechanism and accelerate the pace 
of the transformation of scientific and technological accomplishments towards 
industrialization and commercialization.
In terms of financial means, regional government should enhance its capability 
of fund supply for enterprises; reduce their financing costs, and thus strengthen 
their controlling power for comprehensive operational costs; and create favorable 
conditions for the increase of industrial capital investment. At the same time, 
regional government should adopt such means as interest rates and exchange 
rates to slow down the speed of capital outflow, heighten the level of research 
and development of enterprises, promote R&D capabilities for scientific and 
technological innovation and revitalize domestic innovation and entrepreneurial 
stamina.
In terms of industrial restructuring, regional government should take effec-
tive measures to reduce substantially industrial overcapacity; improve industrial 
supply and its structure; promote market annexation and reorganization led by 
key enterprises; nurture new industries in the strategic directions of industrial 
Internet, intelligent manufacturing and other areas; and relocate government 
capital to the major industries and areas pertaining to regional security and 
economic lifelines and to forward-looking strategic industries so as to effectively 
upgrade and transform their core competitiveness.
3.5.3  Resource allocation policies in the innovation-driven phase
In terms of the policies regarding the allocation of resources for innovation in 
science and technology, regional government should increase the investment in 
innovation and improve the proportion of R&D expenditure in the total income 
and of R&D personnel in the whole staff. These two indicators are of paramount 
importance in determining whether an economy has entered into the innovation-
driven phase of development and whether it has undergone the transition from 
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the factor-driven and investment-driven phase to the innovation-driven phase. 
Investment in innovation of science and technology is more efficient than directly 
in production. Resources can produce extra benefits when they are used for 
innovation. In addition to the increase in the amount of investment, efforts 
should be intensified in the adjustment of investment structure, with inclinations 
toward human capital, especially high-caliber innovative entrepreneurial talents, 
and toward the incubation and R&D of new technology.
Only when these two major innovation-driven links are identified and empha-
sized can a steady stream of new technology be generated and investment be 
guaranteed, which will make it possible to transform into innovation-driven 
development. In the construction of scientific and technological innovation 
environment, it has become the fundamental guarantee for talent retention 
and innovation-driven development to provide sound living and development 
conditions for those creative talents. The environment thus created should 
be well suited for living, research and industrialized R&D, equipped with 
infrastructure and facilities for network information channels, platforms for 
R&D cooperation and production, good environments for innovative entre-
preneurial talents, active risk and innovation investments, innovative culture, 
etc. Policies must be made to build up public environments that can revitalize 
innovation, with the maintenance of market competition and the continuous 
pressure of technological innovation. Moreover, regional government should 
allow a certain degree of monopoly on the basis of guaranteeing necessary 
competition mechanisms by means of intellectual property protection, such 
as patents, and recognize the rights of innovative enterprises and monopolize 
innovation-generated income for a certain period of time, which can fully 
compensate for innovation costs incurred by innovators and stimulate the 
continuous improvement in innovation output.
In relation to the policies for resource allocation concerning management 
innovation, it is important to make clear that supply-side management is the 
key for innovation. The analysis of the demand side and supply side shows that 
demand is endless. The effective demand under this umbrella only refers to what 
the power of payment can support, i.e. the demand that is underpinned by 
the willingness and the ability of fulfillment in total amount of flux. It follows 
that there is nothing like “innovation” in relation to the demand side, and 
“innovation” is essentially on the supply side. Supply must meet the effective 
demand and create new demands, so it must face a lot of specific uncertainties. 
Therefore, supply-related innovation needs policy incentives, and policies that 
guide the supply-side prove to be more prominent. Certainly, policies respecting 
supply-side–related innovation in management do not negate the short-term 
total demand management, which is dominated by monetary and fiscal policies. 
The supply-side reform, with the structural reform and marketization reform 
at its core, fall into medium and long-term policies, while the short-term total 
demand management based on monetary and fiscal policies fall into short-term 
policies. They are both complementary. The vigorous structural adjustment 
and the removal of overcapacity will aggravate the downward pressure on 
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economy, which requires monetary and fiscal policies to be somewhat relaxed 
so as to release the pressure to some extent and create a favorable atmosphere 
for supply-side innovation.
Regional government’s build-up of policy ecology should focus on the com-
bination of both short-, medium and long-term policies, i.e. strengthening the 
supply-side structural reform while moderately expanding aggregate demand. The 
short-term policies are mainly monetary and fiscal policies, which are adopted 
to adjust anti-cyclic economic fluctuations. The medium-term policies focus 
on consumption stimulation and tax reduction for enterprises with an attempt 
to promote the balanced growth from both demand and supply sides and give 
strong support to innovation. The long-term policies undertake supply-side and 
marketizing reforms and employ innovation as the chief driving force for the 
purpose of activating the potentials of economic growth.
Regarding policies for resource allocation in organizational innovation, special 
attention should be paid to changes in governance structure and modes estab-
lished as a result of new economy and new business modes, with all necessary 
support. For example, innovation in financial organization must give full play 
to the role of financial support in real economy. It should center around how 
to serve real economy, heighten the openness level of finance to the outside 
world, actively develop new business and new models, improve the multi-level 
capital market construction, promote the optimal allocation of resources, solve 
the problems of enterprise financing, enhance the efficiency of capital utilization 
and stimulate the new vigor of supply-side reform.
Regarding the layout of asset securitization, measures should be taken to 
effectively activate stock assets, enhance the liquidity of operating assets, reduce 
the financing cost of real economy and promote the adjustment and transfor-
mation of economic structure. As the link between real economy and capital 
market, financial trusts can also develop new technology, new industries and 
new business modes that are related to regional strategic development, and 
expedite the cultivation of new business fields. Meanwhile, financial investment 
should be in favor of high-tech industries, promote scientific and technological 
innovation, promote technological progress and eventually expand product 
supply boundaries. The facilitation of green, low-carbon and circular economic 
development may require the integration of creditors’ rights, equities and other 
financial instruments to incorporate investors, enterprises and intermediary 
service agencies, together with other rights and interests of all parties into 
the trust platform, and direct financial capital into real economy and private 
capital into national strategic industries so as to promote the innovation and 
development of real economy. Innovation in trust policies is also reflected in 
the participation in the enterprise employee stock ownership plan, which allows 
employee shareholding through trusts, avoids the excessive distribution of stock 
rights and improves corporate decision-making efficiency. Besides, merger and 
acquisition funds may be established in case of need to assist in merger and 
reorganization, provide leverage for capital through structural design and bring 
social funding into enterprises. Private equity investment, PE products and 
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other ways may also bring direct or indirect investment, along with investment 
returns, into enterprises.
Innovation in financial policies can also be embodied in the construction 
of multi-level capital markets, opening up new capital market transactions, 
promoting reforms in stock and bond issuing and trading systems, raising the 
proportion of direct financing, reducing leverage rates and implementing the 
registration system for new shares issuing so that capital market financing channels 
are opened up for pioneering and innovating enterprises, allocation structure is 
naturally optimized, excess capacity is discarded, new industries are selected and 
multiple channels for enterprise financing are created. Measures should also be 
taken to vigorously develop overseas business, achieve globalized asset allocation, 
implement internationalized development strategies, promote the transnational 
flow and market allocation of capital factors and improve the efficiency of financial 
asset allocation by constructing a more open financial system.
Regarding policies of resource allocation concerning institutional innovation, 
regional government should strive to create “regional innovation systems”. The 
most important part of government involvement in innovation is integrating 
the two major innovation systems of enterprise technological innovation and 
university knowledge innovation, so that all links in the innovation systems gather, 
coordinate and interrelate around a core objective of innovation, forming the 
knowledge-based and application-oriented aggregation of innovative activities 
between enterprises and research institutions and gradually an internal set of 
mature innovation systems so as to cultivate regional innovation capabilities. In 
this regional innovation system, enterprises interact with scientific research institu-
tions through flexible market mechanisms. The major role of government in the 
regional innovation system is to effectively perform its functions in providing 
innovative resources; cultivating innovation entities; and removing obstacles to 
knowledge flow by means of financial incentives, investment guidance and market 
regulation; playing an additional role of coordinating public organizations; and 
building research and production cooperation innovation platforms in the form 
of regional science commissions, technology promotion organizations, university 
science and technology parks, business incubation centers and so on in order to 
provide a bridge between “knowledge discovery” and “knowledge application” 
and help overcome market failures.
3.5.4  Resource allocation policies in the wealth-driven phase
The primary task in the wealth-driven phase is the construction of an ecological 
innovation system, which will provide support for the wealth-driven transforma-
tion. Innovation in this phase cannot just stop at the technical level and must be 
linked to eco-orientation, advocating ecological innovation, such as adopting the 
economic growth mode of low resource consumption and brand new products 
or services, process designs, marketing models, organizational structure and 
institutional arrangements so as to prevent damages brought about by economic 
growth to the environment. At the level of social management, emphasis should 
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be laid on institutional innovation and systematic innovation, transformation of 
product structure, pursuit of alternative development paths through changing 
people’s life and work objectives, avoidance of one-sided pursuit of high efficiency 
through sheer reliance on technological innovation, close attention to system 
innovation, transit from efficiency-leading to effect-focused and improvement 
in regional ecological performance.
What comes next is adjusting industrial structure, developing circular economy 
and low-carbon economy and creating a new type of industrialized mode of 
service economy so that all types of economic development are inclined toward 
the self-promotion of people, the harmony of external environment and the 
continuous intensification of momentum for economic growth. In addition, the 
structure of employment should be contingent upon the adjustment of industrial 
structure, from the simple productive or manufacturing creation of employment 
opportunities to the service- and performance-integrated creation, so that the 
traditional linear economic growth pattern undergoes radical transformation and 
a welfare society comes into being, characterized by green economy, as well 
as the promotion of life values, social harmony, environment friendliness and 
sound economic prosperity.
The third is to strengthen the provision of public goods and services on the 
basis of considerations of ecological scale, which is the due responsibility of 
government. The regulatory policy, market policy and public participation policy 
should be all fully enforced, and in consideration of the overall scale control of 
ecology, the infrastructure and public services that contribute to urban green 
transformation are to be provided; further measures should be put in place to 
control and close down environmentally damaging industries so that the level 
of social welfare is heightened. Through a series of incentive systems, regional 
government should urge enterprises to consciously assume the responsibility 
of the “cradle to cradle” product life cycle and take measures to implement 
resource-saving and environment-friendly product design, eco-technology, clean 
production and product recycling systems. The public should be encouraged to 
foster a new type of consumption based on ecological adequacy; strengthen the 
publicity and education of consumers through educational institutions, trade 
associations, non-profit organizations, mass media and public welfare activities; 
advocate healthy consumption concepts and life styles; and reduce resources 
and environment pressure.
Fourth, regional government should actively cultivate new consumption trends 
and open up new consumption markets. With the comprehensive coverage of 
the Internet in production and all walks of life, people’s consumption patterns 
and consumption trends are changing fast, and the increasingly mature concep-
tualization of income and values also makes consumers more and more inclined 
to pursue the quality of life. Rather than simply pursuing material life, people 
begin to pay more and more attention to spiritual enjoyment, which is the source 
of wealth-driven power. Therefore, it is necessary for regional governments to 
make better policies regarding service consumption, such as pension, health, 
education and culture; to promote tourism consumption, domestic service 
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and information consumption; to encourage enterprises to develop experiential 
consumption, shop-less consumption, customized consumption and other new 
patterns of consumption; and to promote green cyclic consumption of new 
electronic products, smart home appliances, energy-saving environment-friendly 
cars and environment-friendly home-building materials, so as to form an effective, 
sustainable consumption pattern, driving the development of related industries.
Finally, regional government must nurture the culture and values of the wealth-
driven phase to guide the healthy and sustainable development of economy. The 
accumulation of wealth can not only make people more self-independent and 
entice them to pursue a higher quality of life, but can also degenerate them into 
idle lazybones. The driving force of economic development should continue to 
be dependent on financial gains. A correct understanding of wealth must be 
cultivated to turn people into owners of wealth rather than being caught in 
the bondage of wealth. Therefore, greater challenges are posed in the wealth-
driven phase to the whole society’s civilization and enterprising spirit. Regional 
government must take precautions to foster a healthy, positive and innovative 
cultural atmosphere, which requires a series of systems and sustained patience 
and perseverance.
This chapter discusses various forms of regional government competition; dis-
cusses the attributes of resource allocation and policy matching in different phases 
through careful analyses of mechanisms of regional government competition for 
effectively allocating the three types of resources; and provides its manifestations 
within the market system.
4.1  Modern market system
The market system is an integrated body of various types of market with different 
functions, which are interrelated, mutually constrained and intertwined. It is a 
structurally complicated combined system that consists of various market factors 
and sound mechanisms which reflect and represent various economic relations.
A traditional market system can be interpreted mainly from the following 
perspectives. From the standpoint of transaction or circulation, it consists of 
commodity markets, which cover production material markets and consump-
tion goods markets, and production factor markets, which cover land markets, 
labor markets, currency markets, technological markets, information markets, 
etc. From the spatial standpoint of market transactions, it consists of all local 
markets across different geographic regions, inclusive of local markets, regional 
markets, integrated national markets and cross-border world markets, which 
form a complex and gradually expanding continuum. From the standpoint of 
organizational governance and structural setup, it is composed of wholesale 
markets, retail markets, online markets and various types of intermediaries, 
which constitute a huge network connecting production and consumption, 
supply and demand, cities and countryside, domestic and international markets 
and online and offline markets. And finally, from the standpoint of transaction 
means and manners, it is composed of spot trading markets, forward trading 
market and futures markets.
The modern market system emphasizes both the systematicity of market 
composition and the structural integrity of market functions. A look at the 
relation between the function and structure of market reveals that the market 
system is first of all an interest-adjusting system, playing allocating, regulating 
and constraining roles in the distribution of interest on the part of market 
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entities. Both parties in transactions or entities of competition must abide by 
market rules without infringement of transaction rules or interests that go 
beyond market rules. The market system is a system of competition which 
takes place between its entities by various means, through different processes 
and with varied outcomes. No matter what its nature is, all forms of competi-
tion must proceed in conformity with market laws and values so as to achieve 
optimal allocation of resources through the functioning of the market system. In 
addition, the market system is a system of information transmission. It conveys 
information concerning the supply and demand of transaction parties via prices 
and competition so as to lead the flow of resources and the transformation of 
production. As a result, transaction parties must always keep abreast of market 
changes and take information costs for the pursuit of the market.
As indicated above, a traditional market system can be interpreted mainly from 
four perspectives, i.e. transaction or circulation, space, organizational governance 
and structural setup and transaction means and manners. The modern market 
system emphasizes the systematicity of both market composition and structural 
functions. As far as structural functionality is concerned, a modern market system 
is first and foremost an interest adjustment system, a competition system and an 
information transmission system. Thus, according to theories regarding modern 
market systems, a modern market should encompass at least the following com-
ponents, i.e. a market factor system, a market organizational system, a market 
legal system, a market supervising system, a market environment system and 
a market infrastructure system. All these combine to form a larger network of 
markets which comprehensively reflects its structural integrity and its functional 
completeness and provides guarantees for the normal functioning of market.
(1) A market factor system consists of practically all types of market and market 
factors, including commodity markets, factor markets and financial markets, 
as well as the most cardinal market elements, such as prices, supply and 
demand, competition, etc.
(2) Specifically speaking, a market organizational system consists of the organizers 
of market factors and activities and their gathering locations, covering all kinds 
of market entities such as retail markets, wholesale markets, online whole-
sale markets, personnel management organizations, labor markets, financial 
institutions and cross-border trade and investment organizations, as well as 
intermediary agencies such as consultancy, training, information, account-
ing, law, property rights, asset appraisal agencies and market management 
organizations such as chambers of commerce and industrial associations.
(3) A market legal system refers to an entirety of laws and regulations established 
and formed in accordance with cardinal market economic theories, includ-
ing property rights economics, the economics of contracts and normative 
economics, with normative market value orientation, normative market trad-
ing behavior, contract behavior and property rights behavior as its objects 
of regulation. It encompasses legislation, law enforcement, judiciary and 
law-related educational institutions.
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(4) A market supervisory system is a policy enforcement system built on the 
basis of the market legal system, consisting of supervisory bodies, contents 
and measures. Supervision in this regard covers the aspects of organizations, 
businesses, markets and policy and law enforcement.
(5) A market environment system mainly includes a well-designed real economic 
foundation, a corporate governance structure and a social credit system. 
As far as a social credit system is concerned, it is critically important to set 
up a full-fledged market credit system; regulate and restrain by legal means 
trust relations, credit instruments, credit intermediary agencies and pertinent 
credit elements; and put in place a social credit governance mechanism 
based on a market credit guarantee mechanism.
(6) Market infrastructure is an integrated system encompassing software and 
hardware facilities. Necessary components of a mature market economy 
include market service networks, supplementary equipment and technolo-
gies, market payment and clearance systems of all types and high-tech 
information systems.
Building a modern market system is a feat that can only be accomplished 
by incremental steps. In the early development phase of the US’s market 
economy (in the post-independence period from 1776 to 1861 and the 
post-Civil War period from 1865 to 1890), laissez-faire economics was 
held in high esteem, and its operation in economy resulted in significant 
improvements of the US’s market factor system and market organizational 
system, while fervid objection to government intervention was the prevailing 
sentiment of the time.
In 1890, the US Congress promulgated the Sherman Antitrust Act, which 
was the US’s first federal statute to prohibit trusts and monopoly. In 1914, 
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act were passed 
as complements to the Sherman Antitrust Act. Henceforth, the US’s antitrust 
system and regulatory measures have undergone century-long evolution and 
perfection, with the country’s market legal system and market supervisory system 
experiencing significant improvements and upgrading along the way. In other 
words, the market legal system and the market supervisory system emerged 
on a par with the market factor system and the market organizational system 
in the US, with the entire market system demonstrating a prominent pattern 
that featured coexistence between monopoly and competition and between 
development and supervision.
As of the 1990s, two predominant trends occurred. On the one hand, the 
US government, instead of confining its antitrust goals to simply preventing 
and clamping down on market monopoly and price manipulation, undertook 
effective measures to combat technical monopoly and Internet oligarchy beyond 
the realm of IPR protection, and on the other hand, against the backdrop of 
an explosive growth in ICT (information and communication technology) 
and network technology, market-driven innovation and system infrastructure 
regeneration became the prominent manifestations of market competition.
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Remarkable achievements were then recorded in regard to market infrastruc-
ture and environment, including the enhancement of market infrastructural facili-
ties pertinent to registration, settlement, trusteeship and backup, the increase of 
capabilities against disasters and technical malfunctions, the upgrading of market 
information systems and credit systems and the sharing of market regulation-
related data. As a result, the US’s market credit system and infrastructure were 
further optimized and enhanced, which meant that in addition to the market 
factor, organizational, legal and supervisory systems, market infrastructure and 
environment systems were also being constantly perfected, culminating in the 
creation of a mature modern market system in which market competition was 
driven by total factor productivity and system participation.
4.2  The external possibility and intrinsic necessity 
of regional government competition
Regions share commonalities, similarities and generalities, but are also character-
ized by their individuality, particularity and diversity. Regional government is a 
government organization which administers affairs within its own jurisdiction, 
with a relatively fixed area, a relatively concentrated population and institutional 
governance. Regional government has the attributes of publicity and coerciveness.
The publicity of regional management is mainly reflected in ensuring regional 
public spending and maintaining regional markets and social stability by means of 
taxation, industry and commerce, public security, and monitoring and supervision 
and in ensuring its openness, fairness and impartiality through administrative 
legislation and justice. The coercive power of regional administration is embodied 
not only in the three super-economy coercive forces of legislation, justice and 
administration but in the economic coercion derived from its financial rights 
and rights to administer its affairs. Superficially, regional government manages 
economic development, urban construction, and social livelihood, but in essence, 
its administration is reflected in its effective allocation of tangible and intangible 
resources of various categories, existing and potential, within its jurisdiction.
Two serious drawbacks reside in western market economics. On the one 
hand, government, market and society are considered independent, and govern-
ment has been excluded from the market; on the other hand, government is 
deemed to have a single function of public administration and is deprived of 
the competitive function in economic development and urban construction. 
Regional government’s basic policy of “general underpinning, fair play and 
effective promotion” of non-operational resources and the regulation, supervi-
sion and management policies for operational resources makes it the centralized 
agent of both the region and the central government. These also enable it to 
promote social stability through basic social guarantee and public services and 
to regulate regional economy through pricing, taxation, interest rates, exchange 
rates, and legal means. In practice, regional government achieves its publicity and 
coercive power by utilizing public revenues and expenditure and increasing taxes 
and other sources of revenue to provide budget arrangements for government 
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administration, national defense and security, culture and education, science, 
health and utilities, etc. This is accomplished by providing social consumption 
expenses in the industrial, transportation, commercial and agricultural sector; by 
providing fiscal expenditure in government investments that cover infrastructure, 
scientific R&D and policy-oriented financial input in industries which need 
urgent development; and by providing transfer expenditure, mainly composed 
of social security and various fiscal subsidies. By so doing, regional government 
plays the “quasi-state” and “quasi-macro” roles.
Regional government’s participation in the allocation of and competition 
for quasi-operational resources and its planning, guidance and support for 
operational resources make it the centralized agent of a non-government entity 
in the region and enables it to compete with other regions through innovation 
in institution, management and technology. Under such circumstances, regional 
government possesses management rights as its jurisdictional power, which allows 
it to allocate resources so as to maximize regional benefits, mainly through 
investment attraction, development, investment, operation and management 
of regional projects. Although this role of regional government differs from 
enterprises in objectives, development modes, regulatory factors and evaluation 
criteria, the competitive mechanism becomes the driving force for regional gov-
ernments as the same agent of resources allocation as of enterprises within certain 
areas; their rules of behavior must meet the requirements of market mechanisms. 
Regional government then plays the “quasi-enterprise” and “quasi-micro” roles. 
Regional government’s “dual role” and the competitiveness stemmed from it in 
practice remedy the drawbacks of traditional market economic theories. Accord-
ing to modern market economics, not only are enterprises the entity of market 
competition but regional governments are as well. The operating mechanisms of 
regional government explain the inherent inevitability of regional competition.
Enterprises generally compete for the allocation of industrial resources, and 
regional governments mainly compete for the allocation of city resources. Rela-
tive independence and complementarities exist between enterprises and regional 
governments, but they differ as follows:
(1) Differences in fields of competition. Enterprises are micro-economic enti-
ties. They mainly compete for commodity markets and focus on industrial 
resources allocation. Market equilibrium theory, which takes manufacturers 
as its main subject, occupies a dominant position in western classical econom-
ics. Enterprises regard the pursuit of profit maximization as a precondition 
and assume the competitive forms of supply, demand, market equilibrium 
prices, perfect market competition, monopolistic competition, oligopolistic 
market, different market structures and competitive strategies, etc. Enter-
prise competition is the precondition and basis for regional government 
competition.
  Regional government is the subject of mezzo-economics. Competition 
between regional governments focuses on factor markets and city resources 
allocation. Factor markets include land, capital, labor forces, property rights, 
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and hardware and software markets such as the information and big data 
market. Regional government improves its competitiveness through the 
quantity, quality, structure and layout of urban resources. Regional gov-
ernment can also make policies and initiatives to regulate the allocation 
of regional factors and to attract and influence the direction of factor 
flow outside the region, so as to optimize the allocation of resources and 
eventually enhance regional competitiveness. Factor market competition 
affects enterprise commodity market competition.
(2) Differences in competition means. Enterprises seek to maximize profits 
mainly by increasing labor productivity – to effectively influence costs, 
prices, supply and demand and scale – and by optimizing the allocation of 
corporate resources to promote their cost minimization. Regional govern-
ment makes every effort to increase total factor productivity as its chief 
means of sustainable growth. After simple dilatation through competing 
for tangible factors, such as land, projects and capital, the bottleneck of 
diminishing capital profits makes extensive economic growth difficult to 
continue. When nothing more can be added to regional input of all tangible 
factors, regional government will have to depend on the investment, increase 
and improvement of intangible factors such as technological advancement 
(with innovation as the core), resource allocation optimization, structural 
adjustment as well as institution, organization, legislation, environment, 
etc. as the new driving forces of regional economy development and urban 
construction.
(3) Differences in competition paths. Enterprises are investment growth-
oriented. The continuous improvement of business performance comes 
from the constant input of production factors, including capital, labor, 
land, technology, entrepreneurship and so on. The initial strategy for busi-
nesses investment is mainly extensive expansion of quantity, followed by 
the quality-enhancing stage and then the stage of business management. 
In all these stages, sustained and effective inputs become critical. Regional 
government is efficiency growth-oriented. In light of the experiences of 
regional economies in the world, their economic growth path starts from 
the factor-driven stage (also known as the resource allocation stage), to the 
investment-driven stage (also known as the efficiency improvement stage) 
and then to the innovation-driven stage (also called the sustainable growth 
stage). Regional government makes efforts to optimize the combination of 
tangible and intangible factors, with efficiency improvement as the focus of 
its growth.
(4) Differences in competition orientation. Enterprises regard demand-side 
expansion as their orientation. Business competition starts from market 
demand, demand quantities, demand structure, corporate strategies and tac-
tics. The ability to adapt to market requirements becomes essential to their 
survival and success. Regional government regards supply-side optimization 
as its orientation. Regional government’s determined direction for economic 
development, urban construction and facilitation of people’s livelihood is 
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to promote supply-side structural reforms by effectively allocating the sup-
ply of land, capital, projects, technology, work forces and other tangible 
resources; by effectively regulating the supply of prices, taxation, interest 
rates, exchange rates, law and other intangible resources; and through 
innovation in institution, organization and technology.
(5) Differences in competition modes. Enterprises adopt the ERP mode to 
exercise effective and integrated management of materials, finance, informa-
tion and customer resources and achieve inter-regional, inter-sector, and 
inter-industrial coordination and effective allocation in terms of logistics 
and personnel, financial and information flow. Guided by market demands, 
enterprises will strive for effective integration of resources, adjustment of 
functions, improvement of production efficiency and eventual enhancement 
of competitiveness. Regional government, however, may establish the DRP 
mode to effectively allocate resources such as land, population, finance, 
environment, technology and policies, design layouts and make appropri-
ate arrangements according to regional planning and strategies. Equipped 
with systematic management notions and approaches, regional government 
employs layout design and planning as the basis to make judgment upon 
market changes, deploy regional resources, enhance regional competitive-
ness, realize the best regional TFP and achieve sustainable economic and 
social development in the region.
4.3  Forms of regional government competition
The relations and differences in competition between regional governments 
and enterprises reveal that competition between regional governments and 
that between enterprises are two systems of competition on different levels 
of the modern market economy. They are mutually independent but related, 
constituting the double entities of competition of the modern market economy. 
Competition between enterprises is the basis of competition in the market 
economy and leads to competition between regional governments. Regional 
governments compete for the optimization of resources allocation via systems, 
policies, projects and environment. It is a different kind of competition above 
the level of enterprise competition, which in turn influences, supports and 
promotes enterprise competitiveness. Enterprise competition takes place only 
across enterprises. Regional government can only act as a planner and guide of 
industrial development; an assistant and regulator of commodity production; 
and a supervisor and manager of market order. It has no right to exercise 
direct intervention in micro-level enterprise operations. Regional government 
competition takes place only across regional governments. It follows the rules 
of market economy and competes in terms of projects, policies and public 
affairs in relation to regional resource allocation, economic development, urban 
construction and people’s livelihoods.
Regional government competition takes the following forms, depending on 
its focuses in different phases:
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4.3.1  Project competition
There are mainly three categories of projects: national key projects, social 
investment projects and foreign investment projects. The first category includes 
special national key projects; major projects of national science and technology 
programs; major infrastructure projects of national science and technology pro-
grams; and major state-financed construction and industrial projects. The second 
category includes projects in high-tech industries, newly emerging industries, 
equipment manufacturing, raw materials, finance, logistics and other services. 
The third category includes projects concerning intelligent manufacturing, cloud 
computing and big data, networking, intelligent urban construction and so on.
Regional governments compete for projects in order to directly acquire capital, 
talents and industry; effectively solve regional financing, land acquisition and 
other issues through legitimate project policies and rational public services; guide, 
through project implementation, regional land development, urban infrastructure 
construction; increase investment; promote industrial development; optimize the 
allocation of resources; enhance policy capabilities; and facilitate the sustainable 
development of regional economy and community. Consequently, project com-
petition becomes one of the key issues for regional government work that leads 
the direction for regional development. Awareness of the importance of projects, 
development, efficiency, advantages, conditions, policies and risks becomes an 
essential requirement for regional government in market competition.
In China, the system of project management is a major mode of economic 
administration after the implementation of the tax system reform, which extends 
from central government to local government and then to grassroots units. 
This system works through special transfer payments or special fund allocation 
for certain projects. Major national projects are classified into four categories: 
national major projects, major national science and technology projects, major 
construction and industrialization projects with national financial support and 
infrastructure construction for science and technology development, etc. These 
projects are generally endowed with special missions by different levels of 
government, giving support to national and regional science and technology 
projects or certain industries, such as major science and technology projects, 
high-tech industrialization projects, strategic development of emerging indus-
tries, equipment manufacturing projects, raw materials and consumer goods 
projects, distinctive industries projects, intelligent manufacturing projects, 
the Internet of things projects, cloud computing and big data projects, smart 
city construction projects, regional leading industrial projects, etc. The great 
majority of the projects launched through competitive bidding are selected in 
light of regional government performance. National special transfer payments 
increased from 15.98 percent in 1994 to 46.7 percent in 2012, an increase of 
300 percent. That did not include special funds, which were far greater than 
special transfer payments, allocated through the budget departments within 
the public financial system, ministries and national commissions, and depart-
ments with budgetary and financial authorization. Along the vertical chain of 
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government administration, provincial and regional governments also set up 
a series of local special funds. This system has become an important mode 
of economic governance at all levels of government, spurring and mobilizing 
grassroots units and local enterprises through project application for special 
funds.
Projects are important economic resources for regional governments in China. 
First, projects can directly provide funds. Regional governments at the provincial 
level can obtain all sorts of national project funds, while regional governments 
at the local level can obtain all sorts of provincial project funds, thus boosting 
the development of key industries and enterprises while accelerating the pace 
of infrastructure construction and the supply of public goods. For example, 
during the 13th Five-Year Plan, Anhui Province had 327 projects that were 
listed major national projects, with a total investment of 2 trillion yuan, as 
well as 877 projects that were listed as major provincial projects, with a total 
investment of 1.9 trillion yuan.
Second, in the light of the validity of project policies and the justifiability 
of public services, it is possible to expedite the procedures of project-oriented 
examination and approval from higher-level governments and the expropriation 
of land in rural areas; at the same time, it is also possible to enhance government 
credit and the qualifications of financing so as to help regional governments 
find solutions to fund-raising, financing and land requisition.
Third, with resort to the availability of projects approved by higher-level 
authorities, regions can turn project resources such as land development, 
infrastructure construction, investment attraction and industrial support into 
economic programs through corresponding policy resources. While promoting 
work in all areas by drawing upon the experience gained from key projects and 
pursuing guided development, the current regional government should lead 
the next to participate in project competition in an attempt to enhance their 
awareness for projects and competition. In order to fully leverage the market 
competition mechanism, governmental projects related to infrastructure and 
public facilities should be put into operation so as to boost regional development 
and improve the efficiency of resources allocation.
Project competition is initiated by way of longitudinal project applications, 
which entail not merely the renewed regional government examination and 
evaluation of development orientation, key areas of development, development 
advantages and conditions but, more importantly, also cultivate the awareness of 
projects, efficiency, risk and guidance among participants. Such competition is 
market-based, since regional government at all levels creates a project-oriented 
market within their jurisdiction for sub-national governments. In this process, 
lower-level governments become equal participants through project application, 
though superficially, regional government will leave no stone unturned to trigger 
off competition and contests for project resources, thus forming a complicated 
interest relationship.
In addition, the horizontal international flow of project investment has also 
become the main target of horizontal competition initiated by all regions.
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4.3.2  Competition of industrial chain development
Generally speaking, each region has its own industrial foundation with its 
own characteristics, which are in most cases contingent upon natural resource 
endowments in the region. The crux of the matter lies in how to maintain 
and optimize regional internal resources endowments and how to synergize 
and obtain high-end resources from outside the region. The key is optimiza-
tion of industrial structure and effective development of industrial chains, and 
the breaking point is developing towards high-end industries, form industrial 
agglomeration and lead industrial clustering.
Regional government competition for industrial chain development unfolds 
mainly in two aspects. The first is concerned with factors of production. Low-end 
or primary factors of production cannot form a stable and long-lasting competi-
tive edge. Only by introducing, investing and developing high-end and high-level 
factors of production – such as industrial technology, modern information 
technology, network resources, transport facilities and professional personnel, 
research and development think tanks, etc. – can powerful and competitive 
industries be built up. The second is concerned with industrial clustering and 
industrial underpinnings. Regional competitiveness reveals that effective industrial 
clustering, employing the existing regional industrial base as the leading force, 
can reduce business transaction costs and improve enterprise profitability. The 
industrial smile curve makes manifest that the most valuable areas are located 
at both ends of the value chain – R&D and market. As a result, an important 
route for regional government to follow in achieving sustainable development is 
cultivating competitive industries, developing industrial chains and introducing 
“targeted” investment according to the structural requirements of the industry.
In China, governments at all levels are supposed to formulate their own 
development strategies for primary, secondary and tertiary industry, thus forging 
their own strategic industries. The realization of industrial strategy and industrial 
cluster and the development of strategic industry depend on the endowment 
of resources within the region, the convergence of foreign resources and the 
updating and positioning of technological structural standards. Due to the 
horizontal flow of resources in all regions and the vertical flow as a result of 
the vertical management chain, whether internal resources endowment can be 
maintained and the convergence of external resources can be achieved hinges 
on the competition between regional governments. Industrial chain supporting 
competition is of great significance to regional government’s endeavor to make 
the best of current resources endowment and give full play to competitive 
advantages. Meanwhile, the convergence and integration of more resources 
can be realized by resorting to preemptive rights and policy-based advantages. 
Regional government that wins in the competition is in a better position to 
attract industrial investments and raise the level of industrial clusters as well as 
assist the regional government in completing established industrial goals. It is 
rather difficult for those who fail to win the competition to effectively invite 
industrial investments, obtain comparative advantages in the industrial chain, 
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reach a high-end position of value chain or promote the concentration of 
industries and create reasonable industrial clusters.
It seems that Michael Porter’s diamond model is formulated for the analysis 
of why a certain industry in a given country has stronger competitiveness 
in the world. In reality, it may also be extended to analyze the industrial 
competitiveness of regional government. In Porter’s opinion, four factors may 
contribute to the industrial competitiveness of a region: (a) production factors, 
including human resources, natural resources, knowledge resources and capital 
resources as well as infrastructure; (b) demand conditions, namely the level of 
market demand and the demand structure that are determined by the level of 
economic development; (c) the basis of present standard regarding relevant 
and supporting industries and the level of labor division in the whole industrial 
chain; and (d) the performances of strategy, structure and competitor, namely 
the level and basis of strategy, structure and competitor. In Porter’s opinion, 
the four factors are mutually influential, and their combination has a crucial 
bearing on the industrial competitiveness of regional government. Apart from 
the above-mentioned four factors, Porter also takes into consideration two 
major variations, i.e. government and opportunities. External opportunities are 
obtainable but hard to control. Likewise, government policies can be won over 
but require relevant parties to take the initiative.
According to the diamond theory, regional government competition for 
industrial chain matching can be carried out through production factors and 
through industrial chains and clustering.
First, Porter divides production factors into basic and advanced production 
factor. Based on Porter’s idea and the reality of development, basic production 
factors refer to natural resources, geographic position, non-tech and low-end 
human resources and self-owned financial resources, etc., while advanced produc-
tion factors refer to modern information technology, industrial technical condi-
tions, Internet resources, traffic resources, labor forces with higher education, 
research institutes and think tanks, etc. However, the importance, demand and 
cost of basic factors are on the decline and their availability is relatively simple. 
By contrast, advanced factors have to undergo a difficult process of formation, 
with their importance, demand and cost of availability on the increase and 
the approaches to their availability unique in their dependence upon external 
channels and internal investment as well.
It is possible for high-end production factors to maintain steady and everlast-
ing competitiveness while it is impossible for low-end production factors, as the 
shortage of low-end production factors can urge regional government to step 
up innovation and scale up the investment of high-end production factors. If 
regional government wants to create a strong and long-lived industrial advantage 
by resorting to production factors, it must develop advanced and professional-
ized production factors, such as the cultivation of high-caliber professionals, 
investment in research institutes and think tanks and the attraction of outward 
advanced production factors, rather than merely relying on low-end production 
factors, even though they turn out to be well-endowed.
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Second, the industrial division of regional governments leads to the formation 
of industrial chains, but their values vary with sections of industrial chains. It 
can be inferred from the industrial smiling curve that sections with maximum 
values are highly concentrated in both ends of the value chain: research and 
development and market, and the production, assembly and processing of parts 
are distributed in the low-end section of the value chain. In this connection, 
competitiveness resides in industries that are developed at both ends of the 
smiling curve of the industrial chain or in self-completed industrial chains. 
Advantageous industries for regional governments do not exist by themselves. 
It is also of vital importance for the industrial “clusters”, together with their 
matching industries, to form and develop.
For example, German-made printing machinery enjoys global industrial advan-
tages, and its supporting industries, such as paper industry, printing ink, plate-
making and machinery manufacturing, also enjoy some degree of competitive 
advantages. Likewise, the competitive advantages of the automobile industry 
in the US, Germany and Japan are closely linked to industrial sectors, such as 
iron and steel, machinery manufacturing and chemical engineering as well as 
car-related business. Machinery manufacturing in Foshan, China, is a Chinese 
case in point. It boasts certain comparative advantages, which, in fact, ascribe 
to the support of such related sectors as aluminum, nonferrous metal and 
intelligent design. High-tech industries in Shenzhen, China, enjoy a complete 
range of supporting industries, such as computer and calculator making, for 
which Shenzhen has, apart from chip production, a comprehensive range of 
manufacturing factories providing matching products such as computer cases, 
plug-boards, plate cards and indicators, magnetic heads and hard-disk drives. 
These factories have a total annual supporting capacity of around 20 million sets. 
As such, regional government should either foster its own supporting capacity 
for industries guided by its existing advantage industries, introduce supporting 
industries in clusters for its dominating industries or heighten its own industrial 
value chains so as to drive the formation of larger supporting industries.
4.3.3  Competition for talents, science and technology
The primary issue in competition for talents and science and technology is the 
recognition of the doctrines that human resources are primary resources and that 
science and technology are primary productive forces. The most fundamental task 
is to improve local personnel training systems and increase regional investment 
in personnel training and technological innovation, and the greatest significance 
resides in creating conditions for talent attraction, introduction, training and 
employment. The competitiveness of science and technology talents is measured 
by regional science and technology human resources indexes; the number of 
people engaged in scientific and technological activities per ten thousand people; 
the number of scientists and engineers per ten thousand people; the total number 
of scientific and technological activities per ten thousand people, the number of 
students in colleges and universities per ten thousand people; annual investment 
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in science and technology talent training index per ten thousand people; total 
operating expenses of science and technology activities; the percentage of GDP 
for science and technology expenditure; per capita research funding; the per-
centage of local fiscal expenditure for financial allocations to local science and 
technology; per capita government expenditure on education; total local fiscal 
expenditure on education; numbers of full-time college teachers; and other 
indicators. Regional government should undertake concerted efforts to improve 
and enhance related indicators so as to reinforce the overall competitiveness of 
talents in science and technology.
First of all, what lies at the core of competition for talents and science and 
technology is highly valuing talents and science and technology and sticking 
firmly to the doctrines discussed above. Strategies must be formulated and 
implemented to strengthen the cultivation, introduction and employment of 
talents; foster a social climate in which knowledge, talents and science and 
technology are respected; and create a favorable environment conducive to 
talent cultivation and growth and to technological innovation. The scarcity, 
uniqueness and non-substitutability of talents give rise to the high-end value of 
talents. Globally, whichever country attaches importance to talents and science 
and technology will develop on a track of faster and more sustainable develop-
ment; the same is true of regions, which is amply demonstrated by Shenzhen, 
China, the prosperity of which today is attributable not only to China’s reform 
and opening up but also, and more importantly, to its special emphasis on its 
introduction of talents and its innovation in science and technology.
Second, the most fundamental aspect to competition for talents and science 
and technology lies in improving the cultivation system of local talents, scal-
ing up the investment in local talents cultivation and increasing the input of 
innovation in science and technology. Regional government, as a rule, should 
come up with various ways to intensify investments in education and training, 
especially in entrepreneurship education, as well as education concerning techno-
logical innovation. The proportion of educational training in its fiscal spending 
should be increased with a view to improving the remuneration of those who 
are engaged in education and training sectors, bringing forth a talent pool of 
high quality with a reasonable structure and competitiveness and eventually 
building up an educational system that integrates general and vocational educa-
tion, emphasizes degree and non-degree education and incorporates continuing 
education and lifelong education, thus rendering the popularization of higher 
education possible in a gradual way. Regional government can employ direct 
and indirect investments for talent cultivation and technological innovation. 
Direct investment in technology and education includes financial support for 
affiliated universities and research institutes, subsidies to encourage individuals 
and enterprises to engage in education and training activities as well as activities 
of scientific research by means of project funding, awards for scientific research 
and fiscal allowances. Indirect investment covers the construction of educational 
and technological environments, facilities and platforms so that an enabling 
talent climate can attract and retain those engaged in educational, training and 
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technological activities. Relevant research findings have shown that the greater 
the improvement for technological research environment within the region, the 
greater the investment in technological innovation and the more attractive the 
region becomes to neighboring regions.
Third, the most striking manifestation of competition for talents and science 
and technology are the conditions created by regional governments to attract 
talents. The introduction of talents can help solve the problem of inadequate 
supply of talents in the short run, and local cultivation may lead to talent gaps 
and failures to meet the need of regional economic and social development. 
Increasing reduction in the cost of talent flow has made it easier for both talents 
and technology to become the most active flowing elements in the market. A 
two-way flowing trend of technological talents is observed between developed 
economies and less developed economies, and the same takes place between 
developed regions and less developed regions. What matters in retaining talents 
is not necessarily whether regional economy is well developed but rather, more 
essentially, whether there are such needs and policy advantages. As a result, the 
most noticeable way in which talent competition is initiated is the making of 
policies towards talents, particularly policies for talent introduction. Regional 
government will have to compete in policies concerning the provision of financial 
and material benefits, excellent social services, good child education, financial 
support for scientific research, preferential income tax reduction or exemption, 
flexible talent flow, etc.
Finally, what lies at the core of competition for talents and technology are 
the introduction and cultivation of talents of science and technology. Viewed 
from the historical and global perspective, talents of science and technology are 
at the center of competition for talents and technology and are a guarantee for 
the realization of the primary productive force. They are highly creative and 
are infused with the spirit of scientific exploration. As the rare resources and 
valuable wealth in a country or region, they are in a unique position to make 
contributions to the development of science and technology and the advancement 
of mankind. The US-based “Manhattan Project”, which collected all kinds of 
technological talents, especially top talents, totaling 530,000 people, enabled the 
US to become the first country to grasp nuclear technology, which eventually 
led to victory in the Second World War. Technological talents in China have 
created numerous scientific miracles in basic science and engineering technol-
ogy, such as nuclear and hydrogen bombs, satellite launches, manned space 
flight, a moon probe program, the Beidou navigation satellite, high-temperature 
superconductivity, nanotechnology and human genome sequencing, as well as 
super hybrid rice, etc.
Regional government competition for talents and science and technology 
epitomize competitiveness in science and technology, which is demonstrated by 
the unit technology-based talents competitiveness; the index of technological 
talent resources; the number of talents engaged in technological activities per 
ten thousand persons’ the number of scientists and engineers per ten thousand 
persons; the number of personnel involved in technological projects per ten 
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thousand persons; the number of internal students in colleges and universities per 
ten thousand persons; the index of yearly input of technological talents per ten 
thousand persons; the aggregate of expenditures used for technological projects; 
the share of technological spending in GDP; the expenditure for science and 
research per capita; the percentage of local financial allocation in technology in 
local fiscal spending; the per capita fiscal expenditure for education; the total 
local expense amount for education; and the number of full-time teachers in 
universities, to name only a few. On top of that, the goal of competitiveness 
based on talent and technology is realized by improving the above-mentioned 
indexes in an effort to enhance the overall competitiveness of technology.
4.3.4  Fiscal and financial competition
Regional fiscal competition covers fiscal revenue and expenditure competition. 
Fiscal revenue is mainly achieved through the pursuit of economic growth and 
the accrual of taxes. Apart from social consumption and transfer expenditure, 
competition is chiefly realized through government investment, such as invest-
ment in infrastructure, science and technology R&D, investment of fiscal policy 
funds in industries that need urgent development and other fiscal investment 
expenditure. Fiscal investment expenditure is an important force for driving 
economic growth. The overall size of fiscal revenues and expenditure is limited; 
regional government must actively build various platforms for investment and 
financing – as well as mobilize and attract regional, national and international 
financial institutions, funds, personnel, information and other financial resources 
to the greatest possible extent – in order to benefit regional economic develop-
ment, urban construction, social and livelihood services. Preferential policies and 
measures adopted by regional governments drive each other into competition 
for fiscal spending and monetary absorption.
In China, the reform of the tax-sharing system has provided regional gov-
ernments at all levels with independent interests and made them the entities 
of interests in terms of market competitiveness, which has turned fiscal and 
financial competition between regional governments into their major means 
of competition. Regional fiscal competition consists of competition for fiscal 
revenues and expenditure. The competition for fiscal revenues refers to the 
fact that regional government aims to increase income taxes by pursuing the 
competition of economic growth, which is the most fundamental competition 
and is intensified through the assessment system for administrative performance 
on the part of regional governments. The competition of fiscal expenditure 
means increasing social capital increment by scaling up governmental spending 
in investment so as to add to the impetus for economic development. For spiral 
economic growth, there is no essential difference between fiscal revenue and fiscal 
expenditure. But regarding the impetus for economic growth, fiscal expenditure 
is the ultimate driving force. Furthermore, judging from the motives of regional 
government administrative performance, fiscal revenue is in the final analysis 
for the sake of fiscal expenditure, and fiscal expenditure, especially investment 
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spending, can give full expression to government administrative achievements. 
Thus, fiscal competition between regional governments is demonstrated in fiscal 
expenditure. Related research shows that the decentralization of fiscal powers 
in China, as well as the competition of fiscal expenditure on the basis of the 
assessment of administrative performance, puts their focuses on the accessibility 
of basic construction investment, followed by human capital investment and 
public service.
In addition to fiscal revenue, regional governments can gain financial support 
for their fiscal expenditure from the financing of financial sectors or investment 
and financing platforms within regions. Such an approach has won the favor 
of regional government over recent years. The reason for this is that though 
investment through financial funding is reckoned as a regular means, there is a 
huge limitation in this regard; fiscal revenue is restricted by the level of economic 
development, which causes slow growth and thus results in the restriction of 
the overall scale. Moreover, fiscal revenue cannot depend on the growth of 
budgetary revenue. If that happens, business activities of enterprises, as well as 
disposable incomes and welfares of residents, will be affected considerably, thus 
incurring objections for enterprises and residents.
Since 2009, a variety of governmental or policy-oriented platforms for invest-
ment and financing have been built up by governments at all levels in China, 
which can, to the greatest extent possible, pool financial resources locally and 
even nationwide to serve as local investment, thus creating financial competition. 
Under the condition of the established financial aggregate, regional government 
must resort to different strategies based on financial competition to attract capital 
from all channels to flow into financial authorities or platforms in order to access 
as many financial resources as possible. The building-up of investment and 
financing platforms serves the purpose of attracting capital, including domestic 
non-governmental capital and foreign capital as well as national investments 
and investments from government of all levels. In view of the whole capital 
market, the amount of capital is always limited, which means that regional 
government must adopt some preferential policies related to interests, income 
tax and expenditure and other local and relevant policies to attract the influx 
of capital in ways that increase the local economic performance in a quick way. 
Relevant research has pointed out that the transfer price of industrial land 
agreement in the midst of land competition between regional governments is 
an important approach to investment attraction. The land preferential price war 
between regional governments is in itself an investment battle. A deep look 
shows that it can be regarded as the means of financial competition between 
regional governments.
4.3.5  Infrastructure competition
Infrastructure competition takes place in the construction of both infrastructure 
hardware and smart city software. The former includes transportation platforms 
of highways, ports and aviation; energy supply platforms of electricity, gas and 
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others; information platforms of cable and networks; and science and technology 
parks, industrial, entrepreneurial and creative parks. The latter includes intelligent 
city-building platforms of big data, cloud computing and the Internet of things. 
Infrastructure systems, which can be rated as advanced, adaptive and backward, 
underpin economic and social development in the region. The moderately 
advanced infrastructure supply in a region will provide optimal services for urban 
structure, facility size and spatial layout in market competition so that enterprise 
costs are reduced, production efficiency enhanced and industrial development 
facilitated. Whether regional infrastructure is complete directly brings forth 
differences in regional economy and affects its future.
The competition between regional governments in improving the environment 
of development, signifying the competition of producing and supplying non-
mobile “products”, including hard public goods, e.g. infrastructure, and soft 
public goods, e.g. smart city, targets at the maximization of combined benefits. 
Not only can this kind of competition make possible the benefit maximization of 
residents within the jurisdiction and the benefit maximization of the collective, 
including individual officials and their teams in the region can uphold the overall 
national interests as well, so as to help to propel the balanced development of 
regional economy.
The competition of hard environment, broadly speaking, mainly covers the 
construction of infrastructure and the improvement of the matching environ-
ment of industries. The former covers transportation facilities like expressways, 
seaports and aviation; energy supply facilities like electric power and natural gas; 
information-based hard platforms like cable; and environmental protection like 
sewage treatment plants. They are aimed at building a sound supporting system 
of infrastructure in an effort to create a convenient and efficient environment 
for investors.
The industrial supporting environment construction covers fostering a good 
supporting environment of upstream and downstream industries by centering on 
the promotion of the existing dominant industries and cultivating new industries 
with further focus on the enhancement of favorable industrial supporting envi-
ronment, for example, the construction of industrial parks, high-tech business 
incubator zones and the opening up of economic development zones. The 
construction of soft infrastructure has turned out to be of greater significance 
and has become the major area of competition for regional government. The 
most attractive part is the build-up of big data platforms, cloud computing 
platforms and smart cities, which is generally implemented through project 
schemes, a major form of competition between regional governments.
The reason why regional government is committed to the improvement of 
infrastructure is that infrastructure can play an underpinning and guiding role 
in economic and social development and can put regional development on a 
faster track. It is also helpful to ensure the realization of national interests and 
push forward the coordinated development of regional economy so that the 
maximization of combined interests can be achieved. The underpinning func-
tion can find expression in the capability of the infrastructure system to prop 
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up regional economic and social development. In other words, its supply can 
satisfy the needs of economic and social development in the region, and the 
extent of satisfaction can be divided into three basic levels: advanced, adaptive 
and backward. The advanced level indicates that its supply outstrips the demand 
of economic and social development and even causes some degree of surplus; 
the adaptive level indicates that its supply can basically meet the demand of 
economic and social development without its inadequacy or excessiveness; the 
backward level indicates that its supply lags behind development requirements 
and becomes a bottleneck.
Such competition makes it possible for the construction of infrastructure to 
basically meet the requirements for regional economic and social development. 
If regional potentials wait to be tapped, its construction may desirably outstrip 
the level of its economic and social development. However, its supply should not 
become excessive so as to cause idle capacity, the decrease of marginal benefits 
of infrastructure supply and the dwindling utilization of resources. If extreme 
backwardness occurs, its inadequacy will harm the capability of economic and 
social development and make it difficult to bring it into full play. The theory 
of the “bucket effect” explains that what decides its level of supply is not the 
longest board that makes it but the shortest one. Likewise, the major purpose 
of such competition is just to avoid the presence of any short boards.
The guiding function of infrastructure implies that the infrastructure system of 
a region, under the influence of market competitive mechanisms and industrial 
linkage mechanisms, can play guiding and feedback roles through its supply of 
services in the structure, scale and spatial layout of regional social economic 
development, for example, the information-based infrastructure, which can make 
use of information technology to lead reforms in traditional sectors and develop 
high-tech and modern tertiary industry. A case in point is New York City, which 
boasts the world’s largest financial and information hub and is the key traffic 
hub in North America, as well as having a strong industrial base, which can all 
be ascribed to its priority development of infrastructure. Its superior trade port 
has attracted the industrial agglomeration of processing sectors, which requires 
advanced logistics distribution as a result of advanced transportation and trade 
industries. No matter whether it is the industrial agglomeration or logistics 
industry, it entails the close coordination of the financial and information sectors. 
Therefore, its function as financial and information hubs begin to be intensified 
in terms of their underpinning and guiding roles.
In addition, the enhancement of productivity and the improvement of produc-
tion environment prove to be a huge contribution to regional economic growth. 
Infrastructure services, such as transportation, water supply, electric power and 
information, etc., are all intermediate inputs in the course of production, and 
reduction in such input will improve production efficiency. The improvement 
of infrastructure services will increase the output rate of other production fac-
tors, such as labor force and other kind of capital. The improvement of traffic 
infrastructure, for example, reduces the duration of commuters and enhances 
the efficiency of logistics so that the output rate of production factors rises. It 
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follows that whether infrastructure is improved or not is a crucial cause for the 
disparity in regional economic growth rates and an important motivation for 
the competition of infrastructure between regional governments.
4.3.6  Competition in environmental systems
In addition to infrastructure, environmental systems here mainly cover the 
construction of ecological environment, humanistic environment, policy envi-
ronment, social credit system and the like. Regional government competition 
entails environments for development, including the harmony between invest-
ment development and ecological protection; the matching between investment 
attraction and policy services; the agreement between wealth pursuit and social 
returns; and the mutual support between legal supervision and social credit. 
Favorable environment systems are the recipe for success in investment solicita-
tion, project construction and sustainable development; this has been proven 
by successful experience in China and overseas.
Though the construction of infrastructure is an integral part of environmental 
system competition, what is emphasized here are regional, human, service 
and credit environments. The competition of environmental systems mainly 
encompasses the following aspects.
First, regional governments gain competitive advantages by publicizing their 
own regional advantages, which are embodied in transportation facilities, geo-
graphic location and economic status (especially the advantage of economic 
resources). For instance, Kunshan in China’s Jiangsu Province enjoys proximity 
to Shanghai, just as the Pearl River Delta does to Hong Kong and Macao, and 
as Foshan does to Guangzhou. These locational advantages have a great deal 
to do with regional development in their early days and even in the present 
stage. In the initial stage of China’s reform and opening up, Dongguan of 
Guangdong Province, China, catered to the needs of industrial transfers of 
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and foreign countries by making the most of its 
geographic advantage, low labor force, lower land price and preferential opening 
policies, thus becoming a processing center of the world’s IT sectors in a rapid 
fashion. Kunshan copied Dongguan, attracting investment from Taiwan and other 
regions, thus making it another significant IT manufacturing center in China.
Second, regional government tends to obtain competitive advantages by 
improving service-oriented soft environment. For example, Kunshan imple-
mented special measures to optimize the environment of service and promote 
the attractiveness of investment by putting forward such notions as “atoning for 
policy inadequacies through intensifying services” and “nanny-style government 
service” and “public friendliness towards investment”. Compliance with the law 
and open and transparent administration are considered the basis and prerequisite 
for the optimization of regional service environments, the core of regional soft 
power, which can make up for the inadequacies in the hard power of a region. 
Gutian County in Fujian Province, for example, optimizes the environment of soft 
power by intensifying government services, which eventually convinced overseas 
Representations and effects of competition 101
business people to invest extensively in the region. In Beijing, Zhongguancun in 
Haidian District and Wangjing in Chaoyang District are now both concentrated 
zones of Internet companies. Their secret is to continuously heighten the 
level of government services. Their good services and favorable atmosphere of 
entrepreneurship continue to be great attractions to new Internet companies.
Third, regional government can gain competitive advantages by shaping a 
good humanistic environment. For example, an obvious difference can be found 
between the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta in terms of the 
build-up of humanistic environment. The humanistic spirit in the Pearl River 
Delta can be summed up as “mercantilism, pragmatism and integration”. Its 
young generation does not disguise their aspirations and desire for wealth, as the 
pursuit of wealth is one of their key goals in life. They prove to be pragmatic, 
direct and efficient even in cultural pursuits. But people in the Yangtze River 
region are endowed with deep cultural deposits, with a special focus on education, 
science and technology and sustainable self-cultivation and family development. 
It is precisely the differences in their humanistic environment that give different 
expressions to their historical tracks of economic and social development.
The promotion and creation of a good modern environment turns out to be a 
primary approach to regional government competition. The humanistic environ-
ment, in a sense, has become part of the appraisal of capital cost. The humanistic 
spirit that enterprises attach great importance to includes the excellence of local 
human resources in such aspects as modern awareness and product awareness, 
enterprising folk customs, open-mindedness and moderate public temperament, 
which can effectively help to reduce risks in legality, economy and operation. 
The humanistic spirit is an essential element that boosts the competitiveness of 
a city. The biggest competitiveness of a city lies in giving everyone in the city 
a sense of belonging rather than a sense of being a “passerby”.
The competition of a region or a city goes ultimately to the humanistic 
environment, depending on whether a favorable humanistic environment can be 
created for entrepreneurs to start, develop and sustain their businesses. For those 
companies investing in the Yangtze River Delta, the human spirit is absolutely 
their priority. When BenQ decided to establish factories in China mainland, a 
batch of factories funded by Taiwan had already gathered in Shenzhen, Dongguan 
and other cities in the Pearl River Delta region, which provided it with a strong 
supporting environment for the IT manufacturing industry. BenQ chose to settle 
in Suzhou to become the first Taiwan company in Suzhou New District, which 
is explained by their belief in regional personality, understanding of happiness 
and hard-working, and other cultural attributes of the region, which have been 
deeply imprinted in the minds of the people in the region since ancient times 
and which dovetail with BenQ’s corporate culture.
Finally, the competition of social credit systems has been of increasing impor-
tance to regional governments. With the development of a regional economy, the 
build-up of a social credit system has continuously served as a significant means 
and guarantee of regional competition. A mature social credit system can regulate 
and standardize regional market order, integrate government administration and 
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social scrutiny and help to enhance regional administrative effectiveness. By 
accelerating the pace of social credit system build-up, regional government can 
set up credit system platforms, which undertake credit information collection, 
management, usage, publicity and release; introduce punitive measures such 
as the exposure of information concerning dishonesty; and elevate the level of 
regional governance and regional credit competitive power.
Let us take Zhangjiagang City, Jiangsu Province, China, as an example. In 
2012, Zhangjiagang Municipality established a committee for social credit system 
construction, which was followed by the establishment of the Public Credit 
Information Center of Zhangjiagang City in 2014, with its main responsibilities 
being the collection and handling of credit information and its related services. 
Regarding credit system building, Zhangjiagang City put forth Provisions for 
the Build-up of Social Credit in Zhangjiagang City and Regulations Regarding 
Corporate Information Management in Zhangjiagang City in 2014. The former 
stipulated the macro-level requirements of the build-up of social credit system 
in Zhangjiagang City, specified major tasks, objectives and guarantee measures 
and established a fundamental framework. The latter made relevant stipulations 
regarding the collection of corporate credit data and the standardization of their 
collection, release, use and documentation.
In the same year, it initiated the first-phase project featuring “public credit 
information service platform” and built a passageway for information sharing 
by coordinating authorities of industry and commerce, state taxation, quality 
inspection, court and so on, thus forming an information bank of legal persons 
with information updating mechanisms. The information bank contained a whole 
set of credit information data of all enterprises. By the end of 2014, more than 
700,000 entries from local 40,852 enterprises had been collected. Zhangjiagang 
City had made some initial attempts at the application of credit information, such 
as the creation of honest user websites – “Credit Zhangjiagang” and the APP 
of Credit Consultation as well as promoting corporate credit standards. “Credit 
Zhangjiagang” was officially put into operation in June 2014, highlighting credit 
information publicity, inquiries, dishonesty black lists and exposure platforms, 
as well as credit information assessment.
4.3.7  Competition in policy systems
This involves policies implemented by regional government on both foreign and 
regional levels and is also true between countries. Policies are public products 
that are non-exclusive and imitative. Therefore, good competitive policy systems 
must be (1) realistic, i.e. in line with reality and the requirements for socio-
economic development; (2) advanced, in the sense that they are foresighted 
and innovative; (3) workable, in the sense that they are clear, targeted and 
enforceable; (4) organized, in the sense that specialized agencies and people 
perform duties and put them into operation; and (5) effective, which means 
that there is inspection, monitoring, assessment and evaluation mechanisms, 
including the involvement of third parties playing their role so as to achieve 
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policy objectives effectively. Whether policy systems are sound or not has great 
impacts upon regional competition.
Apart from competition in the above-mentioned areas, it is of greater sig-
nificance for regional government to compete in the policy system. Due to 
its complexity, diversity and extensive impacts, such competition will affect 
various aspects of socio-economic development in the region. In this sense, the 
policy system competition is the most fundamental for regional government, 
because it may exert extensive influence upon public finance, hard and soft 
environment, infrastructure, talent development and science and technology. 
The policy system competition may unfold on two levels: regional governments 
compete for national preferential policies or pilot trials of antecedent policies, 
and regional governments may introduce a variety of competitive policies within 
their own power.
China’s institutional transformation and transition are dominated by the 
national government supply. The national government sets policy bottom lines 
and thresholds for regional governments. The policy “reservoir” is under the 
control of the national government, and it is up to the national government when 
the water in the reservoir is discharged, how and to whom, so experimentation 
and then promotion have been a major way of making decisions concerning the 
discharge of the reservoir water. Therefore, striving for pilot trials has become an 
important part of competition between regional governments, who need to “run 
to meet higher government officials for policies”. Policy experimentation means 
opportunities of being the first to set up pilot zones for policies, preferential 
policies granted by the state and minimized risks in policy implementation. 
The special economic zones, cities under separate state planning, state-level 
development zones and the current free trade zones are all products of such 
competition. Without early trials and pilot implementation, there might not be 
what exist today in different regions of China. As long as a regional govern-
ment can win over certain preferential and special policies, it will be in a good 
position to lay a solid foundation for steady regional economic development 
and the maximization of regional budget revenues.
In addition to the competition of “running for policies”, regional governments 
put forward a variety of policies in line with their own conditions within their 
own authority. Only when these policies prove to be sophisticated can they be 
considered competitive and acquire policy dividends, and the policy sophistication 
is manifested in the form of policy innovation competition in the policy system. 
In order to obtain potential benefits of policy competition, a region must, to 
some extent, be predictive, foresighted and ahead of others, just as commodity 
markets must keep products competitive if they want to gain excess profits. 
Since policies are public products with non-exclusiveness and emulability, they 
are easily reproduced, and therefore, the same policy may appear in different 
regions at the same time; once it is imitated and transcended, the potential 
benefits of the region will be diminished.
Policy competitiveness depends on whether there is such a policy in the 
region, whether it is known to the public, whether it is sound and workable, 
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and whether it can achieve its desired effects. Regional governments need to 
formulate and put into operation such policies as targeting talents, investment 
and financing, land, personnel training support and other aspects through 
official channels. They need to make such policies known to the public and let 
the public publicize, understand and act upon them. They need to promulgate 
policies that are comprehensive, clear, operable and suited for local socio-
economic development. They need to ensure that the policies are implemented 
through designated agencies and specific personnel and that there are checking, 
evaluation and supervising mechanisms. And, finally, they need to look into 
whether the policies have achieved their desired effects, whether they have got 
positive feedback, whether they play an exemplary role outside the region and 
whether they bring the aggregation of resources for regional economic and 
social development.
What is discussed above must be consistent; there should not be contradic-
tions, particularly in terms of policy formulation and implementation. In real 
life, it is not uncommon that the regional government may put forward quite 
a number of policies, which do not have their due effects or demonstrate 
their competitiveness as a result of poor execution. Ningbo City, China, for 
example, issued between 2010 and 2015 seven official documents regarding 
talent planning, 13 regarding talent attraction and introduction, ten regard-
ing talent training, two regarding talent selection, eight regarding talent 
exchange, eight regarding talent rewards, 12 regarding talent appraisal and 
14 regarding talent protection. However, very few official documents touched 
upon talent employment, policy implementation, supervision and others, such 
as the absence of current policies in constraints and supervision after talent 
introduction; very few terms dealt with how the introduced talents or techni-
cal team serve enterprises, how to fully tap the potentials of these talents to 
serve enterprises and how to clarify the requirements of the current laws and 
regulations for work responsibilities. All these partially explain the failures of 
those talent policies to fully achieve their desired goals and effects and the 
reasons why they turned out to be not so competitive in Zhejiang Province, 
China, as expected.
4.3.8  Competition in management efficiency
Regional government management efficiency is an overall indication of its 
administrative activities, speed, quality and efficiency; this covers macro-efficiency, 
micro-efficiency, organizational efficiency and individual efficiency. In terms of 
administrative compliance, regional government bodies should follow the norms 
of legality, interest and quality, and in terms of administrative efficiency, they 
should follow the norms of quantity, time, speed and budgeting. Competition 
in management efficiency is in nature competition of organizational systems, 
government obligations, service awareness, work skills and technological plat-
forms. Developed regions have been practicing, without precedent, the paralleled 
and integrated service modes.
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Efficiency of regional government administration is an overall reflection of 
administrative activities, performance, quality and efficacy and a comprehensive 
evaluation of administrative capacity, executive capabilities and service compe-
tence, which reflect both “what to do” and “how to do” on the part of regional 
government. What regional government does must comply with administrative 
specifications: legality, i.e. whether administration is in line with the Constitution, 
laws and regulations, as well as national principles and policies; interest, i.e. 
whether administrative outcomes are in line with the basic interests of the state 
and whether they are conducive to regional economic and social development; 
and quality, i.e. whether administrative processes conform to the prescribed 
procedures and whether they abide by the budget control process.
“What to do” is the foundation, the bottom line and the touchstone for 
regional government. “How to do” is concerned with administrative efficiency, 
against which four standards are proposed for its measurement: quantity, i.e. 
how much work is done within the unit time; duration, i.e. whether objectives 
are fulfilled within the prescribed time limit; performance, i.e. whether the 
completion of tasks is in agreement with the principles of “shortest duration” 
or “highest speed”; and budget, i.e. whether the costs are reduced and the 
budget of manpower, materials and financial resources are met, in other ways, 
whether the budget is strictly controlled and the tasks are completed within 
a certain budget index. The first three standards are transformable and are in 
essence the same thing, but they differ in calculation methods and perspectives.
Regional government administrative efficiency may be addressed from the 
micro and macro perspective and the organizational and individual perspec-
tive. The micro perspective refers to the administrative efficiency of a single 
administrative body or department or individual, while the macro perspective 
examines from the holistic point of view the regional economic and social 
development within a certain period, which is measurable by the economic 
growth or the social development index. The organizational efficiency refers to 
the timeliness, performance and input–output ratio of specific administrative 
agencies engaging in administrative activities and public services, which is an 
overall evaluation indicator of administrative service agencies; individual efficiency 
refers to the timeliness and performance of a certain administrative person in 
his performance of duties, which is the evaluation of service efficiency of an 
administrative individual.
Starting from the above understanding, the competition of regional govern-
ment administrative efficiency unfolds in the following ways. The first is the 
overall compliance evaluation of regional government services, which will be 
deemed uncompetitive if such misconducts happen to its agencies, departments 
or related personnel as frequent infringements of law, non-compliance with 
regulations, rules and disciplines and procedures, bribery, rent-seeking through 
power and so on. The second is the patency of regional administrative service 
processes and the transparency of administrative information. The fairness and 
justice of administrative services can be ensured and the services are deemed 
competitive if processes are easy to follow with clear time indications and task 
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specifications, and there is no prevarication and wrangling between government 
units, with clear clarification of responsibilities, rights and interests as open and 
transparent information and appropriate service guides or consultation platforms. 
The third is the evaluation of the efficiency of regional administrative services, 
which are deemed competitive if the agencies, departments or individuals, when 
providing services, are equipped with correct notions, sound service aware-
ness and positive attitudes; are skilled in their work; do not play with double 
standards; have a strong sense of time; and can concentrate on their work, with 
clear service objectives in mind.
Therefore, the competition of administrative efficiency is essentially the com-
petition of service awareness, work attitudes, a sense of responsibility, work 
skills and information technology platforms. Through creating a good service 
culture, cultivating service awareness, work skills and professional qualifications, 
and taking advantage of information technology platforms to enhance com-
munication, regional government can enhance service efficiency by providing 
one-stop services, for the purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency and 
the competitiveness of investment promotion.
4.4  The core of regional government competition
Innovation entails competition between regional governments, no matter 
whether it is the competition of finance and economy, talents and science and 
technology, soft and hard environment and infrastructure or it is the competition 
in policy systems and administrative efficiency. It is the core of competition. In 
cases where regional governments have similar financial and policy resources, 
innovation becomes the major arena for regional government competition. 
Innovation is the driving force and competitiveness. Continuous innovation is 
the inexhaustible competitiveness.
Innovation may be interpreted from different angles. Fred Riggs (1981) 
argued that innovation may be understood from three levels, namely technol-
ogy, institution and ideological behavior. Cheng Siwei (2005) believed that 
government innovation includes innovation of technology, administration and 
institution, which can all essentially be categorized under one heading of “insti-
tutional innovation”. Liu Jinghua and Jiang Xianhua (2004) classified govern-
ment administrative innovation on three levels: on the macro level, mainly the 
innovation in models and notions of government administration; on the mezzo 
level, mainly the innovation of specific systems of government administration, 
such as administrative decision-making and supervision, institutional setup, civil 
services, administrative examination and approval, household registration, social 
security, performance evaluation and so on; and on the micro level, mainly 
the innovation of approaches and methods of government administration. The 
macro-level innovation exerts decisive influence upon on the mezzo and micro 
levels, and micro- and mezzo level innovation affects and constrains that on 
the macro-level. The general purpose of innovation is to effectively plan and 
allocate internal resources and maximize the aggregation of external resources.
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In our view, innovation lies at the core of regional government competitive-
ness, and innovation from the perspective of regional government should cover 
notional, institutional, organizational and technological, as well as innovation in 
concept, method, technology, service products and so on in terms of its contents.
4.4.1  Competition in notional innovation
Notional innovation requires conformity to the reality and the discovery and 
development of new ideas and concepts that are down-to-earth and yet strategi-
cally advantageous. Conservative, self-contained and slouch notions will deter 
us from keeping abreast of the times. Competition requires innovation, which 
requires, first and foremost, innovation in ideas and conceptualization. The 
promotion of foresighted concepts, service concepts, competition concepts, 
responsibility concepts, open concepts and others all need a continuous, long-
lasting process.
Regional government needs foresighted concepts. Being foresighted requires 
shattering the stereotyped ways of thinking, breaking through the status quo and 
daring to be the first to challenge. It also requires giving full play to the role of 
regional government in economic orientation, regulation and early warning and 
in effectively allocating resources and forging the leading edge with resort to 
market rules and market forces, by means of investment, pricing, taxation and 
legislation, as well as through innovation in notion, institution, organization and 
technology with a view to promoting the scientific and sustainable development 
of regional economy.
Regional government needs service concepts and to transform administrative 
concepts and management concepts into service concepts to better serve the 
market, enterprises and society. Service concepts have multiple implications: all 
regional market participants and general public objects of government service; 
government service should be oriented towards providing support, monitoring 
and regulation, development and innovation; service satisfaction is the core 
standard for the measurement of services; all services should center around 
their objects and their needs. Government is the provider of public goods and 
services, and the public, enterprises and institutions within the region are the 
demanders for public goods and services. A major reason why Israel’s innovative 
competitiveness is second to none in the world is that its governments at all 
levels positions themselves as service-oriented governments, and civil servants 
at all levels of government position themselves as service providers.
The Tel Aviv Municipality, from the point of view of entrepreneurs’ practical 
needs, provides all the best possible administrative and basic support services. 
Entrepreneurial teams work in the CBD zone in the neighborhood of the 
Rothschild Street for very low rent while enjoying all relevant services and 
resources. In 2004, China started to carry out its service-oriented government 
program and specified four functions, namely economic regulation, market 
supervision, social management and public services, which practice the values 
of service concepts and push the overall administration level to a new height.
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Regional government needs competitive concepts. The market theorists tend 
to believe that competition takes place only between enterprises and not between 
governments. However, in reality, competition takes place where resources are 
limited or scarce and governments have to compete for such resources. Regional 
governments, especially the leadership team, must be equipped with a sense of 
competition, a spirit of strong power and the courage for competition. There 
are scalar economic variations between regional governments in China, ranging 
from the east coastal region to the central region and to the western region, 
and the variations result chiefly from differences in competitive concepts and 
competitiveness, in addition to natural endowments of resources. A gradient of 
awareness of competition between regional governments is observed starting to 
wane to varying degrees from the east, to the central and then to the west region.
Regional government needs responsibility concepts, undertakes competition 
with others responsibly and takes responsibility as its basic starting point to 
ensure the interests of service objects. It should always put responsibility above 
rights and interests. The awareness of responsibility requires the identification 
of responsible persons to be held accountable for any sort of activities and their 
consequences; the appraisal of responsibilities and their ensuing outcomes; and 
the mechanisms for supervision of responsibilities, rewards for fulfillment of 
responsibilities and penalties for failures so that regional government can truly 
become the subject undertaking responsibilities and their appraisal, supervision 
and punishment.
Regional government competition requires the concepts of reform and opening 
up. Foshan City, China, for example, conducted inter-district competition within 
its jurisdiction over the years in talent introduction, technological innovation, 
entrepreneurship management, industrial park construction, industrial chain 
docking and so on. District governments under the Foshan Municipality benefited 
from such competition and collaboration so as to promote their reform and 
development and create a good atmosphere for common interests and prosperity.
4.4.2  Competition in institutional innovation
Institutional innovation is the basis and guarantee of regional government innova-
tion and is the concentrated expression of regional government competition. It 
lands ideas and notions on an operational footing and makes it possible for them 
to guide practice. Without institutional innovation, there will be no basis for 
other kinds of innovation to persist and last. For regional government, institutions 
are provided as public goods, and their innovation should cover public service 
systems, public security systems, social welfare systems, housing systems, health 
service systems, social employment systems, education and training systems, 
income distribution systems, infrastructure construction systems, environmental 
protection systems and so on. However, when innovation is discussed with focus 
on the specific systems of regional government–market competition, then what 
is referred to is the total sum of specific policies, measures and methods based 
on the specific systems. Compared with the micro-innovation costs of enterprises 
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and individuals in the market, the macro-innovation costs of regional government 
may be much lower, and the advantages of competition in regional institutional 
innovation will be definite if the costs become lower with the accrual of benefits.
Since 2000, in China’s endeavor to create service-oriented government, the 
“one-stop service” model launched at the regional government level is representa-
tive of operational and competitive system innovation. In October 2000, Nanjing 
set up the “government supermarket” to provide “one-stop service”, the first 
of its kind in China, followed by Tianjin, which implemented the administrative 
examination and approval system reform featuring “parallel examination and 
combined approval, with overtime acquiescence”, and by Harbin and Chengdu, 
which launched the “one-go examination and auditing system” for handling 
administrative affairs. With the development of mobile Internet, all kinds of 
“mobile government”, such as government APP and WeChat public accounts, 
mushroomed all over China. All this has made administrative processes easier, 
more flexible, more convenient and cost-efficient. Institutional innovation has 
enhanced regional government competitiveness.
Competition in institutional innovation is surging in different regions of 
the world. Israel can be cited as a successful example. In order to foster and 
inspire innovation, Israel has formulated a series of laws, regulations and rules 
and put into operation a series of policies and measures. In 1985, The Law on 
Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development was promulgated, which 
stipulated the general principle for government encouragement and funding of 
industrial research and development. According to this law, the Israeli govern-
ment provides 30 to 66 percent of the funds required for the research and 
development projects that are approved by the government. This stipulation 
is specific, clear and highly workable and has contributed immensely to the 
creation, development, application and popularization of high-tech industries.
In 2002, Israel passed The Tax Reform Act, which made significant adjustments 
to the yield tax on active capital, such as venture capital, securities trading and 
direct investment, so as to promote the development of high-tech industries. In 
2011, Israel promulgated The Angel Law to encourage investment of high-tech 
companies in their early stage. As long as qualified investors invest in high-tech 
private enterprises, they will get the deduction of the same amount as their invest-
ment from their income taxes. Israel also enforced a strict intellectual property 
protection system, attempting to protect intellectual property rights through 
The Property Law, The Trademark Ordinance, The Copyright Law and others.
In order to promote industry–university–research cooperation, Israel, from 
the beginning of 1993, implemented the “Magnet Program” to make the 
industry–university–research combination a sustainable model so as to encourage 
industrial groups and academic institutions to form partnerships and jointly 
develop key general technologies. The Israel government conducted assessments 
of the projects financed by the Magnet Program, and the major indices included 
economic advantages, export and employment potential, innovative and com-
mon technologies, extent of enterprise participation and so on. Each project is 
undertaken by the R&D consortium of enterprises, scientific research institutions 
110 Representations and effects of competition
and other members, with a span of three to six years, thus creating incentive and 
yet binding mechanisms for government, incubators and tenant enterprises and 
a fast channel for quick knowledge transformation from universities and research 
institutions into productive forces. It mainly took the following three systems.
First, the Israeli government strengthens its guidance for technological incu-
bators and provides direct or indirect funding for their daily operation. All of 
them are non-profit organizations with government support of salaries and 
administrative expenses. The Chief Scientist’s Office of the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade grants 85 percent of the expenses to the incubating enterprises for a 
period of two years and with the maximum financial funding of US $150,000 
per year. It is stipulated that for successful enterprises, 20 percent of their 
equity goes to the incubator and 3 percent of its market sales is returned to 
the government incubation fund. By so doing, the Israeli government funds 
start-up businesses and incubators as well.
Second, measures are taken to control the number of incubation enterprises 
so as to ensure the quality of incubation. The government of Israel made rigid 
provisions for each incubator, that is, only eight to 15 start-ups within each 
incubator, which ensures the possibility of more penetrating incubation of each 
start-up business within the incubator. After entrepreneurs get into incubators 
with project-based start-up companies, the government will provide human, 
financial and material resources for incubators to ensure deep incubation of those 
start-ups. Incubators start by helping entrepreneurs to set up an entrepreneurial 
team with full responsibility for financial management, and then provide assistance 
in developing business plans and R&D plans and finding partners. Start-up 
enterprises are not allowed to transfer their equities and options within the first 
two years of their incubation.
Third, a strict examination and assessment mechanism is in place for incubators. 
At the beginning of each year, the government of Israel signs an annual target 
agreement with incubators, and at the end of the year, the government provides 
about US $200,000 to each incubator after their successful assessment. The 
government avoids signing agreements with the managing entrepreneur of the 
incubating project so that it entrusts the responsibility of fund management to 
incubators rather than the entrepreneurs, but it exercises strict control upon the 
approval of each start-up business budget, work plan, work flow, etc. Incubators 
are supposed to submit project reports to the government every six months. 
All this makes sure that incubators take the responsibilities for the spending of 
government funding.
Fourth, incubators must operate in such ways that the mechanism for effec-
tively integrating industries, universities and research institutions must work 
properly. Incubators are independent legal entities with government support. 
Its board members are composed of representatives from government, busi-
nesses, research institutes, universities and intermediaries. This composition 
gives full play to the roles of all relevant parties, and the board of directors of 
the start-up business consists of the initiator, representatives from incubators 
and investors, etc.
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Israel’s policies and institutional innovation have specific targets and clear 
goals and are highly workable. They have proved to be extremely attractive 
to innovative entrepreneurs, as well as realizing Israel’s dream of creating an 
“innovative paradise for entrepreneurs”.
4.4.3  Competition in organizational innovation
Organizational innovation is the optimization of organizational management of 
regional government, especially in terms of its structure and mechanism and on 
both the regional government level and on the level of internal organization. 
Organizational innovation, as a kind of competition, is the advantage formed 
through comparison of organizational performance and efficiency between 
regional governments. Efficiency is the goal government operation strives to 
achieve from the outset. With the development of the times and technological 
progress, new forms of organizational management keep emerging for the 
benefit of better performing government functions and enhancing administra-
tive efficiency. The emergence of networking, for example, aims at providing a 
wider range of new modes of operation to cater for public goods and public 
services, the inter-departmental restructuring is introduced to solve problems 
of inefficient operation as a result of over-departmentalization and functional 
overlapping, and the matrix structure is designed to remove hurdles and enhance 
coordination between horizontal departments in the existing administrative 
system while maintaining corresponding relations between these departments 
and higher-level departments.
Flattened administration is the result of organizational innovation, in which 
case levels of regional government administration are reduced, the span of insti-
tutional management is moderately expanded, and authorities and responsibilities 
are relegated to lower levels. A case in point is China’s administrative reform 
of putting some counties under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial govern-
ment, which was launched under the slogan of “strengthening counties through 
delegation”. Structurally, the three-level administrative system of province–
municipality–county is reduced to a two-level system of province–municipality/
county. In 1992, the provincial government of Zhejiang, China, experimented 
by giving greater authority and a greater degree of autonomy to 13 municipal 
and county-level governments, which released huge momentum for economic 
development. By 2002, more authorities were delegated to county govern-
ments in areas of personnel, finance, planning, project approval and so on. The 
reform in Zhejiang Province improved county-level government performance, 
helped mobilize economic and administrative resources and achieved desirable 
results. Following Zhejiang Province, provinces such as Anhui, Hubei, Henan, 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Fujian, Hunan and Hebei also launched the organizational 
innovation of county governments under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial 
government.
Matrix structural management is another form of organizational innovation, 
which usually takes the form of functional mergers of departments on the 
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horizontal level and then reduces the number of people. However, such mergers 
are often plagued by breaking down the corresponding functions of the current 
administrative system in China. China’s linear administrative system features 
the longitudinal structural correspondence, as there is the Ministry of Culture 
at the national level, to which the Department of Culture corresponds at the 
provincial level, and then the Bureau of Culture at the municipal and county 
levels, and the Station of Culture at the township level. It often turns out to 
be difficult for reforms of local administrative structures to be carried further 
without breaking down the vertical correspondence.
Fuyang City in Zhejiang, China adopted a matrix structure in the form of 
“special committees”, which to a certain extent eases the bottleneck problem. 
It set up 15 special committees, each of which contains a number of functional 
departments. Its reform followed the principle of “previous practices upwards 
and reformed practices downwards”, which means the original corresponding 
relations were retained while special committees exercised authorities over sub-
ordinate departments under their charge by undertaking functional restructuring 
so as to remove obstacles across departments. For example, those departments, 
which now come under the direct charge of the Urban and Rural Co-ordination 
Committee, were functionally fragmented previously, thus leading to repeated 
payment and huge waste of funds for financial support to agriculture.
After the establishment of the committee, the agriculture-related funds were all 
concentrated from previous departments into the committee and were uniformly 
managed by it. The previous problem of non-cooperation between departments 
was solved at one go, which considerably improved its administrative efficiency. 
The inter-departmental restructuring is an example of organizational innovation. 
Shunde District, Foshan City, adopted the overhaul organizational restructur-
ing, which has become a representative of such reforms. Such reforms aim at 
streamlining the organization by merging departments into one track, which 
previously ran on two different tracks, the party and the administrative lines. It 
followed that district leaders took charge of both party and government work. 
The new organization had the advantages of easier coordination and relatively 
centralized administration as a result of “mergers of similar-category items”. 
Since 2008, such streamlined restructuring was gradually implemented from 
the central to the local level.
A series of organizational innovations have been carried out by the US 
government around the revitalization of the US manufacturing industry, e.g. 
the adjustment and concentration of government functions, the setup of new 
institutions and so on. The innovations have improved organizational manage-
ment efficiency and contributed to the realization of goals. In 2009, Barack 
Obama, the then-US president, delivered a speech and proposed to take the 
revitalization of the US manufacturing industry as a major strategy for long-term 
US economic development. At the end of the same year, the US government 
introduced A Framework for Revitalizing American Manufacturing, which 
unfolded from the strategic layout the development path to the specific measures 
so as to complete the deployment of the manufacturing innovation plan.
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In 2011, the US government officially launched the Advanced Manufacturing 
Partnership to speed up the seizure of the advanced manufacturing industry in 
the twenty-first century. In 2012, the US further launched the National Strategic 
Plan for Advanced Manufacturing to encourage manufacturing enterprises to 
return to the US. The plan, on the one hand, adjusted the traditional manufactur-
ing structure and enhanced its competitiveness and, on the other hand, facilitated 
the development of high-tech industries and advanced digital manufacturing 
technologies, such as advanced platforms for production technology, advanced 
manufacturing technology and design and data infrastructure, etc.
Israel’s administrative system for science and technology is characterized by its 
looseness and multi-management, and its national decision-making body consists 
of ministries of science and technology, industry and trade, national defense, 
agriculture, health, communications, education, environment and infrastructure, 
together with the Academy of Sciences and Humanities and other institutions. 
However, the chief scientist responsibility system is implemented for scientific 
and technological work, and the main government departments have the chief 
scientist’s office. There is also a chief scientist forum, with the Minister of Sci-
ence and Technology acting as chairman, which concentrates on major issues 
concerning policies for science and technology, thus avoiding the duplication or 
omission of science and technology projects and improving the competitiveness 
of science and technology.
4.4.4  Competition in technological innovation
There are four major aspects to competition in technological innovation for 
regional government: the technical transformation of regional government and 
the technical promotion of administrative capacities; the provision of advanced 
technological environment within the region and the enhancement of regional 
attractiveness by optimizing its technological environment; regional govern-
ment’s organizing the projects which require higher standards for technological 
innovation, greater capital flow, more labor and time input, and the projects 
other innovative bodies are not in a position to undertake within the region; 
regional government assisting other market participants (enterprises, scientific 
research institutions or individuals) in pushing forward their technological 
innovation through increasing financial support.
Electronic administration is a typical example in the technological innovation 
of regional government. Since the 1990s, regional government in China has 
constantly improved their management approaches and carried out the elec-
tronic transformation. The state has started the construction of e-government 
projects. China’s electronic government construction follows the main thread 
of “office automation within the organization”, “electronic engineering within 
management departments” and “government online projects”. On the basis 
of office automation, the Chinese government initiated the “Three-Golden 
Projects” – Golden Bridge (Jinqiao), Golden Customs (Jinguan) and Golden 
Card (Jinka) in 1993.
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The Golden Bridge Project was an information project designed to sup-
port national macro-economic control and decision-making and achieve inter-
governmental communication by means of special infrastructure network. The 
Golden Custom Project was an information network system set up to heighten 
modern management and service level in China’s foreign trade and related fields. 
The Golden Card Project was launched by the national government as a key 
information infrastructure and an integral part of the electronic administration 
project to enhance cross-bank bankcard services characterized by government 
informationalization.
On January 22, 1999, China Telecom and the Economic Information Center 
of the National Economy and Commerce Commission, along with 40 other 
information-related ministries, commissions, bureaus and offices under the 
administration of the State Council, jointly launched the “Government Online 
Project”, together with its host website www.gov.cninfo.net and guide site www.
gov.cninfo.net, which were officially open to the public and started to provide 
information services. Since then, the Government Online Projects at all levels 
were started in succession and the electronic government construction was in 
full swing. The introduction of advanced e-government technology into every 
aspect of public services has greatly improved administrative efficiency and 
regional competitiveness.
Grid management is a new digital regional administrative model. It divides 
a region into several grid cells by the grid map technology, and these cells 
are the smallest administrative and service units. Each grid is equipped with a 
management supervisor whose duty is to monitor the municipal components 
or facilities within the grid. For any problems, the supervisor can transfer 
relevant information through communication technology to the relevant center, 
which will identify the responsible functional division in the shortest time and 
have the problem addressed. As the platform center can engage itself with all 
functional departments, the coordination between functional departments can 
be accomplished through this platform.
Zhoushan City, Zhejiang Province, has carried this innovation one step 
forward by offering service content in the grid management in light of the 
user-oriented philosophy. The city is divided into 2428 grids and a service team 
of 76 members is designated to each grid. This operation mode is called “grid 
management and group service”. In addition, a comprehensive, integrated and 
shared information management system has been developed for better operation 
of the grid. The urban big data center or cloud platform construction is also 
a manifestation of technological innovation for regional government. In 2014, 
Foshan City, Guangdong Province, introduced the concept of big data and 
established a variety of cloud platforms for government administration, such as 
the social comprehensive governance cloud platform, which provides one-net 
service and solutions to grassroots governance. Chancheng District govern-
ment in Foshan divided the whole district into 122 grids and migrated urban 
administration, public security, safety supervision, judicial and public security 
departments to the grids. Meanwhile, it established a district- and township-level 
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social comprehensive monitoring center. The grid administrator was responsible 
for information collection, coordination within communities, dispute mediation, 
etc. The cloud platform integrated traffic command centers, digital city manage-
ment and emergency command center, etc. to which residents can report by 
phone, WeChat, APP or network. In cases where “difficult problems” arise, the 
district- or township-level command center organizes a joint law enforcement 
team to address the problems collectively, thus forming new competitiveness 
for regional government.
The Tel Aviv Municipality in Israel, in order to help the development of 
incubators, established a database that makes a detailed record of all types of 
enterprises, including the enterprise size, employee number, location, product 
market, development stage, scale of production, main financing methods and 
current problems. By referring to the continuously updated database and by 
employing professionalized financial analysis tools for optimal financing methods 
and scales of enterprises, regional government reduces its financial burden and 
is able to make more effective and reasonable resource allocation. Although 
most financing is up to the market, the Tel Aviv Municipality hosts a variety of 
entrepreneurial contests to select the best teams and provide support to them. 
Once government injects capital into them, the ownership and the right to use 
the capital will be completely transferred to enterprises and teams. If enterprises 
fail, the capital does not need to be reimbursed, and if they succeed, the capital 
should be reimbursed on a yearly basis. Obviously, the construction of big data 
centers, information centers and coordination centers by regional government 
can transform the regional technological environment and help regional govern-
ment to achieve technologically competitive advantages in market competition.
In addition, government involvement in technological innovation is not 
unusual in different parts of the world. Take the US, for example. In 2012, the 
Obama administration proposed the construction of the “Innovation Network 
for National Manufacturing”, and up to 45 research centers were established 
to strengthen the industry–university–research combination between universities 
and manufacturing enterprises. In 2013, the Executive Office of the President 
(EOP), the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and the Advanced 
Manufacturing National Program Office jointly promulgated the Preliminary 
Design of Innovation Network for National Manufacturing and invested US 
$1 billion in the establishment of manufacturing innovation networks, with 
concentrated efforts devoted to promoting the innovative development of digital 
manufacturing, new energy, new materials and other advanced manufacturing 
industries, and created a number of innovation clusters with advanced manu-
facturing capacity.
Those efforts included developing lightweight carbon fiber composite materials 
to improve combustion efficacy, performance and anti-corrosion of the next 
generation of automobiles, aircraft, trains and ships; ameliorating standards, 
materials and equipment pertaining to 3D printing technology to achieve low-
cost pilot production with digital design; and creating intelligent manufacturing 
frameworks and methods to allow operators to control the “big data flow” from 
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completely digital factories so as to improve production efficiency, optimize 
supply chains and enhance the efficiency in using energy, water and materials, 
etc. In 2012, the US government and the private sector jointly invested US $85 
million to set up the National 3D Printer Manufacturing Innovation Institute. 
The following year, a grant of US $200 million in federal funds was in place 
for the establishment of the Lightweight and Modern Metals Manufacturing 
Innovation Institute, the Digital Manufacturing and Design Innovation Institute 
and the Next Generation Power Electronics National Manufacturing Innovation 
Institute, followed by a composite materials manufacturing center, which further 
consolidated competitiveness of technological innovation.
4.5  The impacts of regional government competition 
on resource allocation
Viewed outwardly, regional competition in projects, industries, matching sup-
port, human resources, fiscal and financial resources, infrastructure, environment 
system and administrative efficiency is the external representation of competition 
between regional governments, while regional innovation in notion, institution, 
organization and technology is the core of regional competition and resource 
allocation; they are two sides of the same coin. Resource allocation, as a basic 
issue of economics, is an inevitable subject regarding regional government com-
petition. Regional competition results from the disparity in the flow of regional 
factors, which is caused by imbalanced regional development. In fact, it reflects 
the regional ability to optimize resource allocation, i.e. resource attraction and 
market competitiveness. Due to the limitation and scarcity of resources, there is 
always a trade-off relationship between regions in resource allocation. Regions 
compete for resource allocation rights as much as possible through competition.
The basic economic goal of regional government competition is to form 
regional comparative advantages by optimizing resource allocation; the basic 
idea is that regional governments compete for regional competitiveness and 
comparative advantages, absorb and gather resources, optimize resource alloca-
tion and thus achieve regional sustainable growth. Therefore, regional govern-
ment competitiveness exerts effective influences upon three types of resource 
allocation, such that it promotes the optimal allocation of internal resources; 
emphasizes regional complementariness and collaborative coexistence with resort 
to inter-regional division of labor; forms cooperation teams to implement optimal 
allocation of external resources; and builds up its own soft and hard environments 
with help on innovation in institutions, organizations and technology so as to 
enhance the optimal allocation of resources by cultivating “internal strength”.
Viewed inwardly, regional government competitiveness can exert effective 
influence upon the allocation of operational, non-operational and quasi-operational 
resources, such that it may affect the optimal allocation of internal resources 
and its efficiency within its own jurisdiction; the flow and absorption of scarce 
resources outside its jurisdiction for the optimized formation of resource alloca-
tion and its efficiency within larger areas; and the coordination and matching 
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of both internal and external resources within the region for the formation of 
new resource allocation optimization and its efficiency.
4.5.1  Influence of regional government competition on the 
allocation of operational resources: improvement on 
productive efficiency
Essentially, operational resources are productive resources, enterprise resources 
and industrial resources. They are resources operated by the market rather than 
directly by regional government. They fully retain their market purity. Regional 
governments should adopt measures such as non-interventionism, encourage-
ment and supportive policies, antitrust policies and risk monitoring policies to 
guarantee the decisive role of the market in their allocation. This “market” 
is a “market” of enterprises instead of a “market” of regional governments. 
Therefore, the real effect of regional government competition on the effective 
allocation of operational resources is improvement upon productive efficiency.
First, it is due to the microcosmic nature of business entities of operational 
resources. They are enterprises rather than regional governments. Their micro-
cosmic nature resides in their individuality and specificity. Enterprises cannot 
adjust the allocation of operational resources within a region. Only regional 
government has the attributes of being macrocosmic and mezzocosmic and can 
regulate the allocation of operational resources within the region.
Second, it is due to the economical nature of operational resources. Regional 
government needs to create conditions to guarantee the maximization of economic 
benefits for enterprises within the region, thus maximizing economic interests.
Third, it is due to the mobility of operational resources. In a sense, operational 
resources are profit-seeking. Operational resources will flow wherever the greatest 
benefits can be achieved. What regional government should do is to remove 
the boundaries so as to realize the free flow of resources. That is the essence 
of the optimal allocation of operational resources.
As far as operational resources are concerned, regional government should 
create conditions to protect its micro-subjectivity, operational economics and free 
mobility, without direct operation or intervention. However, it does not mean 
that there is nothing regional governments cannot do. In fact, what regional 
governments should do is generate comparative advantages through competition 
so as to foster the attractiveness and capacity of operational resources, thus real-
izing the crossover flows towards themselves. “Crossover” here means breaking 
regional boundaries and enabling operational resources to flow freely between 
regions with resort to the free market force. The so-called towards themselves 
means that regional governments all want the resources to flow into their own 
regions. Resources flow into their own regions, because the productivity of 
the region is high, and the marginal productivity of the factors of operational 
resources is relatively high.
As shown in Figure 4.1, assume that there are two regions: Region 1 and 
Region 2. The horizontal axis indicates a certain productive factor of operational 
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resources and the vertical axis indicates the marginal productivity. The marginal 
productivity curve VMP1 of Region 1 is lower than the marginal productivity 
curve VMP2 of Region 2. The marginal productivity of N11 is W11, that of 
N12 is W12, that of N21 is W21 and that of N22 is W22. Assuming that N11 
equals N21 and N12 equals N22, which are homogeneous productive factors. 
If this productive factor is only produced in Region 1, when the productive 
factor needs to change from N11 to N12, it only increases the productivity of 
S1. However, if the productive factor flows freely, then this productive factor 
can flow from Region 1 to Region 2 freely. When it changes from N21 to N22, 
the area is increased by S2. In this case, S2 is larger than S1, which signifies that 
if the economics of the productive factors needs to be maintained, that is, the 
productive factors of operational resources can flow freely, the productive factors 
will flow to areas with high productivity; viewed from the entirety of Region 
1 and Region 2, this flow is conducive to expanding the overall production 
efficiency and improving the overall economic benefits. This is the efficiency of 
the allocation of operational resources.
Obviously, the realization of this allocation efficiency is based on two condi-
tions: first, there is no intervention. The free flow of operational resources will 
lead its economic rationality to incline toward the region with high productivity; 
second, the whole region needs to maintain a high marginal productivity. In 
the case of regional government competition, the flow of operational resources 
requires no direct intervention and operation by exerting forces. For the second 
point, it is imperative to improve regional competitiveness through internal 
forces. The essence is to improve the overall marginal productivity, find ways 
to help enterprises carry out technological transformation and enhance the 











Figure 4.1 Marginal productivity of regional factors and flow effects
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4.5.2  Influence of regional government competition on the 
allocation of “non-operational resources”: optimization 
of development environment
Non-operational resources fall under the general category of all social welfare 
products and public products within the jurisdiction of regional government. 
Non-operational resources are managed directly by regional government. Their 
non-exclusiveness and non-competitiveness exclude them from the category of 
profit-seeking operational resources, which is the most fundamental difference 
between them. A major task for regional government is to allocate non-operational 
resources for the purpose of optimizing regional development environment.
First, it is due to the non-economics of non-operational resource allocation. 
The goal of regional government’s non-operational resource allocation is to 
maximize economic benefits indirectly by optimizing investment environment, 
which is reflected in the increase in investment opportunities as a result of 
business environment improvement.
Second, it is due to the relative stability of non-operational resource allocation. 
Non-operational resources cannot flow across boundaries or freely at low costs 
between regions. In this sense, they have the feature of “real estate”. Regional 
government should try to retain their relative stability so as to maintain the 
steady contribution of non-operational resources to the creation and improve-
ment of favorable environment.
Third, it is due to the macrocosmic nature of entities of non-operational 
resource allocation. Non-operational resources are non-economic, and their 
allocation entities can only be regional government. Regional government 
undertakes their allocation from the quasi-macro perspective with a view to 
achieving the balance of their allocation and optimizing the macro environment 
of the entire region.
Fourth, it is due to the exclusiveness and competitiveness of non-operational 
resource allocation between regions. For example, the Guangzhou Library of 
China provides free services to residents in Guangzhou, and charges are required 
only for conditional services to residents outside Guangzhou. Such exclusiveness 
and competitiveness between regional governments can obtain comparative 
advantages of the environment.
Regional development environment is a concentrated reflection of all con-
ditions provided by regions to attract investment and is a multi-level and 
multi-factor dynamically integrated system of both hard and soft aspects. 
Regional government can adopt two approaches to competition for non-
operational resources. It can conduct upward competition for non-operational 
resources: upward competition for direct non-economic resources, which means 
obtaining more projects, preferential policies, financial support and transferred 
payment from higher-level government to improve hard environment of the 
region. It can also obtain non-operational resources indirectly through self-
optimization, which means optimizing regional soft environment through notional 
modification, cultural reshaping, policy guidance and services so as to attract 
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more operational resources or non-operational resources to converge. Both 
approaches are conducive to the transformation of a regional development 
environment. So regional government’s allocation of non-operational resources 
aims at the optimization of development environment.
4.5.3  The impacts of regional government competition on the 
allocation of quasi-operational resources: promoting 
comprehensive and sustainable growth
Quasi-operational resources lie in between social welfare products, public prod-
ucts and enterprise resources. For regional government, they are the most 
competitive and can best inspire the competitive desires of regional government. 
As they lie in between operational and non-operational resources, they boast 
the natural flexibility of being operational and non-operational, and being 
exclusive and non-exclusive under certain conditions. The degree of flexibility 
can be defined, controlled and manipulated by regional government in the 
light of its own needs. When regional government feels short of operational 
resources, quasi-operational resources can be moderately converted into opera-
tional resources so as to increase pure private products. When it feels short 
of non-operational resources, quasi-operational resources can be moderately 
converted into non-operational resources so as to increase pure public products. 
Regional government competition for quasi-operational resources focuses on 
their economic and operational attributes as well as their non-economic and 
non-operational attributes, but greater emphasis is laid on the flexibility and 
resilience between the two kinds of attributes. Owing to the relationship between 
regional government and quasi-operational resources, the competitive functions 
of regional government to quasi-operational resources are diversified.
First, Regional government competition improves the efficiency of resource 
allocation. For regional government, resource allocation efficiency means the 
efficiency of allocating all three types of resources. The allocation efficiency of 
non-operational resources depends on their stability and that of operational 
resources their free mobility; that of quasi-operational resources lies in between 
these two and can be driven by regional government. Quasi-operational resources 
have a moderate degree of mobility between regions, and this attribute facilitates 
the allocation of quasi-operational resources between regional governments. 
When the allocation efficiency of regional non-operational resources is low, it 
can be compensated by moderately increasing quasi-operational resources. When 
the allocation efficiency of operational resources is low, it can be compensated 
by moderately increasing quasi-operational resources.
Second, regional government competition improves productivity. Both quasi-
operational resources and operational resources can be allocated under complete 
competitive conditions as marginal costs are equal to marginal benefits. This 
mode can generate the greatest productivity and maximize economic benefits. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, when marginal benefits of Region 2 are high, the same 
factor increment can yield more benefits than Region 1.
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Third, regional government competition can bring forth first-mover advan-
tages. For regional governments, the biggest advantage of quasi-operational 
resources is their multi-mode utilization. regional governments can develop and 
utilize them all by itself when financial strength is great, or may jointly develop 
and utilize them with other micro entities of the market, or may cooperate with 
other regional governments. For example, BOT and PPP are good business 
modes for their development. Regional governments with a clearer idea of these 
resources and more modes of development will form first-mover advantages and 
improve regional competitiveness.
Fourth, regional government competition promotes sustainable develop-
ment. Due to government participation and control and the incentives as well 
as constraints between multiple regional market entities, there will be neither 
excessive exploitation nor utilization of quasi-operational resources, compared 
with operational resources, which promote sustainable development. Viewed 
globally, the allocation of quasi-operational resources is relatively reasonable 
without overcapacity, because they can take advantage of the double-sided 
advantages on the part of government and market.
4.5.4  Policy implications of regional government competition 
to different types of resource management
4.5.4.1  Encourage and support the accelerated development 
of operational resources
Operational resources represent the direction of pure market economy. Within 
its jurisdiction, regional government acts more as a supervisor, manager and 
regulator. It won’t participate directly in competition as an entity of micro-
economy. Regional government competition takes place through resource flow 
between regions, and resource convergence and absorption can be obtained 
through comparative advantages and regional competitiveness, which eventually 
improve production efficiency.
First, the acceleration of operational resources development gives prominence 
to maintaining the allocation function of regional market. Regional government 
should never participate in competition between enterprises and between other 
micro entities without acting as both athletes and referees. Therefore, rather 
than intervening too much in market operation, regional government should 
push regional operational resource projects to the market, society and investors 
inside and outside the region by means of capitalization.
Second, the acceleration of operational resources development gives promi-
nence to regional macro-control so as to prevent excessive competition and 
excessive flow. The profit-seeking attribute of operational resources focuses 
more on individual or corporate benefits, without giving equal consideration 
to the balance between production and economic benefits within the entire 
region. The reliance upon government is a sure guarantee for the realization 
of such balance.
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Third, the acceleration of operational resources development gives prominence 
to the supply-side structural reform of operational resources. Starting from the 
supply and production sides, regional government should enhance competitive-
ness to promote economic development by emancipating productivity, continue 
to focus on the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries as their 
development direction, innovate and develop new industries and accelerate and 
support advanced industrial clusters so as to create new economic growth areas.
Fourth, the acceleration of operational resources development gives promi-
nence to notional and institutional innovation. The former is most importantly 
manifested in market concepts, concepts of corporate autonomy and concepts of 
government services, and the latter focuses on the creation of legal, competitive, 
production and market environment for open, fair and just competition.
4.5.4.2  Improve and enhance the allocation function  
of non-operational resources
Non-operational resources, which are managed by regional government, are the 
concentrated reflection of its various functions in social undertakings and the 
main object of regional government competition for the optimization of envi-
ronment systems. The promotion of the allocation function of non-operational 
resources can help realize the balance of distribution between regional social 
welfare products and public products, improve their quality and scale and create 
a better business environment so as to create more wealth.
First, the improvement of the allocation function of non-operational resources 
requires that higher-level governments delegate authorities to lower levels under 
vertical government administration. The subordinate government shouldn’t 
be controlled too strictly but be given full autonomy, self-determination and 
self-government rights in terms of social welfare and public products allocation 
within the region. Regional government is economically rational even under tight 
financial conditions and will maximize the utility of limited financial resources 
in the allocation of non-operational resources.
Second, the improvement of the allocation function of non-operational resources 
requires that moderate competition be maintained between regional governments. 
For non-operational resources, competition is the best way to guarantee allocation 
effectiveness. Higher-level government should adopt such methods as project 
competition to promote the competitiveness of subordinate government and the 
balance of the allocation between social welfare and public products within larger 
regions. Meanwhile, it should take measures to prevent over-competition, the 
Matthew effect of the strong becoming too strong, over-concentration at some 
parts and excessive superiority of social welfare and public products.
4.5.4.3  Innovation and guidance in giving full play to the utility of 
quasi-operational resources
Quasi-operational resources can oscillate between market commodities and 
public products, which often fall prey to regional government. Their effective 
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development and utilization can enhance regional development advantages 
and competitiveness. Their “operational” property may vary from region to 
region and from time to time. For example, park construction is operational in 
economically developed regions but non-operational in economically underde-
veloped regions. Sewage treatment plants and highways are often operational 
during the construction fund-withdrawal period and become public products 
after fund withdrawal. Regional governments should innovate the development, 
utilization and operational model of quasi-operational resources. Such modes 
as BOT and PPP are mature models for the development and operation of 
quasi-operational resources. Regional government should try to study and 
apply those modes; make innovations in investment and financing platforms 
and collaborative development platforms; and actively incorporate social capital 
to jointly develop quasi-operational resources.
4.6  GFL – the key to regional competition
4.6.1  Notional foresighted leading – the essential  
competitiveness in the factor-driven stage
Competition entails innovation, and innovation is competitiveness. Continuous 
innovation is sustained competitiveness. Regional innovation is the core of 
regional government competition. Notional foresighted leading is the actual 
competitiveness in the factor-driven stage of economic growth, which has been 
amply demonstrated throughout the world. In this stage, regional technology 
is not as sophisticated, and innovation capabilities, capital accumulation and 
management experience are limited. The economic growth is mainly realized 
by simple expansion of inputs of productive factors such as labor, land or other 
natural resources with focus on competition for resources and in prices. Although 
government can obtain advantages in regional competition and economic benefits 
in the short term, such competition is lacking in development potentials in the 
long term, causing such problems such as excessive exploitation of production 
factors, lower production efficiency, technological backwardness, resource deple-
tion, brain drain and social conflicts. Ultimately, it may lose the opportunity to 
cultivate core competencies and sustainable competitiveness and end up deeply 
trapped in the vicious cycle of resource depletion and economic recession.
Consequently, GFL in development notions, direction and modes becomes 
decisive in this stage and determines the path and trends of regional develop-
ment in the future. The height of development notions determines the pattern 
of the entire regional development. Moreover, once the trend is formed, 
there will be persistent path-dependency, and it will be costly to break and 
reconstruct it. The analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of regional 
competitive factors at this stage requires determining the current foothold 
and the model framework of the future transformation in a vision for long-
term development. Hence, the planning of the factor-driven stage is critical, 
and the planning needs advanced notions and regional development strategic 
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thinking. Essentially, notional foresighted leading is the real competitiveness 
in regional competition.
Notional foresighted leading, which is in essence notional innovation, implies 
the overall grasp of regional factors and their regulation, which shows the broad 
visions and open-mindedness of regional government and its comprehensive 
planning of the strategic positioning of future development and development 
modes, as well as a great challenge. In the factor-driven stage, regional govern-
ments should design from the top level long-term development so as to solve 
problems respecting development modes and motivation; specify the basis and 
power sources for stable long-term development of the regional economy; make 
rational allocation of productive factors within the region and coordinate their 
development; and prevent the imbalance of regional development that may 
be caused by the driving factors. As the factor-driven economic development 
model is inclined to plunder resources, regional government should adhere to 
innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development in the initial stage 
so as to avoid the abuse of resources, achieve harmonious coexistence between 
man and nature and ensure that the economy can go further. Moreover, in the 
allocation of productive factors, government should have cross-regional visions 
for global development and for the allocation of regional productive factors; 
solve linkage problems of internal and external development; and avoid being 
suppressed at the bottom of the industrial chain as the supplier of production 
factors. Regional government needs not only to ensure full regional competi-
tion but also to achieve win–win cooperation, thereby achieving the stabilized 
development of global economy through regional and bilateral economic and 
financial cooperation.
4.6.2  Organizational foresighted leading – the key to competition 
in the investment-driven stage
Organizational foresighted leading plays a key role in competition in the invest-
ment-driven stage, in which period the primary means of regional competition 
is expanding investment and intensifying its stimulation to economic growth. 
Driven by investment multiplier effects, investment can enormously expedite 
economic growth, which has been demonstrated in the Keynesian theory of 
effective demand. Investment is of great significance for increasing effective 
demand and boosting GDP. Especially during economic downturns, govern-
ment can increase investment to reverse the trend of economic downturn and 
drag economy out. However, problems like quick ups and downs in economy 
and the lagging-behind of technology and innovation may ensue as a result of 
“investment hunger” and “investment dependence” after a single short-term 
stimulus of investment.
Under such circumstances, innovation in organizational administration 
becomes crucial. This requires the intensification of investment management stan-
dards, rapid organizational responsive capabilities, closer relations to market and 
enterprise services, network and matrix structuring, streamlined administration 
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so as to achieve greater efficiency and flexibility and to improve investment 
effectiveness. Organizational foresighted leading is crucial to stable and orderly 
economic development and inter-regional competition in the investment-driven 
stage. At the investment-driven stage, the major means of regional competition 
is the expansion of investment and its stimulus of economic growth. The invest-
ment is mainly put into infrastructure, real estate and technological renovation. 
Driven by investment multiplier effects, investment can multiply its effects upon 
economic growth, which no factor can excel. That is why it has been so attractive 
to both enterprises and government and has become a regular instrument to 
drive regional economic growth and gain advantages in competition.
A great deal of research has been conducted concerning the effects of invest-
ment on economic growth. The Keynesian theory of effective demand holds 
that the settlement of economic growth and employment problems needs to be 
driven by investment, which is the key force for increasing effective demand and 
expanding GDP. In the economic downturn stage, government may intensify 
investment to reverse the trend of economic downturn and drag its economy 
out of the trough. On the basis of the Keynesian economic theory, the Harrod–
Domar model for economic growth further suggested that the enormous driving 
force of investment for economic growth is discernible from the cumulative 
expansion in cycles of economic boom and the cumulative shrinkage in cycles 
of economic recession.
Problems may occur in the investment-driven stage, mainly the one-sided 
pursuit of short-term investment stimulus, which may cause “investment hunger”, 
“investment dependence”, quick ups and downs in economy, the lagging-behind 
of technology and innovation and so on. Without effective organization and 
leading of investment, problems such as absence of responsibilities for investment, 
careless decision-making, diversified investments, repeated investments and invest-
ment failures will occur. Currently, Japan’s economy is in a long-term recession, 
and the Japanese government continues to employ the easy monetary policy to 
stimulate business investment and go so far as to lower its interest rates to be 
negative. Meanwhile, there is continuing growth in financial expenditure by means 
of investment. However, Japan has not recovered from its economic recession, 
and one of the explanations is that its organizational solidification is caused by its 
culture, which constrains its economic dynamics and causes market inactiveness. 
So, in order to achieve stable economic development in the investment-driven 
stage, orderly organizational foresighted leading must be put in place.
Organizational foresighted leading focuses on organizational management 
innovation, which means that regional government must carry out pre-process 
intervention and planning to prevent blind, repeated and inefficient investment 
by enterprises, especially real estate enterprises. At the same time, measures must 
be taken to prevent government from misconduct with their rights which violate 
market rules, such as excessive financial investment, infrastructure investment, 
inefficient investment and blind investment. Needless to say, regional govern-
ment competition should aim to strengthen the standardization and creativity 
of organizational management; improve its efficiency; strengthen organizational 
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quick response; and get close to the market and to enterprise services. It is also 
important to downsize bureaucratic organizations and functional departments; 
develop networking and matrix structure; streamline regional government admin-
istrative hierarchy; and moderately expand the span of institutional management 
so as to improve investment output with greater efficiency and flexibility.
4.6.3  Technological and institutional foresighted leading – 
the winning point of competition in the innovation- 
driven stage
Technological and institutional foresighted leading is the key to scoring success 
in regional competition in the innovation-driven stage. Innovation has the most 
explosive driving force for economic development and pushes socio-economy 
to transform from quantity- to quality-type, reflecting overall breakthroughs in 
socio-economic performance and in optimized social allocation. At this stage, tech-
nological innovation is the core of all driving forces, and institutional innovation is 
the fundamental guarantee for continuous technological innovation. Technological 
innovation gives birth to new formats, new products, new industries and new 
models. Institutional innovation protects and promotes the integrated innovative 
development of science and technology, finance and industry, which combine to 
stimulate innovation-driven sustainability. Technological and institutional fore-
sighted leading becomes an important means of regional competition at this stage.
“Innovation-driven” implies innovation in technology, institution or models 
to be a breakthrough point for regional economic development. The crux of 
the innovation-driven stage lies in the breakthrough creation and utilization of 
all factors in the course of economic growth and in the crystallization of high 
intelligence achievements. This signifies great leaps forward in promoting the 
development of the whole of mankind and is the most explosive force in driving 
economic growth. From the perspective of total factor productivity (TFP), the 
innovation of technology and business modes is the core driving force in the 
innovation-driven stage and the engine to effectively meet and even lead social 
demand. Supply-side reform strives for vigorous development of new technolo-
gies through which to meet ever-changing demands for quantity and quality, 
and to create new demands by means of new business modes when demand 
growth and economic development become stagnant.
Take US-made iPhones, for example. There did not seem to be any demand 
for them before their appearance on the market, but their supply on the market 
created huge demand, as people were surprised to find that numerous applications 
could run in such little apparatuses. These new demands create the incentives of 
the market for innovation and the recognition of innovation. In turn, they inspire 
continuous innovation and the leading of a new round of supply technologies, 
forming supply-side model innovation and soliciting new demands; this in turn 
inspires more cyclic demand-side innovations, giving rise to the advancement of 
such giant companies as Google, Tesla, Facebook, Twitter and a large number 
of other high-tech entrepreneurial companies.
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However, it is hard for the profit motivation of the market and personal 
wisdom and keenness to trigger off and sustain innovation and to make it 
long-lasting and penetrating in an aggregative manner. The continuous driving 
force for innovation and innovation itself requires directional concentration and 
institutional innovation. The blowout growth of China’s new energy vehicle, a 
good example in this connection, has very much to do with matching supportive 
government policies. The system foresighted leading formed by system innova-
tion is bound to be connected to technological innovation. The institutional 
foresighted leading, which stems from institutional innovation, is bound to be 
integrated with technological innovation. The effective incorporation of techno-
logical innovation into policy incentives and leading and the vigorous support 
of economic development modes – such as the shared economy, the long-tail 
economy, and the zero cost economy, as well as new-generation information 
technologies such as big data, cloud computing, mobile Internet, the Internet 
of things and artificial intelligence – will bring about a comprehensive and in-
depth integration of regional government policies with economy, industry and 
science and technology, and will continue to generate new business modes, new 
products, new models and new trends for future growth. In the innovation-
driven stage, in addition to protecting and encouraging innovation, regional 
government should endeavor to create a relaxing environment at low costs 
for innovation and strengthen institutional supply to ensure market access and 
revitalize market potentials. Meanwhile, institutional foresighted leading must 
be in place to prevent regional government from infringing upon market rules 
in competition and to avoid vicious competition between regional governments, 
thereby facilitating social funding and allocation efficiency.
4.6.4  The overall foresighted leading – the inevitable choice  
in the wealth-driven stage
Under the assumption that regional economic development in the world fol-
lows the sequence of factor-driven, investment-driven, innovation-driven and 
wealth-driven stages, then the wealth-driven stage of economic growth – which 
is characterized by the full play to individual creativity, comprehensive work–life 
balance, rapid development of tertiary industries, growing awareness of the 
importance of resources environment and continuously emerging models of 
economic and individual development – requires not only innovation in notions, 
institution, organization and technology but also overall foresighted leading, so 
as to achieve and guarantee the sustained advantages of regional competition. 
Therefore, the flexible, quick and diverse development of regional economy in 
the wealth-driven stage requires the coordination of institutions, policies and 
measures to match the pulse of the wealth-driven times, orient the values of the 
wealth-driven stage and maintain the sustainability and vitality of economy. The 
overall continuous innovation and foresighted leading in the whole process and 
over the full range of factors is the inevitable option for regional competition 
at this stage.
Upon its publication, Adam Smith’s masterpiece of economic analysis, The 
Wealth of Nations, immediately produced great implications for western economic 
theories, implications that over time proved profound and far-reaching. As Adam 
Smith puts it in his book, the perfect marriage between the utility-seeking 
economic entities and the “invisible hand” generates a wealth-creating force, 
strong and powerful enough to drive economic development and social evolution 
and, ultimately, to contribute to the emergence of a new economic modality. As 
a tool for resource allocation, the price mechanism, once employed, has proven 
its phenomenal power in improving efficiency, optimizing economic structure 
and driving the evolution of economic modalities.
In essence, economic development lies in enhancing the efficiency of how 
scarce resources are allocated, which means reaping the maximum possible 
amount of economic benefits at the minimum possible cost of resource usage. 
Economists who have come after Adam Smith, either professedly western eco-
nomic theorists or believers of Marxist political economy, have acknowledged, 
almost without exception, the incomparably powerful strengths and efficiency 
of the market economy in allocating resources. In practice, the economic 
growth performances (in terms of both growth speed and results) of nations the 
world over have proved that the market is the most efficient tool for resource 
allocation. As a result, a consensus has already been reached among economic 
theorists and over a long process of national policy practice that the market, as 
a general rule in market economy, is the decisive force for resource allocation 
and that market economy, by its very nature, is an economy where the market 
plays a decisive role in allocating resources.
Throughout its history, the world economy has been dominated by two eco-
nomic systems – one with market economy as its main body and the other with 
planned economy as its main body. With the development of the world economy, 
these two systems tend to intermingle so that government and market begin to 
overlap in function and the modes and consequences of government economic 
behavior start to exercise increasing impacts upon the volume and structure 
of the whole economy. As a result, previous economic theories are constantly 
being shattered. The interdependence and interconnectedness between market 
and government are clearly discernible through a variety of questions that have 
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arisen in the development of the world economy, including those regarding 
market inefficiency, the initiative and the competitive nature of government 
behavior, the multiplicity of key governmental functions and the output rate of 
margins between market and government. Essentially, the following two critical 
questions need to be addressed for any given market economy to be effective 
in the modern era: how do market forces interplay with government policies, 
and how do we reconcile between them?
Market and planned economic systems are both approaches to the allocation 
of social resources that aim to resolve by certain means such problems as what 
to produce, in what amount, in what ways and how to allocate what has been 
produced over a certain period and under circumstances of resource scarcity. 
Under planned economy, resources are allocated according to government plans. 
The central government formulates a wide-ranging program that commands and 
arranges for all economic activities. Under market economy, the invisible hand 
of market prices becomes the decisive force that determines what to produce, 
how much and in what ways.
In reality, pure planned economy and market economy are not common. The 
planned economic system, which resists market forces, has basically withdrawn 
from the historical scene in contemporary countries. Plans, however, are retained 
and commonly employed as regulative means. Under a market economic system, 
plans are not completely done away with. Countries under that system still make 
use of macro-level strategies and programs to intervene in resource allocation, 
but these programs and plans are of a supplementary and guiding nature, relative 
to the market. Market mechanisms are decisive factors in resource allocation.
5.1  Three types of market
In terms of how full-fledged they are and how much power they wield over 
economic operation, the market can be categorized into the following three 
types: weak efficient market, semi-strong market and strong efficient market. 
Generally speaking, “operational resources” are the focus of market resource 
allocation. This is because, for one thing, given their totally competitive and 
exclusive nature, such resources enable a market price mechanism to give full 
rein to its function, and, for another, where the allocation of “operational 
resources” is concerned, competitive entities of market are able to reap bounty 
rewards by abiding by the rules of the market. As a result, high efficiency 
regarding the allocation of “operational resources” is most likely achievable 
in a full-fledged market. The allocation of “non-operational resources”, which 
are non-exclusive and non-competitive in nature, goes well beyond the power 
of the market to affect and control. As such, the allocation of such resources 
is regarded as falling outside the precincts of the market. There is yet another 
type of resources – “quasi-operational resources”, the allocation of which is, 
to some extent, subject to the power of the market, except for a market 
economy that is still in its infancy; in this case there is no clear definition or 
delimitation of what “quasi-operational resources” are, and there is a lack of 
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competent measures for effectively allocating such resources. In this sense, a 
market economy can be considered strong or weak according to whether or not 
it has well-defined entities and well-established measures regarding the allocation 
of “quasi-operational resources”.
In 1970, Eugene F. Fama put forth his efficient-market hypothesis, in which 
he proposed three types of market efficiency: (1) strong-form efficiency; (2) semi-
strong efficiency; and (3) weak-form efficiency. These three types of efficiency 
are judged according to what information sets are factored in price trends. As 
Fama suggested, strong-form efficiency assumes that current prices reflect all 
public and private information in the market or, put another way, current prices 
are totally and utterly determined by the market. Weak-form efficiency assumes 
that current prices are determined by many non-market factors. Tucked between 
strong- and weak-form efficiency is semi-strong efficiency, which assumes that 
current prices adjust rapidly to the release of all new public information. Let us 
put aside for the time being the debate over whether it is rational and logical 
to determine the degree of a market’s efficiency on the basis of information sets 
factored in prices. This author is sold on Fama’s idea of categorizing markets 
into strong-form, weak-form and semi-strong form markets.
This book suggests that the efficiency of a modern market should be defined 
and assessed according to the degree to which the modern market brings its func-
tions into play. In its original form, a market consists only of a “market element 
system” and a “market organizational system”. With the market developing to 
higher levels, a “market legal system” and a “market regulatory system” gradually 
take shape as two new building blocks of the market and become increasingly 
full-fledged. After the market grows into maturity and evolves into a modern 
market system, its structure is further cemented with two more building blocks, 
namely, a “market environment system” and “market infrastructure”. Hence, 
markets can be categorized into weak efficient forms, semi-strong efficient forms 
and strong efficient forms based on the levels of completeness and maturity 
regarding the aforementioned six functional systems.
5.1.1  Weak efficient market
5.1.1.1  Signs
A “weak efficient market” refers to one that comprises merely a “market ele-
ment system” and a “market organizational system”, with unclear categorization 
of resource types. A market of this type often emerges during the infancy of 
market economy, when the market is still spontaneously exploring which types 
of resources for which it will be responsible for allocating.
5.1.1.2  Connotation
A “market element system” practically consists of a variety of commodity markets 
and element markets, including exchangeable commodities and commodity 
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buyers and sellers. Commodities in this regard include tangible material prod-
ucts and intangible services, as well as a diversity of commercialized resource 
elements, such as capital, technology, information, land, labor force, etc. The 
most cardinal elements for the operation of commodity and element markets 
are price, supply and demand and competition.
A “market organizational system” denotes an integral system of intercon-
nected markets that takes shape on the basis of the division of social labor 
and under the discretion of price mechanisms. Specifically, it is made up of all 
kinds of market entities and intermediary agencies, including retail markets for 
commodities and means of production, wholesale markets, cross-border trading 
organizations, professional labor markets, financial institutions, technology and 
information exchange agencies, property rights markets and real estate markets. 
These market entities and agencies are interrelated and mutually restrictive, serv-
ing to distribute market elements for production and service activities, improve 
market operational efficiency and achieve optimal organizational development and 
consumption utility in a market operational system. Within a market economy 
that has a “market element system” and a “market organizational system”, the 
invisible hand of the market is able to play a decisive role in allocating resources 
for economic activities, whether for consumption or for production purposes. 
Therefore, a market with these two systems can be called an efficient market.
However, a market with and only with these two systems is weak in nature, 
because in the infancy of market economy – though with its “market element 
system” and “market organizational system” well-established and the market 
playing a predominant role in resource allocation – the market has yet to grow 
to its full-fledged form in order to clearly categorize its resource types. Under 
such circumstances, given that there is no clear line of demarcation between 
“operational resources”, “non-operational resources” and “quasi-operational 
resources”, serious problems will inevitably crop up to plague the allocation of 
market resources. Held away by their intrinsic profit-seeking motive, different 
market actors will scramble for profits wherever profits are obtainable, with a 
total disregard for the categorization of resources. This problem, compounded 
with an untenable market structure, asymmetry of information, the absence 
of regulation and a sound legal system, might give rise to a series of resultant 
problems, such as the incorporation of some “non-operational resources” – the 
allocation of which should have been led and undertaken by government – into 
private domains, collusion between power and money, monopoly for extravagant 
profits, etc. Problems such as these threaten to jeopardize both market efficiency 
and social equity.
As there is yet no clear conception of what constitutes “quasi-operational 
resources” at this stage, problems such as arbitrary intervention and arbitrary 
abdication are likely to crop up to complicate and disrupt the allocation of 
such resources. Unclear delimitation of resources means unclear demarcation 
between the roles of market and government concerning the allocation of 
resources. Under such circumstances, problems pertaining to the supersession, 
vacancy and dislocation between market and government will inevitably arise, 
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a situation that speaks volumes of the fact that the market at this stage is still 
a far cry from a modern market system featuring equity, justice, efficiency and 
standardization. Once again, all of the above-mentioned analysis points to one 
conclusion, which is that a market with a market element system and a market 
organizational system but without regulatory and legal systems is an efficient 
but weak market.
5.1.1.3  Historical period
Historically, the US market was in its efficient but weak-form between 1776 – 
when the USA. declared its independence – and 1890, in a period where laissez-
faire economics was the dominant economic theory. With the North winning 
a victory in a bloody civil war against the South, the element system and the 
organizational system of the US market economy were further developed and 
perfected. This was an era where fervid objection to government intervention was 
the prevailing sentiment of the day, and free rein was given to the spontaneous 
order of the market. This situation did not change until the late 1890s.
5.1.2  Semi-strong efficient market
5.1.2.1  Signs
A market can be called a semi-strong efficient market if it has the follow-
ing four essential elements: a market element system, a market organizational 
system, a market legal system and a market regulatory system. A semi-strong 
efficient market represents an improved version of a weak efficient market, in 
the sense that both its legal environment and regulatory system are fortified 
and strengthened, though with its market element system and organizational 
system remaining the mainstays for market operation and with recognition of 
the “invisible hand” as the predominant force for resource allocation. In terms 
of categorization of resource types, the lines of demarcation between “opera-
tional resources” and “non-operational resources” have been clearly drawn in 
a semi-strong efficient market, but there is still neither clear delimitation of 
“quasi-operational resources” nor visible pathways for enhancing efficiency for 
the allocation of such resources.
5.1.2.2  Connotation
A semi-strong efficient market refers to one that is building and perfecting its 
market legal system and regulatory system in an incremental fashion, in addi-
tion to having a market element system and a market organizational system. 
A market legal system denotes an entirety of laws and regulations established 
and formed in accordance with cardinal market economic theories, which has 
normative market values, normative market trading behaviors, contract behaviors 
and property rights behaviors as its objects of regulation. Such a system generally 
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encompasses legal, law enforcement, judiciary and law-related educational insti-
tutions. A market regulatory system is built for the overarching objective of 
creating a fair and viable market ecology that features a level playing field, free 
flows of commodities and elements, exchanges on an equal footing, honesty 
and law compliance and transparent and efficient management, as well as a law-
based market regulatory environment. To this end, a market regulatory system 
is normally designed to counter such illicit acts as regional shutdown, industry 
monopoly, price deception and unfair competition. A market legal system and 
a regulatory system that are sound and full-fledged are necessary guarantees for 
the smooth running of a market mechanism.
In a semi-strong efficient market, categorization of resource types is by and 
large completed, along with clear lines of demarcation between market and 
government regarding their respective roles for resource allocation – the market 
dominates the allocation of “operational resources”, while government guides 
the allocation of “non-operational resources”. A variety of favorable outcomes 
can arise from differentiation of resource allocation domains between market 
and government, i.e. making clear the respective positioning and function of 
market and government; lessening government intervention in market activities; 
strengthening the role of government as a guardian of market order; and boost-
ing the efficiency of resource allocation. Nonetheless, given that there is as yet 
neither clear delimitation of “quasi-operational resources” nor well-devised tools 
for their allocation, the market at this stage is inescapably plagued by the absence 
of a well-established and well-regulated operating system for the allocation of 
“quasi-operational resources”, which inevitably means low efficiency for the 
allocation of such resources. In this sense, a market that fits the aforementioned 
descriptions can only be said to have developed to its semi-strong efficient form.
5.1.2.3  Historical period
The US market was in a semi-strong efficient form between 1890 and 1990, 
marked by the establishment and improvement of an antitrust legal and regula-
tory system, which was the centerpiece of market development efforts. In 1890, 
the US Congress promulgated the Sherman Antitrust Act, which was the US’s 
first federal statute to prohibit trusts and monopoly. In 1914, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act were passed as complements to 
the Sherman Antitrust Act. In accordance with these statutes and regulations, 
any given enterprise, once adjudicated as guilty of monopoly, would be subject 
to multiple forms of punishment, including fines, imprisonment, compensa-
tion, civil sanction, involuntary dissolution and separation. Once adjudicated 
as violating antitrust laws, an enterprise would be imposed with fines three 
times the amount of damage caused. Henceforth, the US’s antitrust system 
and regulatory measures have undergone a century-long process of evolution 
and perfection, with the country’s market legal system and market regulatory 
system experiencing significant improvements and upgrades along the way. The 
entire market system exhibited a prominent pattern that featured coexistence 
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between monopoly and competition and between development and supervi-
sion. As of the 1990s, the US government, instead of confining its antitrust 
goals to simply preventing and clamping down on market monopoly and price 
manipulation, undertook effective measures to combat technical monopoly and 
Internet oligarchy beyond the realm of IPR protection. These efforts ended 
up injecting inexhaustible vitality into the US economy, in that they generated 
economies of scale and provided favorable conditions for the development of 
innovation-competent SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises).
5.1.3  Strong efficient market
5.1.3.1  Signs
A strong efficient market refers to one that is in simultaneous possession of 
a market element system, a market organizational system, a market legal sys-
tem, a market regulatory system, a market environment system and market 
infrastructure. A strong efficient market has two more building blocks than its 
“semi-strong efficient” counterpart, namely, a market environment system and 
market infrastructure. After a market develops to its strong efficient form, “quasi-
operational resources” must have already been clearly defined and delimited 
and, given that government and market must have arrived at a certain extent of 
harmony regarding their respective roles in allocating such resources, efficiency 
for resource allocation will reach a new high in a strong efficient market. This 
means that the market economy at this point has entered the stage of a modern 
market system.
5.1.3.2  Connotation
A market environment system encompasses a well-designed real economic foun-
dation, a corporate governance structure and a social credit system. The focus 
for building a market environment system is to set up a full-fledged market 
credit system; leverage legal institutions to regulate and restrain trust relations, 
credit instruments, credit intermediary agencies and pertinent credit elements; 
and put in place a social credit governance mechanism based on a market 
credit guarantee mechanism. An increasingly mature market environment system 
means all-dimensional openness and transparency of information. Under such 
circumstances, no market entity will be in a position to register exponential 
growth simply by capitalizing on its information edge or by taking advantage of 
a certain opportunity. Rather, market entities must battle it out in competition 
that tests a holistic set of their capabilities in terms of management, product 
innovation and distribution channel upgrading and regeneration. After market 
competition enters the stage of “systematic management”, market entities are 
required not only to have distinct edges in certain respects but also to foster 
systematic management capabilities commensurate with their edges, in a bid to 
achieve overall improvement in internal management, technical development, 
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marketing, etc. In a mature market environment, how a product is priced is 
truly reflective of the perfect competitiveness of a market entity.
Market infrastructure is an integrated system encompassing software and hard-
ware facilities. Necessary infrastructural components of a mature market economy 
include market service networks, supplementary equipment and technologies, 
market payment and clearance systems of all types and high-tech information 
systems. The focus for building market infrastructure is to register, settle and 
take care of infrastructural facilities, achieve sharing of data and information 
regarding capital market regulation, establish a capital market information system 
and enhance capacity building for countering cyber attacks, tackling major 
disasters and addressing technical failure. The establishment and improvement 
of a market big data information system will propel the information-carrying 
capacity of market prices to a new level. Taken together, a market element 
system, market organizational system, market legal system, market regulatory 
system, market environment system and market infrastructure combine to form 
a “strong efficient market”.
Improving market environment and market infrastructure paves the way for 
delimiting “quasi-operational resources” and enhancing the means for allocating 
such resources. A case in point is that in a well-established market environment 
system, a viable contractual relationship can be formed between government 
and market to bring about win–win outcomes regarding the allocation of 
“quasi-operational resources” – where their respective roles overlap or intersect. 
As far as market infrastructure is concerned, its critical components, such as 
market clearance systems and risk control systems, can open up a new vista for 
government–market cooperation in resource allocation. From what is stated 
above, it can thus be concluded that building and perfecting a modern market 
system is a process of constantly crystallizing resource categorization as well as 
resource allocation means. The presence of six market system elements and the 
clear-cut definition and allocation of “quasi-operational resources” are important 
indicators of a “strong efficient market”.
5.1.3.3  Historical period
Asthe Highest among its kind in the world in terms of the level of marketization, 
the US securities market should be regarded as between a semi-strong efficient 
market and a strong efficient market. For example, to ensure market fairness, 
information concerning a potential company takeover is strictly blocked to such 
a level that the takeover, when it really takes place, sends insignificant or even 
little shock waves across the market. There is as yet no example of a strong 
efficient market in absolute terms in real life.
Since the early 1990s, the US market has been moving towards becom-
ing a strong efficient market. The methodology of categorizing markets into 
“strong efficient forms”, “weak efficient forms” and “semi-strong efficient 
forms” based on the levels of maturity and development of a market’s six 
functional systems – its market element system, market organizational system, 
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market legal system, market regulatory system, market environment system and 
market infrastructure – is able to shed light on the history of a market economy 
and its evolutionary process. This methodology is also convenient for clear-cut 
definition, empirical research and practical assessment when it comes to the 
study of the market. By shaping a mature modern market system, countries 
throughout the world will be in a better position to bring out the functions of 
their market economy for the benefit of economic growth, urban construction 
and social welfare improvement.
5.2  Three types of government
Government can be categorized into the following three types based on different 
degrees to which they intervene in the allocation of non-operational resources, 
operational resources and quasi-operational resources: “weak effective govern-
ment”, “semi-strong effective government” and “strong effective government”. 
A government that focuses solely on non-operational resources can be called 
a “weak effective government”; a government that not only focuses on non-
operational resources but is also able to render assistance and support where the 
allocation of operational resources is concerned can be deemed a “semi-strong 
effective government”; and a government can be credited as a “strong effective 
government” if it is able to directly allocate non-operational resources, supports 
and assists the allocation of operational resources and offers foresighted guidance 
on the allocation of quasi-operational resources.
As is resoundingly indicated by the practical experience of governments 
throughout the world and by China’s success story of reform and opening up, 
governments of most countries would allow market entities to develop, operate 
and manage part of or a large proportion of “quasi-operational resources”, 
as a precaution against urban resources being left idle and wasted, or for the 
sake of rectifying low efficiency and disorderliness in urban construction and 
administration. Under such circumstances, a project’s equity nature and equity 
structure – the carrier of quasi-operational resources – should be designed and 
constructed in a way that complies with the rules of market-based competition; a 
project’s investment and management mode – the operation of quasi-operational 
resources – should be determined by the means of market competition. As such, 
how a country’s government performed in propelling economic development 
can be measured and gauged by how well it fares against governments in other 
countries or regions in terms of the allocation of the above-mentioned three 
categories of resources and in terms of the efficacy of policies and measures 
devised for this purpose.
First, the efficient allocation of non-operational resources through policy 
guarantee is conducive to maintaining social synergy and stability and opti-
mizing economic environment. Second, the efficient allocation of operational 
resources with responsive policies can lead to a higher level of equity, fairness 
and openness in the market and give a tremendous boost to overall social 
Effective government and efficient market 137
productivity. Third, the efficient allocation of quasi-operational resources 
by ensuring sufficient competition is a recipe for driving sustainability in 
all respects of urban construction and socio-economic development. The 
means and policies for the optimal allocation of resources in these categories 
converge to form a gigantic framework, in which countries compete fiercely 
against one another.
5.2.1  Weak effective government
5.2.1.1  Meaning
A government can be called a “weak effective government” if it focuses only 
on the allocation of “non-operational resources” and on the formulation of 
corresponding policies. This is because such a government has neither a clear 
understanding of nor specific measures for the allocation of “operational 
resources”. Such an administrative model is often called “the minarchist 
government model”.
5.2.1.2  Characteristics
A weak effective government holds market mechanism in high esteem, striving 
to reduce the role of government in resource allocation to the minimal possible 
size in terms of both thinking and policies. A weak effective government is 
passive and unmotivated in action when it comes to resource allocation, play-
ing a role only in public domains where “non-operational resources” abound, 
while adopting a non-interventional approach towards the economic realms. 
It seeks to guarantee the running of the economy by the smallest possible 
authority and relies on market forces for the adjustment of economic activities, 
believing that any given government should refrain from directly intervening in 
economic adjustment, no matter how big a cost and how much time it might 
take for the market itself to spontaneously effect such adjustment. In this sense, 
a weak effective government tends to restrict its power down to the absolute 
minimal level or assume a role tantamount to that of a night watchman, pro-
viding services that are only necessary and fundamental (i.e. the court system, 
policing, the prison system and national military defense). Moreover, a weak 
effective government is also characteristic of its advocacy for decentralization 
and delegation of government power to small jurisdictions (such as cities and 
towns) rather than concentration of it on large jurisdictions (such as provinces 
and the central state). Finally, a weak effective government, as a rule, opposes 
direct government engagement in financial assistance to the needy; it also lashes 
out at the idea of wealth redistribution and subsidization. In regard to policy 
arrangement, a weak effective government basically persists in low expenditure, 
low tax rates and low social welfare, putting a premium on individual free will 
and the importance of self-management.
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5.2.2  Semi-strong effective government
5.2.2.1  Meaning
A government can be labeled as a “semi-strong effective government” if it lays 
stress only on the allocation of “non-operational” and “operational” resources. 
In addition to fulfilling its public duties and responsibilities regarding social 
security, a “semi-strong effective government” also keeps an eye on how the 
market is operating or will seek to macro-control, adjust and intervene in the economy 
by use of effective demand or effective supply policies whenever the market 
malfunctions, for the sake of preventing severe losses and damages caused by 
an economic slump. A “semi-strong effective government” might also strive for 
a dynamic equilibrium between total supply and total demand with a master 
plan for strategic economic development, which includes the following measures: 
planning and guiding industrial layout; supporting and adjusting productive 
and operational activities; tightening up regulation to ensure openness, equity 
and fairness in market competition; curbing the spike of commodity prices; and 
controlling unemployment. Nevertheless, a “semi-strong effective government” 
still fails to have a clear-cut understanding and definition of “quasi-operational 
resources”; nor does it succeed in fostering responsive policies and measures 
for the management of such resources.
5.2.2.2  Characteristics
A semi-strong effective government fails to clearly define and delimit “quasi-
operational resources” but is able to rush in to control and adjust the allocation 
of “operational resources” whenever the “invisible hand” loses its grip over this 
matter. Generally speaking, a semi-strong effective government exhibits the 
following characteristics.
First, it recognizes the idea of the market as the decisive force for resource 
allocation, but follows closely the way that the market operates, showing no 
sign of passivity.
Second, it adopts a supportive attitude towards operational resources in critical 
domains pertaining to the overall economy and people’s livelihood and selects 
supporting or interventional approaches based on the strategic significance of 
projects and the specific utility of assets.
Third, it promulgates adjustment and instructive policies for economic areas 
where the market is prone to malfunction.
Fourth, it either gets involved directly in or incentivizes in appropriate ways 
market resource allocation entities into areas where they otherwise would be 
unwilling to establish any presence voluntarily.
Fifth, when it comes to adjusting and supporting “operational resources”, 
it shows a certain level of flexibility and temporariness, intervening mainly for 
the purpose of compensating for the insufficiency of the “invisible hand” in 
controlling such resources.
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5.2.3  Strong effective government
5.2.3.1  Meaning
A “strong effective government” denotes a government that is already capable 
of precisely delimiting “quasi-operational resources” and coordinating with the 
market for the allocation of such resources. A “strong effective government” can 
tailor its policies and measures towards three different types of resources – namely, 
“non-operational resources”, “operational resources” and “quasi-operational 
resource” – so as to achieve efficient resource allocation and promote the 
development of a regional economy towards viability and sustainability. Spe-
cifically, it will undertake the following approaches: bringing into full play its 
role in economic positioning, economic adjustment and early warning; tapping 
into market rules and mechanisms; leveraging the instruments of investment, 
consumption, export, pricing, taxation, interest rates, exchange rates, policies 
and laws; and fostering institutional, organizational, technical and philosophical 
innovation. As such, a “strong effective government” can be understood as a 
“foresighted leading” government.
5.2.3.2  Characteristics
A “strong effective government” not only attaches importance to the allocation 
of “non-operational resources” and “operational resources” but also seeks to 
facilitate the effective allocation of “quasi-operational resources” with well-
designed policies. A “strong effective government” will seek in every possible 
way to achieve efficient allocation of resources in all three categories, such as by 
bringing into full play its role in economic positioning, economic adjustment 
and early warning; tapping into market rules and mechanisms by leveraging the 
instruments of investment, consumption, export, pricing, taxation, interest rates, 
exchange rates, policies and laws, and by fostering institutional, organizational, 
technical and philosophical innovation. The efficient allocation of non-operational 
resources can lead to significant improvements of economic growth environ-
ment; the efficient allocation of operational resources is conducive to boost-
ing economic vitality and synergy; the efficient allocation of quasi-operational 
resources can help create a leading edge and bring about comprehensive and 
sustainable development. Therefore, fostering a “strong effective government” 
is the pathway for a country or a region to emerge victorious amid cut-throat 
competition in the world’s grand market system.
(a) A strong government can foster regional competition through regulation 
and early warning in economic guidance to promote economic develop-
ment. Within a market economy, a strong government’s role should not 
be confined to administering public affairs and providing public services; 
rather, it should be extended to coordinate and promote economic devel-
opment, such as formulating economic norms, maintaining market order, 
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stabilizing macro-economic conditions, providing basic services, nurturing 
market systems, reallocating income and social wealth, contributing to social 
equity and justice, etc. A strong government plays a dual role that represents 
both the micro and macro levels of a market economy – the latter refers 
to a central government leading and regulating economic development on 
the macro level.
  Enterprises and governments are the dual components of competition in 
a market economy. On the micro level, enterprises are the sole entity for 
market competition; on the macro level, in addition to enterprises, strong 
governments constitute another form of competition entities. Competition 
on these two levels is the “dual driving force” for rapid and continuing 
economic development.
(b) A strong government should play its “foresighted leading” role on the basis 
of market mechanisms and rules.
  Within a market economy, the allocation of resources is realized through 
the functioning of the price mechanism. It must be made clear that empha-
sizing the role of government does not mean that government has to be 
involved in everything. Rather, it means that “operational resources” are 
left to the market to allocate; “non-operational resources” are placed in 
the hands of government to manage; “quasi-operational resources” are 
coordinated by market and government, in light of the level of market 
maturity and the extent of public acceptability. Inappropriate government 
intervention may hinder the normal development of a market, consequently 
bringing about the undesirable need for more government intervention. 
On the contrary, moderate government intervention will contribute to the 
realization of social goals and facilitate market nurturing. In this sense, 
government should exercise moderate and appropriate intervention. As 
indicated by developmental economist William Arthur Lewis (1915–1991), 
the failure of government may be due to its doing too little or due to its 
doing too much. It is thus reasonable to conclude that government should 
properly delimit and undertake its instructive and discretional behaviors for 
the allocation of three types of resources on the basis of market mecha-
nisms and market rules; through effective foresighted leading in investment, 
consumption and export; and by employing economic and legal means and 
various innovative measures.
(c) Foresighted leading by a strong government should be aimed at effectively 
allocating resources, forging leading edges and achieving sustainable develop-
ment. Various metaphorical expressions have been used to denote the role of 
government, from Adam Smith’s “night watchman” and John Maynard Keynes’s 
“visible hand” to Friedman’s “servant” government, etc. Neither “servant” nor 
“nanny”, however, is enough to cover the full implications behind the role of a 
strong government. It may be more precise to use the term “leading”, which 
indicates a government’s guiding, regulating and early warning function for 
one thing and, for another, its role in employing such measures as investment, 
pricing, taxation and law by means of market forces. During the infancy of an 
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economy, it is necessary to “cross the streams by fumbling for the stones”, but 
it becomes a must for government to guide, lead and plan economic develop-
ment when the economy moves into a higher stage.
5.2.3.3  Categories of strong GFL
From the developmental perspective of an economy, institution, organization, 
technology and notions are all important factors. Accordingly, GFL is classified 
into institutional, organizational, technological and notional categories.
Institutional foresighted leading means giving full play to the role of govern-
ment, particularly regional government, in an innovation of systems by creating 
new and more incentive policies and standards to increase the efficiency of 
resource allocation and the sustainability of socio-economic development and 
reform. Its core part is innovation in social, political, economic and administrative 
systems; in regulations of human conduct and interrelations; and in organizations 
and relations of its external environment. Its direct consequence is the inspiration 
of human creativity and enthusiasm, the creation of new knowledge, the fair 
allocation of social resources and the continuous creation of social wealth, which 
ultimately promote social progress. Only when there is innovative government 
can institutional foresighted leading be realized and innovative systems and 
policies be formulated.
Organizational foresighted leading means the innovation of government, 
particularly regional government, in such areas as organizational structure, 
modes and regulations with the aim of strengthening foundations for economic 
and industrial development and eventually facilitating innovations in policies 
and technology.
Technological foresighted leading means giving full play to the advantage 
of government in allocating social resources and enabling government to 
participate in and lead technological innovations directly or indirectly so 
as to promote scientific and technological advancement and strengthen the 
capabilities of cities and businesses to perform scientific and technological 
innovation. There are two aspects to technological foresighted leading. On the 
one hand, government should create a favorable environment for enterprises 
to enhance the capabilities to perform technological innovation, for example 
the construction of systems for patent application and protection and product 
standardization. On the other hand, government should implement effective 
economic measures and policies to encourage businesses to take the initiatives 
for technological innovation, for example granting funds to support research 
and development in key technologies, establishing technological funds, recruit-
ing leading experts and so on.
Notional foresighted leading means that in the course of exercising authori-
ties and power, government should conduct foresighted investigation, rational 
analysis and theoretical thinking concerning newly emerged issues and problems; 
foresee new social and economic phenomena; and generalize work experience and 
push it to a theoretical elevation so as to guide innovation and advancement in 
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economic systems and institutional structuring. In the new phase of economic 
development, only by continuously transforming and upgrading government 
notions – such as notions of civilian community, restrained government, open 
government and government efficiency – can government innovate administra-
tive systems, behaviors, methodology and technology and provide right value 
guidance and boundless innovative incentives.
5.3  Models of government–market  
combination and their appraisal
According to traditional micro-economics, market price mechanism is the funda-
mental force propelling economic operation. The fluctuation of prices affects the 
supply–demand relation on the market. Consumption, production and allocation 
reach equilibrium under the guidance of the invisible hand of prices and make 
the best out of resource allocation. In addition, government should not intervene 
in economic activities. Any government intervention in enterprises and market 
mechanisms will bring about a loss of efficiency. However, this traditional view 
proved feeble in the world economic depression of the 1930s, which called 
forth the era of government intervention in economy. The pattern of market 
economy under macro-level government intervention became the mainstream, 
and Keynesian economics and the subsequent neo-classic theories became the 
mainstream thought of economics.
The analytical paradigm of traditional micro-economics usually assumes the 
role of government to be an external variable and the market to be the optimal 
means for resource allocation. Such a value judgment often leads to the conclu-
sion of minimal role of government for achieving maximal economic utility. 
In reality, however, such an analysis treats government as an external variable, 
excluding from the very outset the possibility of government and market reaching 
a certain level of synergy and harmony, which causes total neglect and disregard 
for the fact that economic development is a dynamic process. In other words, 
treating the role of government as an internal variable is the way to correctly 
understanding the relationship between government and market; the efficiency 
of either government or market in resource allocation is changeable in light of 
such actual conditions as time, geography and objects. As such, it is imperative 
to have a dynamic perspective of the effective line of demarcation between 
government and market in real practice.
In real economic practice, though the majority of countries lay claim to being 
market economies, huge differences exist among them in terms of economic 
efficiency and development trends, due to the divergent lines of demarcation 
they draw between government intervention and market mechanism. Countries 
like China have attained breakthroughs in traditional macro-economics, especially 
regarding market entities, competition areas and economic growth rates. It is 
incumbent upon modern market economic theorists to address questions about 
economic behaviors and developmental laws – questions that have arisen out of 
various models of combination between government and market.
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5.3.1  The evolution of theories concerning government– 
market combination modes
The relationship between government and market has always been the centerpiece 
of debates among economists in the west. At the core of these debates is the 
issue of to what degree government intervention may affect economic growth, 
urban construction and social welfare.
An analysis of the government–market relationship must begin with mer-
cantilism, a school of economic thought that gained strength and popularity 
in the early phase of capitalism from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. 
The core belief behind mercantilist propositions was that a nation’s power and 
growth depended primarily on the amount of wealth accumulated through 
trade surplus, achieved by exporting more than the nation imported. Along 
this line of argument, mercantilists proposed that government should intervene 
in economic life by way of prohibiting the outflow of gold and silver and 
bringing in more of such precious metals. They believed that to acquire more 
gold and silver, it was best that government regulate and control agriculture, 
commerce and manufacturing; develop a state monopoly of foreign trade; 
protect home markets through high tariffs and other trade restrictive measures; 
and make colonies both a source of raw materials and an export destination 
for manufacturers of home countries. The mercantilist theory served as a 
catalyst for the robust development of capitalist economies in their early stages.
The late eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of classical economics, 
which placed the market at the center of resource distribution. Classical economic 
theories, as best represented by Adam Smith’s economic liberalism and David 
Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory, confined the role of government to 
the smallest possible scope, sufficient only for the sake of ensuring the effective 
operation of the market.
In the 1930s, the economic crisis raging in the capitalist world posed challenges 
to classical economic theories, which culminated in the rise of Keynesian econom-
ics. John Maynard Keynes advocated the adoption of expansionary economic 
policies, arguing that government should promote economic growth by boosting 
demands. As Keynesian economics followed, not only should governments act 
to ensure the proper operation of the market, but they should also intervene in 
economic activities through monetary and fiscal policies, so that an equilibrium 
could be maintained between supply and demand in the economic system.
In the 1970s and 1980s, economists such as Milton Friedman and Arthur 
Laffer offered a new recipe for turning the raging economic crisis around, 
which was centered on unfettering economic activities from direct government 
intervention. Friedman, Laffer and other like-minded economists proposed to 
tackle the crisis by improving supplies in the economy.
Throughout the history of the evolution of capitalism, there have been vary-
ing descriptions of the relationship between government and the market. Some 
theories depicted them as contradictory to each other, while others saw them 
as complementary and coordinated to each other.
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Now when we return to the six functional structures of a modern market 
system and face squarely the issue that confronts government across the globe – 
the efficient allocation of three categories of resources – we will find that 
the government–market relationship is by no means a one-to-one relationship 
between two contradictory forces. The categorization of markets into “weak 
efficient” forms, “semi-strong efficient” forms and “strong efficient” forms 
exists within a quantifiable paradigm and reflects a true historical process. The 
definitions of “weak effective”, “semi-strong effective” and “strong effective” 
governments are reflective of where each country or region stands in the 
world’s real market economy and are conducive to tackling an enormous set 
of conundrums pertinent to the government–market relationship.
5.3.2  Modes of government–market combination
A review of the history of market economic development reveals that the relation-
ship between government and market has always been one of constant changes. 
Government and market complemented each other and worked in synergy amid 
perpetually changing economic circumstances. Theoretically speaking, there are 
nine models that reflect different forms of combination between government 
and market (as shown in Figure 5.1).
Model one: a weak effective government and a weak efficient market
Model two: a weak effective government and a semi-strong efficient market
Model three: a weak effective government and a strong efficient market
Model four: a semi-strong effective government and a weak efficient market
Model five: a semi-strong effective government and a semi-strong efficient market
Model six: a semi-strong effective government and a strong efficient market
Model seven: a strong effective government and a weak efficient market
Model eight: a strong effective government and a semi-strong efficient market
Model nine: a strong effective government and a strong efficient market







A strong efficient market
A strong effective
government
Figure 5.1 Modes of government–market combination
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5.3.2.1  Model one: a dual-weak model
This model denotes a combination between a weak efficient market and a weak 
effective government, which means that neither market nor government is 
capable of effectively and efficiently allocating resources. Government basically 
does not play a role in economic management and regulation, and market is 
underdeveloped in the sense that the functioning of its competition mechanism 
is often curtailed by an ill-designed legal system and impaired by chaos and 
disorder. More often than not, many low and medium-income economies fit 
the descriptions of this model.
The proportion of government spending in total GDP is generally held up 
as a typical indicator of the role of government in economic activities. Accord-
ing to this indicator, it can be found that in low-income and medium-income 
countries, government spending takes up less than 20 percent of total GDP, 
while this percentage is more than an average of 25 percent in high-income 
countries (as shown in Table 5.1). When examined on a region-by-region 
basis, the proportion of government spending in total GDP is relatively low 
in South Asia and Central America, less than 20 percent on average. Despite 
the fact that it reaches an average of 20 percent in Sub-Saharan countries, a 
large credit should go to South Africa, whose government spends 34.8 percent 
of the country’s GDP; on the contrary, the proportion in this regard is only 
16 percent on average in countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. In 
countries with low government spending, it is usually unlikely for government 
to maintain basic public order, much less develop a national market. Govern-
ments in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and South Asia are often too 
handicapped by a shortage of financial resources to adjust and regulate their 
economies; worse still, with their markets underdeveloped – especially given 
that some countries in these regions are still subsisting on farming – their 
market competition mechanisms are often choked and strangled by the absence 
of a well-established legal framework to effectively keep a proper order. This 
explains why countries in these regions make up a majority of the low and 
medium-income ranks in the world.























2000 25 33.6 19.3 18 15.6 20.9 – 17.1 26.5
2013 28.7 36.6 – 22.7 16.6 20.8 16.8 17.5 28.8
Source: Database of the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/GC.XPN.TOTL. 
GD.ZS?view= chart&year_low_desc=false.
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5.3.2.2  Model two: the laissez-faire model in market economy
The combination between a “semi-strong efficient market” and a “weak effective 
government” is akin to a laissez-faire model in the development of a market 
economy, in which information sets determined by and factored in prices are far 
from complete, but transparency of internal information within enterprises has 
reached an acceptable level, close to what is hypothesized as “total information” 
in the theory of classical economics. Under this model of combination, the 
market plays a somewhat significant role in resource allocation, while govern-
ment persists in reducing its intervention in economic affairs to a minimum.
This model of combination is, however, practically nowhere to be found in 
the real economic world, for it requires a legal market system and a market 
regulatory system, which are unlikely to be put in place and driven forward by 
a weak effective government. The earliest market economic model of the USA. 
is the closest thing to this form of combination, which exhibits these features: 
an absolute dominance of private sectors in the economy, with the public 
sectors taking up a small proportion; a high concentration of private capital, 
even to the point of monopoly; a high degree of spontaneous adjustment by 
the market, coupled with a low level of state intervention; and a high degree 
of openness in the labor market, with great mobility and intense employment 
competition. One thing worthy of note is that without necessary regulation 
and intervention, this model of combination is prone to creating a breeding 
ground for monopoly and is unable to resolve problems that emerge whenever 
the market malfunctions.
5.3.2.3  Model three: classical market economic model
Model three, reflective of a combination between “weak effective government” 
and “strong efficient market”, is akin to a classical market economy. This model 
is characterized by a pursuit of maximum market efficiency, the assumption of 
the role of government being exogenous and a basic exclusion of government 
from any economic activity. The working of this combination model is strictly 
limited by hypotheses, i.e.: Hypothesis of Economic Man, which assumes that 
every person, by capitalizing on the experience and information sets he or she 
acquires, will be able to make the best possible economic decisions and perform 
the best possible economic behaviors; Hypothesis of Perfect Competition, which 
assumes that perfect competition exists within various markets, to such a point 
where, once the balance between supply and demand is lost, the levels of prices 
and salaries will be promptly adjusted accordingly – this form of automatic 
market adjustment is hypothesized to be able to ensure the running of market 
economy under an equilibrium of full employment; and Complete Information 
Hypothesis, which assumes that an economic man is able to achieve optimal 
results by acquiring “complete information”. Idealized hypotheses such as these 
naturally imply that freedom to choose is the most fundamental principle govern-
ing economic activities. With free market competition being held as the one 
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and only path to achieving optimal allocation of resources and full employment 
under these idealized hypotheses, any government intervention will be deemed 
as hampering market efficiency. In this sense, government should refrain from 
intervention in economic activities and, whenever such intervention is truly 
necessary, the less, the better.
A consensus has been reached in real life about the infeasibility of the theoretical 
assumption involved in this model of combination, and it is empirically impos-
sible to find any practical example in the real economic world to substantiate 
the rationality behind it. Put bluntly, therefore, no economic model has yet to 
emerge to reflect pure classical economic doctrines.
5.3.2.4  Model four: a regulatory model during  
the infancy of market economy
As a combination of “semi-strong effective government” and “weak efficient 
market”, model four is descriptive of a regulatory model that is often instituted 
during the infancy of market economy. During the early stage when market 
economy is relatively weak, the efficiency of the market in allocating resources 
is somewhat limited as a result of inadequate competition and the inability of 
price signals to automatically regulate economic activities in a way similar to an 
invisible hand. Under such circumstances, government is in a position to fulfill 
its duties and responsibilities pertinent to the allocation of “non-operational 
resources”, by providing basic public goods. In the meantime, the government, 
though capable of allocating and supporting “operational resources” in some 
way, is still unable to keep an exact track of the pulse of the market. Thus, a 
more mature market is needed to resolve problems that keep cropping up. This 
government regulation model is often adopted during the infancy of a market 
economy, when the market is weak and the government is growing towards 
sophistication.
The real-life parallel for this model is the Chinese economy during the early 
stage of reform and opening up (from 1978 to 1984), in a period when the 
market was allowed to play its part in certain sectors and regions, though 
only in a heavily restricted and partial way. At that time, resources were still 
allocated, by and large, in a planning-based fashion, with regional governments 
required to formulate plans that not only covered the overall economy but 
also governed the operation of enterprises down to minute details. Against this 
backdrop, it was only natural that a market-based competition mechanism did 
not take shape among enterprises. The Chinese economy in this period was one 
in which the “invisible hand” of the market was severely hampered, while the 
government both macro- and micro-managed economic activities, consequently 
straining the government–enterprise relationship. The government, though hav-
ing reached its peak in terms of its jurisdictional scope and power, was more 
of a semi-strong effective government than a strong effective one; despite not 
being mature enough, it was proactive in finding out where it fit in a changing 
economic landscape. In short, economic resources of China in this period were 
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allocated in a way that combined a semi-strong effective government with a 
weak efficient market.
5.3.2.5  Model five: a semi-mature economic model
Model five depicts a combination between “semi-strong effective government” 
and “semi-strong efficient market”. This economic model indicates that the 
market and the government are well matched in strength, both of which have 
already developed to a semi-strong form, and yet are still in the process of 
honing and perfecting their capacity for resource allocation – the market has 
some untapped potential to be released, while the government is seeking to 
better position itself in a growing economy. In short, diversified ownership 
constitutes a predominant feature of most economies in this period, with the 
balance of power between government and market in constant flux. For one 
thing, a market-based price determination mechanism has taken shape, but in 
the absence of full-fledged mechanisms regarding market regulation, legal protec-
tion and environment enhancement, prices have yet to factor in all information 
sets available in the market. For another, unpredictable policy flip-flopping is a 
commonplace occurrence, mainly because the government, despite having been 
able to assume its proper role in allocating non-operational resources, is still 
devoid of mature experience and policy guidelines when it comes to delimiting 
quasi-operational resources and leading the allocation of operational resources – 
nevertheless, the government in such an economic model usually has come to 
recognize the market as a basic regulator of economic activities.
A semi-mature economic model is generally seen in a country that is in its 
mid-term phase of market economic development. A case in point is China prior 
to its entry into the World Trade Organization, when the Chinese economy 
was in its semi-mature form, featuring a combination between a semi-strong 
efficient market and a semi-strong effective government. On one hand, the 
Chinese government was beefing up the intensity and mechanisms for planning 
and guiding industrial layout, supporting and regulating productive operational 
activities and ensuring openness, equity and fairness in market competition; on 
the other hand, initiatives were well underway to boost the market’s regula-
tory mechanism, legal protection mechanism and environmental enhancement 
mechanism.
To cite two more examples: the Russian Federation – which represented 
countries in transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy – saw 
the ratio of government spending to GDP rise from 21.2 percent in 2000 to 
25.3 percent in 2013. During this period, the Russian government somewhat 
lowered its intensity for regulating economic activities, which resulted in more 
and more resources being allocated by the “invisible hand” of the market. 
However, due to unsteady overall economic growth, the government was being 
constantly challenged in its ability to manage the economy, thus having to 
work out a proper relationship with the market. The other example is Brazil, 
the epitome of countries in Latin America that once persisted in the policy 
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of import substitution industrialization, with “overtaking” as an overarching 
objective. The overpowering role of the Brazilian government on the country’s 
economic development ended up spurring an industrial boom in the short 
term, but not without causing some long-term ill-effects, as manifested in the 
form of a distorted market system, a failure of market mechanisms, a spike of 
inflation and a disruption of financial order. Against this backdrop, the govern-
ment spiraled downward in terms of its impact on the economy. To redress its 
dwindling role in the economy, the Brazilian government resorted to increasing 
spending, which resulted in the ratio of government spending to GDP slightly 
edging up from 21.4 percent in 2000 to 24.4 percent in 2013. This meant that 
the government and the market were in a process of sorting out the scopes and 
mechanisms of their function.
5.3.2.6  Model six: a regulatory model for the  
post–market-economy period
Model six describes the combination between “semi-strong effective govern-
ment” and “semi-strong efficient market”, which is an indication that the 
market has evolved to a highly mature state, so much so that it has primacy in 
allocating resources in ways that generate tantalizing efficiency and profitability. 
The government in an economy of this model has an important role to play in 
allocating non-operational and quasi-operational resources, but with its hands 
tied by institutional or ideological restrictions, it either fails to clearly delimit 
operational and quasi-operational resources or takes a somewhat laissez-faire 
approach to the allocation of these resources, thus showing a lack of good 
planning, systematicity and foresight for overall economic development.
The current US economy is a real-life mirror image of this model of government– 
market combination. By tapping into the market’s predominant forces in 
resource allocation, the US government has reaped the bounty of benefits that 
a highly efficient market can deliver. Although it plays a preeminent role in 
the allocation of “non-operational resources”, the US government, plagued by 
institutional or ideological impediments, fails to match its deeds to its words 
and register breakthroughs when it comes to allocating “operational resources” 
and delimiting or exploiting “quasi-operational resources”. As a result, there are 
weak signs of systematic and foresighted leadership by the US government for 
overall economic growth and urban improvement. This model of combination 
between a semi-strong efficient market and a semi-strong effective government 
is also seen in many other developed economies in the world. To better illustrate 
this point, let us measure the role of government in economic activities in 
major developed economies against the ratio of government spending to GDP, 
as reflected in Table 5.2.
As Table 5.2 shows, the government spending to GDP ratio has exceeded 
30 percent in many major developed countries of the west, which is an indication 
of the high intensity at which governments in these countries have been involved 
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in the 2013 estimates in some of the countries listed in Table 5.2, such as in 
Israel, New Zealand and South Africa, and even rose above 40 percent in the 
2000 estimates in countries like Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
Austria, the UK and Israel. That ratio, though kept below 30 percent from 
2000 to 2013 in some other developed countries such as the USA., Canada 
and Australia, was raised above 20 percent by the end of 2013 in the USA. 
and Australia, which testifies to the growing level of government involvement 
in resource allocation in these countries. Take the OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) as an example. From a historical 
standpoint, the average ratio of government spending to GDP in OECD coun-
tries as a whole stood at 10.7 percent in the late nineteenth century, increased 
to 18.7 percent in 1920, edged up to 22.8 percent in 1937, skyrocketed to 
43.1 percent in 1980 and has remained stable at this level ever since. A review of 
these countries’ actual economic development reveals that the constantly rising 
level of government engagement in resource allocation has exerted no negative 
impact whatsoever on their competitiveness; on the contrary, the level of market 
maturity and competitiveness in these countries has grown higher and higher 
in tandem with the rise of government intervention. It should be particularly 
noted that Nordic countries and Israel, though government spending accounts 
for 40 percent of GDP, are way ahead of other OECD countries in terms of 
economic openness and labor market vibrancy, and have remained on top of the 
list of global competitiveness for years. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the famous Wagner’s Law, a law that has predicted the upward sloping trend 
of the share of government spending in GDP rising continually in tandem with 
the increase of income per person.
5.3.2.7  Model seven: a non-existent form of combination
Model seven depicts a form of combination between strong effective govern-
ment and weak efficient market, which finds no parallel in real life, because in 
functional terms, a strong effective government needs a mature market economy 
in order to play out its role, and should at least be matched with a semi-strong 
efficient market. Along this line of rationality, a weak efficient market – which 
means that the market fails to play out its proper function – provides no fertile 
ground for the formation of a strong effective government. It should be noted 
that a planned economy does not fall into this model of combination, because 
there is no such a thing as a market in a planned economy, much less a “weak 
efficient market”. Furthermore, the government in a planned economy adopts, 
by and large, a repulsive attitude towards the market, thus exercising nothing 
near effective and foresighted leadership over the market. All told, a government 
in a planned economy is an “authoritarian government”, but by no means a 
“strong effective government”. In this sense, this form of combination is merely 
an assumption that can be neither logically reasoned in theory nor substantiated 
by empirical examples.
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5.3.2.8  Model eight: an authoritative government economic model
This economic model denotes a form of combination between “strong effective 
government” and “semi-strong efficient market”, with “government control” 
as its core. In an authoritative government economic model, the government 
capitalizes on its strong “government intensity” and capabilities in a bid to propel 
economic growth and alleviate various social, political and economic pressures 
that arise therefrom. An authoritative government economic model can serve 
as a driver for economic growth and industrialization, mainly due to its ability 
to guarantee the smooth enforcement of various institutional arrangements 
through a high degree of “government quality”. An authoritative government 
knows how to bring to bear its tremendous power in mobilizing and allocating 
resources, but not without grasping and respecting market rules. With vision 
and foresight for the future of the market, an authoritative government is able 
to formulate appropriate instructive policies for the development of industries 
and enterprises, taking into account the overall picture of an economy. In short, 
the following three words encapsulate the role of an authoritative government 
in economic activities: proactivity, initiative and power.
Meanwhile, this economic model often comes with a mature and stable 
market. However, market mechanisms might be hampered in certain areas 
by overpowering government interventions. Therefore, a market under this 
economic model, as a general rule, shows a lack of intra-regional competition 
and is teeming with government–corporation alliances that lay stress on loyalty 
and coordination among governments, corporations and employees.
Model eight depicts a market economy quite similar to the current Chinese 
economy. It is usually deemed a government-led economy moving incrementally 
towards maturity, one that has registered world-acclaimed accomplishments but 
is still confronted with grave challenges in the form of intensifying market com-
petition and the urgency to foster a better market order, improve market credit 
systems and upgrade market infrastructure. Other typical examples of this model 
can be found in east Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, whose 
mature government-led economic systems have yielded universally recognized 
achievements. This government-led economic model has taken shape and form 
in these countries for profound historical reasons. As late-bloomers, countries 
like Singapore and South Korea were once plagued by various challenges, not 
the least of which were a structurally deformed market, underdeveloped market 
entities, a lack of mobility for production factors, sluggish economic growth, etc. 
To accomplish an economic take-off in the earliest possible time, these countries 
held the role of the state in high esteem from the very beginning, resorting to 
boosting market efficiency through state intervention in a way that respected the 
rules of the market. One thing of particular note is that the share of govern-
ment spending in GDP was anything but high in these countries from 2000 to 
2013, all below 20 percent (as shown in Table 5.2). On the surface, the impact 
of the state on economic growth was unpronounced in these countries; this 
is because the states in these countries successfully instituted and implemented 
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a development model of government-linked enterprises, which was designed, 
first and foremost, to incentivize investment from enterprises and individuals 
for realizing the will of the state. A case in point in this regard is the housing 
provident fund system in Singapore, which has helped pool and inject needed 
financial resources into the Singaporean economy through personal mandatory 
saving schemes and high-yield investment channels. Through systems like this, 
the Singaporean government has managed to exert powerful influence on the 
country’s economic growth and industrial upgrade. Nevertheless, the existence 
of government–corporation alliances in abundance tends to breed grounds for 
collusion between power and money, which is likely to hamper market order and 
free competition and to induce risks of administrative decision-making faults. 
This is the new challenge confronting the governments in Japan, Singapore 
and South Korea.
A review of various economic models, coupled with the aforementioned 
analysis, reveals that the combination between “weak effective government” and 
“weak efficient market” is, more often than not, found in countries that are 
economically backward, and that very few fast-growing countries adopt what 
neoclassical economists have recognized and advocated, namely, the combina-
tion between “weak effective government” and “strong efficient market”. What 
is more commonly seen is the combination between “semi-strong effective 
government” and “strong efficient market”.
5.3.2.9  Model nine: a dual-strong economic model
Model nine is the highest and best possible form of combination between 
government and market. It depicts what a truly mature market economy looks 
like and shows the ultimate point of the destination that national and regional 
economies across the globe should strive to reach through theoretical studies 
and practical exploration.
5.3.2.9.1  A LOGICAL DEDUCTION FOR THE DUAL- 
STRONG ECONOMIC MODEL
With GFL practice by regional governments as a point of departure, the dual-
strong economic model reveals the dual role of regional governments, discovers 
enterprises and regional governments as the dual entities for market competition 
and finally comes to the conclusion of a dual-strong mechanism – consisting 
of “strong efficient market” and “strong efficient market” – as the indicative 
feature of a mature market economy.
What is meant by “foresighted leading” is that regional government has an 
important role to play in economic orientation, adjustment and early warn-
ing, and it should bring this role into play in a way that abides by market 
rules and market mechanisms. Under the foresighted leading theory, regional 
government should, to the best of its capabilities, develop a leading edge in 
resource allocation so as to better catalyze the sound and sustainable growth 
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of regional economy. To this end, regional government should guide activities 
regarding investment, consumption and export; leverage the instruments of 
prices, taxation, exchange rates, interest rates and legislation; and incentivize 
organizational, institutional and technological innovation. The reason for 
regional government being able to exercise foresighted leadership lies in its 
dual role as a “quasi-state” and a “quasi-enterprise”: on the one hand, regional 
government plays a role tantamount to a “quasi-state”, macro-managing and 
regulating regional economies under its jurisdiction; on the other hand, regional 
government acts on behalf of the basic interests of the local area, attempting 
to compete with their counterparts in other regions for the maximization of 
regional economic profits.
Thus, regional government (as a quasi-enterprise) and enterprises combine to 
form the “dual entities” in a modern market competition system. The dual-strong 
mechanism theory for a mature market economy, which focuses on a mechanism 
comprising a “strong government” and a “strong efficient market”, deductively 
emerges out of the dual-entity theory. As the theory goes, on the premise of 
giving full play to the decisive role of the market in resource allocation, an 
“efficient market” and an “effective government” should be developed as the 
“double wheels” on which an economy runs.
5.3.2.9.2 THE CONNOTATION OF A DUAL-STRONG MECHANISM
Given that regional government plays a dual role and acts as one of the dual 
entities for market competition, an “effective government” plus an “efficient 
market” – or, put another way, a “strong government” plus a “strong efficient 
market” – constitutes the best possible combination for a full-fledged market 
economic system. For one thing, a “strong efficient market” is able to efficiently 
allocate resources, while a “strong government” is needed for creating and 
protecting a good market climate, bringing about new ideas and impetus for 
development, exploring new vistas for development and building new strengths 
for development; for another, a “strong government” should not be for the sake 
of “replacing a strong efficient market”, while a “strong efficient market” cannot 
run smoothly without the underpinning of a “strong government”. Only when 
a “dual-strong mechanism” is put into effect can market failures be redressed 
and government malfunction be alleviated.
5.3.2.9.3 AN “EFFECTIVE” REGIONAL GOVERNMENT MODEL
To properly exercise foresighted leadership, an “effective” regional government 
should make clear the purpose, prerequisite and pathway pertinent to GFL: 
the purpose of GFL is to efficiently allocate resources of all kinds and advance 
sustainable regional development; the prerequisite to GFL is the market, which 
means that GFL should be exercised on the basis of the rules and forces of the 
market. The pathway for effecting GFL is through finance, taxation, legislation 
and necessary administrative measures.
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In the economic realm, government should, first and foremost, exercise 
foresighted leadership in areas where economic growth, urban construction 
and resource allocation optimization are concerned, with different approaches 
and priorities for different stages of development. Take China, for example: 
in the factor-driven development stage, the Chinese government relied on its 
control over land supply to drive economic growth; after China entered the 
investment-driven stage, the government exercised GFL mainly in the provision 
of public goods, notably infrastructure; currently, as China transits towards 
innovation-driven development, the government’s foresighted leading role is 
all the more important for scientific innovation, proprietary innovation and 
synergetic innovation.
The USA. represents another notable example of GFL to boost economic 
growth. At a glance, the USA. seems to be a market economy with a “weak 
effective government” and a “strong market”, where values of economic liberal-
ism prevail. In actuality, whether the space program enacted during the Cold War 
era or the “brain project” being implemented right now, the US government 
has been playing a prominent role in foresightedly leading innovation in science 
and technology, with R&D investment and government procurement as the two 
main drivers for this endeavor.
Shunde District of Guangdong Province, China, represents a compelling 
example of foresighted leading for resource allocation. At the outset of reform 
and opening up in China, Shunde was neither a special economic zone nor a big 
city, but rather a county totally dependent on agriculture. As the wind of reform 
breathed new life into the local economy, the CPC and government leaders of 
Shunde set forth the development strategy. With inspiration drawn from the 
ancient Chinese story of five sons successfully passing the imperial examination, 
the local leaders set priorities in five aspects: following the right paths, fostering 
excellent leadership, bringing forth talents, realizing good economic returns 
and enlisting brilliant ideas. As one of the first counties to have focused on 
developing village and township enterprises, Shunde managed to capitalize on 
the promise of a burgeoning market economy in China.
In the early 1990s, Shunde once again became a pioneer in China’s new reform 
initiative – this time around, on property rights and ownership. By bringing the 
development of its secondary industry more in sync with the market economy, 
Shunde successfully took its private economy to a whole new level. In 2005, one 
year into this author’s tenure as Secretary of the CPC Shunde District Committee, 
this author took steps to restructure the local economy in an effort to address 
pronounced problems facing the district, most notably overdependence on three 
major home appliance manufacturers (Midea, Glanz and Kelon) for economic 
growth, as well as a severe lack of resilience against risks. A series of reform 
measures culminated in the formulation and implementation of the “Triple-Three 
Strategy” for coordinating the development of three major industries in Shunde. 
The first “three” refers to three major industries; the second “three” means that 
three key sectors would be singled out in each of the three major industries, 
sectors that would receive strong government support; the third “three” means 
156 Effective government and efficient market
that three leading enterprises would be cultivated and developed within each 
selected sector. Thanks to the success of this strategy, the economy of Shunde 
managed to weather an array of challenges that came at it in the next several 
years, the biggest of which was the international financial crisis. As a result, 
Shunde continues to remain at the forefront of socio-economic development 
among district-level cities and counties in China.
The key to building an “effective government” is to make good use of 
finance, taxation, legislation and necessary administrative measures. A look 
into China’s financial structural reform – a crucial part of its supply-side 
structural reform – can offer some insight and perspectives into the behavioral 
patterns of an “effective government”. For China, an economy that ranked 
second in the world in total import and export volumes in 2016, drastic 
fluctuations of exchange rates require it to speed up the pace of exchange 
rate reform for RMB internationalization. In this connection, China is con-
sidering the possibility of establishing an onshore trading center for RMB 
offshore business, which, once put in place, will be used as a fulcrum for 
RMB internationalization. This has been an approach taken by major countries 
in the process of internationalizing their currencies. Two standout examples 
come to mind. One example is the decision by the Federal Reserve Bank to 
establish IBFs (International Banking Facilities) in the process of US dollar 
internationalization, which were designated to undertake offshore US dollar 
business within the jurisdiction of the USA., such as international lending 
and deposit activities. This approach ended up being a tremendous boost for 
US offshore finance. The other example is the step of the Japanese govern-
ment setting up the Japan Offshore Market (JOM), an institution that has 
played a critical role in promoting internationalization of the Japanese yen. 
With full consideration given to its actual conditions, China can establish a 
pilot onshore trading center for RMB offshore business in either Shanghai 
Free-Trade Zone or Guangdong Free-Trade Zone, as a springboard for 
China to leap from a service trade power to a capital power and as a boost 
for financial structural reform.
5.3.3  Criteria and standards for assessing modes  
of government–market combination
5.3.3.1  Criteria for assessment
As the optimal form of government–market combination, the dual-strong model 
does not come into being until both market and government develop to maturity. 
However, when it comes to practice in real life, one grave mistake has to be 
avoided, which is mechanically and indiscriminately applying any particular model 
of government–market combination to a regional economy. This is because the 
best possible model of government–market combination varies across regions, 
depending on their differences in economic development stages and levels of 
maturity regarding government and market. Applying a model of combination 
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that is behind or ahead of a region’s development curve will definitely under-
mine its economy. As a matter of fact, the economic backwardness of a region 
oftentimes should not be ascribed to its market or government being power-
less, but to dislocation and disruption between its market and government, a 
problem that arises from a misjudgment of the scopes of their respective roles 
and functions. For this reason, making assessments of the economic efficiency 
of different combination models is critically important for eschewing exaggera-
tion and restraint of the roles of government and market; doing so can also 
shed some light on how to properly position and develop the government and 
market of a regional economy, enabling the regional economy to tap its market 
potentials; foster better governance; shun problems pertaining to supersession, 
vacancy and dislocation between government and market; and secure steady 
and healthy development.
For the sake of tapping the potentials and realizing the sustainability of any 
given regional economy, a system of criteria and standards for assessing economic 
benefits of different models of government–market combination must be built 
and shaped on the basis of five economic parameters – effectiveness, coordina-
tion, continuity, creativity and inclusiveness.
5.3.3.1.1  EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
The effectiveness of economic growth denotes the efficiency and sustainability 
of economic growth, as well as the employment and price stability generated by 
economic growth. The growth of an economy cannot be described as effective 
unless it leads to increased efficiency, stable prices and full employment, because 
otherwise it will only cause new turbulence and even induce ill-effects that far 
outweigh the benefits it generates. Assessment indicators of the effectiveness of 
economic growth include labor productivity, economic growth rate, economic 
sustainability, employment rate, price fluctuation, etc. Labor productivity, also 
known as workforce productivity, is the ratio of a region’s GDP to the total 
amount of its workforce. The higher a region’s labor productivity is, the higher 
quality of economic development it has, and vice versa. As compared with 
conventional assessment indicators, labor productivity can present a clearer 
picture of whether a region’s economic development is quantity-based or quality-
based, so that the region’s economy can be shifted onto the path of improved 
worker proficiency. Economic growth that is stable, rational and sustainable 
is a significant measure of the quality of economic development, as well as 
a remarkable indicator of a region’s development efficiency. A region with 
high development efficiency necessarily features a continued high growth rate. 
Increasing economic aggregate in the shortest time possible is a necessary path 
to social wealth creation. However, if the growth of an economy fails to bring 
about stable employment or, worse still, leads to severe inflation, then such 
growth will deal a detrimental blow to long-term economic sustainability. Thus, 
to make the growth of an economy effective calls for attention to all-rounded 
development of the whole society.
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The effectiveness of economic growth can be judged according to how close 
real GDP is to potential GDP. Potential GDP is generally defined as the maximum 
possible level of output that an economy can produce under the condition of 
available economic resources being used to the fullest possible extent in a specific 
period of time. Put another way, potential GDP reflects the biggest possible 
gross domestic product that an economy can produce under the condition of 
full employment in a specific period of time. The closer the ratio of real output 
to production capacity is to 100 percent, the more fully the production capacity 
is being tapped, the higher quality of development the economy has and the 
lower level of waste and idleness it features. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that there still exists some difficulty in measuring potential GDP.
5.3.3.1.2  COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
As a key indicator of economic development quality, the coordination of eco-
nomic development mainly describes the level of synergy in industrial structure, 
urban–rural structure and structure of trade in an economy. Of the three types 
of structure, industrial structure assumes a dominant position and constitutes a 
significant component of economic development quality, with its changes bearing 
critically on economic development. The coordination of economic development 
can be assessed and measured by industrial structure ratio, urbanization rate 
and coefficient of openness.
The ratio of the tertiary industry in a region’s economy is a crucial indicator of 
its level of development. As it stands now, this ratio hovers at about 70 percent 
in most developed economies, and stays at around 50 percent on average in 
developing economies as a group. Some cities in China have caught up with 
or even surpassed major cities in developed economies in terms of this ratio. A 
case in point is Beijing, with its tertiary sector accounting for over 70 percent 
of its industrial output. However, never before has this ratio reached 50 percent 
for the whole of China, even at its peak, indicating relatively huge room for 
improvement. Urbanization rate refers to the percentage of an economy’s urban 
population in its total population, an indicator that helps optimize urban–rural 
economic structure and facilitate viable economic growth and coordinated 
social development. Coefficient of openness is reflective of the level of inter-
nationalization of a national or regional economy, the competitiveness of its 
products and services on the international market and its capacity and intensity 
for soliciting foreign investment. This coefficient is conducive to strengthening 
the competitiveness and enhancing the external coordination of an economy.
5.3.3.1.3  CONTINUITY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The continuity of economic development defines the capacity of an economy for 
sustainable development, which is mainly manifested in the carrying capacity of 
resources and environment for long-term economic development. The continuity 
of economic development can be measured by the coefficient of resource supply 
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and demand, the energy consumption per unit of output and the variance ratio 
of environmental quality cost.
The coefficient of resource supply and demand refers to the degree of varia-
tion between the availability and demand of resources: if the coefficient is larger 
than 1, that means the availability of resources is sufficient to meet the demand 
for resources needed for economic development; if the coefficient is less than 
1, that means the availability of resources is below what is needed to ensure 
economic development. The energy consumption per unit of output refers to the 
ratio of energy consumption (as measured by tons of coal equivalent) to GDP, 
an index that is conducive to boosting the efficiency in energy consumption, 
accelerating technical transformation of traditional industries, forcefully phasing 
out low-efficient energy sources and alleviating energy shortage in economic 
development. The variance ratio of environmental quality cost describes the 
change of environmental quality cost in economic development: if the ratio is on 
the rise, it signals a deterioration of an economy’s sustainability. This ratio can 
help reduce the damages done to the environment and speed up the recovery 
of a damaged environment.
5.3.3.1.4  CREATIVITY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The creativity of economic development denotes the impact of technological 
innovation on economic development. The ratio of R&D spending to GDP is 
a core indicator of an economy’s creativity. If R&D spending accounts for less 
than 1 percent of GDP, it signals a lack of creativity; only when the ratio stands 
between 1 percent and 2 percent can it show a certain degree of creativity; if 
the ratio is higher than 2 percent, it indicates strong capacity for innovation. 
Other indicators of an economy’s creativity include the ratio of high-tech sectors’ 
added value to GDP and the index of patent authorization.
5.3.3.1.5  INCLUSIVENESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The inclusiveness of economic development describes the impact of economic 
development on poverty alleviation and improvement of people’s livelihood, and 
can be measured by the growth rate of residents’ income, Engel Coefficient 
and income disparity between urban and rural residents. A market–government 
combination model can be considered good only if it is conducive to narrowing 
income gaps and enhancing social fairness, on top of boosting economic growth.
5.3.3.2  Assessment of the nine models of market–government 
combination
Of the nine models of market–government combination, the dual-weak eco-
nomic model, which is extreme in nature, shows an obvious lack of potential 
for future development. The two models that encompass either a strong 
government and a weak market or vice versa only appear in specific stages of 
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history. By no means do they provide the pathway for the future. The models 
that are both feasible in real life and enlightening for the future are the semi-
mature economic model, the regulatory model for the post-market-economy 
period, the authoritative government economic model and the dual-strong 
economic model.
The semi-mature economic model is an economic model that indicates 
both market and government have already developed to a semi-strong form, 
as best represented by Russia or Latin American countries. The regulatory 
model for the post-market-economy period denotes the combination of strong 
efficient market and semi-strong effective government, as best represented 
by developed countries in North America and the European Union. The 
authoritative government economic model describes the combination of 
semi-strong efficient market and strong effective government, as seen in 
countries like Singapore, South Korea and Japan. The dual-strong economic 
model specifically refers to the combination of strong efficient market and 
strong effective government, as is reflected in some regions in China, such 
as the PRD.
What follows is an assessment of the performances of these four models as 
measured against various indicators for economic development quality.
5.3.3.3  Economic growth rate
The dual-strong economic model, as best represented by the one adopted 
in China’s PRD, fares much better than the other three models in terms of 
economic growth rates. Under this model, the PRDhas enjoyed steady economic 
growth on a robust momentum, with tremendous vigor and vitality and with 
economic activities well under control. In contrast, practically all developed 
economies, where the regulatory model for the post-market-economy period is 
enforced, have exhibited negative economic growth and a lack of stamina for 
the future, with only one exception, namely, Israel, whose economic growth has 
been sloping downward but at a very gentle gradient. In particular, Sweden, 
well known for its welfare state, has seen its economic growth turn negative, 
down by 5.11 percent, indicating an obvious lack of growth impetus. Russia 
and Brazil, which have followed the semi-mature economic model, have expe-
rienced a roller coaster ride of economic development over the past decade, 
debilitated by fragile economic stability. As for countries where the authoritative 
government model prevails, Singapore and South Korea have shown a steady 
pace of growth, but Japan has been plagued by economic fluctuations and a 
lack of momentum. As is clear from the above analysis and from Table5.3, the 
dual-strong economic model presents distinct advantages in terms of growth 
momentum and stability, followed by the authoritative government economic 
model and then by the regulatory model for the post-market-economy period. 
The semi-mature economic model is, distressingly, at the bottom of the peck-
ing order.
Table 5.3 Economic growth rates (%) in countries with different growth models
Year/Model 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
M1 Brazil 3.2 3.96 6.06 5.09 −0.13 7.54 3.92 1.93 3.02 0.1 −3.85
Russia 6.38 8.15 8.54 5.25 −7.82 4.5 4.26 3.52 1.28 0.71 −3.73
M2 France 1.61 2.37 2.36 0.2 −2.94 1.97 2.08 0.18 0.64 0.63 1.22
Germany 0.88 3.88 3.38 0.81 −5.57 3.94 3.72 0.62 0.41 1.58 1.45
Sweden 2.81 4.95 3.54 −0.72 −5.11 5.69 2.74 0.05 1.23 2.38 3.83
UK 3 2.66 2.59 −0.47 −4.19 1.54 1.97 1.18 2.16 2.85 2.33
USA. 3.35 2.67 1.78 −0.29 −2.78 2.53 1.6 2.22 1.49 2.43 2.43
Israel 4.39 5.63 6.23 3.16 1.23 5.37 5.03 2.86 3.35 2.6 2.49
M3 Japan 1.3 1.69 2.19 −1.04 −5.53 4.71 −0.45 1.74 1.36 −0.03 0.55
South 
Korea
3.92 5.18 5.46 2.83 0.71 6.5 3.68 2.29 2.9 3.34 2.61
Singapore 7.5 – – – – 15.2 6.2 3.4 4.4 2.9 –
M4 The PRD 15.7 16.8 16.3 12.8 9.4 12.2 9.9 8.1 9.3 7.8 –
Source: https://data.oecd.org/ (OECD database),www.adb.org/ (ADB database), www.gdstats. 
gov.cn/tjnj/2015 (2015 Statistics Yearbook of Guangdong Province).
M1 = the semi-mature economic model; M2 = the regulatory model for the post-market-
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Figure 5.2  Growth rates in countries representative of the four assessed models
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5.3.3.4  Unemployment rate
Apparently, judging from the level of unemployment, the authoritative govern-
ment economic model produces the lowest level of unemployment compared 
with the other three combination models. Unemployment for China has stayed 
above 4 percent. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the dual-strong economic 
model hereby represents only the PRD of China, rather than the whole of 
China. The PRD has been a region with a high concentration of workforce, 
which has not only provided enough job opportunities for local population but 
also attracted a massive number of workers migrating from elsewhere in China. 
Moreover, despite being just a region of China, the PRD has played a crucial 
role as a cross-regional labor market for the whole country. Therefore, the PRD, 
if taken independently, features insignificantly low unemployment. From this 
perspective, it is fair to say that the dual-strong economic model is the optimal 
form of combination when it comes to taming unemployment. There is big cause 
for pessimism regarding unemployment in countries that have instituted either 
the regulatory model for the post-market-economy period or the semi-mature 
economic model, as unemployment in these countries has been high for years 
(as shown in Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Unemployment (%) under different combination models
Year/Model 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
M1 Brazil 9.89 10.03 9.35 7.93 8.11 6.76 5.98 5.52 5.4 4.85 –
Russia 7.56 7.17 6.13 6.36 8.38 7.48 6.5 5.46 5.49 5.16 5.57
M2 France 8.49 8.45 7.66 7.06 8.74 8.87 8.81 9.39 9.89 10.29 10.35
Germany 11.17 10.25 8.66 7.53 7.74 6.97 5.83 5.38 5.23 4.98 4.62
Sweden 7.48 7.07 6.16 6.23 8.35 8.61 7.8 7.98 8.05 7.96 7.43
UK 4.75 5.35 5.26 5.61 7.54 7.79 8.04 7.89 7.53 6.11 5.3
USA. 5.07 4.62 4.62 5.78 9.27 9.62 8.95 8.07 7.38 6.17 5.29
Israel 8.99 8.4 7.32 6.1 7.54 6.64 5.6 6.85 6.21 5.91 5.24
M3 Japan 4.42 4.14 3.84 3.99 5.07 5.05 4.58 4.35 4.03 3.59 3.38
South 
Korea
3.73 3.47 3.25 3.17 3.65 3.73 3.41 3.23 3.13 3.54 3.64
Singapore 4.2 – – – – 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 –
M4 China 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 –
Source:  https://data.oecd.org/ (OECD database), www.adb.org/ (ADB database), http://data. 
stats.gov.cn/ (China’s state-level database).
M1 = the semi-mature economic model; M2 = the regulatory model for the post-market-
economy period; M3 = the authoritative government economic model; M4 = the dual-strong 
economic model
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5.3.3.5  Inflation of prices
Judging from the movement of prices, Japan, South Korea and other countries 
under the authoritative government model have exhibited the lowest rate 
of price increase, with a steady trend of price movement. On the flip side, 
Japan features a certain degree of deflation, which might metastasize into a 
huge drag on its economy. Countries in western Europe and North America, 
where the post-market-economy model predominates, have experienced a 
gentle rise in prices over the past decade, capable of controlling commodity 
prices in economic development, which indicates a good market climate where 
there is sufficient economic output to meet market needs. Under the semi-
mature economic model, Russia has been plagued by severe inflation, and 
Brazil has exhibited a steep upward slope of price levels. Commodity prices 
have been kept within a range of 2–4 percent in the PRD of China, where 
the dual-strong economic model is being implemented; despite remarkable 
fluctuations in 2008 and 2009, commodity prices have remained at about 
2 percent since 2012, indicating good price stability amid high economic 
growth (as seen in Table 5.5).
5.3.3.6  Industrial structure
Performances in terms of industrial structure speak volumes for how well these 
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Figure 5.3 Unemployment in countries representative of the four assessed models
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Table 5.5 Inflation of prices (%) under different combination models
Year/Model 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
M1 Brazil 6.87 4.18 3.64 5.68 4.89 5.04 6.64 5.4 6.2 6.33 9.03
Russia 12.69 9.67 9.01 14.11 11.65 6.85 8.44 5.07 6.75 7.82 15.53
M2 France 1.75 1.68 1.49 2.81 0.09 1.53 2.11 1.95 0.86 0.51 0.04
Germany 1.55 1.58 2.3 2.63 0.31 1.1 2.08 2.01 1.5 0.91 0.23
Sweden 0.45 1.36 2.21 3.44 −0.49 1.16 2.96 0.89 −0.04 −0.18 −0.05
UK 2.1 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.2 3.3 4.5 2.8 2.6 1.5 0
USA. 3.39 3.23 2.85 3.84 −0.36 1.64 3.16 2.07 1.46 1.62 0.12
Israel 1.31 2.12 0.49 4.59 3.32 2.7 3.48 1.69 1.57 0.49 −0.63
M3 Japan −0.27 0.24 0.06 1.37 −1.35 −0.72 −0.28 −0.03 0.36 2.75 0.79
South 
Korea
2.75 2.24 2.54 4.67 2.76 2.94 4.03 2.19 1.3 1.27 0.71
Poland 2.18 1.28 2.46 4.16 3.8 2.58 4.24 3.56 0.99 0.05 −0.87
M4 PRD 2.3 1.8 3.7 5.6 −2.3 3.1 5.3 2.8 2.5 2.3 –
Source: https://data.oecd.org/ (OECD database),www.adb.org/ (ADB database), www.gdstats.
gov.cn/tjnj/2015(2015 Statistics Yearbook of Guangdong Province).
M1 = the semi-mature economic model; M2 = the regulatory model for the post-market-economy 
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Figure 5.4 Unemployment rates in countries under different combination models
industry in gross domestic product being the key indicator. As is clear from 
Table 5.6, this ratio has hovered above 70 percent in countries that implement 
either the post-market-economy model or the authoritative government 
economic model, indicating an advanced industrial structure and a high level 
of economic prosperity. In China’s PRD, this ratio has remained at about 
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Table 5.6  The weights of the three industries in GDP under different combination 
models (%)





2.9 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4
Secondary 
industry
24.6 25.7 25.7 25.6 27.0 25.2 26.6 26.5 25.1 25.3
Tertiary 
industry






3.1 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3
Secondary 
industry
37.5 36.9 37.0 36.3 36.7 38.3 38.4 38.1 38.4 38.2
Tertiary 
industry





0.1 – – – – 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Secondary 
industry
32.4 – – – – 27.6 26.3 26.4 24.8 24.9
Tertiary 
industry





3.1 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9
Secondary 
industry
50.7 51.4 50.5 49.9 47.9 48.4 47.9 46.2 45.2 45.0
Tertiary 
industry
46.3 46.1 47.0 47.7 49.9 49.5 50.0 51.8 52.9 53.1
Source: www.adb.org/ (ADB database), ww.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2015 (2015 Statistics Yearbook 
of Guangdong Province).
M1 = the post-market-economy model;  M2 = the authoritative government economic model; 
M3 = the dual-strong economic model
50 percent and is rising steadily; the secondary industry has seen a drop of its weight 
in the region’s GDP, while the weight of the primary industry has declined 
to the point of insignificance, just as is the case in developed economies. In 
terms of development tendency, the PRD is accelerating the pace of industrial 
transformation and upgrade, with manufacturing being moved to the fringe 
and towards intelligent application. It will gradually adjust the weight of its 
secondary and tertiary industries to the level of developed countries.
5.3.3.7  Share of R&D spending in GDP
The share of R&D spending in GDP represents the level of creativity in a 
region’s economic development. As is indicated in Table 5.7, Israel ranks top in 
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this index, spending over 4 percent of its GDP on research and development, 
followed by the Republic of Korea, which has contributed over 4 percent of 
its GDP to R&D programs over the past several years. Next in the table are 
Japan and Sweden, trailed by the USA. and Germany, the latter two spending 
nearly 3 percent of their GDP on R&D. The share of R&D spending in GDP 
Table 5.7  Share of R&D spending in GDP in countries under different combination 
models (%)
Year/Model 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
M1 Russia 1.07 1.07 1.12 1.04 1.25 1.13 1.09 1.13 1.13 1.19
M2 Germany 2.42 2.46 2.45 2.60 2.73 2.71 2.80 2.87 2.83 2.90
Sweden 3.39 3.50 3.26 3.50 3.45 3.22 3.25 3.28 3.31 3.16
UK 1.63 1.65 1.68 1.69 1.74 1.70 1.69 1.62 1.66 1.70
USA 2.51 2.55 2.63 2.77 2.82 2.74 2.76 2.70 2.74
Israel 4.04 4.13 4.41 4.33 4.12 3.93 4.01 4.13 4.09 4.11
M3 Japan 3.31 3.41 3.46 3.47 3.36 3.25 3.38 3.34 3.48 3.59
South 
Korea
2.63 2.83 3.00 3.12 3.29 3.47 3.74 4.03 4.15 4.29
Singapore 2.16 2.13 2.34 2.62 2.16 2.01 2.15 2.00 2.00 2.20
M4 China 1.32 1.38 1.38 1.46 1.68 1.76 1.79 1.93 2.32 2.37
Source: https://data.oecd.org/ (OECD database), www.adb.org/ (ABD Database), www.
gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2015 (2015 Statistics Yearbook of Guangdong Province).
M1 = the semi-mature economic model; M2 = the post-market-economy model; M3 = the 
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Figure 5.5  Share of R&D spending in GDP in countries under different combina-
tion models
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has also exceeded 2 percent for Singapore, while Russia has always contributed 
a little more than 1 percent of its GDP to this cause, somewhat behind other 
countries listed in the table. The PRD has been increasing its spending on R&D 
over the years, contributing over 2 percent of its GDP to this end in 2013. 
This trend indicates that the market and the government are on the same page 
in the matter of R&D. It also reflects the commitment of the PRD to a new 
growth path driven by R&D and innovation.
5.3.3.8  Growth of household disposable income
The PRD has shone brightly in its increase of household disposable income, 
with growth hovering above 8 percent for the past decade and reaching over 
12 percent at its peak (as shown in Table 5.8). In this respect, the PRD has 
surpassed, by a large margin, other economies under a combination model dif-
ferent from its dual-strong economic model, a fact that testifies to the strength 
of the dual-strong economic model in driving inclusive economic growth to 
improve people’s livelihood. Russia and Hungary, two economies dominated by 
the semi-mature economic model, have undergone a roller coaster ride in the 
growth of household disposable income, even plagued by shrinking household 
income during the worst of times. Economies dominated by the post-market-
economy model and the authoritative government economic model have had 
their moments of household disposable income growth, though by a very small 
margin.
Table 5.8  Growth of household disposable income in countries under different 
combination models (%)
Year/Model 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
M1 Hungary 4.01 1.6 −4.07 −1.48 −3.66 −2.6 3.31 −3.1 1.64 2.41 –
Russia 10.92 11.83 12.33 7.23 −1.88 7.01 4.03 4.85 2.43 – –
M2 France 0.94 2.05 2.82 0.35 1.75 1.44 0.4 −0.32 0.38 1.13 –
Germany 0.4 0.99 0.4 1.06 −0.09 0.66 1.03 0.62 0.61 1.5 –
Sweden 1.92 3.41 4.05 1.73 2.53 1.52 3.11 2.76 1.37 1.95 –
UK 2.2 1.45 2.39 1.1 3.1 0.8 −1.54 2.52 −0.61 0.72 –
USA. 1.33 3.6 1.83 1.7 −0.08 1.09 2.3 3.07 −1.2 – –
M3 Japan −0.27 0.24 0.06 1.37 −1.35 −0.72 −0.28 −0.03 0.36 2.75 0.79
ROK 2.75 2.24 2.54 4.67 2.76 2.94 4.03 2.19 1.3 1.27 0.71
M4 PRD 8.4 8.4 10.5 11.5 9.3 10.8 12.6 12.4 9.5 8.8 –
Source: https://data.oecd.org/ (OECD database), www.adb.org/ (ADB database), www.gdstats.
gov.cn/tjnj/2015(2015 Statistics Yearbook of Guangdong Province).
M1 = the semi-mature economic model; M2 = the regulatory model for the post-market-economy 
period; M3 = the authoritative government economic model; M4 = the dual-strong economic 
model
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5.3.3.9  Poverty rate
As is shown in Table 5.9, countries with a welfare state, most notably Finland, 
enjoy the lowest poverty rate, at only 0.07 percent as a group. There is little 
difference in poverty levels among countries under any of the other three models. 
There is as yet a lack of consensus on the standards for gauging poverty levels in 
China, and as a result, science-based and world-recognized standards for measur-
ing poverty levels have yet to be produced in China. Given that data on poverty 
are yet to be included into the country’s comprehensive statistical system, it is 
difficult and even impossible to compare China with other countries in this regard.
5.3.3.10  Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient is high for China as a whole, an indication of severe wealth 
polarization amid buoyant economic development. By no means, however, does 
this give a real and even-handed picture of the income distribution situation in 
the PRD. As a developed region in China, the PRD has by and large eradicated 
income disparity through a diversity of channels for employment and a high 
degree of marketization. Thus, the PRD fares much better than the rest of China 
in balancing income distribution. Given that the PRD is not a mirror image of 
the whole of China when it comes to income distribution, the Gini coefficient 
of China, though over 4 percent, does not speak volumes of the dual-strong 
economic model being weak in balancing income distribution. Other countries, 
except Germany and Sweden at below 3 percent, have a Gini coefficient of 
between 3 percent and 4 percent, an indication that the post–market-economy 
model and the authoritative government economic model have manifested strong 
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Figure 5.6 Poverty rates in countries representative of the four economic models
Effective government and efficient market 169
5.3.3.11  Comprehensive assessment
A comparison of the four combination models – the semi-mature economic 
model, the post-market-economy model, the authoritative government model 
and the dual-strong economic model – in their competence for fostering effective-
ness, coordination, continuity, creativity and inclusiveness of economic develop-
ment reveals that the dual-strong economic model is well ahead of the other three 
models in boosting economic growth, delivering strong performances in curbing 
inflation and unemployment, and producing good economic development qual-
ity. Moreover, as shown in various tables above, an apparent trend shows that 
Table 5.9 Poverty levels of countries under different combination models (%)
Year/Model 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
M1 Poland 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 –
M2 Finland 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
UK 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 –
USA. – – – – – – – – 0.17 0.18
Israel – – – – – – 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
M3 South 
Korea
– – – – – – – 0.15 0.15 0.14
Source: https://data.oecd.org/(OECD database).
M1 = the semi-mature economic model; M2 = the post–market-economy model; M3 = the 
authoritative government economic model
Table 5.10 Poverty rate in countries under different combination models (%)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
M1 Poland 0.327 0.316 0.316 0.309 0.304 0.306 0.301 0.298 0.3 –
M2 Germany – – – 0.285 – – 0.291 0.289 0.292 –
Sweden – – – – – – 0.273 0.274 0.281 –
UK 0.359 0.364 0.373 0.369 0.374 0.351 0.354 0.351 0.358 –
USA. – – – – – – – – 0.396 0.394
Israel – – – – – – 0.371 0.371 0.36 0.365
M3 ROK – – – – – – – 0.307 0.302 0.302
M4 China 0.485 0.487 0.484 0.491 0.49 0.481 0.477 0.474 0.473 0.462
Source: https://data.oecd.org/ (OECD database), www.adb.org/ (ADB database), http://
data.stats.gov.cn/ (China’s national database).
M1 = the semi-mature economic model; M2 = the regulatory model for the post-market-
economy period; M3 = the authoritative government economic model; M4 = the dual-strong 
economic model
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this model is vibrantly catching up with the other three from behind in terms of 
ability to improve the coordination and creativity of economic structure and to 
make economic growth inclusive and accessible to all people. As such, it can be 
regarded as the optimal model of combination between government and market. 
Next in the ranking of viability and effectiveness are the post-market-economy 
and the authoritative government economic models; as evidenced from their 
performances in several key areas, these two models are stable and reliable. 
Due to a lack of stamina and momentum for future development, however, 
they can only be seen as a suboptimal choice of combination between govern-
ment and market. As far as the semi-mature model is concerned, although it 
generates good economic growth in some ways, it also presents a certain level 
of uncertainty, whether in terms of market function or government regulation. 
Thus, it can be considered the least viable option, only to be adopted during 
periods of exploration and transition.
5.3.4  Different combination models for resource allocation 
in different economic development stages
As indicated above, there are basically four stages of economic development, 
which vary from one another depending on the means by which resources are 
allocated: the factor-driven stage, the investment-driven stage, the innovation-
driven stage and the wealth-driven stage. Priorities for competition measures also 
vary with regional governments, depending on the stages where the economies 
under their governance are. Such differences in priorities are mainly mirrored in 
the arrangements across the notional, institutional, organizational and techno-
logical realms. Given that the balance of power between government and market 
shifts as an economy transits from one economic development stage to another, 
different government–market combination models should be instituted and 
enforced for countries and regions in different stages of economic development.
5.3.4.1  The government–market combination model for  
the factor-driven stage
Factor-driven economic growth means that the source of momentum for eco-
nomic growth stems from the advantages in factors of production that a region 
has, such as in agricultural products, mineral resources, workforce, etc. A region 
with such advantages is generally able to register fast economic growth by tap-
ping into its naturally endowed resources. Such resource advantages often lead 
to the creation of a loosely regulated environment for economic development, 
which might result in regional government paying no heed to the efficiency of 
resource allocation and putting premium only on the exploration and allocation 
of “non-operational resources”.
In this stage, regional management is largely restricted to the provision of 
pure public goods, with a lack of means and capacity for the allocation of 
“quasi-operational resources”. Meanwhile, given the concentration of advantages 
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in factors of production, the market is prone to monopoly, exhibiting a certain 
level of inadequate competition. From this perspective, the government–market 
combination model for a region in the factor-driven stage must be the semi-
mature economic model, with a semi-strong market and a semi-strong government – 
the least viable of the four models previously discussed.
Russia is a typical economy in the factor-driven stage, with oil the key factor 
propelling economic growth. Oil prices of the world took a nosedive in 2008 
and have remained low since then, dealing a devastating blow to the Russian 
economy. Latin America and the Caribbean, which, like Russia, implement the 
semi-mature economic model, registered a growth rate of merely 1.3 percent 
as a group in 2015, and are expected to sustain a sluggish 2.3 percent growth 
rate in 2016. The plunge in oil and commodity prices has prompted a growth 
forecast downgrade for Sub-Saharan Africa, while casting an ominous shadow 
over the economic growth prospect of Nigeria and South Africa.
If history is any guide, regional government in the factor-driven stage will have 
to strive for breakthroughs in the realm of government function and capacity. 
Specifically, regional government should accelerate the pace of reform towards 
a market-based economy and beef up its control over economic transformation. 
The priority of competition orientation for regional government in this stage is 
to foster notional and institutional innovation.
5.3.4.2  The government–market combination model  
for the investment-driven stage
A region under a factor-driven economic model tends to become dependent 
on low-cost advantages derived from the abundance of a certain factor of 
production, while losing sight of the fact that such advantages are, in actuality, 
tantamount to a drain of resources. To maintain such low-cost advantages, 
regional government often has no other choice but to allocate a large amount 
of financial resources as subsidies. Government subsidies on such a large scale 
not only lead to overconsumption of factors of production but also encourage 
overdependence on them, thus further weakening the competitiveness of these 
factors of production. Worse still, government subsidies for production factors 
are likely to distort investment decisions in both public and private sectors, 
absorbing fiscal resources that otherwise should be spent on other important 
matters, including infrastructural development and social services where govern-
ment spending is badly needed. Dilapidated and unattended infrastructure can 
end up putting a huge dent in a region’s competitiveness and growth potential. 
In this sense, it is imperative for any region to make the transition from factor-
driven growth to investment-driven growth.
An investment-driven growth stage means that government has shifted the 
way it participates in regional competition, from solely relying on resource-
generated low costs to beefing up the intensity of investment in non-operational 
resources and getting involved in quasi-operational resource investment. This 
is a stage where government has achieved a quantum leap in its capacity 
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for resource allocation, in the sense that some of the weaknesses previously 
plaguing economic growth are being remedied and the advantages derived 
from abundance in production factors are being better tapped and played out. 
Meanwhile, regional government has developed a deeper understanding of the 
market, somewhat recognizing the market’s primacy in allocating resources. Thus, 
during the investment-driven stage, a series of beneficial experiments are made 
regarding the functional scopes of government and market, as well as the form 
of combination between them, with a view to forging suboptimal combination 
models better than the semi-mature economic model.
Countries like Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania are well on their way to 
transitioning from factor-driven growth to investment-driven growth. Between 
1995 and 2010, they formulated rational medium-term policies and conducted 
structural reforms. These policies and measures proved to be crucially effective in 
enlisting assistance funds that helped to alleviate debts and release the gushing 
vitality of their resources. Returns from these policies and measures eventually 
translated into wide fiscal latitude for their governments, allowing them to 
increase social expenditure and capital investment – especially in infrastructure – for 
faster economic growth. For example, Ethiopia registered buoyant economic 
growth by incentivizing investment in the flower sector, aviation and tourism. 
In the 1990s, Mozambique enlisted a massive amount of foreign and exter-
nal capital to finance capital-intensive projects regarding the production and 
transmission of electricity and natural gas – electricity was generated mainly to 
produce aluminum. Tanzania achieved impressive economic growth and boosted 
private investment through three rounds of macro-economic and structural 
reform and, by instituting relevant policies, extended its export scope to cover 
non-traditional products. These reform measures were rational, well-arranged 
and inclusive to all social sectors.
Singapore, South Korea and other countries under the authoritative govern-
ment model have spared no effort to beef up investment in the public and 
quasi-public sectors. Countries under the post-market-economy model, as best 
represented by the USA., have attempted to boost economic recovery through 
quantitative easing and proactive fiscal spending since the outbreak of the financial 
crisis in 2008. In particular, the USA. has undertaken industrial restructuring 
through investment in areas that are conducive to increasing productive capital 
for the future, with an overarching objective of driving up potential output. The 
growing influx of refugees into Europe has posed a grave challenge to the EU 
in terms of its labor market’s absorption capacity and its political system. What 
is of critical importance under such circumstances is to implement policies and 
measures that support the integration of immigrants into the EU’s workforce, in 
the sense that doing so helps tackle social exclusion, eases worry over long-term 
fiscal burdens from immigration and facilitates the materialization of the long-
term economic benefits derived from the inflow of refugees. These problems, 
however, cannot be well addressed without massive government spending.
A review of reform initiatives and practices by various regional govern-
ments reveals that in the investment-driven stage, governments start rendering 
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attention or support to the allocation and development of “quasi-operational 
resources”, coupled with certain actions to explore or innovate the utility 
of “quasi-operational resources”. The priority of competition orientation for 
regional governments in this stage is to foster institutional and organizational 
innovation.
5.3.4.3  The government–market combination model for 
the innovation-driven and wealth-driven stages
Despite its great dependency on investment for economic growth, the USA., 
under the post-market-economy model, has been plagued by a teetering invest-
ment-driven recovery since 2010, mainly due to an ominous shadow surround-
ing its business prospects. In Europe, where growth is hugely uneven among 
its economies, financial fragmentation has become increasingly pronounced, 
continuing to divide the Eurozone. Against this backdrop, lopsided emphasis 
on economic growth through investment is counterproductive to building 
core competitiveness in market competition; on the contrary, it will lead to 
massive capital inflow and currency appreciation, thus creating a huge drag on 
monetary policies, sending shock waves across the financial system and plunging 
the European economy into recession. In addition, sluggish economic growth 
will worsen social pressures arising from stubbornly stagnant wage growth, 
structural economic changes and hampered welfare programs. Though abdicating 
it is unrealistic, investment-driven approach is seeing its potential dwindling. 
As such, regional government is required to develop foresight and insight into 
questions like this and realize their foresighted leadership through innovation 
on various levels.
Just take a moment to think about the changes 3D printing, self-driving 
vehicles and artificial intelligence can bring to the future, and the impact 
information technology, e-commerce and the sharing economy are having on 
how people learn, work, shop and travel. Innovation has fundamentally changed 
the future of the world. Innovation, however, is highly dependent on regional 
policies – even the slightest bit of government support can give a tremendous 
boost to innovation and growth. For example, public policies can reduce the 
cost of private sector R&D by 40 percent, which means that R&D spending 
in the private sector will increase at the same percentage rate of 40 percent, 
driving up GDP by 5 percent in the long run. In this sense, innovation-driven 
and wealth-driven models of government–market combination are able to shift 
regional government’s focus of management towards innovation-centered com-
petition in a holistic range of areas, including in notion, institution, organization 
and technology.
Research and development constitute the main driver of innovation, and 
the success of R&D depends on economic incentives and public policies. An 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) study shows that just a small amount of 
public support is able to yield returns on R&D investment. For instance, given 
domestic spillovers, spending 0.4 percent of GDP on R&D as fiscal support is 
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able to boost GDP growth by 5 percent in the long term. The importance of 
catch-up growth (also known as compensatory growth) for emerging economies 
like China, South Korea and Singapore cannot be overstated, and the application 
of foreign technologies is a key to promoting such growth. Globally, an increase 
of R&D spending can lead to growth of global GDP by about 8 percent in the 
long run. With international factors taken into account, the cost of fiscal support 
for R&D will only account for 0.5 percent of global GDP, and the returns 
yielded by such support will rise proportionally to the rise of fiscal spending, 
eventually resulting in an 8 percent increase of global GDP. Therefore, innova-
tion by regional government is of critical importance for economic growth. In 
this connection, the possibility of public–private partnership can be explored to 
propel innovation-driven growth.
In addition, regional government needs to design and implement a pro-
innovation regional system. A case in point is the so-called patent box system 
instituted and implemented in a small number of countries, which has served to 
directly incentivize R&D by deducting patent-income tax burdens on companies.
Another thing of note is that when it comes to innovation, regional govern-
ment should pay special attention to start-up enterprises, which generate a 
disproportionate share of transformational innovations. In this sense, putting in 
place efficient processes for the founding, growth and exit of start-up enterprises 
has a strong bearing on the success of innovation. Government should set up a 
series of pro-innovation processes to tear down barriers on various levels, such 
as the issuance of licenses and permits, oversight over the employment market, 
and financial restrictions and taxation. On top of that, government can render 
immense support in terms of offsetting taxable losses, streamlining taxation 
rules and alleviating enterprises’ compliance burdens. The government–market 
combination model in the innovation-driven and wealth-driven stages is a major 
driver for improving people’s lives and achieving long-term prosperity. It is an 
optimal combination model consisting of strong effective government and a 
strong efficient market.
A review of the economic development around the world reveals that if the 
relationship between government and market is defined by the use of oversimpli-
fied terms like “strong” and “weak”, then more often than not, what we see 
in real life are combinations either between “strong government” and “strong 
market” or between “weak government” and “weak market”. Never has the 
combination between “weak government” and “strong market” been observed. 
Therefore, neither government nor market can be weakened in a modern market 
economy. The crux of the matter is to rightly position the roles of government 
and market. A modern market economy cannot function efficiently without an 
effective government, in the sense that government power is needed for defining 
and protecting property rights, establishing and maintaining a level playing field, 
expanding market systems, guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts, curtailing 
monopoly and curbing malicious competition. The market is remotely likely to 
function properly in the absence of these conditions. Moreover, an effective 
government is a stabilizer and a boost for the market to play out its function. 
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Specifically, an effective government can bring its role into play in a long list of 
things, from providing public services of all kinds, narrowing down the gaps in 
income and development and protecting the eco-system to exercising macro-
economic regulation and devising medium and long-term plans for development. 
Government functions in these areas are able to remedy market defects and 
bring about harmonious development that balances efficiency against equality. 
Having said that, if government deviates from this direction, overextends its 
hand at things and even attempts to replace a market-based mechanism with 
a centrally planned mechanism, then government is definitely going to badly 
hurt and weaken the market.
5.4  Connotations of and standards for an effective 
government and an efficient market
No mature theory of modern market economy can come into existence without 
an adequately developed market economy. The adequate development of market 
economy in the world today has brought forth a variety of modes of market 
economy. Whether it is the American or British mode of market economy with 
regulations, the French mode of market economy with plans, the German 
mode of social market economy, the northern European mode of welfarism 
or China’s socialist market economic system, they are without exception the 
result of continuous trials and explorations in the effective pairing of market 
and government.
Apparently, current theoretical researches and practical explorations should 
be a clear departure from traditional economics in terms of how to demar-
cate market competition entities and how to define and position the role of 
government; this is especially the case considering the fact that competition 
between governments is on the rise, governments are undertaking planning 
and foresighted regulation of market and enterprises, government behaviors are 
going beyond simple macro-level regulation and governments are setting targets 
beyond securing steady growth of GDP. Against this backdrop, clear answers 
are urgently needed to such questions as what an effective government is and 
how to define and devise the standards for an efficient market.
5.4.1  Connotations of and standards for efficient market
5.4.1.1  Market as the decisive force for resource allocation
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations produced immediate implications for west-
ern economic theories, implications that over time proved to be profound and 
long-lasting. As Adam Smith puts it in his book, the perfect marriage between 
the utility-seeking economic entities and the “invisible hand” generates a wealth-
creating force, strong and powerful enough to drive economic development 
and social evolution and, ultimately, to contribute to the emergence of a new 
economic modality. As a tool for resource allocation, the price mechanism, once 
176 Effective government and efficient market
employed, has proven its phenomenal power in improving efficiency, optimizing 
economic structure and driving the evolution of economic modalities.
In essence, economic development lies in enhancing the efficiency of scarce 
resources allocation, which means reaping the maximum possible amount of 
economic benefits at the minimum possible cost of resource usage. Economists 
who have come after Adam Smith, either professedly western economic theorists 
or believers of Marxist political economy, have acknowledged, almost without 
exception, the incomparably powerful strengths and efficiency of the market 
economy in allocating resources. In practice, the economic growth performances 
(in terms of both growth speed and results) of nations the world over have 
proved that the market is the most efficient tool for resource allocation. As a 
result, a consensus has already been reached among economic theorists and 
over a long process of national policy practice, which is that the market, as a 
general rule in a market economy, is the decisive force for resource allocation 
and that a market economy, in its nature, is an economy where the market plays 
a decisive role in allocating resources.
5.4.1.2  Connotations of and standards for efficient market
An efficient market is defined as one with fully-fledged basic functions (including 
a market element system and a market organizational system), a well-established 
basic order (consisting of a market legal system and a market supervisory system) 
and a sound and vibrant market climate (encompassing a social credit system 
and a market infrastructure system). The efficiency of a market is measured 
and gauged by how well these six functional systems perform and is reflected 
in how integrated and synergized these three elements are, namely, production 
competition, market fairness and orderly business operation. The efficiency of 
an efficient market can be measured and tested against the following three 
standards – full market competition, orderly law-based supervision and a fully-
fledged social credit system.
5.4.1.3  The indication of strong efficient market
5.4.1.3.1  IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS: TRADING 
GAINS AND EFFICIENCY OF PRICE MECHANISMS
In economics, the optimal allocation of resources is described with the use of 
the term “Pareto optimality” (also known as Pareto efficiency), which defines 
a state of resource allocation as “Pareto efficient” or “Pareto optimal” when 
it reaches Pareto optimum (no further Pareto improvements can be made). 
In general, conditions in the following three aspects have to be met for an 
allocation to achieve a Pareto efficient outcome: first, optimal conditions for 
exchange; second, optimal conditions for production; third, optimal conditions 
for exchange–production ratio. Although it is just a theoretical concept, “Pareto 
optimality” implies a crucial prerequisite – a market mechanism, free from 
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external interventions; only in the existence of effective price adjustment can 
such an outcome be realized.
How do price mechanisms contribute to the efficient production and allocation 
of resources? First, labor division enhances the efficiency of resource production. 
Market transaction changed the traditional structure of a natural economy, and 
production activities not purely for the purpose of self-consumption emerged 
as a consequence. As the sphere of market expanded, labor division was made 
possible and feasible, which in turn served to push forward the market bound-
ary as it was proven effective in increasing production efficiency and reducing 
production costs. Thus, it is fair to say that labor division and price mechanisms 
develop hand in hand through a process of mutual interaction and converge to 
improve working efficiency and expand market sphere.
Labor division contributes extraordinarily to the improvement of working 
efficiency. The strengths of the division of labor are well captured and elaborated 
by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. First, the division of labor enables a 
worker to repetitively complete a single operation and to increase labor skills 
and working efficiency in consequence of such repetition. In other words, a 
worker is able to improve his working efficiency through on-the-job learning 
and specialized laboring, a result most visibly observed and noticed in sectors 
that have a steep and precipitous learning curve. Second, the division of labor 
makes it possible to reduce time loss due to the change of work. Third, the 
division of labor helps to simplify labor and enables workers to focus their 
attention on a specific target, which is conducive to the creation of new tools 
and the improvement of equipment. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith also cited 
the example of pin-making to make a convincing case for how the division of 
labor contributes to increasing productivity. What Smith expounded in his book 
started a profound transformation of production relations in human history.
Second, price mechanisms help to achieve efficient resource allocation. A 
price mechanism serves to build up media and bridges that facilitate market 
transaction, making transaction the most important means for resource alloca-
tion. Although the division of labor is able to push forward and extend the 
production-possibility frontier (PPF) by increasing production efficiency, there is 
nothing it can do to facilitate the realization of the optimal resource allocation 
outcome. As subjective assessments on different products may vary from one 
demand side to another, an act of resource allocation is considered as achieving 
an efficient outcome only when it is able to distribute a product to whoever 
needs it the most. It is in this regard that a price mechanism is able to bring 
its role into full play. As the extent of trading expands, free markets spring up 
around the globe, in which both the buyer and the seller are able to benefit 
from free choices.
On the basis of how free exchange served to improve resource allocation, 
David Ricardo put forth his comparative advantage theory for international trade, 
emphasizing that international trade was based on relative differences (rather 
than absolute differences) in production technologies and on the differences in 
comparative costs arising therefrom. Ricardo thereby argued that both sides with 
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differential production costs would benefit from trading with each other. Ricardo 
also suggested that each country should, in line with the principle of choosing 
the lesser of two evils and the better of two goods, focus on producing and 
exporting that which it has a comparative advantage in producing and import 
that which it has a comparative disadvantage in producing. The comparative 
advantage theory for trade, in a more common sense, helps to explain the 
foundation on which trading activities take place and the gains arising therefrom, 
and therefore the proposition of the comparative advantage theory marks a giant 
step for developing the absolute advantage theory for trade.
5.4.1.3.2  OPTIMIZATION OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SIGNIFICANCE 
OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER AND MARKET BEHAVIOR
Although it is true that the division of labor and the allocation of products to 
those who need them most can increase economic efficiency, such an increase 
in economic efficiency can be realized either through a price mechanism or 
through a central-planning mechanism. Under a central-planning mechanism, 
the division of labor can be realized by means of centrally planned deployment 
and the allocation of resources can be achieved through central rationing. Nev-
ertheless, a price mechanism has two distinct advantages over a central-planning 
mechanism, which have been clearly demonstrated and verified in both economic 
theories and economic practice.
First, supply and demand serves as the optimal information transmission 
mechanism. Here, mainstream economics assumes that every economic entity 
is a utility-seeker and a rational subject and that such utility and rationality 
will automatically and spontaneously adjust to achieve optimal allocation of 
resources, which Friedrich August Hayek called “spontaneous order”. As 
the extent of the market is vast, information available within the market is 
as multifarious as it is disorderly, and therefore no one central institution is 
able to have a total grasp of all minute details of the constantly changing 
information. As such, a system for labor division and resource allocation that 
is centered on spontaneous market order is apparently better than one based 
on central planning.
Second, there should be a democratic order for the distribution of knowl-
edge and free decision-making. Hayek, an eminent economist, pointed out 
that in contrast to a centrally planned economy, a free market economy is 
more efficient and better-ordered. Hayek introduced the concept of “local 
knowledge” to make his case for the “spontaneous order” process. Such 
local knowledge is possessed and grasped only in the hands of individual 
actors. The most striking examples are personally favored choices, a type of 
knowledge that is only controlled by the individual actors who make the 
choices and thus unavoidably exists outside the awareness of others. Such 
“favored knowledge” is dispersed and constantly changing, the existence of 
which cannot be totally understandable or perceivable to any single central 
authority. With the market bestowing the freedom to choose on every 
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individual actor, these individual actors make their choices spontaneously, 
which eventually converge to form a catalyst for the spontaneous adjustment 
of the entire economy.
Hayek believed that the emergence of social order is not a result of rational 
designing by individual actors or groups, nor is social order controlled by 
some transcendental power; rather, the emergence of social order is more 
possibly a result of self-adaptation and self-evolution. The spontaneous order 
theory provides a set of legitimate grounds for individual freedom and lim-
ited government. Given that individual actors enjoy naturally endowed and 
inalienable freedom in a spontaneous order, a government should not deprive 
individual actors of such freedom by use of authority and power, much less 
replace the naturally free order with a humanly designed dictatorial order 
and substitute a mandatory planned economy for a free market economy. 
In this connection, the extent and method of government action should 
be strictly restricted by law, as should the size of government; the power 
of government should be separated to the point where checks and balances 
are achieved. Therefore, the spontaneous order theory of the conservatives 
is one that delves into the relation between individual freedom and limited 
government.
5.4.1.3.3  EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC MODALITIES: RATIONAL CHOICE AND 
“SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST” UNDER MARKET MECHANISMS
Mainstream economics is founded on the assumption of individual behaviors 
being a result of rational choice. Such an assumption has remained fundamen-
tally unchanged, in spite of its repeated subjection to questioning and criticism 
by a number of scholars. The case that many economists have made for the 
rational choice assumption is that a market economy has a powerful function of 
purification, which is able to improve market environment by pushing irrational 
individual actors out of the market. Such an attribute of self-improving evolu-
tion, as these economists argue, is exactly what has been found lacking in a 
centrally planned economy.
5.4.1.4  The trial-and-error process on the market
In market transactions, unqualified participants (be they buyers or suppliers) 
will be phased out through price competition, while individual actors who 
make rational choices in observance with market rules will be rewarded. 
It is true that economic paradigms like rational choice and choice maxi-
mization are subject to criticism by scholars in both economics (such as 
Herbert Simon) and psychology (such as Daniel Kahneman), who believe 
that people have neither the abilities nor the conditions for maximizing their 
choices. Notwithstanding, even if the prerequisite governing human rational 
decision-making is stretched to its maximum limit, the decisions made by 
individual actors, however irrational they may be, will always be rational at 
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the end of the day, as long as the market mechanism functions well. This is 
because at a microscopic level, decisions made by individual actors will be 
put to test through trials and errors, and decisions proven “correct” in the 
process of natural selection will be kept and emulated by other actors. The 
trial-and-error action is not without its costs, and therefore, when it comes 
to well-established economic rules and business experience already proven 
successful, a late-comer (whether an enterprise or a nation) can improve its 
decision-making by opting for interventional measures.
5.4.1.5  The role of customs and norms
Even if all participants in a market transaction are rational actors, they may still 
find themselves trapped in a dilemma borne out of rational choices; this is called 
the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory terms. The prisoner’s dilemma explains 
why and how two parties in a market transaction end up with reduced mutual 
benefits when both are in a relentless pursuit of maximizing their individual 
choices. Table5.2 shows the end results derived from both parties adopting a 
“tit for tat” strategy. As indicated in the chart, when both parties, guided by the 
“tit for tat” strategy, make transactions with each other on multiple occasions, 
a self-healing mechanism emerges. Once adopting the “tit for tat” strategy 
becomes the predominant norm in a market, favorable behavioral customs and 
norms, which are tacitly agreed upon by both parties, will occur, resulting in a 
quantum leap in transaction efficiency.
5.4.1.6  The role of reputation
Cooperative behaviors in the market occur as a consequence of two parties 
repetitively gaming with each other. In a prisoner’s dilemma with no repeti-
tive transaction behaviors, participants in the game (which involves multiple 
participants) can examine and find out which participant(s) is (are) reputable 
by relying on certain information screening tools. Once a participant in 
the market is identified to have conducted deceptive behaviors, all of the 
undeceived participants in the market will downgrade their credibility rating 
of the deceiving participant and will consequently limit the possibility of 
making transactions with the deceiving participant. Over time, the participants 
with low reputation and credibility ratings (due to the fact that they have 
conducted deceptive behaviors) will be pushed out of the market. In this 
sense, market reputation is an elimination mechanism that rewards repetitive 
honest behaviors and punishes deceptive behaviors based on the “tit for tat” 
customs. Of course, under changed conditions of the game, in a market where 
full-fledged economic customs and norms are yet to be established and where 
repetitive transactions rarely occur, behaviors of an opportunistic nature may 
crop up from time to time. Nevertheless, by no means will such opportunistic 
behaviors inhibit the market from driving economic development forward as 
an evolutionary force.
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5.4.2  Connotations of and standards for effective government
5.4.2.1  Connotations of effective government
A government cannot be defined as being effective unless it is able to meet 
all of the following three criteria: first, being capable of efficiently allocating 
“non-operational resources” with well-designed supplementary policies, in a way 
that enhances social harmony and stability and optimizes economic environ-
ment; second, being able to efficiently allocate “operational resources” with 
feasible supplementary policies, in a way that guarantees openness, fairness and 
justice in the market and boosts overall social productivity; and third, being 
able to efficiently allocate “quasi-operational resources” and engage in market 
competition, in a way that promotes urban construction and all-round sustain-
able socio-economic development. The effectiveness of an effective government 
lies in its competent performances in the allocation of these three categories 
of resources and in its ability to successfully align policy-making with resource 
allocation and objective realization.
5.4.2.2  Standards for effective government
STANDARD ONE: A STRONG GOVERNMENT SHOULD RESPECT  
MARKET LAWS AND OBSERVE MARKET RULES.
First, it should respect the laws of the market. A strong effective government will 
bring into full play its role in economic positioning, economic adjustment and 
early warning; tap into market rules and mechanisms; leverage the instruments 
of investment, consumption, export, pricing, taxation, interest rates, exchange 
rates, policies and laws; and foster institutional, organizational, technical and 
notional innovation. A strong efficient market and a strong effective government 
are not in a mutually replaceable relation. A strong efficient market and a strong 
effective government do not mean that the two will struggle for their respective 
roles and positions in the same realm and dimension. Instead, they have their 
respective roles to play and they somewhat differ from each other in terms of 
the scope and level where they play out their roles and the way they function. 
A strong effective government and a strong efficient market should play out 
their respective roles, maintain their respective strengths and complement each 
other in the allocation of three different types of resources.
Second, a strong effective government should observe the rules of the market. 
A strong government will rely on market economic bases, mechanisms and rules 
to exercise foresighted leading over economic activities. In other words, a strong 
effective government will make the most of its visible hand to make up for the 
blanks and margins left by the invisible hand so as to redress market failures. This 
function of a strong effective government is mainly reflected in the following 
aspects: regulating and supporting operational resources to improve productivity; 
improving and perfecting non-operational resources to boost their optimization 
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and development; and tapping and injecting innovation into quasi-operational 
resources to synergize regional sustainable development.
STANDARD TWO: A STRONG EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT SHOULD  
SAFEGUARD ECONOMIC ORDER AND STABILIZE ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT.
A strong effective government is a guardian of the six element systems that 
underpin a modern market economy – a market cannot run efficiently without a 
strong government enforcing laws and exercising regulation through the alloca-
tion of non-operational resources; market environment and infrastructure (such 
as market credit) cannot be perfected without a strong government undertaking 
to effectively allocate non-operational resources. In this sense, for a strong market 
to properly bring its role to bear, it is imperative for it to be matched with a 
government that is strong and effective enough to do whatever the market is 
unable to do and fails to do well. Thus, a strong government should be one 
that is able to safeguard economic order and stabilize economic development.
STANDARD THREE: A STRONG GOVERNMENT SHOULD EFFECTIVELY ALLOCATE 
RESOURCES AND PROACTIVELY PARTAKE IN MARKET COMPETITION.
Given that regional governments are the subject of mezzo-economic research, 
competition between regional governments may correct government misconduct 
and reduce government malfunction. Any given regional government, if it aspires 
to make itself strong and powerful, will have to depend on competition for the 
increase of efficiency of resource allocation. Such competition may help avoid 
such defects as are incurred by government interventionism, e.g. monopoly, 
bureaucracy, low efficiency and waste. In order to win in such competition, a 
regional government must regulate and monitor government behaviors through 
foresighted pre-process regulation so as to prevent possible government failures, 
reduce government malfunction, keep the cost of remedying economy to the 
minimum, and enhance its regional competitiveness.
5.4.2.3  Three conditions for government to be effective
In reality, a government should, at the very least, fulfill the following three 
conditions for it to be defined as being effective.
First, be able to keep abreast of the times, which refers to the critical impor-
tance of government getting ahead of the technology curve in this specific case. 
New businesses, new industries, new resources and new instruments, derived 
from the leaps-and-bounds development of science and technology, are sending 
shock waves across the existing government managerial apparatus. While being 
capable of stimulating demand and boosting efficiency in productive and living 
activities, new technologies also generate an onslaught of new problems (most 
notably the application of big data) that beset governments in their exercise of 
Effective government and efficient market 183
administrative authority and power, making it difficult or even impossible for 
governments to make decisions on a whim. Governments need to constantly 
renew and regenerate their ideas, policies and measures in a way that reflects 
the trends of the times if they truly aspire to make a significant difference in 
economic growth, urban construction and social welfare or in the allocation of 
non-operational resources, operational resources and quasi-operational resources.
Second, be able to compete in all dimensions, which requires governments 
to play a foresighted leading role and to compete in all productive factors and 
in all realms, thoroughly and systematically, by fostering innovation in notion, 
institution, organization and technology. Competition in this sense spans across 
social welfare undertakings (for optimizing the distribution of public goods and 
effectively enhancing socio-economic environment), continues throughout the 
process of economic growth (by way of leading, supporting, regulating and 
adjusting market entities and for effectively boosting productivity) and involves 
all aspects of urban construction (by following the rules of the market and 
engaging in project development). Competition in this regard is based on the 
production of goods and entrepreneurial activities, but is by no means confined 
to the realm of good production in the traditional sense. Rather, it covers all 
processes required to accomplish the all-dimensional and sustainable development 
of a nation’s economy, including objective designing, policy-making, pathway 
charting and ultimate outcome delivering.
Third, be able to make government affairs public and transparent, such as 
in decision-making, policy enforcement, management, administrative services, 
policy outcomes and key-area information release. Fostering openness and 
transparency in government affairs enables people from all quarters of the society 
to fully exercise their rights to know the truths, to participate, to express their 
views and to supervise the government. It is also conducive to achieving optimal 
allocation of resources for robust economic growth, fruitful urban construction 
and better social welfare. A government that is competent, transparent, ruled 
by law, innovation-focused, service-oriented, clean and honest is what it takes 
to release the gushing vitality and creativity of the market for the benefits of 
its people and even the entirety of humanity.
5.4.2.4  The functional positioning of effective government
5.4.2.4.1  FUNCTIONAL POSITIONING IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
First, in the allocation of non-operational resources. In economic terms, public 
goods are referred to as “non-rivalrous” and “non-excludable” goods. National 
defense, diplomacy, legislation, judicature, public security, environmental pro-
tection, industrial and commercial administration and other public services 
provided by administrative departments can all be considered non-operational 
resources, which do not change in availability and quality as a result of their 
being enjoyed and consumed by more or fewer individuals in a certain period 
of time. Non-excludability means that any form of non-operational resources 
184 Effective government and efficient market
cannot be possessed and used by any individual to the exclusion of others and 
that it is financially costly and practically impossible to exclude any individual 
from consuming and enjoying the resources. For instance, by reducing air and 
noise pollution, environmental protection efforts contribute to the increase of 
public goods in a certain district, such as fresher air and a quieter environment. 
Technically, it is impossible to exclude a specific individual of that district from 
enjoying the fresh air and quiet environment. Given that rivalry may lead to a 
lack of market demand and non-excludability makes it impossible for any form 
of non-operational resources to be enjoyed exclusively by any specific individual, 
a market-based economy appears to be powerless in resolving problems pertain-
ing to non-operational resource allocation. It is naturally incumbent upon the 
government to properly allocate non-operational resources. A government’s 
gross incompetence in the allocation of non-operational resources is likely to 
cause an insufficiency of merit goods and a rampancy of demerit goods, such 
as in the form of public pollution.
Second, in the allocation of quasi-operational resources. The allocation of 
quasi-operational resources is where the resource-allocating roles of market and 
government intersect. Therefore, a strong effective government should naturally 
undertake the task of allocating quasi-operational resources under the premise of 
respecting market laws. Transaction costs can serve as a watershed line between 
market and government when it comes to the allocation of quasi-operational 
resources. Market transaction is able to facilitate the effective allocation of 
resources, but not without generating its cost. The cost that impedes the 
efficiency of a market transaction is called transaction cost, an economic term 
coined in 1937 by Ronald Coase, the founder of new institutional economics. 
Once a powerful individual actor exerts control over quasi-operational resources 
that have a significant bearing on national economy and people’s livelihoods, 
such as land, roads, mineral resources and energy, then that individual actor 
is in a position to perform a hold-up behavior against the general public by 
taking advantage of public dependency on such resources, damaging the price 
allocative efficiency by doing so. Held sway by rationality, a corporate entity and 
an individual person are efficiency-geared and result-oriented, and therefore are 
incapable of fundamentally resolving the hold-up problems caused by exclusive 
dependency. Based on the above analysis, a state is in a position to play a crucial 
role in allocating quasi-operational resources.
5.4.2.4.2  FUNCTIONAL POSITIONING IN PROJECT INVESTMENT
In a fully competitive market, as resources are transferred and allocated 
via the price mechanism, optimal allocation of resources can be achieved 
without any external intervention. Under such circumstances, it is viable 
for corporations to make efficient investment decisions based solely on 
price signals. However, the following factors may reduce the efficiency 
of market investment, and they include the monopoly factor, the group 
irrationality factor, the information asymmetry factor and the public good 
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factor. Given the presence of these factors, government investment appears 
to be extremely necessary.
The first is direct government investment in high-risk sectors. For example, 
a scientific research project on high and new technology is akin to a complex 
social undertaking, so technology-intensive, capital-intensive and risk-intensive 
that it is often beyond the capacity of any enterprise or individual to assume. 
Therefore, government efforts in investment, management and coordination are 
needed to advance the industrialization of high and new technologies. Govern-
ments across the world make it a government priority to support and develop 
the high-tech industry and have, by and large, institutionalized and legalized 
investment in high-tech projects, via the following approaches: formulating 
policy and institutional incentives for investment and R&D in high technology; 
encouraging high-caliber personnel mobility and technical exchanges; providing 
stable distributional markets for the high-tech industry; and reducing social risks 
pertaining to high-tech R&D. Real practice shows that government investment 
in high-risk sectors plays a visibly significant part in speeding up the growth of 
the high-tech industry.
The second is direct government investment in public goods, such as education 
and national defense. Education and national defense are critically important 
for the development of any region, but investment in such areas is unlikely to 
generate profits for private investors. Given the failure of market mechanisms 
in addressing problems related to public goods, a regional government should 
undertake direct investment in public goods, including in various kinds of public 
education institutes, libraries, compulsory educational systems, free training 
activities and activities designed to popularize and promote knowledge. National 
defense bears critically on the security of a region but often involves a large pool 
of technology and an astronomical sum of investment. Thus, national defense 
is another high-priority area for government direct investment, in addition to 
education.
The third is direct government investment in the establishment of sound 
market ecology. For instance, the government is duty-bound to take on problems 
caused by information asymmetry problems. As a third party with authority, 
the government is in a position to reduce the level of group irrationality and 
improve a market’s operating efficiency by stringently verifying market informa-
tion, releasing authoritative information and imposing administrative penalties 
on opportunists seeking to profit from information asymmetry.
The fourth is direct government investment in social risk protection. On top 
of investing in high-risk projects in the realm of high and new technology, a 
government is also duty-bound to offer to its people protection against social 
uncertainties and risks, because it is virtually impossible to either calculate the 
probabilities of uncertainties or predict what harm unexpected and uncertain 
factors might cause to society. It is not financially feasible for corporations to 
offer protection against uncertain and unforeseeable events; nor is it viable and 
practical to employ market-based insurance policies as a form of protection against 
such harm. Under such circumstances, it becomes all the more necessary for the 
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government to provide to the society insurance against uncertain and unexpected 
factors, such as in the form of relief and assistance efforts against earthquakes, 
floods and other natural disasters. In this connection, a government can take 
the initiative to create insurance companies and venture capital institutions for 
the purpose of lowering social risks. Financial resources needed for investment 
in this regard can come from both the public and private sectors.
The fifth is government investment and the multiplier effect. By increasing 
spending for both public consumption and investment, a government is able to 
redress the lack of effective demand, bring down unemployment and achieve 
stable economic growth. Government spending can set in motion a chain reac-
tion of multiplication, meaning that a sum of government spending is able to 
generate a massive income several times larger than the sum of spending itself. 
This phenomenon is economically called the “multiplier effect”. According to 
the “multiplier effect”, when total investment increases, the income generated 
will be larger than the investment increment value by a factor of K, eventually 
leading to a growth in national wealth.
5.4.2.4.3  FUNCTIONAL POSITIONING IN MARKET REGULATION
Tax system and supply Although taxation is a primary source of government 
fiscal revenue, how a tax system is formulated not only determines how much 
fiscal revenue government can earn but also has a predominant impact on how 
efficiently the market is able to operate. Supply-side economics holds excessively 
high social costs to be the primary cause of economic crises, arguing that to 
improve the supply side of the economy, it is necessary to reduce the costs borne 
by corporations and individuals to engage in the market, which, in concrete terms, 
means that cuts in taxes and fees should be implemented to boost economic 
growth. In this connection, the formulation of tax systems is a crucial area for 
regional competition, where the importance for government to play out its role 
becomes the most pronounced.
The development of a property rights system As far as a market economy 
is concerned, defining and protecting property rights constitutes the primary 
responsibility of government and the prerequisite to building a well-functioning 
market mechanism. A property rights system consists of a set of rules devised 
through government authority, which governs how property rights are classified, 
defined, protected and exercised. In 1960, Ronald Coase emphatically stressed 
that the responsibility of dealing with property rights–related ambiguities 
and controversies fell to the government. As far as Ronald Coase saw it, it 
was incumbent upon the government to unequivocally define property rights 
by exercising its authority. Coase argued that once property rights were well 
defined, then the market would be able to reach its optimally efficient state simply 
through internal trading. Meanwhile, it is also the unshakable responsibility of 
government to design and safeguard public property rights. Government should 
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serve as an agent for the general public when it comes to public property rights, 
with its power firmly based on voting and democratic procedures. Thus, a public 
decision-making information release system and an accountability system are 
important bricks and mortars for government institutional building.
Currencies and the development of a national credit system One of the most 
important aspects of national credit lies in it being able to substitute precious 
metal as a new medium of exchanges. By endorsing the credibility of its currency 
by use of its authority, a government can ensure the reliability of its currency for 
market transactions and, at the same time, lower the transaction costs arising out 
of distrust between transaction parties, leading to a boost in transaction efficiency. 
National credit can also be used to raise public funds for the advancement of 
infrastructural development. For instance, China’s national credit has been 
shaped and formed mainly through the issuance of national bonds, state treasury 
bonds and special bonds and through bank overdraft or bank lending. It is a 
type of credit either acquired by the state as a debtor or provided by the state 
as a creditor. National credit is a special kind of resource, and the government 
has a special privilege in controlling and allocating it. A good government with 
accountability shall never abuse its national credit. Instead, a good government 
will capitalize on its national credit to leverage funds for the following objectives: 
bolstering public infrastructure development, securing steady economic growth, 
maintaining social equity, providing to its people more public goods and services 
and creating a harmonious and peaceful social environment. National credit is 
usually protected by national laws.
The protection and expansion of international trade The theory of free trade 
between sovereign states is based on David Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantages, which suggests that the foundation for international trade and 
specialization is built not just on absolute cost differences but also on comparative 
advantages between states. However, comparative advantage arises from 
international trade on an equal footing, which is almost impossible to be realized 
since trade between states at different developmental stages is not totally equal. In 
response to an unequal order of international trade, some economically backward 
states have put forth their versions of economic intervention theories, which 
are designed to serve their overarching objective of establishing a fully-fledged 
industry system and boosting the competitiveness of their domestic industries. 
The following are some of the striking theories on economic intervention.
First, the theory of protecting infant industries arose against the backdrop 
of unequal trade between leading nations and late-blooming nations. During 
the first industrial revolution, advanced industrial nations like the UK staunchly 
advocated free trade, which directly resulted in national industries of some 
later-blooming nations bearing the brunt of the negative impacts of free trade. 
At that time, free trade served the interests of early industrialized nations, and 
therefore if the economically backward nations followed in the footsteps of 
their richer and more developed counterparts, then they could not but suffer 
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the fate of being reduced to a logging camp or a sheep farm of the UK and 
a subject of looting. Under such circumstances, Georg Friedrich List argued 
that as late-blooming nations moved towards becoming developed nations, they 
should implement protectionist policies to protect their domestic industries, just 
like the USA. and France had done, and that they could gradually revert to free 
trade after reaching a certain point of wealth and power.
Second, the strategic trade theory, initially put forth by Paul Krugman, sug-
gests that as returns to scale increase progressively, expanding production scales 
and achieving economies of scale are necessary steps for domestic industries 
and enterprises to boost their competitiveness on the international market. As 
a general rule, it is extremely difficult for an enterprise to expand its production 
scale solely by relying on its own efforts and strengths. It is even more so for 
economically backward countries. In this connection, the most effective way 
to scale production expansion is for the government to protect and support 
industries with promising development prospects and huge externalities, so that 
these selected industries can, in a short period of time, expand their production 
scales, lower production costs, bring trade advantages to the fore and boost 
competitiveness.
Third, some scholars in the evolutionary economic school put forth some 
suggestions on how late-blooming countries can upgrade their industries. 
The key points of their suggestions are as follows: (a) high-quality activities 
should be learning-centric, meaning that improvements on production sites, 
product designs and R&D can contribute to boosting the accumulation of 
knowledge and enhancing the quality of industrial activities; (b) learning 
should be a process that starts from what is simple and then transitions 
to what is complex, which means that enterprises of developing countries 
generally undergo a learning process from being an OEM (original equip-
ment manufacturer) and an ODM (original design manufacturer) to being 
an OBM (original brand manufacturer); (c) in order to help enterprises 
break path-dependency, government shall render support to enterprises for 
their efforts to seek high-quality learning and technological upgrading; 
and (d) given that learning activities are distributed differently in different 
industries, some industries are in no need of a large number of learning and 
upgrading activities, such as the industry of clothing production, while such 
activities are needed in some other industries, such as in precision instrument 
manufacturing and in auto manufacturing. Therefore, it is necessary for a 
government to render support to industries featuring a high concentration 
of high-quality learning activities.
Fourth, the key points of the theory of the advantages of backwardness 
are as follows: (a) by leveraging cutting-edge technologies already available, 
late-developing countries are able to position themselves at a high starting 
point and avoid the detours made by leading nations; (b) late-developing 
countries are able to leapfrog technological gaps and bring leading countries’ 
technologies, equipment and capital into their home markets. By so doing, 
late-developing countries can save time and money that otherwise would be 
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spent on research and development, develop a large pool of local talents and 
advance towards industrialization from a high starting point. Capital from 
leading countries can help late-developing countries redress the shortage of 
capital, which is a commonplace problem plaguing countries in the process 
of industrialization; (c) late-developing countries are able to learn and draw 
upon the successful experience of first-mover countries, and at the same 
time avoid making the same mistakes that first-mover countries have made. 
In this regard, the advantage of backwardness is most vividly manifested 
in the availability, diversity and creativeness of models that late-developing 
countries can pick and choose for achieving industrialization. Put another 
way, later-developing countries can learn from early developing countries 
their experience and lessons to avoid making detours, and by taking viable 
catch-up strategies, they are able to reduce the time length needed for 
completing primary industrialization and thus leapfrog into a higher stage 
of industrialization; and (d) relative backwardness can translate into strong 
social motivations for growth and development.
All in all, there is no need for government involvement if trade is conducted 
between countries with equal economic power; however, whenever there is 
trade between a first-mover country and a late-developing country, then the 
government of the first-mover country might have a motive to strengthen its 
first-mover advantages, while the government of the late-developing country 
might have an equally strong motive to harness the advantages of backwardness 
for leapfrog growth.
5.5  The dual-strong mechanism theory 
for mature market economies
A mature market economy is distinctively characteristic of the coexistence of 
a strong market and a strong government. A strong market means that the 
market has the primacy in determining resource allocation, that all decisions 
and actions for optimizing regional resource allocation shall be firmly premised 
on the rules of the market and that no market entity shall be allowed to do 
anything that might violate the rules of the market. In a nutshell, a strong 
market is categorically an efficient market. A strong government lays stress on 
being an effective and competent government within the boundaries of market 
rules, which is to say that a regional government should actively exercise its 
foresighted leading role in allocating three types of resources and in fostering 
innovation in institution, organization, management and technology. in addition, 
a regional government should become well prepared for undertaking market 
risks, making up for the deficiencies of the market, providing public goods and 
capitalizing on its region’s advantages of backwardness in international trade, 
so that a favorable environment is created to ensure the smooth running of the 
region’s market economy and the achievement of leapfrog economic growth. 
In this sense, in short, a dual-strong mechanism is the organic combination of 
an efficient market and an effective government.
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5.5.1  The Washington Consensus and the middle-income trap
In the late 1980s, faced with the world economic depression, real economy 
grew sluggishly, the momentum for economic growth was becoming insufficient, 
demand was slumping, the population growth rate was dropping, economic 
globalization was in turmoil, financial markets were in fluctuation and interna-
tional trade and investment were in a downturn. In 1989, John Williamson, 
an economist from the Institute for International Economics, an international 
economic think tank based in Washington, D.C., first presented the concept 
and name of the Washington Consensus, a set of ten economic policy prescrip-
tions considered as constituting the “standard” reform package promoted for 
crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington, D.C.–based institutions, 
such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the US Treasury 
Department. The ten broad sets of relatively specific policy recommendations are 
as follows: fiscal policy discipline, with avoidance of large fiscal deficits relative to 
GDP; redirection of public spending from subsidies (“especially indiscriminate 
subsidies”) toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services 
like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment; tax 
reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; 
interest rates that are market-determined and positive (but moderate) in real 
terms; competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization: liberalization of imports, 
with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, 
etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs; 
liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; privatization of state enter-
prises; deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer 
protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions; and legal 
security for property rights.
The core value of such policy recommendations is the minimization of govern-
ment’s role in the market, and rapid privatization and liberalization. Theoretically, 
it advocates the implementation of a completely free market economy model 
and minimizes the role of government. As long as the market can freely allocate 
resources, economic growth is achievable. These recommendations involve rapid 
liberalization of the market and domestic and foreign trade; rapid privatization 
of state-owned enterprises; and reduction of fiscal deficits and strict restric-
tions on loaning and currency issuing in order to stabilize macro-economy. 
The Washington Consensus aims at providing economic reform programs and 
countermeasures for debt-stricken Latin American countries and a political and 
economic theoretical basis for the transition of eastern European countries. 
In spite of their justifiability in stimulating economic development of those 
countries over certain periods, the ten policy recommendations overlooked the 
importance of constructing the market system from the above-mentioned six 
aspects, and more importantly the great value that government attaches to the 
three categories of resources, thus leading to the combination of “weak effective 
government” and “weak efficient market”; failure of government in playing a 
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role in regulating economic development; inadequacy in market development; 
absence of necessary legislation; market chaos; and the frequent failure of the 
competitive system of the market. Consequently, those policy recommendations 
did not prove to be sustainable and inevitably ended in predicaments.
The concept of “middle income trap”, which was introduced by the World 
Bank in 2006, specifically refers to the situation in which those middle-income 
economies, such as the newly emerging market economies – on their way to 
breaking through the “poverty trap” of per capita GDP of $1000 to develop 
into high-income countries – will soon enter into the “take-off” stage from US 
$1000 to US $3000 when their per capita GDP gets close to US $3000, thus 
causing a concentrated outbreak of the contradictions that have been accumu-
lating in their rapid development. Owing to the fact that the renewal of their 
own systems and mechanisms has reached a critical stage, the contradictions are 
difficult to overcome, which causes their economies to be trapped in economic 
downturn or stagnation, hence the “middle income trap”.
At this stage, the costs of resources, raw materials, labor, capital and man-
agement remain high, while cutting-edge core technology is hard to obtain, 
innovation becomes difficult and their industries stay at the low-end of the 
chain without competitiveness; this results in economic downturn or stagnation, 
unemployment, social and public service shortages, fragile financial systems, 
polarization of wealth, corruption, lack of faith, social turmoil and so on. It 
takes quite some time for these countries to get out of the middle-income stage 
and into the rank of high-income countries. Interestingly, those Latin American 
countries which have followed the Washington Consensus in their promoting 
economic reforms have become examples of the middle-income trap. In 1964, 
Argentina’s per capita GDP exceeded US $1000 and rose to over $8000 in 
the late 1990s, but it fell back to over 2000 in 2002, though it went back up 
to $12,873 in 2014. Mexico’s per capita GDP reached $1000 in 1973 and 
$10,718 in 2014, but remained just a little above the middle-income level 
after more than four decades. Similar examples are found elsewhere in Latin 
America, where quite a few countries, after two or three decades of repeated 
efforts, still failed to skip across the threshold of $15,000 for their entry into 
the rank of developed economies.
Let’s take Argentina, for example: its “lesion” analysis reaches the following 
conclusions. First, there has been a great deal of fluctuation in its economic 
growth rates. Between 1963 and 2008, it underwent 16 years of negative GDP 
growth, with an average annual GDP growth rate of only 1.4 percent. In 1963, 
its per capita GDP was US $842, located at the middle–high income level, 
but in 2008, it rose to only $8236, remaining at the same income level after 
45 years. Second, there has been a severe lack of momentum from innovation in 
science and technology. The proportion of R&D expenditure to its GDP in 
2003 was 0.41 percent, ranking 40th in the world; its R&D personnel accounted 
for only 1.1 per 1000 people in 2006; in terms of labor quality, its proportion 
of university graduates and above in its entire labor force was 29.5 percent in 
2007. Third, the polarization between the rich and the poor has been serious 
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and social contradictions have been prominent. Argentina’s Gini coefficient 
was about 0.45 in the mid-1980s, close to 0.50 in the late 1990s, and 0.51.
in 2007.Its income ratio was 40.9 percent, judging from 10 percent of the 
highest income class and 10 percent of the lowest income class, which shows 
that its unfair distribution is not only reflected in property income but also in 
wage grades. Moreover, urban infrastructure and public services have lagged 
far behind, social security has deteriorated and social contradictions have been 
outstanding. Finally, government administration has proved to be ineffective. 
There has been long-term macro-economic instability, fluctuations in exchange 
rates, high inflation, commonplace financial deficits, numerous problems with the 
supply side and weaknesses of legal means and economic instruments in terms 
of macro-economic management. To address these problems, government has 
taken stop-gap measures, which eventually resulted in socio-economic imbalance.
The Washington Consensus turned out to be a failed strategy, and its “shock 
therapy” has proved to be a failed policy. First, an efficient market is one with 
complete competition, orderly legal supervision and sound social credit. The 
Washington Consensus focused only on the competition and promotion of the 
basic functions of the market, i.e. the competition and promotion of the element 
system and the organization system, but overlooked the improvement of the basic 
order of the market, i.e. the legal system and the supervision system, as well as 
the development and improvement of the foundation of the market environment, 
including social credit systems and market infrastructure. Therefore, the market 
economy in the Washington Consensus is a free market economy rather than a 
modern market economy with sound systematic functions.
Second, an effective government is one that complies with market rules, 
maintains market order and participates in market competition. The Wash-
ington Consensus only recognizes the government’s protection and provision 
of non-operational resources, i.e. public goods, and completely ignores the 
government’s planning, guiding and supportive policies as well as policies con-
cerning the adjustment, supervision and management of operational resources, 
i.e. industrial resources, and enterprise competition. There is entire ignorance 
of national government’s promotion of the construction of quasi-operational 
resources, i.e. urban resource allocation, and its role in competition. Only 
those who have obtained policy support for the allocation of three types of 
resources and achieved tangible results are effective governments in the mature 
market economy. Therefore, its recommendation for deregulation is essentially 
anarchism, which appears feeble and lacking in strength in contrast with the 
theory of modern market economy that advocates the organic combination of 
effective government and efficient market.
Third, in order to ensure that the real economic growth rate gets close or 
equal to the potential rate, the primary task for government is to strengthen 
government capacity building, institutional arrangement and development and 
transformation of development modes, in addition to improvement upon the 
modern market system, which all turn out to be lacking in the Washington 
Consensus. Government capacity building includes compliance with the rules of 
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the market economy and government capabilities for the development of market 
economy and participation in the market competition. The institutional envi-
ronment construction includes market legislation, law enforcement, judicature 
and market legal education; the construction of regulatory bodies, supervision 
contents and supervision modes according to the requirements of the market 
economy; and the supervision of institutions, transactions, market, policies and 
regulations, as well as the amelioration of social and institutional norms for 
self-implemented reforms and development of administrative organizations. 
The development models should essentially shift from Adam Smith’s theory of 
market (the invisible hand) coupled with emphasis on supply (commodity, price, 
supply regulation) and Keynesian theory of government intervention coupled 
with emphasis on demand (investment, consumption, export, troika’s pull) to 
the theory of modern market economy, i.e. government leading (interven-
tion) coupled with focus on supply (the new structural engine for the supply 
side), that is, shifting to the model of effective government + efficient market. 
Government leading should have its part in the market economy on all rounds 
and in all dimensions.
5.5.2  The government and the market: a symbiotic and 
complementary relationship rather than one inversely 
proportional to the other
If the share of government spending in GDP is regarded as a striking indicator 
of the extent to which a government is involved in economic activities, then it 
is clear that in any country throughout modern history, as per capita income 
surges, this share rises as well. Such is the famous Wagner’s Law, a law that has 
predicted this upward sloping trend of the share of government spending in 
GDP rising continually in tandem with the increase of income per person. Take 
the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) as an 
example: an organization that consists mainly of developed countries. Among 
OECD countries, the average share of government spending in GDP stood at 
10.7 percent in the late nineteenth century, reached 18.7 percent in the 1920s, 
inched up to 22.8 percent in 1937, skyrocketed to 43.1 percent in 1980 and 
has remained flat-lined ever since. The share reaches over 50 percent in Nordic 
countries such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark. In spite of rising government 
interventions in OECD countries, their market systems are the strongest across 
the globe in terms of both development levels and competitiveness. What is 
particularly noteworthy is that even with government spending accounting for 
half of the GDP, northern European countries are way ahead of other OECD 
countries in terms of economic openness and labor market vibrancy. In northern 
European countries, each with a population of just several million people, there 
has emerged an array of globally leading multinational corporations that for 
years have topped the list of global competitiveness, such as Nokia, Erickson 
and Maersk. Singapore is another striking example in this regard. The share 
of government spending in GDP is not particularly high in Singapore, mainly 
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due to the forceful implementation of a housing provident fund system, but 
the Singaporean government has still managed to exert a powerful influence 
on the country’s economic growth and industrial upgrading, largely through 
fiscal policies and government-linked enterprises. As a result, the economy has 
undergone a long period of explosive growth, propelling Singapore into the 
ranks of the world’s most competitive countries.
In stark contrast to developed countries, the share of government spending in 
GDP is usually kept somewhere near or at 20 percent in developing countries. 
The share is at an even lower level in some Sub-Saharan countries. With this 
share kept at such a low level, the governments in these countries often find it 
difficult to maintain public order and develop a national market. If the relationship 
between government and market is defined by the use of oversimplified terms 
like “strong” and “weak”, then more often than not, what we see in real life 
are combinations either of strong government and strong market or of weak 
government and weak market. Never have we observed the combination of 
weak government and strong market. As such, it is of critical importance that 
we delve into the complicated relationship between government and market, 
rather than just scratch its surface.
First of all, there is no government that does not play a role in any modern 
market economy, and a market economy without a government playing a role 
definitely goes against modern market economic philosophies. Nevertheless, it 
does not necessarily mean that an economy with a government playing a role 
is a modern market economy. The crux of the matter is what kind of a role a 
government plays and how the government plays its role in the economy. Second, 
an efficient market cannot function without an effective government, in the sense 
that government power is needed for defining and protecting property rights, 
establishing and maintaining a level playing field, expanding market systems, 
guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts, curtailing monopoly and curbing 
malicious competition. The market is remotely likely to function properly in the 
absence of these conditions. Third, an effective government is a stabilizer and a 
boost for a market to play out its function. Specifically, an effective government 
can bring its role to play in a long list of things, from providing public services 
of all kinds, narrowing the gaps in income and development and protecting 
the eco-system to exercising macro-economic regulation and devising medium 
and long-term plans for development. Government functions in these areas are 
able to remedy market defects and bring about harmonious development that 
balances efficiency against equality. Fourth, despite the above-mentioned func-
tions, if a government deviates from this central task, overextends its hand at 
things and even attempts to replace a market-based mechanism with a centrally 
planned mechanism, then the government, though seemingly very strong, is 
definitely going to badly hurt and weaken the market. In the last analysis, a 
modern market economy must be built on the basis of a dual-strong mechanism 
featuring a strong effective government and a strong efficient market. Put another 
way, there is definitely a strong and righteous government behind a strong and 
well-functioning market economy.
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5.5.3  Demarcation and analysis of strong government 
and strong market in resource allocation
The government–market relationship is both contradictory and complementary 
in that on one hand, an overwhelmingly powerful government, such as in a 
centrally planned economy, will disrupt market fairness and efficiency; on the 
other hand, the market force, if left unchecked and unregulated, will sometimes 
cause insufficient supplies of public goods and lead some people to relentlessly 
pursue short-term benefits, which might eventually result in irrational group 
mentality and the rampancy of underground shadow marketplaces. Then to what 
extent can government intervention be deemed as being ideal for economic 
operation?
5.5.3.1  Government-led resource allocation and  
price-based resource allocation
It is mainly regarding non-operational resources and quasi-operational resources 
that a government undertakes its resource allocation tasks. A government allo-
cates non-operational resources by exercising its authority as an agent of public 
will, which means that a government can assign and distribute resources by 
issuing executive orders. As to quasi-operational resources, a government often 
adopts the 3-P mode for allocating them. Under the 3-P mode, the govern-
ment and the business sector (both non-profit and profit-making) can establish 
cooperative relationships in a way that enables different parties to bring their 
respective strengths to bear for achieving win–win outcomes.
The market distributes and allocates operational resources with the use of the 
price instrument, which means that by emitting and transmitting different price 
signals, the market constantly assesses the value of resources of all kinds and 
guides the proper configuration of resources among market entities. Price-based 
resource allocation is achieved by balancing supply against demand: when the 
price is high, supply will increase, while demand will decline; when the price 
is low, supply will decrease, while demand will rise. Ultimately, the price will 
stabilize at an equilibrium point between supply and demand, enabling resource 
allocation to be completed. When it comes to “quasi-operational resources”, it 
is true that a government can decide whether to partake in allocating them or 
not in response to the price signals emitted by the market, for quasi-operational 
resources are not as strongly excludable and rivalrous in nature as operational 
resources. However, incentives and instructions from the government in the 
form of policy support are often needed, given the lack of motivation for market 
entities to allocate such resources.
When it comes to the demarcation between an effective government and an 
efficient market in resource allocation, the critical and difficult point mainly lies 
in the allocation of quasi-operational resources. In other words, quasi-operational 
resources are often allocated jointly and coordinately by strong government 
and strong market.
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5.5.3.2  Conditions for the price mechanism to play a strong role
5.5.3.2.1  RIVALRY AND DEMAND
Economic goods are generally described as being “better-than-nothing” goods, 
which require rivalry and competition to be obtained. Rivalry in this regard 
means that whoever is in want of these economic goods is willing to pay for them 
with money. Meanwhile, given that people’s marginal propensity to consume 
economic goods is declining progressively, the demand curve for economic 
goods is downward sloping, which means that as the purchased economic 
goods increase in quantity, people’s propensity to consume more will be on 
constant decline. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that some economic goods are 
non-rivalry in nature, such as digital products not subjected to IPR protection, 
public green space and beaches and certain scientific research products. The 
aforementioned goods, though often perceived as being better than nothing, 
are non-rivalry in nature in that whoever wants them is unwilling to pay for 
them with money. The reasons for this are as follows: first, there is no need 
to compete for these resources and goods; second, there should not be any 
competitive activities for these resources and goods, in that once obtained by 
whoever wants them through competition, then a disruptive blow will be dealt 
to the fairness and justice of the overall economic system; third, whoever (the 
demand side) wants these resources has no willingness whatsoever to compete 
for them, as in the case of infrastructure facilities, because they usually take 
huge and sustained investment to be built, which cannot be taken care of by 
the invisible hand of the market.
5.5.3.2.2  EXCLUDABILITY AND SUPPLY
A company is willing to supply what it produces to the market only on the 
precondition that the gains of doing so outweigh or at least equal the input 
costs. As the price of its products rises steadily, the company will pocket more 
and more profits, provided that the input costs remain constant, and therefore, 
the supply curve is generally sloping upward. However, if individual actors, who 
have no intention whatsoever to buy the product directly from the company, are 
able to obtain from other sources, at zero or very low costs, the same product 
that the company has invested a fortune to produce and supply, then the direct 
consequence will be that the company becomes unable to obtain any gains 
from selling the product to compensate for the cost of producing it. Generally 
speaking, there are three major factors accounting for the non-excludability of a 
product. The first factor is the impossibility of technically excluding non-payers 
from using the product. Cases in point include industrial designs, technological 
processes and some basic research products that are difficult to be patented. The 
second factor is the excessively high cost of excluding non-payers from using the 
product, even when it is technically possible to do so. Examples in this regard 
are a clean environment, fresh air, pleasant music and other resources or goods 
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whose property rights cannot be clearly defined. The third factor is that certain 
resources or goods should not be used exclusively by a selected few, because their 
being exclusively possessed by a selected few will induce inequity and unfairness.
5.5.3.2.3  THE “DUAL-STRONG MECHANISM” THEORETICAL ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK BASED ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Resources and goods can be classified into four categories according to their 
non-excludability and non-rivalry characteristics (as seen in Figure5.7). These 
four categories are respectively described in four quadrants. Quadrant I refers 
to resources and goods with excludability and rivalry characteristics. The market 
dictates how to allocate the resources and goods in this category, whose property 
rights are clearly defined. The government, as a general rule, does not play a 
role in allocating resources and goods in this category except during the pro-
cess of leading foreign enterprises competing against domestic late-developing 
enterprises or for the sake of protecting its home agriculture. Thus, a “strong 
market” coupled with a “weak government” is an efficient combination approach 
to allocating resources and goods in Quadrant I.
In Quadrant II are resources and goods with excludability and non-rivalry 
characteristics, whose property rights are clearly defined. However, their non-
rivalry characteristics can place a great strain on the market in allocating them. 
The most representative of resources and goods in this category are digital 
products ubiquitously available on the Internet, including operating systems, 
apps, digital music pieces and e-books. Given that the demand side is able to 
obtain such goods and resources at a near zero cost, it is extremely difficult to 
make people pay for them with currencies. Evidently, it is practically unviable for 
the price mechanism to independently work out a way of efficiently allocating 
resources and goods in Quadrant II. The government is able to help the market 
with the allocation of such resources and goods, mainly in the following three 
ways. First, the government needs to beef up protection of intellectual property 























Figure 5.7  Classification of resources and the respective roles of market and 
government
198 Effective government and efficient market
and raise public awareness of IPR protection through government-sponsored 
media and other authoritative channels. Third, the government can also directly 
purchase some intellectual products in order that the income of those involved 
in the knowledge creation process is well guaranteed.
Quadrant III refers to resources and goods of rivalry but non-excludability 
characteristics, which the public craves and is willing to pay for with money. 
Nonetheless, given that it is difficult (unnecessary) to clear define their prop-
erty rights, how to properly allocate them is still a conundrum too daunting 
for the invisible hand of the market to crack independently. Resources and 
goods in this category mainly take the form of infrastructural facilities, such 
as roads, parks, high-speed rail lines and public transportation means. Given 
the low efficiency of the market in allocating these resources and goods, it is 
imperative for the government to directly engage in the allocation and supply 
of them. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these resources and goods are 
not created by the government. The government is just the ultimate purchaser 
of them, while the organization and allocation of these resources and goods is 
undertaken and completed by the invisible hand of the market under govern-
ment regulation and supervision. Cases in point in this regard are the launch 
and solicitation of bids, the recruitment of personnel and the procurement of 
equipment. In this sense, the combination of a “strong government” and a 
“strong market” is able to produce synergy powerful enough to compensate 
for what the market lacks and to enable the government to act as both a 
supervisor and a coordinator.
Quadrant IV refers to resources or goods that are non-rivalry and non-
excludable in nature. The goods fitting into this category are state-funded 
basic research products, which can neither be turned into private properties 
to exclude others from using them nor spark market-based competition. As 
such, strong government support and intervention is imperative for ensuring 
the sustained supply of resources or goods in this category, while the role of 
the market mechanism in this regard is only supplementary at best, such as in 
terms of bringing in R&D personnel through economic instruments. Thus, it is 
only natural that a “strong government” coupled with a “weak market” is the 
perfect recipe for allocating resources and goods in this quadrant.
In summary, the government and the market play different roles, depend-
ing on the different categories of resources and goods to be allocated. The 
combination between a “strong government” and a “strong market” has shown 
remarkable efficiency in allocating certain public goods like digital products and 
infrastructure facilities.
5.5.4  The potential economic growth rate and  
the real economic growth rate
The potential economic growth rate means the growth rate of the largest volume 
of products and total labor generated in the modern market system within a 
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country’s economy, or the greatest economic growth rate that can be achieved 
under conditions of the full and optimal collocation of various resources under 
the modern market system of a country. It can only be derived through the 
operation of the dual-strong mechanism under the mature market economy. 
There are two aspects to it. On the one hand, the market must be efficient, 
which means the perfection of the basic functions of the modern market sys-
tem (including the market element system and market organizational system), 
the basic order of the market (including the market legal system and market 
supervision system) and the basis of market environment (including the social 
credit system and market infrastructure); on the other hand, the government 
must be effective, that is to say, the national government can systematically 
undertake the effective allocation of operational resources, non-operational 
resources and quasi-operational resources with appropriate policy support and 
institutional arrangement.
The real or actual economic growth rate refers to the comparison between 
the gross national product (GNP) at the end of a period and the GNP at 
the base period. The GNP based on the current price at the end of a period 
is known as the nominal economic growth rate, while the GNP based on 
the current basic price (the constant price) at the end of a period is the 
real economic growth rate, i.e. the speed of real economic growth, which 
is the dynamic indicator of the economic development of a country over a 
certain period.
As the degrees of market development and of government effectiveness vary 
from country to country – combinations of weak effective government and 
weak efficient market as in some middle-low income countries; semi-strong 
effective government and strong efficient market as in the USA; strong effec-
tive government and semi-strong efficient market as in China, which is still 
obsessed, to certain extent, with problems regarding market competition, 
order, credit and infrastructure – there exists some distance between the real 
economic growth rate and the potential economic growth rate generated from 
the combination of strong effective government and strong efficient market. 
The distance indicates the potential of national economic development, and 
the policy matching or institutional arrangement targeting at such distances 
are where the innovational vitality resides for national economic development. 
Mature market economy means the combination of strong effective government 
and strong efficient market, which is the most sophisticated level of government 
and market combination, the theoretical goal of the world economic growth 
rate and the best model governments should explore and pursue for their 
national development.
In the real economy, the aggregate social supply may surpass the aggregate 
social demand, or the aggregate social demand may surpass the aggregate social 
supply. Their root causes, basic solutions and approaches can all be found from 
the six aspects of modern market systems and the effectiveness of government 
models for the allocation of the three categories of resources.
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5.5.5  The dual-strong operating mechanism of government 
and market
5.5.5.1  Government and the initial allocation of resources
Government should not intervene in the allocation of operational resources. How-
ever, direct government allocation, intervention and guidance must be undertaken 
for non-operational and quasi-operational resources. Government investment 
constitutes the most direct and forceful form of intervention, as in cases where 
government can attempt to improve supply by way of direct investment when the 
market fails to independently supply enough products or services to meet social 
demands, and where government may need to adopt approaches in replacement 
of the market to price and regulate certain goods and resources when effective 
allocation of resources cannot be achieved merely through price mechanisms.
5.5.5.2  The role of government in the reallocation  
of operational resources
In addition to being directly involved in the allocation of non-operational 
and quasi-operational resources, such as through investment and procurement, 
government can indirectly intervene with the allocation of operational resources, 
mainly by means of taxation, interest rates and exchange rates.
The lever of taxation is a means by which government indirectly adjusts 
economic activities. By offering favorable or unfavorable terms to taxpayers 
through the lever of taxation, a state-level government can direct operational 
resources to be allocated in a way that complies with the overarching objectives 
of its macro-economic planning. In terms of interest rate policies, government 
can leverage the instruments of interest rates in good time to adjust interest 
rates and interest rate structure, with a view to balancing the supply and demand 
of social capital and achieving the pre-set objectives for its monetary policies. 
With respect to exchange rate policies, regional government can endeavor to 
keep at appropriate levels the rates at which its home currency is exchanged for 
foreign currencies, through the promulgation of financial laws and regulations 
and through the implementation of relevant policies and measures. Regional 
government can devise a series of reward measures for special contributions 
to incentivize innovation and influence the way “operational resources” are 
being allocated. Financial assistance, support and rewards in various forms can 
contribute to boosting scientific and technological capabilities as well as regional 
economies, with profound and extensive spillover effects.
5.5.5.3  The dual-strong role of government and  
market in resource creation
Government involvement is necessitated by the uneven distribution of knowledge 
within an industry. Unlike resource allocation, where the emphasis is placed 
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on pricing existing resources, products and services, resource creation puts a 
premium on producing new resources, new services and new knowledge. When 
the level of knowledge remains unchanged and highly diffused, resource creation 
depends more on market entities, and production activities are self-initiated and 
self-completed under the drive of benefits. Therefore, when knowledge becomes 
an industry consensus, a strong market can independently complete the work 
of resource creation without any government involvement. When knowledge 
is unevenly dispersed within an industry, government involvement becomes a 
necessity.
Tacit knowledge or tacit technology needs government support and protection 
to be created. Many studies on corporate competitive advantages consider tacit 
knowledge, which is inimitable and irreplaceable in nature, to be the source of 
enterprises’ competitive advantages. Such knowledge or technology is difficult 
to be coded into information or transferred (also known as informationalized 
knowledge, explicit knowledge is totally transferrable). Whenever new knowledge 
is created, the market will transform it into information and proliferate it to 
such an extent and at such a speed that it will quickly become commonplace 
knowledge within an industry. As a result of the new knowledge becoming 
commonplace in a short time period, what its creator loses will largely exceed 
what he or she gains by creating it in the first place. Since whoever imitates 
and copies the new knowledge can gain a profit tantamount to the industrial 
average just by imitation, there is neither point nor incentive for creating new 
knowledge.
Worse still, copying and imitating will, in the long run, lead to the degen-
eration of both the knowledge system and the innovation capabilities of an 
industry. For ordinary enterprises, knowledge acts on the production process 
through the vehicle of applied technologies. Capital and labor are still affected 
by market-based prices, but technologies, which are infused with tacit knowl-
edge, are hard to be assigned and allocated through the price mechanism. In 
this sense, instead of bringing about the upgrade of knowledge, the market 
will only catalyze its degeneration, and therefore, only through government 
involvement can be new knowledge be truly created to boost the core com-
petitiveness of enterprises and regional economies. For a region to improve 
its competitiveness, its government needs to help domestic enterprises develop 
competitive advantages in two ways: rendering support to domestic enterprises 
in innovation and investing heavily in the protection of know-how. From this 
standpoint, what government does in this regard runs counter to the forces 
of the market, and a strong government needs to adopt a strategy focused on 
knowledge cultivation and innovation.
Conditions for the creation of resources like high and new technology are 
often provided by governments. The high-tech sectors are both a reflection of 
the speedy regeneration of knowledge and an embodiment of the sophisticated 
and tacit nature of knowledge. R&D activities are the centerpiece of industrial 
activities in the high-tech sectors, where a large number of knowledge-intensive 
talents conduct cooperation with a high degree of synergy and where innovation 
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and creativity are key to winning competition. Similarly, the high-tech sectors 
do not just arise naturally out of market competition, just as enterprises in 
the low-tech sectors are unable to climb up to the top of the technological 
ladder overnight. How far a country can go in the upgrading of knowledge 
and technologies is gravely restricted by its educational foundation, culture 
of creativity, personnel reserves and the technologies already in its possession. 
All of these factors cannot be cultivated and improved without government 
investment and support.
5.6  Building up a new engine for global 
economic development
In 1948, Ragnar Knox likened trade to the engine for nineteenth-century 
economic growth to justify the rationality of the import-substitution indus-
trialization strategy. During the 2012–2014 financial crisis, the annual growth 
in global trade was less than 4 percent and was far below the average growth 
rate of about 7 percent prior to the crisis. Eventually, officials from the World 
Bank raised the question of how to “restart” the engine of global trade. Many 
countries, especially those economies that are rich in natural resources such 
as oil, natural gas, mineral products and agricultural products, utilized such 
“tangible factors” as land, labor and other resources to the extreme in order 
to propel their economic growth; this showed the unsustainability of their 
transformation from the factor-driven to the investment-driven and then to the 
innovation-driven stage. Under the twenty-first-century modern market system of 
“effective government” and “efficient market”, it will be of primary importance 
to global economic governance and development to promote and enhance the 
new supply-side structural engine (not the demand-side “trade engine”), give 
full play to the role of enterprise competition in the allocation of industrial 
resources and government competition in the allocation of urban resources and 
set up the “three engines” of investment, innovation and governance, which 
incorporate tangible and intangible factors globally.
5.6.1  Building up a new engine for global investment
Investment-driven growth depends on the allocation and competition of supply-
side products and industrial resources, as well as the supply-side governmental 
allocation of urban resources and the promotion of infrastructure construction 
competition. It can deepen national markets, increase capital, create technological 
innovation and job opportunities and generate long-term sustainability.
First, the supply-side structural reform is facilitated from the angle of 
industrialization and agricultural modernization. There are three aspects to 
the promotion of new-type industrialization: (a) to support and guide the 
restructuring and upgrading of traditional industries. The revitalization of 
huge inventory assets through the support and guidance of technological 
transformation undertaken by enterprises and the optimization of the benefits 
Effective government and efficient market 203
of industrial quality can stimulate demand and promote economic growth; 
(b) to support and foster the development of newly emerging strategic industries 
and high-tech industries. Focus should be laid on supporting and nurturing 
the R&D innovation of core and key technology of enterprises and the transfer 
and commercialization of research findings so as to cultivate competitive and 
leading industries and construct complete industrial chains and modernization 
service networks; and (c) to make efforts in promoting business mergers and 
takeovers so as to integrate, restructure and enhance the core competitiveness 
of enterprises by means of market competition, which is one of the major 
means of realizing the supply-side effective investment and the conversion of 
old power into new dynamics.
There are five aspects to the acceleration of agricultural modernization: 
(a) agricultural modernization covers not only the expansion of land manage-
ment scale but also the modernization of farmers, in which farmers should be 
guided and nurtured out of ignorance and backwardness and be developed 
into a new-type that is armed with knowledge, technology and management 
skills; (b) organizational modes: no matter whether they are large farms or 
small family businesses, government should support farmer cooperatives or 
help individual farmers dock with market demands, provide one-stop pre-
production, in-production and post-production services and one-stop services 
in purchasing production materials and the storage, processing, transportation 
and sales of agricultural products; (c) moderate scale operation; (d) moderate 
urbanization; and (e) promotion of the professionalization of agricultural 
technical education. Agricultural modernization can create a stable social 
environment for industrialization and urbanization, reduce social costs and 
boom national economy.
Second, the investment in infrastructure is to be intensified: (a) the new-type 
urbanization is to be promoted. Urban population generally accounts for more 
than 80 percent in developed countries. With urban and rural integration and 
the formation of city-centered urban systems, the planning and construction of 
human-oriented new-type urbanization; the construction of underground facili-
ties for “sponge cities” and “sponge communities”; the integrated construction 
of water, electricity, roads, and gas in urban and rural areas; the provision of 
facilities for urban and rural public services such as education, health, culture, 
sports and so on; and the development of leisure tourism, commerce and logistics, 
information industry, and transportation will all provide new growth potentials 
for regional and world economies; and (b) the infrastructure modernization is to 
be enhanced for energy, transportation, environmental protection, information 
and irrigation and water conservancy, with a great deal of room for investment 
and sufficient potentials.
Third, the investment in science and technology projects is to be expanded. 
For example, the National Networks of Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) in 
the US spent $1 billion in the initial stage, with 45 Institutes for Manufacturing 
Innovation to be set up within ten years. The Knowledge Transfer Partnership 
(KTP) in the UK and the smart manufacturing based on the Communication 
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Physics System (CPS) in Germany’s Industry 4.0 can integrate innovative 
resources of personnel, enterprises and institutions; lead industrial research and 
development; and promote industrial upgrading. The investment in big data, 
cloud computing, and the Internet of things, and investment in technological 
development such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology 
and artificial intelligence, will all give rise new economic growth points.
Fourth, the financial supporting capacity is to be enhanced. It should be 
emphasized that financial services support entity economy, in addition to the 
integration of finance, science and technology and industry. The new investment 
engine will not work without the reform, innovation and development of the 
financial system.
5.6.2  Building up a new engine for global innovation
When switching from their search of how to increase economic growth rates to 
economic development modes, from giving full play to enterprise competition 
in industrial resources allocation to national government competition in urban 
resources allocation, from a single market mechanism playing its role to the 
combination of effective government and efficient market for the purpose of 
building up the new investment engine for world economic growth, whether 
regions, countries or even the world, they will inevitably be faced with such new 
issues as how to protect fair and equitable principles in the global economic 
governance system, protect the interests of the developing countries in the 
global economic order, maintain or expand an open economic system in order 
to resist protectionism, combat the norms of new economic fields (such as 
the Internet), and deal with new challenges of global economic development. 
Therefore, improvement and innovation must be in place to create public 
mechanisms or provide public goods, i.e. ideological, material, organizational 
and institutional public goods, which coordinate and govern the global economic 
order in competition and cooperation.
First, notional innovation is to be promoted for ideological public goods, 
to which there are three aspects: (a) the market should be an efficient one. 
Modern market system is composed of six sub-systems. In some countries, 
overemphasis is laid on competition in market elements and market organiza-
tion while overlooking the construction of its legal supervision system and the 
perfection of environmental infrastructure such as the market credit system, 
which will cause the deviation of the “three fair” market principle; (b) the 
government should be an effective one. National government should impose 
planning, guidance, support, regulation, supervision and management on the 
allocation of operational resources, i.e. industrial resources; provide “basic 
underpinning, fairness and justice, effective promotion” for non-operational 
resources, i.e. social public goods; and regulate and participate in the com-
petition of quasi-operational resources allocation; and (c) the mature market 
economic mode that national government should strive for is the combination 
of effective government and efficient market. Under the big market economic 
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system, enterprise competition targets industrial resources, and government 
competition targets urban resources. National government should play an 
important role in global economic growth.
Second, technological innovation is to be enhanced for material public goods. 
Currently, the most representative development of science and technology is the 
integration of informationalization with industrialization, urbanization, agricul-
tural modernization and infrastructure modernization, which can be boiled down 
to “Internet plus”. Therefore, when what a country or a city provides – e.g. 
public transportation, urban management, education, health, culture, business, 
government and environmental protection, energy and security configuration – 
converges with smart intelligence, the public and communities will benefit from 
the security, efficiency, convenience and greenness and harmony a smart city can 
provide by combining tangible and intangible factors. This integration will also 
expedite their transformation in industries, urbanization and internationalization 
and eventually catalyze the rise of newly emerging countries.
Third, management innovation is to be promoted for organizational public 
goods. The world is just like a country or a city. Traditionally, urban construc-
tion and organizational framework sprawls and road congestion frequently takes 
place with serious air pollution and low efficiency, even if city traffic is diverted 
through the first, the second, the third, the fourth and even the fifth ring. The 
development of modern cities requires grouping layouts which can effectively 
solve problems that are caused by their traditional sprawling mode of develop-
ment, just as modern city development requires the reshaping of spatial order 
and global supply chain development can easily remove boundaries between 
countries. Like urban configuration, the organizational management of the world 
economic order must be reformed and innovated from their sprawling modes to 
grouping layouts. However, it requires corresponding new rules and necessary 
infrastructure investment so as to form sound layouts and ensure harmonious, 
coordinated and sustainable development.
Fourth, governance innovation is to be promoted for institutional public 
goods. National construction requires a trinitarian system of conceptual, urban 
and rural and land planning, from which is derived its strategic planning, layout 
positioning, implementation standards, policy evaluation, legal guarantee and 
so on, thus creating a meticulous and hierarchical implementation mechanism. 
Global economic governance is conducted by means of regulatory mechanisms 
such as the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, the World Trade Organization and so on. In order to realize the goals 
of “letting globalization create more opportunities” and “letting the public 
share the fruits of economic growth”, improvement and innovation must be 
put in place for economic growth conceptualization and the formulation of 
regulations and rules; the cooperation of government finance and monetary and 
structural reform policies; the consistency of economy, labor, employment and 
social policies; the equal stress on demand management and supply-side reforms; 
the coordination of short-, mid- and long-term policies; the advancement of 
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economic social development and environmental protection; and joint efforts 
for global economic governance and sustainable global economic growth.
5.6.3  Building up a new engine for global governance
It requires a perfect governance system for global economy to build the “Four-
I” world economy, which is “innovative”, “invigorated”, “interconnected” and 
“inclusive”. The supply system for international public goods corresponds to 
non-operational resources in regional economy; the allocation system for inter-
national industrial resources corresponds to operational resources; and the alloca-
tion system for international urban resources corresponds to quasi-operational 
resources. They operate in conformity with the existing objective rules.
First, they operate in conformity with the rules for international security order – 
peace and stability, which has universal recognition. As the basic guideline 
for the supply system for international public goods, efforts should be made to 
build a peaceful and stable development environment, strengthen international 
security and cooperation, safeguard the goals and principles of the UN Charter, 
maintain the basic norms of international relations and create a peaceful, stable, 
just and equitable international security order.
Second, they operate in conformity with the rules for international eco-
nomic competition – fairness and efficiency, which form the basic guidelines 
for industrial competition in the international industrial resources allocation 
system. For example, G20 (Hangzhou, China, 2016) formulated the guiding 
principles for “the trade promotion and investment liberalization”, which 
includes the reduction of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, the reduction 
of barriers and restrictions on foreign direct investment, the implementation of 
trade facilitation measures to reduce border costs, the moderate reduction of 
post-border restrictions on trade and investment to facilitate wider cross-border 
coordination and the minimization of discriminatory measures against the 
third party through multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral agreements to reduce 
the trade and investment barriers. The governing principle of “promoting 
competition and improving business environment” embodies the fairness and 
efficiency of the rules that enterprises all over the world must abide by in 
their competition, including the strengthening of competition laws and their 
enforcement; the reduction of administrative and legal barriers to starting up 
a business and expanding its operation; the promotion of fair market competi-
tion; the implementation of efficient insolvency procedures; the reduction of 
the constrictive rules that impede competition; the reduction of additional 
regulatory compliance burdens; the effective supervision of regulatory policies; 
the strengthening of rule of law; the improvement of judicial efficiency; the 
combat against corruption and so on.
Third, they operate in conformity with the rules for international co-governance – 
cooperation and win–win, which are the basic guiding principles that inter-
governmental competition should follow in the worldwide urban resources 
allocation system. There are two types of urban resources: tangible factors and 
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intangible factors. Among them, new-type urbanization, smart urban develop-
ment, investment in infrastructure modernization with energy, transportation, 
environmental protection, information and water conservancy as the main body 
will be the new engine for international economic growth and can lead to capital 
expansion, employment opportunities, technological innovation, market deepen-
ing, sustainable economic growth, social benefits, environmental improvement, 
national strength facilitation and so on. As countries vary in urbanization, policy 
initiatives and institutional arrangements, their investment-driven growth and 
competition results differ from each other. However, international governmental 
competition should be cooperative and sustainable, aiming at common enhance-
ment competition in the global economic governance system and common 
innovative economic growth mode competition. Its basic principle should be 
win–win cooperation. Building an innovative, open, interlinked and inclusive 
world economic system with win–win cooperation as its core will enable us 
to innovate continuously the economic growth mode and enhance the global 
economic governance system so as to benefit the whole world.
5.7  A summary of theories on competition 
between regional governments
Figure 5.8 is a graphic summary of theories on regional government competi-
tion. As is shown below, the figure presents a clear overview of theories on 
regional government competition that are contained in this book, in a way 
similar to peeling back layer upon layer of an onion, from the core all the way 
to the periphery.
The role of government is manifested in real life in three aspects: allocating 
regional resources, administering regional resources and formulating matching 
policies. Resources pertinent to social welfare are referred to as non-operational 
resources in a market economy. Policies and principles for the allocation of 
resources in this category can be encapsulated as providing social security 
and basic underpinning, ensuring equity and fairness and effective promotion. 
Resources pertinent to economic growth are referred to as operational resources 
in a market economy. Policies and principles for the allocation of resources in 
this category can be summed up as “planning and guiding; supporting and 
adjusting; regulating and managing”.
Resources pertinent to urban construction are referred to as quasi-operational 
resources in a market economy. Such resources are mainly urban resources, 
including public service systems (for keeping national economic and social 
activities running on a day-to-day basis) and software and hardware infrastructure 
(for providing public services necessary for productive and living activities). 
Such resources are referred to as quasi-operational resources in that they can 
be developed and managed by the government – in this case, they are non-
operational and not for profit; or, they can be placed into the invisible hand 
of the market – under such circumstances, they are operational resources and 
for commercial purposes. Whether they are developed and operated by the 
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government or by the market can be determined by such factors as the govern-
ment’s fiscal standing, market demands and the level of public acceptability.
Governments and markets can be categorized into three types: weak, semi-
strong and strong on the basis of their abilities to define and allocate operational, 
non-operational and quasi-operational resources. A weak efficient market is one 
with and only with a market element system and a market organizational system; 
a semi-strong efficient market is a market with a market element system, a market 
organizational system, a market legal system and a market regulatory system; and 
a strong efficient market is a market that consists of a market element system, a 
market organizational system, a market legal system, a market regulatory system, 
a market environment system and market infrastructure.
A government can be called a weak effective government if it focuses only on 



































































Figure 5.8 A graphic summary of theories on regional government competition
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policies, without a clear understanding of or specific measures for the allocation 
of operational resources. It has yet to clearly define and delimit quasi-operational 
resources, much less to devise well-directed measures for allocating them. A 
government can be labeled as a semi-strong effective government if it lays stress 
only on the allocation of non-operational and operational resources. In addi-
tion to fulfilling its public duties and responsibilities regarding social security, 
a semi-strong effective government also keeps an eye on how the market is 
operating, or will seek to macro-control, adjust and intervene in the economy 
by use of effective demands or effective supply of policies whenever the market 
malfunctions, for the sake of preventing severe losses and damages caused by 
an economic slump. A semi-strong effective government might also strive for a 
dynamic equilibrium between total supply and total demand with a master plan 
for strategic economic development, which includes the following measures: 
planning and guiding industrial layout; supporting and adjusting productive 
and operational activities; tightening up regulations to ensure openness, equity 
and fairness in market competition; curbing the spike of commodity prices; and 
controlling unemployment. Nevertheless, a semi-strong effective government 
still fails to have a clear-cut understanding and definition of quasi-operational 
resources, nor does it succeed in fostering responsive policies and measures for 
the management of such resources.
A strong effective government denotes a government that not only focuses 
on the allocation of operational and non-operational resources with policy 
support but also is capable of precisely delimiting quasi-operational resources 
and coordinating with the market for the allocation of such resources. A strong 
effective government can tailor its policies and measures towards the three 
types of resources, so as to achieve efficient resource allocation and promote 
the development of regional economy in a way that is viable and sustainable. 
Specifically, it will undertake the following approaches: bringing into full play its 
role in economic positioning, economic adjustment and early warning; tapping 
into market rules and mechanisms; leveraging the instruments of investment, 
consumption, export, pricing, taxation, interest rates, exchange rates, policies 
and laws; and fostering notional, institutional, organizational and technological 
innovation.
As the pinnacle of market economic development, the combination of a 
strong effective government and a strong efficient market represents the best 
possible form of government–market relations. This model depicts what a truly 
mature market economy looks like. A modern market economy cannot run 
and operate efficiently without the combination of an efficient market and an 
effective government. The effectiveness of an effective government resides in its 
capabilities to efficiently allocate non-operational resources with well-designed 
supplementary policies, in a way that enhances social harmony and stability and 
optimizes economic environment; to efficiently allocate operational resources 
with feasible supplementary policies, in a way that guarantees openness, fairness 
and justice in the market and boosts overall social productivity; and to efficiently 
allocate quasi-operational resources and engage in market competition, in a way 
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that promotes urban construction and all-round sustainable socio-economic 
development.
An efficient market implies that the market is one with fully-fledged basic 
functions, a well-established basic order and a sound and vibrant market climate. 
The efficiency of an efficient market is reflected in how integrated and syner-
gized production competition, market fairness and orderly business operation 
are and can be measured and tested against the following three criteria: full 
market competition, orderly law-based supervision and a fully-fledged social 
credit system.
In The Competitive Advantages of Nations, Porter (1990) points out that a 
country (or a region) will experience four stages of economic development, 
which are the factor-driven, the investment-driven, the innovation-driven and the 
wealth-driven stages. When the market and the government of an economy are 
yet to go beyond operational resources and non-operational resources in terms of 
its resource allocation capacity, then the economy is still stuck in the factor-driven 
and investment-driven stages. It is not until the allocation of quasi-operational 
resources evolves into the centerpiece of regional competition that innovation 
and wealth become the main drivers for regional economic development.
As it is among regional governments that regional government competition 
takes place, such competition should comply with market economic rules, spilling 
over to projects, policies and affairs in the areas of regional resource allocation, 
economic development, urban construction, social welfare, etc. Specifically, such 
competition centers on projects, industrial chain matching, talents and science 
and technology, fiscal planning and finance, infrastructure, environmental systems 
and policy systems, as well as management efficiency. In terms of substantive 
meaning, regional government competition is reflected in how regional gov-
ernments optimize the allocation of resources through policy-making – what 
policies to be adopted towards the allocation of operational resources in a way 
that strengthens corporate vitality; what policies to be implemented for the 
allocation of non-operational resources in a way that creates a sound and viable 
environment; and in what way for regional governments to be engaged in the 
allocation of quasi-operational resources, with what supplementary policies and 
in compliance with what rules, so as to achieve regional sustainable growth. 
Innovation is needed to win in regional government competition. As innovation 
begets competitiveness, continuous innovation means continuous competitive-
ness; regional innovation is at the core of regional government competitiveness. 
On the level of innovation, regional government needs to foster innovation 
in notion, institution, organization and technology. In this connection, GFL 
becomes the key to success in regional competition and development.
It is imperative to shape and build new drivers (encompassing both tangible and 
intangible factors) for global investment, innovation and governance by giving full 
play to the role of competition among enterprises in allocating industrial resources 
and the role of competition among governments in allocating urban resources. 
The shaping of these new drivers will surely go a long way towards fostering 
higher levels of global economic governance and development. Specifically, new 
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drivers for global investment include deeper supply-side structural reform, higher 
intensity in infrastructural development and higher financial supplementary 
capabilities; new drivers for global innovation encompass innovation for public 
goods in notional, material, organizational and institutional dimensions; and new 
drivers for global governance consist of international security rules for peace 
and stability, international rules for fair and efficient economic competition and 
international rules for cooperative and win–win governance.
In a nutshell, the government–market relationship is the Goldbach conjecture 
in the realm of economics. Massive achievements have been made by synthesiz-
ing an effective government and an efficient market, a fact amply testified and 
proven by an array of success stories in China and abroad. In China, the rise of 
the PRD is the epitome of the “China Dream” coming true. Shenzhen was an 
impoverished fishing village to the north of Hong Kong in 1979. In the early 
1990s, the PRD embarked on a path to becoming China’s biggest labor-intensive 
manufacturing powerhouse. As it stands now, the PRD, with Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Foshan and Dongguan as its mainstays, is moving at accelerating 
speed up the industrial value chain. While focusing on building a top-notch 
national manufacturing innovation center and a national high-tech innovation 
center, the PRD is on track to becoming a cluster of international megacities. 
The PRD’s obsession with innovation and endeavors towards urbanization 
are leading China into a whole new model of socio-economic development. 
Within a short span of 20 years, China’s PRD has completed a feat that would 
otherwise have taken 200 years to accomplish in other regions. Behind this 
success story of spectacular achievements in economic development, urban 
construction and social welfare resides a brand new economic philosophy, one 
that focuses on reshaping an innovation-driven market economy comprising an 
effective government and an efficient market. Never relenting in its unwavering 
effort to create synergy between the government and the market, the PRD 
has been scaling new heights in its economy, urban construction and social 
welfare undertakings.
The “Singaporean Consensus”, which places special focus on all-dimensional 
social progress, is another example of what can be achieved by synthesizing a 
competent government and an efficient market. In 1960, Hong Kong’s and 
Singapore’s per capita GDP stood at US $405 and $428 respectively. By 1980, 
they soared to $5,692 and $4,859 and skyrocketed to $38,074 and $54,776 by 
2013, which indicates that Singapore’s GDP per capita was 1.44 times higher 
than that of Hong Kong. During this period, Singapore successfully underwent 
five economic transformations – gravitating away from labor-intensive industries 
in the 1960s and towards economically intensive industries in the 1970s, shifting 
towards capital-intensive industries in the 1980s, moving towards technology-
intensive industries in the 1990s and focusing on knowledge-intensive indus-
tries in the twenty-first century. Behind the push towards these five economic 
transformations is the visible hand of the Singaporean government. Synthesizing 
the government with the market and aligning economic policies with social 
policies is Singapore’s recipe for successfully balancing efficiency against equity 
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and development against stability. Such a combination between an effective 
government and an efficient market has been proven effective for boosting 
economic growth, upgrading urban facilities and achieving all-dimensional social 
progress in Singapore. The highly acclaimed “Singaporean Consensus” – an 
effective government plus an efficient market – has been driving Singapore 
forward towards all-round and sustainable development.
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